

The Summa Theologiæ ranks among the greatest documents of the Christian Church, and is a landmark of medieval western thought. It provides the framework for Catholic studies in systematic theology and for a classical Christian philosophy, and is regularly consulted by scholars of all faiths and none, across a range of academic disciplines. This paperback reissue of the classic Latin/English edition first published by the English Dominicans in the 1960s and 1970s, in the wake of the Second Vatican Council, has been undertaken in response to regular requests from readers and librarians around the world for the entire series of 61 volumes to be made available again. The original text is unchanged, except for the correction of a small number of typographical errors.

The original aim of this edition was not narrowly ecclesiastical. It sought to make this treasure of the Christian intellectual heritage available to theologians and philosophers of all backgrounds, including those who, without claiming to be believers themselves, appreciate a religious integrity which embodies hardbitten rationalism and who recognise in Thomas Aquinas a master of that perennial philosophy which forms the bedrock of European civilisation. Because of this the editors worked under specific instructions to bear in mind not only the professional theologian, but also the general reader with an interest in the 'reason' in Christianity. The parallel English and Latin texts can be used successfully by anybody with a basic knowledge of Latin, while the presence of the Latin text has allowed the translators a degree of freedom in adapting their English version for modern readers. Each volume contains a glossary of technical terms and is designed to be complete in itself to serve for private study or as a course text.



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
ST THOMAS AQUINAS SUMMA THEOLOGIÆ



ST THOMAS AQUINAS

SUMMA THEOLOGIÆ

Latin text and English translation, Introductions, Notes, Appendices and Glossaries





JOANNIS
PP. XXIII

DICATUM



IN AN AUDIENCE, 13 December 1963, to a group representing the Dominican Editors and the combined Publishers of the New English Summa, His Holiness Pope Paul VI warmly welcomed and encouraged their undertaking. A letter from His Eminence Cardinal Cicognani, Cardinal Secretary of State, 6 February 1968, expresses the continued interest of the Holy Father in the progress of the work, 'which does honour to the Dominican Order, and the Publishers, and is to be considered without doubt as greatly contributing to the growth and spread of a genuinely Catholic culture', and communicates his particular Apostolic Blessing.



> To Fr Thomas Gilby O.P.



ST THOMAS AQUINAS

SUMMA THEOLOGIÆ VOLUME 41

VIRTUES OF JUSTICE IN THE HUMAN COMMUNITY

(2a2æ. 101-22)

Latin text, English translation, Introduction, Notes, Appendices & Glossary

T. C. O'BRIEN



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T. C. O'Brien

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EDITORIAL NOTES

THE TEXT AND TRANSLATION

THE LATIN TEXT mainly reflects that of the 'Leonine' edition, commissioned by Leo XIII at the end of the last century. Variant readings from the Piana edition of 1570-71 published under the auspices of Pius v (modern edition, Ottawa, 1941), are noted throughout and, where they seem more in keeping with the sense, substituted in the text. Paragraphing and punctuation of the Latin text are those of the editor. The English has been prepared to be read independently of the Latin text, but reference to this is, of course, made easy in the present edition. Experience with students who have neither a knowledge of Latin nor prior acquaintance with St Thomas's thought has influenced the revisions of the translation on the side of greater literalness. The Latin itself is not imaginative, the vocabulary neither rich nor varied. One suspects that even the medieval student had to become initiated into the sparseness of Scholastic style, the burden that basic technical terms were made to bear. Explanatory notes are meant to assist the modern reader with technical terms; the plainness and economy of language, the editor believes, were meant in order to keep rhetoric from obscuring clarity and consistency of thought.

FOOTNOTES

Those signified by a superior number are usually the references given by St Thomas and tracked down by the Leonine Commission, with the exception of no. I to each article which refers to parallel texts in his writings. Those signified alphabetically are editorial references and explanatory remarks.

REFERENCES

Biblical references are to the Vulgate; Patristic references to Migne (PG, Greek Fathers; PL, Latin Fathers). When the English titles are well known, references to the works of St Thomas and Aristotle are in English. Titles of St Thomas's works are abbreviated as follows:

Summa Theologiæ, without title. Part, question, article, reply; e.g. 1a. 70, 1 ad 2. 2a2æ. 25, 4.

Summa Contra Gentiles, CG. Book, chapter; e.g. CG 11, 14.

Scriptum in IV Libros Sententiarum, Sent. Book, distinction, question, article, solution or quæstiuncula, reply; e.g. 11 Sent. 15, 1, 1, ii ad 3.

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Compendium Theologiæ, Compend. theol.

Scriptural commentaries (lecturæ, expositiones reportata): Job, In Job; Psalms, In Psal.; Isaiah, In Isa.; Jeremiah, In Jerem.; St Matthew, In Matt.; St John, In Joann.; Epistles of St Paul, e.g. In 1 Cor. Chapter, verse, lectio as required.

Philosophical commentaries: On the Liber de Causis, In De causis. Aristotle: Peri Hermeneias, In Periherm.; Posterior Analytics, In Poster.; Physics, In Physic.; De Cælo et Mundo, In De cæl.; De Generatione et Corruptuone, In De gen.; Metereologica, In De metereor.; De anima, In De anima; De sensu et sensato, In De sensu; De memoria et reminiscentia, In De memor.; Metaphysics, In Meta.; Nicomachean Ethics, In Ethic.; Politics, In Pol., Book, chapter, lectio as required, also for Expositions in Boethius, Liber de Hebdomadibus and Liber de Trinitate, In de hebd. and In De Trin., and on Dionysius De divinis nominibus, In De div. nom. References to Aristotle give the Bekker numeration.

Quæstiones quodlibetales, Quodl.

Complete titles are given for other works, including the 10 series of Quæstiones Disputatæ.

Denz. refers to Denzinger-Schönmetzer, Freiburg, 1093.

ACKNOWLEDGMENT

The editor is grateful for the opportunity he had to consult a first draft of the translation of the Questions in this volume prepared by Fr Finbar Synnott, then of the English and now of the South African Dominicans. His careful work was an invaluable point of reference in the deliberation and choice regarding the translation of many technical and stylized terms in the treatise.

T. C. O'B.



INTRODUCTION

THE PROLOGUE of the Second Part of the Second Part of the Summa states that the aim of this more particular consideration of the moral life is to leave out nothing relevant to it. The methodological principle with regard to topics that apply to all men¹ is this: 'The whole subject of morals being reduced to a consideration of the virtues, these are further reducible to seven: three theological and four cardinal virtues.' Of chief interest to the contents of this volume is a further reduction, by which, namely, all moral virtues are aligned with one of the cardinal or principal virtues. With regard to those considered as annexed to justice, the contents of the present volume, an indispensable preliminary is 2a2æ. 80.

The device by which the reduction is worked out is the concept of 'potential parts' of a virtue: 2 i.e. virtues that are allied to a cardinal virtue as potential parts have some affinity with the principal virtue but in some sense fall short of its complete meaning. Question 80 shows that religion, piety, respect, gratitude, vengeance, truth, friendliness and liberality have an affinity with justice in that they also regard another person. They do not exhibit the strict meaning of justice, either because the indebtedness they discharge cannot be rendered exactly (secundum æqualitatem), which is the case with religion, piety, respect; or because the debt they fulfil is not a legal, but a moral debt, 3 which is the case with the other virtues mentioned.

The Secunda Pars of the Summa Theologiæ has been rightly recognized as the first coherent systematization of Christian moral theology. Yet to appreciate the work in depth it is imperative to recognize that its author was not out to contrive an a priori schema in a vacuum. Thus the organization of the treatise on justice must be seen as first of all a work of literary classification. This is to say that it was fashioned within the medieval intellectual ambience where the work of dialectic and synthesis operated along with, and in a sense was regulated by, the 'method or technique of

⁸See Appendix 1.

¹Questions 1-170, as distinguished against topics related to special states and offices, Questions 171-89.

^{*}See 2a2æ. 80, also 2a2æ. 48: 'Potential parts of any virtue are those adjunct virtues that have reference to some secondary act or objective, and so in a sense lack the full power (potentia) of the principal virtue.' See 2a2æ. 128 and 143. Note that the cardinal virtues are called principal, the potential parts secondary, but not necessarily in the sense that the cardinal virtues are more perfect; rather they deal with more urgent and frequently occurring aspects of the moral life, and the right dispositions towards such matters are a kind of foundation for other like yet distinctive virtues; see De virtutibus cardinalibus 1 ad 12.



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authorities'. This phrase of M.-D. Chenu⁴ means that the work of the medieval theologian directly involved privileged texts, the writings, possessed often only in relatively brief excerpts, of Church Fathers and other writers, Christian and non-Christian, that by long usage had come to be regarded as authoritative statements on theological topics. By academic custom the theologian was obliged to deal with these; this literature was presumed to form part of the data of theology.⁵

Only from about 1250, i.e. after the possession in the West, through Robert Grosseteste's Latin translation (c. 1245) of Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics, was there any attempt at organizing a treatise on justice. But theologians, of course, had discussed and written about the virtues, and with regard to justice the capital text, the 'authority', was a quotation from Cicero. The text is from Rhetorici libri duo qui vocantur De Inventione (invention, i.e. a determination of topic, being the first phase in the art of rhetoric), a work of his youth that Cicero himself later scorned, in De oratore I, 5. The context is a discussion of virtue, the parts of which are prudence, justice, courage, temperance; because of their moral beauty (honestas) these recommend themselves as themes for forensic oratory. Religion, piety, respect, gratitude, vengeance and truth are related to justice because they are included in the law of nature. That the prob-

⁴See Towards Understanding St Thomas (tr. A. M. Landry & D. Hughes; Chicago, 1964) pp. 126-49.

⁵The method of Scholastic theology developed through the interplay of dialectics and authorities: the aim was to achieve concordance, consistency, coherence.

and authorites, the affir was to achieve concordance, consistence, consistence. Because of its prominence in Questions 101–18, it is useful to have the whole text at hand: 'Justice is a habit of mind which gives every man his desert while preserving the common advantage . . . The law of nature is that which is not born of opinion, but implanted in us by a kind of innate instinct: it includes religion, duty, gratitude, revenge, reverence and truth. Religion is that which brings men to serve and worship a higher order of nature which they call divine. Duty is the feeling which renders kind offices and loving service to one's kind and country. Gratitude embraces the memory of friendships and of services rendered by another, and the desire to requite these benefits. Revenge is the act of defending or avenging ourselves and so warding off violence, injury or anything which is likely to be prejudicial. Reverence is the feeling by which men of distinguished position are held worthy of respect and honour. Truth is the quality by which events in the past, present or future are referred to without alteration of material fact.'

'Justitia est habitus animi communi utilitate conservata suam cuique tribuens dignitatem . . . Naturæ jus est quod non opinio genuit, sed quædam in natura vis insevit, ut religionem, pietatem, gratiam, vindicationem, observantiam, veritatem. Religio est, quæ superioris cujusdam naturæ quam divinam vocant, curam cærimoniamque affert; pietas, per quam sanguine conjunctis patriæque benivolum officium et diligens tribuitur cultus; gratia, in qua amicitiarum et officiorum alterius memoria et remunerandi voluntas continetur; vindicatio, per quam vis aut injuria et omnino omne, quod obfuturum est, defendendo aut ulciscendo propulsatur;



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lematic in Question 80 is primarily one of accounting for literature on the virtue of justice is clear from the formulation, whether the virtues allied to justice are appropriately (convenienter) assigned. The variation in the structure of the article reinforces the point; there is no argument 'on the other hand' (sed contra), but just the one set of arguments from differing authorities, followed by the Reply.8 Clearly Cicero's list, given in obj. 1, is the point of reference throughout. The burden of the Reply is to assign a plausible reason for annexing the virtues in this list to the virtue of justice; the responses seek to bring into concordance with Cicero the list of Macrobius (ad 2), of William of Paris (ad 3), and of Andronicus of Rhodes (ad 4).9 Obviously, St Thomas's approach to this literature is not historicocritical; 10 he is content in Scholastic fashion to advance a dialectical principle that will deal adequately with the authorities in question, and will account for this part of the theological data concerning the sphere of justice. That this kind of literary classification is involved is of significance for the interpretation of the contents of this volume.

The operation of the technique of authority, not only in the present treatise but throughout the Summa, often determines the language, the phrasing of problems, the argumentation. And frequently, while allowing the privileged texts to define the discussion, the understanding and interpretation that St Thomas intends is quite removed from that of the author he quotes, even if this be Aristotle or Augustine.¹¹ The language adopted from sources that dominates so much of the present treatise presents problems. We do not readily think of respect for parents and loyalty to

observantia, per quam homines aliqua dignitate antecedentes cultu quodam et honore dignantur; veritas, per quam immutata ea quæ sunt aut ante fuerunt aut futura sunt dicuntur.' Text and translation, in Loeb Classical Library edition, H. M. Hubbell (London, Cambridge, Mass., 1949), pp. 328-9.

The usual form in similar articles; see 122æ. 68, 4; 69, 3; 70, 3; 84, 4; 222æ. 48; 122; 128; 143, etc.

⁸The same structure is followed in parallel articles on the other cardinal virtues: prudence, 2a2æ. 48; courage, 128; temperance, 143; like Question 80 they have a single article.

Note that Aristotle's epieikeia (see Question 120) is allied to legal justice (ad 5). The implication is that it is the meaning of particular justice that is the criterion for evaluating the other virtues. Legal justice regards the public good of a community; particular justice is between individuals. See 2a2æ. 58, 5-8.

¹⁰All references to Cicero's *Rhetoric* are from the same brief excerpt, Book I, ch. 53; see 101, I, sed contra; 2 ad 3; 3, sed contra; 102, I, obj. I & sed contra; 2, sed contra; 103, 4; 106, I, sed contra; 108, sed contra & Reply; 109, I, obj. 3; 3, sed contra.

¹¹See R. A. Gauthier, Magnanimité (Paris, 1951); idem, L'Éthique à Nicomaque (2d ed. Louvain, 1970) 11, pp. 125-31; 241-99; Vol. 26 of this series, ed. T. C. O'Brien Appendix 6.

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country as contained in the one concept and expressed in the one term; yet this is the connotation of *pietas* here. Vengeance does not sound like a virtue. *Dulia*, its meaning derived from Augustine's *City of God*, has its primary reference to what to-day is regarded as a moral monstrosity, slavery. One might conjecture that St Thomas himself experienced the constriction arising from the language of accepted texts; certainly one must be prepared to look through the formulae and discover meanings intended beyond the words.

A further point: one phalanx of 'Thomists' has marched under the banner of a Thomas of flawless consistency; he is to be read like the Bible, any apparent discrepancies being evaporated by conciliatory exegesis. In the present instance this would require explaining away the fact that some virtues (liberality, friendliness, truth) allied to justice in Question 80 are sharply separated from justice in 1a2æ. 60, 5 because they are concerned with inner emotions, not outward actions. 12 This view of the Summa as a logical monolith would also require some doctrinal reason why the order of virtues given in Question 80 (religion, piety, respect, truth, gratitude, vengeance, liberality, friendliness) is not followed in Questions 101-18. Nor is the distinction between legal and moral debt as applied in Question 80 thereafter interpreted in the same way.13 The explanation in point of fact for these 'inconsistencies' is the functioning of literature, of texts, as theological data. Aristotle's Ethics is the reason why in 1a2æ. 60, 5 the number of all the moral virtues is determined to be eleven; the various authorities in Question 80 are the reason why the list of possible parts of justice alone numbers twenty-two. The first level of inquiry is one of literary classification; no ironclad, exhaustive or apodictic schema of the moral life itself is intended.¹⁴ The meaning of virtue is the criterion by which St Thomas judges the complexities of living the moral life; to understand that judgment means first of all to know the difference between what is purely formal, organizational, methodological and what is of content, real, substantial. He would not propose that a person becomes virtuous by patterning his life on a systematic schema of virtues; that is artificial. The real innerconnection of virtues in the dynamics of the moral life is in the right judgment of prudence and the habitual responsiveness of the appetites to that judgment through the virtues. 15 The virtues become a key to understanding the thought when they are seen above all in their relation to the moral realities to which they respond.

¹²See 1a2æ. 60, 2

¹⁴See Question 81, Prologue, where the order of the following treatise is set out, and some of the virtues mentioned in Question 80 freely located elsewhere in the Summa.

¹⁵See 1a2æ. 65, 1-3



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To reduce all moral matters to a consideration of the virtues is to fashion a moral theology that is pre-eminently a moral of the good. St Thomas's moral is prescriptive by being descriptive. It is meant to be 'practical knowledge' that is directive of action, but it serves this purpose by pointing to the intrinsic exigencies of ends, of human goods, and by indicating the specific variations in the good in terms of the specific objectives of human actions, in the 'good of reason', which is the good of virtue. That which is descriptive of virtue—and, by opposition, of sin—is the normative and the judgmental in this moral theory. The present volume contains a description and evaluation of a sector of the order of justice, the order of human community and communication. Cicero and others provide the language. But the Questions here are not a 'natural social ethic'; they are rather a theology in which it is presupposed that natural values of justice are present still in the life of grace, and are ultimately transformed through the workings of the Gift of Piety under the Holy Spirit.

The revision of the order of considering the virtues from that outlined in Question 80 is not casual. The treatise is in fact regulated by a principle of diminishing indebtedness, from a debt owed to God and to other superiors, to a debt owed to equals.¹⁷ But always there is an order of true justice, an order where there is some form of real indebtedness, the honouring of which makes the community of man possible, a community in which men can possess and peaceably enjoy the goods of human existence. For the indebtedness is based radically on a metaphysics of divine causality and government. The true human response is a rightful acknowledgment of dependence upon those who make it possible for one to be a participant in the human community. In 1a. 103, 4 & 6 the interpretation of God's governance is shown to include both the primacy of God's own lordship and the sharing in this government by creatures whom God causes to be causes, sources of being and development for others. This notion is constantly present in the discussion of the virtues of veneration (see IOI, I; 102, 1 & 2; 103, 3; 104, 1; 106, 1). The exigency, the indebtedness here is one of a 'necessity of justice' (104, 1 & 2) that requires a human 'conversion of effect to cause' (106, 3), a human response by the reasoned choice to acknowledge dependence upon superiors. These virtues imply a recognition that the community of man is not one of undifferentiated equality; its form is not anarchic, but hierarchic; not orderlessness, but a sacred order. The community of man exists and each individual participates in its resources because physical, moral, spiritual, cultural values are derived from the causality of God, both direct and participated (103, 3). The maintenance of

¹⁶See 1a2æ. 61, 1 ad 1

¹⁷See also 2a2æ. 122, 6



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that community is the work of the virtues allied to justice. Ultimately it is a sacred work, for it looks to a sacred order, one deriving from God. Only in the recognition, not only of God's supreme and absolute lordship, but of the fact of his communicating a share in his dominion that makes others our superiors and so constitutes the human community, can that community be preserved. Only by respect for all their sources can the advantages and values in human life be maintained. In a word, the other virtues of veneration depend upon the virtue of religion. St Thomas adds warmth and illumination to the full significance of the hierarchical order of justice when in 102, I he compares those who are sources of our being or betterment in any way to fathers; there is a graduated participation in the fatherhood of God that is honoured by all the virtues of veneration. Into this line of thought there is also introduced the meaning of respecting and honouring all men, indispensable to the society of man (103, 2). Ultimately the whole order of justice is transformed by the meaning of the Gift of Piety, for then it is not God's fatherhood simply as lord that suffuses all the acts of the just man, but the fatherhood of God the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, a fatherhood not only of lordship but of love.

As the virtues honouring superiors are differentiated among themselves according to degree of indebtedness, so also as a group they are differentiated from truth, friendliness and liberality, virtues that regard a diminished form of debt. Yet for these too an objective indebtedness remains: it is the debt owed to the human community as such, a debt based on the social nature of man, that he is created by God to live with others; that he is dependent upon the social structure and must contribute to its humane perdurance. The relations of man to man are not satisfied by the coldly correct calculations of commutative justice itself; there must be humaneness, the reasonableness of candour, civility, even of a degree of generosity. Because God has made man a social being, words, actions, possessions have a necessary reference to others. The exigencies of being part of the community of man require the virtues that contribute to that community's life. To recognize that to maintain honourable, courteous, even beneficent relations towards others is a part of justice, is to recognize that without which the society of man cannot survive (109, 3).

The enumeration and systematization of virtues can seem to be artificial, an undue 'multiplication of entities' in the moral life. Yet looking to justice we realize that the good of virtue, the good of reason, is more eminently present, since more of the judgment and discernment of reason is needed in relationships with others; we should, therefore, expect a further refinement and multiplicity of moral values as human existence has become more complex. Two examples may be suggested. The virtue of piety as it includes respecting and honouring one's country is spoken of by St Thomas



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with words that have an Italian ring: piety binds together compatriotas in natali solo.18 He perhaps measured patriotism to one's native soil on the scale of the Kingdom of Sicily; a first footstep on the moon, the menace of nuclear or ecological suicide have made us conscious of the Good Earth, the native soil of which we are all compatriots, and of a debt in piety to respect, to revive, to preserve the planet itself. Or take the use of language in contemporary life. We are pressured to chatter at cocktail parties with strangers as though they were intimates; we are tempted to use 'in' words— —like 'input', 'finalize', 'package', 'linguistics' (when we mean language) lest we appear not to know them; we are assailed by the use of mass media. whether by politicians or peddlers, and expected by our reactions to match the predictions of market research; we are presumed to want to project a self-image in keeping with the patterns of advertising and fashion. There is room for truth, for candour, for simplicity, for appropriate speech and appropriate reticence. There may even be room for St Thomas and his evaluation of justice among men.

¹⁸III Sent. 33, 3, 4, sol. 1 ad 2.