

## SOUTHERN PATERNALISM AND THE AMERICAN WELFARE STATE Economics, Politics, and Institutions in the South 1865–1965

Using the new institutional economics, Professors Alston and Ferrie show how paternalism in Southern agriculture helped shape the growth of the American welfare state in the hundred years following the Civil War. Paternalism was an integral part of agricultural contracts prior to mechanization. It involved the exchange of "good and faithful" labor services for a variety of in-kind services, most notably protection from physical violence. The Southern landed elite valued paternalism because it reduced monitoring costs and turnover. Workers valued paternalism because they lacked civil rights. In order to maintain the value of paternalism to their workers, the agricultural interests needed to prevent meddling from the federal government, which they accomplished through their disproportionate political power. Only the advent of mechanization and complementary technology in the late 1950s and early 1960s finally reduced the desire of Southern agricultural interests to fight the expansion of federal welfare programs.

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Lee J. Alston and Joseph P. Ferrie

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ECONOMICS, POLITICS, AND INSTITUTIONS IN THE SOUTH 1865-1965

LEE J. ALSTON

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To Mary, Greg, and Eric, and Mari



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## Preface

This book is about the interplay of institutions, technology, and contracting. Though it is an example of the "new institutional economics," there was no such well-defined approach when we started this project twenty years ago. In part, this accounts for the book's long gestation. Much of the scholarship on which we rely is the product of research undertaken by others in the new institutional economics over the last two decades. Like those scholars, we had to venture beyond the literatures in economics and history into political science and sociology to answer the questions that we posed. We hope that our work is better for these intellectual excursions.

The genesis for this book was Alston's Ph.D. dissertation. Our collaboration on this topic began in 1980 when Ferrie was an undergraduate in one of Alston's courses. He wrote his undergraduate thesis (which received the Wells Prize in Political Economy) at Williams College on the topic of paternalism and social security in the United States. In the course of our collaboration we had various detours, the most significant being Ferrie's completion of a doctoral dissertation in economics on an unrelated topic. Though the journey to complete this book has been a long one, we believe that the book is better for it – each time we returned to the project, we revised and added new material, often with the benefit of comments from colleagues and the appearance of new findings from scholars working in the field.

The intellectual debts that we owe are numerous. We presented aspects of our work at seminars and conferences around the globe. Many individuals gave us helpful comments and engaged in valuable discussions. Several people deserve special recognition: Robert Higgs patiently listened to Alston for many hours during his dissertation days and throughout this project, and offered his advice and encouragement; Larry Neal came on the scene halfway through this project when Alston moved to Illinois and was the very epitome of a good colleague with his



### Preface

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