

## Index

Entries for technical terms indicate pages where the terms are explained.

- Aumann, R., ix, 58, 145, 215
- Bernheim, B., ix, 215–16
- Binmore, K., 214
- box and arrow diagram, 132–3, 194–5
- Brandenburger, A., 145
- Bratman, M., 122
- choiceworthiness, 128–9
- common knowledge, 40
- conditional preference, 52–3, 80; *see also* incentive
- conditionals: counterfactual, 27, 174; disjunctive, 170, 173; negative, 172–3; subjunctive, 54
- decision theory: causal, 57, 77; evidential, 58
- deference, 70
- dilemmas of rationality, 3
- dominance: ordinary, 116; principle of, 116, 124–7, 220–1; as a solution standard, 217–21; strict, 116–17
- Eells, E., 56, 118
- equilibrium, 48; correlated, 215; joint deliberational, 214–15; perfect, 213; proper, 213; as a rationalizable profile, 216; as a rationalized profile, 216–17; subgame-perfect, 213–14; *see also* Nash equilibrium, strategic equilibrium
- foreknowledge: direct, 40; indirect, 40; strategic, 40; *see also* idealization of prescience
- futility, 64, 74
- game, 6; concrete, 14, 191; mixed extension of, 11, 39, 69; objective, 18–19, 202–3; subjective, 19, 202–3; *see also* game type, representation of a game
- game type: cooperative, ix–x, 9–10; extensive-form, 10; finite, 4; finite in number of agents, 11–12, 45–6; multistage, 8–9; noncooperative, 9; normal-form, 10–11; single-stage, 7; strategic, 7
- Gibbard, A., 57, 69, 117
- global rule, 107–8
- grounds of preference, 128, 209–10
- Harper, W., 56, 57, 58, 63, 72, 117, 118
- Harsanyi, J., 4, 214
- Hide and Seek, 1–2
- Higher Number Game, 64–5, 196–8
- hypothetical choice, 95–7
- idealization, 29–30; fundamental, 34–6; of informedness, 42; of prescience, 37–42; *see also* foreknowledge; priority of, 32, 41, 99, 171–2; of rational pursuit of incentives, 101–2; of rationality, 31
- identification procedure, 189
- incentive, 52; initial, 143; nonrelative, 49–50, 132; objective, 53; optimal, 97, 113; preempted, 163, 183–4, 205–6; relative, 49, 132; resisted, 163; subjective, 53; sufficient, 60, 80; to switch to a set of options, 87–9; unselected, 163
- incentive-proofness, 3; and Nash equilibrium, 3, 63–4, 67; principle of, 64, 67–8; *see also* ratification, principle of; and self-support, 60
- incentive structure, 101; completely reduced, 102; partially reduced, 102
- independence from irrelevant alternatives, 206–10
- individualistic explanation, 161, 182
- information carried, 12–13, 52, 148
- interagent selection rule, 177–8
- interagent stopping rule, 182

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Index

[More information](#)

- Jeffrey, R., xii, 56, 58, 72
- Kadane, J., 71–2
- Kohlberg, E., 214
- Kreps, D., 214
- Larkey, P., 71–2
- Luce, R., xii, 118, 207
- Maschler, M., ix
- Matching Pennies, 2, 13–14, 41–2, 61–4, 70–1, 74–5, 110–11, 150–3; complete version of, 181, 186, 192–6; embedded, 87–8; mixed extension of, 76, 123–4; partial version of, 169–72
- maximization of expected utility, 115–16, 123–4
- Mertens, J., 214
- Morgenstern, O., 37, 58
- Myerson, R., 213
- Nash equilibrium, 3; multiple Nash equilibria, 75, 149–50, 203–4; nonexistence of, 62; objective, 3, 61; subjective, 3, 61, 78; unattractive, 66, 198–202
- Nash, J., 4
- Newcomb-like phenomena, 85
- Newcomb's problem, 58, 85, 114
- Nozick, R., 58
- Pareto optimality, 75
- Pareto superiority, 75
- path of incentives, 85; for an agent in a complete version, 185; closure of, 85, 180; for a group, 161; for a group and compressed, 184–7; with indecisive switching, 113, 138, 162, 224; subpath of, 86
- payoff, 7, 11
- payoff matrix, 9, 11; ignorance of, 202–3
- Pearce, D., 215–16
- principle alpha, 117–18, 127–9, 209–10
- principle of rejection, 81–4; *see also* principle of sufficiency
- principle of sufficiency, 79; basis, 81, 82, 91; recursive, 81, 83; *see also* principle of rejection; rationality, necessary condition of
- profile of strategies, 7; nearest alternative to, 173; remainder of, 134; response, 137; switch, 137; terminal, 155
- pursuit of incentives, 95–6, 169, 173; cyclical, 64, 177; relentless, 166–7, 169–71, 175
- quantization, 115
- Rabinowicz, W., 56, 125
- Raiffa, H., xii, 118, 207
- ratification, 56; principle of, 56–9, 116, 122–3
- rationality, 31; bounded, 214; compensatory standards of, 25–6; conditional, 24–8, 75; full, 31, 70, 101–2; joint, 20–3; necessary condition of, 79–80, 85–7, 93, 97, 103, *see also* principle of sufficiency; noncompensatory standards of, 25–6; robustness of, 31–2; *see also* idealization of rationality
- representation of a game, 14; appropriate abstract, 16–17; complete, 178–9; cooperative, 9; noncooperative, 9; partial, 166
- resisters, 193
- Resnik, M., xii
- response: nonrelative, 134; relative, 133
- Richter, R., 72
- search procedure, 159–60
- selection rule, 107
- self-defeat, 54, 60, 74–5, 104
- self-support, 5, 53, 61, 68; joint, 48, 51; nonrelative, 48; principle of, 104; relative, 48, 154; satisfaction of the principle of, 105–6; strategic, 104, 130
- Selten, R., 9, 131, 213, 214
- Sen, A., 117
- Shin, H., 58
- Skyrms, B., 58, 214
- Sobel, J., 31, 56, 100, 205
- solutions of a game, 23; consistency of, 16–17; cooperative and noncooperative standards for, 17; as intensional objects, 18; nonrelative, 23; objective, 19–20, 29–30; potential, 15; relative, 23; subjective, 19–20, 30
- Stalnaker, R., 15, 32
- stopping rule, 109
- strategic equilibrium, 130, 144; for agents, 161, 163; for a group, 161, 163; nonrelative, 49, 136; relative, 49, 136
- strategic reasoning, 7–8, 38, 39–40, 51–2
- strategy, 6; mixed, 4; pure, 4; terminal, 154

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Index

[More information](#)

sufficient reason, 74–9

supposition: indicative, 26–8; subjunctive,  
26–7termination: of a group path, 162; of a path,  
85; in a tree, 92

Tic-Tac-Toe, 7

tie breaking, 22–3, 177, 204–5

tree of paths, 89; closed, 90; minimal, 90

Vallentyne, P., 118

Von Neumann, J., 37, 58

Wilson, R., 214