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This book presents a new theory of the will – of our capacity for decision-making. The book argues that taking a decision to act is something we do, and do freely – as much an action as the actions which our decisions explain – and that our freedom of action depends on this capacity for free decision-making. But decision-making is no ordinary action. Decisions to act also have a special executive function, that of ensuring the rationality of the further actions which they explain. This executive function makes decision-making an action importantly unlike any other, with its own distinctive rationality. Pink's original and highly persuasive study uses this theory of the will to provide new accounts of freedom, action, and rational choice. The author argues that, in a tradition that runs from Hobbes to Davidson and Frankfurt, Anglo-American philosophy has misrepresented the common-sense psychology of our freedom and action – a psychology which this book now presents and defends.

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CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS
Cambridge, New York, Melbourne, Madrid, Cape Town, Singapore, São Paulo

Cambridge University Press
The Edinburgh Building, Cambridge CB2 8RU, UK

Published in the United States of America by Cambridge University Press, New York

www.cambridge.org
Information on this title: www.cambridge.org/9780521555043

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First published 1996
This digitally printed version 2007

A catalogue record for this publication is available from the British Library

Library of Congress Cataloguing in Publication data

Pink, Thomas.
The psychology of freedom / Thomas Pink.
p. cm.
ISBN 0 521 55504 3 (hardback)
1. Free will and determinism. 2. Decision-making. I. Title.
BJ1461.P55 1996
128'.3 – dc20 95–51644 CIP

ISBN 978-0-521-55504-3 hardback
ISBN 978-0-521-03822-5 paperback

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For Judy

Contents

<i>Acknowledgments</i>	<i>page</i> x
Introduction	i
1 Agency and the will	14
2 Scepticism about second-order agency	33
3 Decision-making and freedom	64
4 The Psychologising conception of freedom	101
5 Decision rationality and action rationality	137
6 Decision-making and Teleology	166
7 The Regress argument	187
8 In defence of the Action model	228
9 The special-purpose agency of the will	247
Conclusion	269
<i>Bibliography</i>	276
<i>Index</i>	278

Acknowledgments

Most of this book was written at the end of a research fellowship at Churchill College, Cambridge, for which I owe thanks to the Master and Fellows. My thanks in particular to Tom Baldwin for supporting this project. In addition the following have read through drafts of this book and given many comments: John Bishop, Tim Crane, Rob Hopkins, Mike Martin, Joe Mintoff, David Owens, Paul Noordhof. My thanks also to participants in meetings at Oriel College, Oxford and at Heidelberg, to David Gauthier for some correspondence and comments, to Bill Brewer, Edward Craig, Nick Denyer, Dorothy Edgington, Frank Hahn, Susan James, and Charles Kahn for useful discussions, to various referees for their criticisms, and to Paul Snowdon for his support and advice at a late stage. Acknowledgments are due to the Editor of *Mind* for permission to use material from two articles: 'Purposive intending', published in 1991, and 'Justification and the will' published in 1993.

Lastly, my thanks to the staff at Cambridge University Press who have helped bring this book to press, and especially to Judith Ayling, Hilary Gaskin and Gillian Maude.