SUPERVENIENCE



Edited by ELIAS E. SAVELLOS ÜMIT D. YALÇIN



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For Vivian Ackerson, Miranda Yalçın, and Ayten İmer

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Contributors

Felicia Ackerman is Professor of Philosophy at Brown University. She has published papers on a wide range of philosophical subjects, including methodology of philosophy, philosophy of language, and related issues in epistemology and metaphysics.

John Bacon is Reader in Philosophy at the University of Sydney. He has written in metaphysics, philosophical logic, and modal and predicate-functor logic. A book on tropes, *Relations Particularized: The Alphabet of Being*, is in press (Blackwell).

Daniel Bonevac is Professor and Chair of the Department of Philosophy at the University of Texas at Austin. He is the author of *Reduction* in the Abstract Sciences (Hackett, 1982), Deduction (Mayfield, 1987), The Art and Science of Logic (Mayfield, 1990); editor of Today's Moral Issues (Mayfield, 1991); and coeditor of Beyond the Western Tradition (Mayfield, 1992) and Understanding Non-Western Philosophy (Mayfield, 1993). He has published articles on Kant, metaphysics, semantics, and philosophical logic.

Earl Conee is Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of Rochester and Book Review Editor of *Noûs*. He is the author of various papers, largely of a critical nature, on topics in epistemology, ethics, metaphysics, and philosophy of mind. Currently his philosophical opposition is directed primarily toward naturalism in epistemology and imputations of begging the question.

Berent Enç, Professor of Philosophy at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, has published papers on scientific reduction, metaphysics, and the philosophy of mind. His current interests range from studies in animal behavior, action theory, and functional explanation to the philosophy of Hume.

Thomas R. Grimes is Professor of Philosophy at Arkansas State University. He received his Ph.D. from the University of Arizona. He has published articles on ontology, confirmation, and explanation and is currently working on a project on scientific realism.

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Contributors

John Heil is Professor of Philosophy at Davidson College and the author of *The Nature of True Minds* (Cambridge University Press, 1990).

James C. Klagge is Associate Professor of Philosophy at Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University. He is the author of several articles on supervenience published over the past dozen years. He has coedited a collection of essays, *Methods of Interpreting Plato and His Dialogues*, published as the 1992 supplementary volume to Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, and also a collection of Wittgenstein's shorter writings, *Philosophical Occasions: 1912–1951* (Hackett, 1993).

Keith Lehrer is Regents Professor of Philosophy at the University of Arizona, Honorary Professor at the University of Graz, Austria, and Chair of the Board of Officers of the American Philosophical Association. He is the author and editor of many books and articles on freedom, knowledge, and consensus, including, most recently, *Metamind* (Oxford University Press, 1990), *Thomas Reid* (Routledge, 1991), and *Theory of Knowledge* (Westview Press and Routledge, 1991).

Barry Loewer is Professor of Philosophy at Rutgers University. He works on issues in philosophy of physics, philosophy of mind, and philosophical logic and has published widely in these areas.

Cynthia Macdonald is Senior Lecturer in Philosophy at the University of Manchester. She is the author of *Mind-Body Identity Theories* (Routledge, 1989), coeditor of *Philosophy of Psychology: Debates on Psychological Explanation* (Blackwell, 1994) and of *Connectionism: Debates on Psychological Explanation*, Vol. 2 (Basil Blackwell, forthcoming), and author of articles on the philosophy of mind, metaphysics, and the philosophy of psychology.

Brian P. McLaughlin is Associate Professor of Philosophy at Rutgers University. He has published numerous articles on the philosophy of mind, philosophy of psychology, and metaphysics.

Paul K. Moser is Professor of Philosophy at Loyola University of Chicago. He has authored three books, *Epistemic Justification* (Reidel, 1985), *Knowledge and Evidence* (Cambridge University Press, 1989), and *Philosophy after Objectivity* (Oxford University Press, 1993), and edited a variety of anthologies, among them *A Priori Knowledge* (Oxford University Press, 1986) and *Rationality in Action* (Cambridge University Press, 1990). He has published numerous papers in the areas of epistemology, philosophy of mind, and rationality.

David Papineau is Professor of Philosophy of Science at King's College, London. He is the author of *Philosophical Naturalism* (Basil Blackwell, 1993), *Reality and Representation* (Basil Blackwell, 1987), *Theory and Meaning* (Clarendon Press, 1979), and *For Science in the Social Sciences*

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(Macmillan, 1978). He has written articles on a wide range of philosophical topics and is currently editor of the *British Journal for the Philosophy of Science*.

John F. Post is Professor of Philosophy at Vanderbilt University. He is the author of *The Faces of Existence: An Essay in Nonreductive Metaphysics* (Cornell 1987), *Metaphysics: A Contemporary Introduction* (Paragon, 1991), and numerous articles in metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of religion, and philosophical logic.

Elias E. Savellos is Associate Professor of Philosophy at the State University of New York at Geneseo. His research interests lie in contemporary analytical philosophy, and he has published several papers on topics of current interest in philosophical logic, metaphysics, and the philosophy of language.

J. D. Trout is Associate Professor of Philosophy at Loyola University of Chicago and Adjunct Assistant Professor at the Parmly Hearing Institute. He has also taught at Bryn Mawr College and Virginia Tech. Professor Trout is coeditor (with Richard Boyd and Philip Gasper) of *The Philosophy of Science* (MIT Press, 1991), has recently completed a book, *Measuring the Intentional World*, on quantitative methods in the social and behavioral sciences, and has published various papers on the philosophy of science, philosophy of mind, and speech perception.

James Van Cleve teaches philosophy at Brown University. His principal interests are epistemology, metaphysics, and the history of philosophy from Descartes to Kant. He has published several papers on supervenience, including "Semantic Supervenience and Referential Indeterminacy" (*Journal of Philosophy* 89, 1992).

Ümit D. Yalçın teaches at East Carolina University. His research interests lie in epistemology, metaphysics, the philosophy of science, and the philosophy of mind.