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# 'SCRUTINY': A RETROSPECT

That it should be the Cambridge University Press that undertakes this reprint of *Scrutiny* seems to me altogether right, for *Scrutiny* was essentially Cambridge's achievement. To convey in saying this the implication that it was an historic one is to make the claim, or state the assumption, in what, I hope, is a sufficiently modest way, the occasion and the circumstances being what they are. One does not in any case give oneself to such an enterprise (I mean *Scrutiny*) and maintain it, in the face of every discouragement, for twenty years, without a clear conception of its nature and a strong conviction that the causes served are of great moment, so that to achieve any marked success might be to make a difference in history. But the

emphasis I lay on Cambridge is inevitable and unaffected.

Only at Cambridge could the idea of Scrutiny have taken shape, become a formidable life, and maintained the continuous living force that made it hated and effective. It was (to deepen the emphasis) a product, the triumphant justifying achievement, of the English Tripos. I express, and intend to encourage, no simple parochial enthusiasm or loyalty in dwelling on these truths. I had better, in fact, add at once the further testimony that Scrutiny started, established itself and survived in spite of Cambridge. And it will be my duty to insist on this ungracious note. If you are intent on vindicating the Idea of a University (an inseparable undertaking, we felt—we who founded Scrutiny—from that of vindicating the Idea of Criticism), and on the peculiar need, at this moment of history, to have the Idea realized in a potent living actuality, you will have no difficulty in understanding how the word 'academic' acquired its pejorative force, and you will know that, even at the cost of indecorum, you must do all that can be done to discourage illusions. You will know that the academic spirit may smile upon and offer to take up the causes of your advocacy, but that it will none the less remain what it is and be, in the academic world, always a present enemy.

We who founded *Scrutiny* could have no illusions. It was an outlaws' enterprise, and we were kept very much aware of that from the outset to the close. The research students and undergraduates who used, in the early 'thirties, to meet at my house, which was very much a centre, did not suppose that they were meeting at an official centre of 'Cambridge English', or one that was favoured by the official powers. They gravitated there because it had become known as a place where the essential nature, the importance and the possibilities of the English Tripos were peculiarly matters of preoccupation—where in such preoccupation the 'Cambridge' ethos that had made Cambridge the university to come to had an intensified conscious life. We had most of us taken the English Tripos; a couple of us—I should have said 'our house' in the sentence before the last—were (without salaries—an important point) teaching for it; the research students aspired to prove that they had subjects in



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dealing with which they could vindicate conceptions of 'research' answering to the spirit of the English Tripos. Fiction and the Reading Public, the appearance of which was a contemporary event, worked in the intellectual climate as a pervasive and potent influence—the more potent because everyone knew that the book had been written as a dissertation in the English School.

Such a milieu favoured discussion of the state of criticism—discussion urgent and unacademic. I mean, we had no tendency to confine ourselves to questions of method or theory, and the 'practicality' of the 'practical criticism' we were indeed (taking 'practical' as the antithesis of 'theoretical') concerned to promote was not just a matter of analytic technique and brilliant exercises. What governed our thinking and engaged our sense of urgency was the inclusive, the underlying and overriding, preoccupation: the preoccupation with the critical function as it was performed, or not performed, for our civilization, our time, and us. The discussion was probably as little naïve, as intelligently concerned with fundamentals, and as truly practical and realistic in spirit as any that could have been reported from an English-speaking milieu at that time. To say this is not, I think, to be wantonly or indecently assertive, or at all extravagant: it is to insist on the essential significance of Cambridge in the way that belongs to my theme.

In the immediate background, then, was Fiction and the Reading Public, with its documentation and analysis of the developments that had left our culture in the plight that disquieted and challenged us. The reflexions incited by that work were reinforced by the reviewing it suffered in the organs addressed to the educated public—The New Statesman ('Best-sellers Massacred'), the Sunday papers, and so on. Our observations and conclusions in regard to the contemporary performance of the critical function at the level of the higher reviewing were those presented in my article, 'What's Wrong With Criticism?', which appeared in the second number of Scrutiny (September 1932). That article, there is point in recording, was drawn from a pamphlet I wrote at the invitation of the editor of The Criterion (who liked, he wrote to tell me, my recent 'Minority Pamphlet', Mass Civilization and Minority Culture) for the 'Criterion Miscellany'. When he had my typescript he let me finally understand (much time having passed) that he preferred not to publish it. I will not modestly say that no doubt it was the inadequacy of my work that made him regret his commission and decide to go back on it. The truth is that I found reason, and found steadily more as perception became sharper and the evidence multiplied, for the conclusion I at first resisted but have long had to rest in as clear and significant fact: what he objected to was the pamphleteering strength. Perhaps (though editor of *The Criterion*) he had not realized what his commission taken seriously would mean. But in any case, reading what I had written and the illustrative matter I had assembled (see 'What's Wrong With Criticism?'), he knew that such a pamphlet would arouse unforgiving hostility in the dominant literary world, and knew too that it was not at all his vocation to incur such hostility for himself.



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An advanced Cambridge intellectual, who had the art of being advanced without offending anyone, and of being anti-academic while remaining academically acceptable, said to me, I remember, at about the same time, with quiet admonitory irony: 'I am not a moral hero.' Whether the editor of *The Criterion* would ever have liked to be one I have found it impossible to tell, but the effects, in *The Criterion*, of the editorial determination to maintain a solidarity with that world to which any real offer at asserting the function of criticism must give mortal offence were plain to see, once one's eye had lost its respectful innocence. And they were becoming rapidly plainer.

My point in recalling these things is that when we discussed the state of criticism, and reflected that the whole of the Englishspeaking world could not—or would not—support one serious critical review, the existence of *The Criterion* did not seem to us a reason for

qualifying.

Of what a serious critical review might be we had an example before us in The Calendar of Modern Letters, which belonged to the recent past, having died in 1927 after two and a half years of life (1925-7). The Calendar did most unquestionably represent a real offer (it was a very impressive one) to establish a strong and lively contemporary criticism. Its reviewing had the weight, responsibility and edge given by disinterested intelligence that perceives and judges out of a background of wide cultivation and of acquaintance with relevant disciplines. At the core of its contributing connexion was a group of half-a-dozen intelligent critics who really were, it was plain, a group. Discussion playing over a body of common interests could be felt behind their writing. And a quick perceptive responsiveness to the new creative life of the time had determined the interests, the idiom and the approach. In the middle 'twenties, for instance, The Calendar recognized unequivocally that a basic change had occurred in poetry—and not merely that the Eliot of The Waste Land had talent and would repay more attention than, for instance, The London Mercury contrived to suggest. The recognition was apparent in the reviewing, as in the verse *The Calendar* itself printed, but I will refer in particular to Edgell Rickword's essay, 'The Re-creation of Poetry: Art and the Negative Emotions' which I included in the selection of Calendar work, Towards Standards of Criticism, that, as a calculated demonstration, I brought out in 1933, when Scrutiny had started.

The name of our new quarterly was itself thought of as a salute and a gesture of acknowledgement—an assertion of a kind of continuity of life with *The Calendar*, whose 'Scrutinies', set critiques of the Old Guard, the modern 'classics', it overtly recalled (for there was a very current volume, *Scrutinies*, reprinting those of Barrie, Bennett, Chesterton, De La Mare, Kipling, Masefield, George Moore, Shaw, Wells and Galsworthy—the last being D. H. Lawrence's).

We did not, however, suppose that we were repeating *The Calendar*, or attempting to do so. We saw a finality in the brief episode of its life: if an organ at once so intelligent and so lively could not find and hold a public large enough to support it, then no serious literary review, it was plain, could hope in our time to maintain



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itself on business lines—meeting costs and paying contributors, that is, out of the revenue from sales and advertisements. The processes of civilization that were associated with the symbolic name of Northcliffe had brought us here. But it did not, we thought, follow that, because the potential public for a critical review was not large enough to make it, in the ordinary sense, pay, there could not be one. There must be one—that was our assumption; and the problem was that of finding some other than the old business way of keeping it going. We were not thinking of possible subsidies, and that was not merely because we did not think of the talent for attracting them as one of the qualifications we could muster, but because we were intent on a solution of a more significant kind.

We were of course empirical and opportunist in spirit: we were very conscious of being in a particular place at a particular time, and the cue, we should have said, was to make the most of the advantages the accidents of the place and the time offered. But we were very conscious too of what was more than accidental in and behind the accidents, and of what the advantages were. This was the hey-day of the Marxising literary intellectual. We were anti-Marxist—necessarily so (we thought); an intelligent, that is a real, interest in literature implied a conception of it very different from any that a Marxist could expound and explain. Literature—what we knew as literature and had studied for the English Tripos—mattered; it mattered crucially to civilization—of that we were sure. It mattered because it represented a human reality, an autonomy of the human spirit, for which economic determinism and reductive interpretation in terms of the Class War left no room. Marxist fashion gave us the doctrinal challenge. But Marxism was a characteristic product of our 'capitalist' civilization, and the economic determinism we were committed to refuting practically was that which might seem to have been demonstrated by the movement and process of this. The dialectic against which we had to vindicate literature and humane culture was that of the external or material civilization we lived in. 'External' and 'material' here need not be defined: they convey well enough the insistence that our total civilization is a very complex thing, with a kind of complexity to which Marxist categories are not adequate.

Cambridge, then, figured for us civilization's anti-Marxist recognition of its own nature and needs—recognition of that, the essential, which Marxian wisdom discredited, and the external and material drive of civilization threatened, undoctrinally, to eliminate. It was our strength to be, in our consciousness of our effort, and actually, in the paradoxical and ironical way I have to record, representatives of that Cambridge. We were, in fact, that Cambridge; we felt it, and had more and more reason to feel it, and our confidence and courage came from that. In the strength of the essential Cambridge which it consciously and explicitly represented, Scrutiny not only survived the hostility of the institutional academic powers; it became—who now questions it?—the clear triumphant justification to the world of Cambridge as a humane centre. In Cambridge it was the vitalizing force that gave the English School its reputation



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and influence, and its readers in the world at large, small as the subscribing public was, formed an incomparably influential community. A large proportion of them were concerned with education in schools and universities. The achievement of our quixotic antiacademic design, the demonstration of the power of essential Cambridge to defeat the academic ethos from within in the most positive and creative way, could not have been more complete and significant.

For there was nothing academic about *Scrutiny's* performance. Through two decades it discharged the responsibilities of criticism with decisive force. It had no equivalent of the Marxist or the Criterion philosophy and no critical orthodoxy, but its large connexion of very varied critics, serving an ideal of living perception and real judgement, came to form, in respect of sensibility and criteria, a community, out of whose essentially collaborative work a consistency emerged, so that Scrutiny established, for those concerned, in the face of the contemporary confusion, with value and significance and the movement of life, something like an authoritative chart. Its main valuations were authoritative; that is, they imposed themselves, and, however derided or resented at first, have become accepted currency. It established a new critical idiom and a new conception of the nature of critical thought. Its critical attention to the present of English literature was accompanied by an intimately related revaluation of the past—for the attention paid to the past in a sustained series of critiques and essays amounted to that.

It is plain that while it was proper to say, as I did a few lines back, that Scrutiny had no philosophy (none, at any rate, answering to the current polemical requirements) and no orthodoxy, it had behind it in respect of idea and conviction something very far from negative: there was a strongly positive conception of what a real offer to perform the critical function would be—a conception of the state and drive of civilization in this country, the cultural need, and the way of meeting this. That is, we who collaborated in *Scrutiny* recognized, for all our diversities of creed and 'philosophy', that we belonged to a common civilization and a positive culture. That culture was for us pre-eminently represented by English literature. We believed there was an English literature—that one had, if intelligently interested in it, to conceive English literature as something more than an aggregate of individual works. We recognized, then, that like the culture it represented it must, in so far as living and real, have its life in the present—and that life is growth. That is, we were concerned for conservation and continuity, but were radically anti-academic. We were concerned to promote that which the academic mind, in the 'humanities', hates: the creative interplay of real judgements genuine personal judgements, that is, of engaged minds fully alive in the present.

Where the Idea of a University was in question, we were concerned to demonstrate that Cambridge need not be academic—that the essential Cambridge was not. Our special business was literary criticism but we saw nothing arbitrary in our taking the creative process of criticism—that interplay of personal judgements in which



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values are established and a world created that is neither public in a sense congenial to science nor merely private—as representative and type of the process in which the human world is created and renewed and kept living; the human world without which the 'scientific edifice of the physical world...in its intellectual depth, complexity and articulation' (pronounced in Sir Charles Snow's Rede Lecture not long ago to be the 'most beautiful and wonderful collective work of the mind of man') would have had no meaning or use—would not have been possible. We knew, as I have put it in commenting on that lecture, that this prior human achievement, the creation of the human world, is not one we can rest on as on something done in the past, but lives in the living creative response to change in the present. We saw it as the function both of criticism and of the English School at our ancient university to be the focused effort of the larger cultural community at making that response.

That Scrutiny, then, was a very different kind of enterprise from those subsequent American quarterlies which have long represented the main possibility of one's finding, now and then, an intelligent critique or an informed, thorough and responsible review, should be plain. The difference lay in the charged positiveness of conception and intention with which we were engaged in something more specific, ambitious and (to the academic mind) offensive than, merely and generally, running an intellectual literary organ. It lay in the strong positive conception of function and means in relation to time and place and opportunity, contemporary civilization (of which we had a pondered relevant view) being what we saw it to be. It lay in the fact that Scrutiny, unlike the American quarterlies (and The Criterion) had no subsidy (and none in prospect). Indeed, not to be subsidized was a part of the conception. We were out to prove that, with such a pied-à-terre as we, the ring-leaders, were somehow contriving to keep, the enterprise we conceived could be made to maintain itself—to the extent, that is, of paying the printing costs.

It was essential to the conception of Scrutiny to demonstrate that, the total function having been challengingly presented and the challenge enforced in strong, convinced and intelligent performance, a public could be rallied, a key community of the élite (one therefore disproportionately influential) formed and held. Scrutiny made its own reputation and made it, in spite of the fierce (and unscrupulous) hostility of the literary and academic worlds, very rapidly. Our contributors wrote, if anything more than devotion to the common idea were required, for the honour: there was advantage as well as satisfaction in being printed in a place that conferred distinction. Instead of paying them (we couldn't—or pay ourselves, the 'staff') we maintained a notoriously exacting standard. In this way we attracted talent from outside Cambridge, as well as known and established names we didn't want (a burden and an embarrassment and however tactful the rejecting note, animus was incurred). But the core of the contributing connexion, at any rate in the earlier years, were young graduates, products of 'Cambridge English', at the research stage and frequenters of the house at which the idea of Scrutiny was conceived.



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The relation with 'Cambridge English' was close and essential, though institutionally uncountenanced, and known not to enjoy official favour. It represented a realized part of our conception of *Scrutiny*; here we had the active association of the concern for the critical function with the concern for the University as a humane centre. For the nucleus actually at Cambridge, work for *Scrutiny* was inseparable from their studies and teaching in (however unofficially) the English School and from their research. *Scrutiny* would not have been possible if there had not been the English Tripos and the established actuality of 'Cambridge English', and 'Cambridge English' without *Scrutiny* would, these thirty years, have been without the vitalizing force that has made it a decisive influence in education (and more than education).

And lest in these observations I should be taken to be in any way confirming the idea that Scrutiny was the organ of a small and narrow group, or cultivated the ethos of coterie, I will add that before it stopped it had printed well over a hundred and fifty contributors. These were of diverse creeds and outlooks, and their range of subject corresponded to our contention that the English School should be a liaison centre. Of the attention given to foreign literatures it is proper that the French should have had the greatest proportion, the long relation between English and French having its unique importance and its key significances. Some of the work on the Grand Siècle done in Scrutiny is very well known, though—long current in book form and much favoured in the metropolitan literary world—it tends not to be credited to *Scrutiny*, which, indeed, has not altogether escaped the smear of 'Francophobia' with which a representative editor, the one now writing, has been, oddly enough, distinguished. But there is a great deal else on French, and if it was characteristic of Scrutiny to print reappraisals of Corneille and Racine, it was equally characteristic that it should, after the war, have been first in the field with its reports on Sartre and Camus. And if, with one of the essential aspects of Scrutiny's achievement in view, I may point to a distinguished and highly individual product of not very commonly co-present qualifications as representative, in its way, of Scrutiny's differentia, I will point to the essay that James Smith wrote on Mallarmé (volume VII, page 466) as a review of a book on that poet by a German-a book of which I think it likely that it received no other serious review in any journal in the English language. If we aimed to be free from academicism, it was not by being unqualified academically.

James (now Professor) Smith's essay is a searching piece of critical thought; it could have been written only by a critic capable of intelligent original judgement in the poetry of his own language who was also wholly inward with both German and French. It is, in fact, with its combination of sensitive perception and intellectual sinewiness the work of the author of that essay on 'Metaphysical Poetry' which we printed in our second year (volume II, page 222), and which became (with the blessing of Professor Grierson) a recognized critical classic almost at once. The fact that James Smith was for us one of the most highly valued of the inner group of collaborators (he



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contributed besides a long critique of Chapman and essays on 'The Tragedy of Blood' and Marlowe's 'Dr Faustus', examinations of Croce and of Alfred North Whitehead) may be seen as giving the positive correlative of our dead set against sciolism and bogus intellectuality—a divined dead set and hatred that earned us much hatred in response.

It is true in general of our criticism of foreign work, French, German and Italian, that it comes from writers who not only have an intimate knowledge of the given language, but are also critically alive in the way that is tested by a man's performance in relation to the literature of his own speech. And it goes with this that, though we started fashions, our critics were not any more given to modishness in dealing with foreign literatures than in dealing with our own. It may fairly be seen as characteristic of the ethos we cultivated that one of the most influential of D. A. Traversi's essays printed in Scrutiny was his critique of I Promessi Sposi (volume IX, page 131). On the other hand, where German literature, to which we gave much more space than to Italian but—and properly—less than to French, was concerned, though we took prompt note of Kafka (who had the attention of more than one critic), and were far from neglectful in respect of Rilke and Stefan George, we printed during the war D. J. Enright's<sup>1</sup> sustained examination of Goethe—to give to whom, at that time, so much space was in a sense our 'politics'.

The explorer of those volumes will see that we did not fail to find, the qualifications being of the kind indicated, admirably qualified American representatives; they, indeed, will be judged to have constituted one of our distinctive strengths. But, with a view to recalling the current talk about 'the two cultures', I will, instead of dwelling on the extent and variety of Scrutiny's achievement on the American side, pass with a jump to the remote other end of the range of interests from literature, and make the immediately relevant point that J. L. Russell, whose essay, 'The Scientific Best Seller', dealing with Jeans and Eddington, will be found on page 348 of volume II,3 was a research scientist who belonged to what I may call our early Scrutiny group and was a familiar of the discussions at the hearth that was our centre. Jeans and Eddington have not now the representative or symbolic value they had then, but I can testify that the essay made a great impression ('The purpose of the present article', the first sentence runs, 'is to discuss the causes of the popularity of the books listed above, and their value from a general cultural and philosophical point of view'), had much influence, and earned a world-wide reputation, as I knew from the comments of visitors to Cambridge (and visitors from abroad, I will take the opportunity to put on record, had commonly formed flattering notions of Scrutiny's statusflattering to Cambridge, at any rate).

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> He now holds the Chair of English at Singapore.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> See especially the work of Henry Bamford Parkes and of Marius Bewley, whose *The Complex Fate* was very largely written in *Scrutiny*.

<sup>3</sup> I reprinted it with other essays from *Scrutiny* in *Determinations*, which we sold outright to the publisher in aid of *Scrutiny* funds.



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J. L. Russell was not our only scientist contributor. But what I oughtn't longer to leave unreferred to, for it was a major manifestation of the Idea of Scrutiny as we conceived and realized it, is the way in which we endeavoured to illustrate and enforce the conviction (expressed, I may properly say, since the book came out first in Scrutiny, in my Education and the University: A Sketch for an English School) that literary studies should be developed outward from the centre and, by way of 'background' (that accepted and honoured category), take the intelligence trained in 'English' into quite otherthan-literary fields. The work initiated and given so powerful an impulsion by Fiction and the Reading Public (with its derivative, Culture and Environment) went on in Scrutiny—it was one of our staple preoccupations. And, if one is to speak of 'sociology', what has been so much heard of in the last few years as a new 'sociological' approach to literature, entertainment and culture and is supposed (it seems) to have been invented by writers enjoying in The Guardian, the weeklies and the Sunday papers a favour that Fiction and the Reading Public and Scrutiny most certainly did not, may fairly be said, in so far as disciplined studies requiring the literary-critical intelligence are in question, to have been demonstrated and established by Scrutiny and the research work, with the documented thesis, out of which Scrutiny very largely took its start.

Further, in order to insist properly that when we spoke and thought of disciplines of intelligence that derive, so far as the subtlety of control and evaluation they cultivate is concerned, from the training got in intelligent 'English' studies we were not using the word 'discipline' lightly or irresponsibly, I must put on record that at least five of the familiars of the Scrutiny milieu, students of 'English', became anthropologists. Certain of them are now well known and of recognized distinction in their field, and a group of them have made Scrutiny a not unknown name in their School at an ancient university. I have in front of me as I write a letter (written somewhere in Africa) from one of them, in which he speaks of the experience of 'English' acquired in the Scrutiny milieu as having told decisively in his development as an anthropologist.

One of our editorial team, D. W. Harding, now holds a Chair of Social Psychology in London. Professor Harding read English in the first place, and went over from the English Tripos to Psychology. He, then, might reasonably have been said (more reasonably than I. A. Richards, with whom in those days the formula was associated) to be 'the point at which psychology and literary criticism meet'. It is a familiar kind of irony that *The Times Literary Supplement* should have found it possible a long quarter of a century after Harding's critique of I. A. Richards (volume I, page 327) to go on telling its readers, as if referring to known and indisputable fact, that *Scrutiny* aimed at making criticism a science.

The ambition, of course, was associated with Cambridge, and the Cambridge was that of I. A. Richards, C. K. Ogden, Basic English and Neo-Benthamism. It is, I think, fair to say that the only effective criticism that Richards, who represented the influence of that Cambridge on critical thought (or quasi-intellectual fashion), ever



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received was in Scrutiny, and it was decisive—a good instance of what can be done against the ostensible odds if the clear and unanswerable truth can be put trenchantly and be both heard and known to have been heard. Harding's critique appeared in 1933, and I reprinted it in Determinations (1934). No attempt that I am aware of was made to answer Harding's drastic analysis, and Richards moved on to 'Semasiology', the book in which he offered to found that science being Coleridge on Imagination, where he proposes to 're-state Coleridge in terms of Bentham'. That book, under the heading 'Dr Richards, Bentham and Coleridge', Scrutiny dealt with in a long review which appeared in 1935 (volume III, page 382). Scrutiny's criticism of the Neo-Benthamite drive was, as I have said, decisive—decisive in that curious and characteristic way we came to know so well. The academic Establishment in 'English', which had shown itself decidedly hospitable to Richards (Coleridge on Imagination was accepted—and prescribed—as an authoritative work on Coleridge), did not give a sign of recognition that anything had occurred that might be supposed to be within its proper intellectual purview; nor did the modish literary world, that reflected in The New Statesman and Nation, The Times Literary Supplement and The Criterion. A student of those organs will find that the habit of knowing reference and assumption (and 'Cambridge criticism'-meaning, without any recognition of it as such, the Neo-Benthamism-had become one of those familiar 'placed' features of the literary intellectual's pocketmap which make confident critical mastery of the scene possible) continued as before. But actually the chapter of Cambridge Neo-Benthamism—and it was by way of the English School that Neo-Benthamism implicated Cambridge—was finished; Basic English superseded Semasiology as overtly Richards's major interest, and Neo-Benthamism was, in this form, associated thereafter, if with any university, with Harvard.

Another of the editorial team who combined academic qualifications in two different fields was W. H. Mellers (now Andrew Mellon Professor of Music at Pittsburgh). Mellers, an Exhibitioner in English at Downing College, took both parts of the English Tripos and then (having always been a vital dynamism in the musical life of the College, which became in his time a well-known musical centre) proceeded to his Mus.Bac. His very frequent contributions earned him a great reputation, and were for some years a major feature of Scrutiny. As a critic, he rapidly earned a name for his exploring intelligence and pioneering judgement. He wrote as musician and musicologist, but his criticism offers yet another illustration of the way in which the discipline and the education we, in the Scrutiny group, held to be central and basic can tell in the field of a nonliterary discipline. The characteristics by which his approach in general belonged to the Scrutiny ethos are seen plainly in his first book, Music and Society (1946), a large proportion of which had been written for Scrutiny. Here, among other things, it will be noted, we have the line that runs from Fiction and the Reading Public.

We had a distinguished music critic before Wilfred Mellers began to write for us. Bruce Pattison (now Professor of Education in