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

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For M.: Quod spiro et placeo, si placeo, tuum est.

Horace, 'Quem, tu, Melpomene . . .'

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Acknowledgements

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Part of Chapter 5 are from 'A Causal Theory of Truth Conditions', a paper I gave at the Thyssen seminar in April 1984, and which was helpfully criticised there, most extensively by Michael Ayers, Jeremy Butterfield, Hide Ishiguro, Hugh Mellor, John Perry and John Skorupski. I am grateful to them especially; and also to the Thyssen Group and the Thyssen Foundation, who made, between them, an extremely enjoyable meeting possible.

Portions of this book have appeared before in journals, and I am grateful to their editors and publishers, both for permission to republish, and for commenting or arranging comments on earlier versions of the arguments.

In particular, parts of Chapter 8 are from 'Conversation and Conditionals', which appeared in the *Philosophical Quarterly* in 1982, and was based on a paper which was improved by criticism it received at a Keele conference on philosophy of language and logic, in 1981; and from 'Jackson on the Material Conditional', which appeared in the *Australasian Journal Of Philosophy* in 1984, and owes much to Professor Brian Ellis, its editor, and to Phil Bricker. Chapter 9 owes a good deal to my paper 'Generalising the Probabilistic Semantics of Conditionals', which appeared in the *Journal Of Philosophical Logic* in 1984, to which Professor Thomason, the editor, and an anonymous referee made important contributions. This paper is © D. Reidel publishing company, Dordrecht, Holland.

Since I wrote my dissertation I have been at Yale; and the collegiality of my fellows in the departments of Afro-American Studies and Philosophy has been a constant pleasure. If I pick out Phil Bricker for special mention here, it is because Phil has helped me to clarify the triviality proofs and the dispute, reported in Chapter 9, about implicatures and conditionals.

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A. A.

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Notation

A few notes on notation and other conventions may prove helpful: I use '$\rightarrow$', '$\supset$', '$\equiv$', '$\boxdot\!\!\rightarrow$', for the indicative conditional, the material conditional, material equivalence and the subjunctive conditional respectively. '$\langle S_1, S_2, \ldots S_n \rangle$' denotes an ordered set with n members, S_1 to S_n. '$\vdash$' is the consequence relation (classical entailment or probabilistic consequences as context requires); and '$\dashv$' is its converse.

I use 'P', 'Q', 'R', 'S', 'U', as variables for sentences, beliefs or other representations; and 'T' for a sentence, which is logically true, except where it is used, with 'F' for 'false', for the truth-value 'true' in the truth-tables of Chapter 8. 'i', 'k', 'm', 'n' are used as numerical variables. Other letters are used less systematically. Brackets are dropped wherever they are not necessary to avoid ambiguity.

In general, indented expressions or sentences are named (usually with a mnemonic label) where they will be referred to again in other sections or remote parts of the same section; numbered if they will be referred to again immediately and then not again (the numbering beginning anew in each section); and unlabelled if they do not need to be referred back to. But these principles are not strictly applied.

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