

For several decades the work of Joel Feinberg has been the most influential in legal, political, and social philosophy in the English-speaking world. This volume honors that body of work by presenting fifteen original essays, many of them by leading legal and political philosophers, that explore the problems that have engaged Feinberg over the years. Among the topics covered are issues of autonomy, responsibility, and liability. It will be a collection of interest to anyone working in moral, legal, or political philosophy.



IN HARM'S WAY



## Cambridge Studies in Philosophy and Law

GENERAL EDITOR: JULES L. COLEMAN (YALE LAW SCHOOL)

#### ADVISORY BOARD

David Gauthier (University of Pittsburgh)
David Lyons (Cornell University)
Richard Posner (Judge in the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, Chicago)
Martin Shapiro (University of California, Berkeley)

This series reflects and fosters the most original research currently taking place in the study of law and legal theory by publishing the most adventurous monographs in the field as well as rigorously edited collections of essays. It is a specific aim of the series to traverse the boundaries between disciplines and to form bridges between traditional studies of law and many other areas of the human sciences. Books in the series will be of interest not only to philosophers and legal theorists but also to political scientists, sociologists, economists, psychologists, and criminologists.

#### Other books in the series

Jeffrie G. Murphy and Jean Hampton: Forgiveness and mercy

Stephen R. Munzer: A theory of property

R.G. Frey and Christopher W. Morris (eds.): Liability and responsibility: Essays in law and morals

Robert F. Schopp: Automatism, insanity, and the psychology of criminal responsibility

Steven J. Burton: Judging in good faith Jules L. Coleman: Risks and wrongs



# In harm's way Essays in honor of Joel Feinberg

Edited by

JULES L. COLEMAN
Garver Professor of Jurisprudence
Yale Law School

ALLEN BUCHANAN
University of Wisconsin, Madison





### CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS Cambridge, New York, Melbourne, Madrid, Cape Town, Singapore, São Paulo

Cambridge University Press
The Edinburgh Building, Cambridge CB2 8RU, UK

Published in the United States of America by Cambridge University Press, New York

www.cambridge.org
Information on this title: www.cambridge.org/9780521454100

© Cambridge University Press 1994

This publication is in copyright. Subject to statutory exception and to the provisions of relevant collective licensing agreements, no reproduction of any part may take place without the written permission of Cambridge University Press.

First published 1994
This digitally printed version 2007

A catalogue record for this publication is available from the British Library

Library of Congress Cataloguing in Publication data
In harm's way: essays in honor of Joel Feinberg / edited by Jules L.
Coleman, Allen Buchanan.

cm. – (Cambridge studies in philosophy and law)
 Includes bibliographical references
 ISBN 0-521-45410-7 (hard)

1. Law-Philosophy. 2. Law and Ethics. 3. Liberalism.

4. Feinberg, Joel. I. Feinberg, Joel. II. Coleman, Jules L. III. Buchanan, Allen E., 1948- . IV. Series.

K235.I5 1994

340'.1—dc20 93-45339 CIP

ISBN 978-0-521-45410-0 hardback ISBN 978-0-521-03871-3 paperback



## Contents

Preface		page vii	
Con	tributors	ix	
1	Liberalism and group rights ALLEN BUCHANAN	1	
2	The argument from liberty SHELLY KAGAN	16	
3	Autonomy and preference formation RICHARD J. ARNESON	42	
4	Critical analysis and constructive interpretation DAVID LYONS	76	
5	Liberalism, free speech, and justice for minorities DAVID A. J. RICHARDS	92	
6	Liberalism and the new skeptics THOMAS MORAWETZ	122	
7	Tort liability and the limits of corrective justice JULES L. COLEMAN	139	
8	Liberalism, retribution and criminality JEAN HAMPTON	159	
9	Responsibility for consequences  JOHN MARTIN FISCHER and MARK RAVIZZA	183	
10	Some ruminations on women, violence, and the criminal law JEFFRIE G. MURPHY	209	
11	Force, consent, and the reasonable woman  JOAN MCGREGOR	231	



vi	CONTENTS	
12	Self-defense ROBERT F. SCHOPP	255
13	Letting patients die: Legal and moral reflections SANFORD H. KADISH	290
14	Fetal-maternal conflicts HOLLY M. SMITH	324
15	Benign and malign morality HYMAN GROSS	344
Pub	olications by Joel Feinberg	351



## **Preface**

Given how far-ranging and subtle Joel Feinberg's work is, and how eloquently it speaks for itself, no brief overview could possibly do it justice. Instead, we will limit ourselves here to a few unsystematic remarks about what we take to be some of the most distinctive features of his approach to philosophy, knowing full well that we will not succeed in indicating its richness. Our attempt to convey something of the man's character will be even less satisfactory.

It is no secret that Feinberg's writings achieve an unparalleled combination of rigor, sensitivity, and clarity. No other contemporary philosopher writing in English is as able to deal with complex and nuanced issues without lapsing into the false security of jargon. That Feinberg's books and essays represent much of what is best in liberal, legal, and moral philosophy is also widely recognized. What is less often appreciated is the fact that Feinberg's work achieves something that some of the most vociferous contemporary critics of Liberalism assume to be incompatible with Liberalism: a highly contextualized, concrete rendition of the liberal point of view, rooted in the actual practices and culture of a distinctive society, rather than in an abstract and ahistorical conception of the moral agent.

It is interesting (some less charitable might say suspicious) that "communitarians" and "contextualists" such as MacIntyre and Sandel, who excoriate Liberalism for its abstractness and sterility, almost uniformly fail to engage Feinberg's work. Yet here, if anywhere, we find Liberalism, or one interpretation of it, as a living doctrine built on the common values of a certain type of society and political culture, within a definite historical context.

Feinberg draws upon patterns of legal reasoning (especially in the common law), public and scholarly constitutional debates, common sense moral thinking, and the best, most systematic thought of Western Judeo-Christian secular and religious ethical theory. In this sense Feinberg actually does what these critics advocate but do not themselves attain. He articulates, refines, and sometimes challenges the shared values of a community – what we might call the liberal community of principle – in the right context of the historically evolving, particularistic conflicts of values which that community now faces. What is more, the substantive views he puts forward are unmistakably liberal



viii PREFACE

– just the sorts of views which these critics of Liberalism mistakenly think are necessarily rooted in a noncontextualist, abstract approach to values.

In other words, Feinberg not only talks about the importance of rooting moral philosophy in a community of values, he actually participates in that community by deftly negotiating the practices, discourses, and institutions in which those values are embodied. To say that Feinberg always treats these wellsprings of liberal values critically is true, but fails to capture his more important accomplishment: In his own thinking, he shows quite convincingly that the liberal culture which nourishes him and which he in turn nourishes contains concepts and styles of argumentation that make its own self-criticism possible. And in doing so, he gives us a special reason to give our allegiance to this community.

There is something highly artificial about dividing our comments between Feinberg the philosopher and Feinberg the man. Joel Feinberg is a good man, writing and speaking well, about things that matter. Sympathy without sentimentality, a sensitivity which does not sacrifice strength, rectitude without rigidity, seriousness of purpose leavened by a wit that is sharp but never malicious – these rare virtues are equally well expressed in his life as well as his writings.\*

For those who have not had the good fortune to know him personally, we take the liberty of mentioning two anecdotes which do something to convey a sense of wholeness of the person and the thinker. Both incidents occurred when Feinberg was a young soldier in World War II. In the first, he was reprimanded while he was an officer candidate because he was too polite towards the troops under his command in a trial exercise ("Bill, would you please move that machine gun forward a bit?" was thought to lack command presence). In the second, Joel was sentenced to thirty days in the guard house for having allowed the prisoners he was guarding to come into a boiler room out of the bitter cold. These vignettes are of course endearing and indicate Joel's kindness and generosity. But what is equally significant is what he did with the experiences – reflection on them helped generate his interest in the relationship between law and morality. It is no doubt because Feinberg the thinker and Feinberg the person are one that his work provides not only knowledge but wisdom.

Allen Buchanan Jules L. Coleman

<sup>\*</sup>A complete bibliography of Joel Feinberg's works appears at the end of this volume.



# **Contributors**

RICHARD J. ARNESON is Professor of Philosophy at the University of California, San Diego.

ALLEN BUCHANAN is Professor of Business and Philosophy at the University of Wisconsin-Madison.

JULES L. COLEMAN is Garver Professor of Jurisprudence and Philosophy at Yale Law School.

JOHN MARTIN FISCHER is Professor of Philosophy at the University of California, Riverside.

HYMAN GROSS is Fellow in Law at Cambridge University.

JEAN HAMPTON is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Arizona.

SANFORD H. KADISH is Professor of Law Emeritus at the University of California, Berkeley.

SHELLY KAGAN is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Illinois, Chicago.

DAVID LYONS is Sage Professor of Philosophy and Law at Cornell University.

JOAN McGregor is Associate Professor of Philosophy at Arizona State University.

THOMAS MORAWETZ is Professor of Law at the University of Connecticut.

JEFFRIE G. MURPHY is Professor of Law and Philosophy at Arizona State University.

MARK RAVIZZA is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at the University of California, Riverside.

DAVID A. J. RICHARDS is Professor of Law at New York University.



X CONTRIBUTORS

ROBERT F. SCHOPP is Professor of Law at the University of Nebraska.

HOLLY M. SMITH is Professor of Philosophy and Associate Provost at the University of Arizona.