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978-0-521-02943-8 - Summa Theologiae: Volume 35 - Consequences of Charity,  
(2a2ae. 34-46)

Thomas R. Heath O.P.

Excerpt

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## SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, 2a2ae. 34, I

DEINDE CONSIDERANDUM EST de vitiis oppositis caritati.

Et primo, de odio, quod opponitur ipsi dilectioni;  
secundo, de acedia et invidia, quæ opponuntur gaudio caritatis;  
tertio, de discordia et schismate, quæ opponuntur paci;  
quarto, de offensione et scandalo, quæ opponuntur bene-  
ficientiæ et correctioni fraternæ.

## Quæstio 34. de odio

Circa primum quærentur sex:

1. utrum Deus possit odio haberi;
2. utrum odium Dei sit maximum peccatorum;
3. utrum odium proximi semper sit peccatum;
4. utrum sit maximum inter peccata quæ sunt in proximum;
5. utrum sit vitium capitale;
6. ex quo capitali vitio oriatur.

*articulus 1. utrum aliquis possit Deum odio habere*

AD PRIMUM sic proceditur:<sup>1</sup> 1. Videtur quod Deum nullus odio habere possit. Dicit enim Dionysius<sup>2</sup> quod *omnibus amabile et diligibile est ipsum bonum et pulchrum*. Sed Deus est ipsa bonitas et pulchritudo. Ergo a nullo odio habetur.

2. Præterea, in *apocryphis Esdræ*<sup>3</sup> dicitur quod *omnia invocant veritatem, et benignantur in operibus ejus*. Sed Deus est ipsa veritas, ut dicitur *Joan.*<sup>4</sup> Ergo omnes diligunt Deum, et nullus eum odio habere potest.

3. Præterea, odium est aversio quædam. Sed sicut Dionysius<sup>5</sup> dicit, *Deus omnia ad seipsum convertit*. Ergo nullus eum odio habere potest.

<sup>1</sup>cf 1a. 60, 5 ad 5. IV *Sent.* 50, 2, 1, v. *De Verit.* xxii, 2 ad 3. *In Matt.* 13. *In Joan.* 5, 7; 15, 5. *In Rom.* 8, 2

<sup>2</sup>*De div. nom.* 4. PG 3, 708; St. Thomas, *lect.* 9

<sup>3</sup>III *Esdras* 4, 36, 39

<sup>4</sup>*John* 14, 6

<sup>5</sup>*De div. nom.* 4. PG 3, 700; St Thomas, *lect.* 3

<sup>a</sup>cf 2a2ae. 23, Introduction. As his examination develops, Thomas for various reasons considers vices that are not mentioned here and omits some that are

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## HATRED

NOW WE MUST EXAMINE the vices opposed to love:<sup>a</sup>

- first, hatred which is against the very act of love (34);
- second, spiritual apathy<sup>b</sup> and envy which are against the joy of loving (35-6);
- third, discord and schism which is against peace (37-42);
- fourth, offensiveness which is against neighbourliness, and scandal which is against fraternal correction (43).

## Question 34. hatred

With regard to the first point, we ask six questions:

1. can anyone hate God?
2. would hating God be the worst sin?
3. is hating one's neighbour always sinful?
4. is that the worst sin against him?
5. is hatred a capital sin?
6. what capital sin is behind it?

*article 1. is it possible for anyone to hate God?*

THE FIRST POINT:<sup>1</sup> 1. It would seem that no one could hate God. After all, Dionysius<sup>2</sup> says, *That which is unqualified in goodness and beauty is lovable and delightful to all.* But this is God. How then could anyone hate him?

2. In the same vein the apocrypha of *Esdras*<sup>3</sup> notes that *everyone invokes truth and is delighted with what truth can do.* But as *John* points out,<sup>4</sup> *God is truth itself.* So then, everyone loves God; none can hate him.

3. Besides, hatred involves a certain 'turning away from'. But Dionysius<sup>5</sup> tells us that God *turns everything towards himself.* Therefore, no one can hate him.

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<sup>b</sup>I have translated *acedia* as spiritual apathy, *discordia* as discord, *contentio* as contentiousness, *rixa* as brawling, *beneficentia* as neighbourliness, and *offensio* as offensiveness. The reasons for these choices will be given in the pertinent questions. Since there is no pertinent Question concerning *beneficentia* and *offensio* I note here that Thomas sees *beneficentia* as a general doing-good (*bene-facere*), an effective carrying out in various ways of the good will (*benevolentia*) a man has for others. The general virtue then, under which special virtues like almsgiving would fall is this 'beneficence'. 'Neighbourliness' seems to come closest to naming that general doing of good. Opposed to this virtue is the general vice of *offensio*. I should think 'offensiveness' is fairly close to what Thomas has in mind

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## SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, 2a2ae. 34, 2

SED CONTRA est, quod dicitur in *Psalm.*,<sup>6</sup> *Superbia eorum qui te oderunt ascendit semper*; et *Joan.*,<sup>7</sup> *Nunc autem et viderunt et oderunt me et Patrem meum.*

RESPONSIO: Dicendum quod, sicut ex supradictis<sup>8</sup> patet, odium est quidam motus appetitivæ potentiae, quæ\* non movetur nisi ab aliquo apprehenso. Deus autem dupliciter ab homine apprehendi potest: uno modo, secundum seipsum, puta cum per essentiam videtur,<sup>9</sup> alio modo, per effectus suos, cum scilicet *invisibilia Dei per ea quæ facta sunt intellecta conspiciuntur.*<sup>10</sup> Deus autem per essentiam suam est ipsa bonitas, quam nullus habere odio potest: quia de ratione boni est ut ametur. Et ideo impossibile est quod aliquis videns Deum per essentiam eum odio habeat.

Sed effectus ejus aliqui sunt qui nullo modo possunt esse contrarii voluntati humanæ: quia esse, vivere et intelligere est appetibile et amabile omnibus, quæ sunt quidam effectus Dei. Unde etiam secundum quod Deus apprehenditur ut auctor horum effectuum, non potest odio haberi.

Sunt autem quidam effectus Dei qui repugnant inordinatæ voluntati: sicut inflictio pænæ; et etiam cohibitio peccatorum per legem divinam, quæ repugnat voluntati depravatæ per peccatum. Et quantum ad considerationem talium effectuum, ab aliquibus Deus odio haberi potest: inquantum scilicet apprehenditur peccatorum prohibitor et pœnarum inflictor.<sup>11</sup>

1. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ratio illa procedit quantum ad illos qui vident Dei essentiam, quæ est ipsa essentia bonitatis.

2. Ad secundum dicendum quod ratio illa procedit quantum ad hoc quod apprehenditur Deus ut causa illorum effectuum qui naturaliter ab hominibus amantur, inter quos sunt opera veritatis præbentis suam cognitionem hominibus.

3. Ad tertium dicendum quod Deus convertit omnia ad seipsum inquantum est essendi principium: quia omnia, inquantum sunt, tendunt in Dei similitudinem, qui est ipsum esse.<sup>12</sup>

*articulus 2. utrum odium Dei sit maximum peccatorum*

AD SECUNDUM sic proceditur:<sup>1</sup> 1. Videtur quod odium Dei non sit maximum peccatorum. Gravissimum enim peccatum est peccatum in Spiritum Sanctum, quod est irremissibile, ut dicitur *Matt.*<sup>2</sup> Sed odium Dei non computatur inter species peccati in Spiritum Sanctum; ut ex supradictis patet.<sup>3</sup> Ergo odium Dei non est gravissimum peccatorum.

\*Piana, *qui*

<sup>6</sup>*Psalm* 73, 23 (D). *This ever rising clamour of your adversaries* 74: 23 (J). In reference to biblical texts, D stands for Douay–Rheims translation of the Vulgate; J for the Jerusalem Bible. If no initial appears the Jerusalem Bible is understood

<sup>7</sup>*John* 15, 24

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ON THE OTHER HAND the psalms say, *The pride of those who hate you constantly goes up*.<sup>6</sup> St John too, records, *They have seen all this, and still they hate both me and my Father*.<sup>7</sup>

REPLY: It is clear from what we have said<sup>8</sup> that hatred is a sort of movement in the appetitive power, a movement that begins once we know something. Now we can know God in two ways; in himself, when we see his essence;<sup>9</sup> and in his effects. *The invisible things of God are clearly seen being understood by the things that are made*.<sup>10</sup> In his essence God is unqualified goodness and no one could hate that since the very idea of goodness calls up love. Who sees God in his essence then could never hate him.

And even some of his effects are of a kind that could never be in opposition to human willing. Being, living, and knowing are like that, desirable and lovable to all. When God is understood as the author of such things who could ever hate him?

However, other effects of his do stand against an unruly will. Punishment is an example, and so is sin's interdict by divine law. These things simply affront a man whose will is caught in sin's depravity. To the degree that they dwell on such effects some can hate God. They hate him because he forbids sin and deals out punishment.<sup>11</sup>

Hence: 1. The argument holds for those who see God's essence, since that is unqualified goodness.

2. This argument holds when God is understood as the cause of those effects men love naturally. One such effect revealing its knowledge to men is truth.

3. God turns everything towards himself as he is the source of reality. All things inasmuch as they are real tend towards a likeness of God who is unqualified reality.<sup>12</sup>

*article 2. is hating God the worst sin?*

THE SECOND POINT:<sup>1</sup> 1. It seems that hating God is not the worst sin. After all the worst sin is that committed against the Holy Spirit, which, as *Matthew* records,<sup>2</sup> cannot be forgiven. But we have already shown<sup>3</sup> that hating God is not included among the special sins against the Holy Spirit. Hating God, then, is not the worst sin.

<sup>6</sup>1a2æ. 29, 1<sup>9</sup>1a. 12, 1<sup>10</sup>Romans 1, 20 (D). *Ever since God created the world his everlasting power and deity—however invisible—have been there for the mind to see in the things he has made* (J)<sup>11</sup>2a2æ. 19, 1<sup>12</sup>1a. 44, 3 & 4<sup>1</sup>1a2æ. 73, 4 ad 3. cf 2a2æ. 39, 2 ad 3<sup>2</sup>Matthew 12, 31<sup>3</sup>2a2æ. 14, 2

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## SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, 2a2ae. 34, 2

2. Præterea, peccatum consistit in elongatione a Deo. Sed magis videtur esse elongatus a Deo infidelis, qui nec Dei cognitionem habet, quam fidelis, qui saltem, quamvis Deum odio habet, eum tamen cognoscit. Ergo videtur quod gravius sit peccatum infidelitatis quam peccatum odii in Deum.

3. Præterea, Deus habetur odio solum ratione suorum effectuum qui repugnant voluntati, inter quos præcipuum est pœna. Sed odire poenam non est maximum peccatorum. Ergo odium Dei non est maximum peccatorum.

SED CONTRA est quod *optimo opponitur pessimum*; ut patet per Philosophum.<sup>4</sup> Sed odium Dei opponitur dilectioni Dei, in qua consistit optimum hominis. Ergo odium Dei est pessimum peccatum hominis.

RESPONSIO: Dicendum quod defectus peccati consistit in aversione a Deo, ut supra dictum est.<sup>5</sup> Hujusmodi autem aversio rationem culpæ non haberet nisi voluntaria esset. Unde ratio culpæ consistit in voluntaria aversione a Deo. Hæc autem voluntaria aversio a Deo per se quidem importatur in odio Dei: in aliis autem peccatis quasi participative et secundum aliud. Sicut enim voluntas per se inhæret ei quod amat, ita secundum se refugit id quod odit: unde quando aliquis odit Deum, voluntas ejus secundum se ab eo avertitur.

Sed in aliis peccatis, puta cum aliquis fornicatur, non avertitur a Deo secundum se, sed secundum aliud: inquantum scilicet appetit inordinatam delectationem, quæ habet annexam aversionem a Deo. Semper autem id quod est per se est potius eo quod est secundum aliud.<sup>6</sup> Unde odium Dei inter alia peccata est gravius.

1. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut Gregorius dicit,<sup>7</sup> *aliud est bona non facere, aliud est bonorum odisse datorem: sicut aliud est ex præcipitatione, aliud ex deliberatione peccare*. Ex quo datur intelligi quod odire Deum, omnium bonorum datorem, sit ex deliberatione peccare, quod est peccatum in Spiritum Sanctum. Unde manifestum est quod odium Dei maxime est peccatum in Spiritum Sanctum secundum quod peccatum in Spiritum Sanctum nominat aliquod genus speciale peccati. Ideo tamen non computatur inter species peccati in Spiritum Sanctum, quia generaliter invenitur in omni specie peccati in Spiritum Sanctum.

2. Ad secundum dicendum quod ipsa infidelitas non habet rationem culpæ nisi inquantum est voluntaria. Et ideo tanto est gravior quanto est magis voluntaria. Quod autem sit voluntaria provenit ex hoc quod aliquis odio habet veritatem quæ proponitur. Unde patet quod ratio peccati in infidelitate sit ex odio Dei, circa cujus veritatem est fides. Et ideo, sicut

<sup>4</sup>*Ethics VIII, 12. 1160 b9*

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2. Furthermore, sin involves being distant from God. Now an unbeliever would seem to be further away from God than a believer. The believer, even though he hates God, does have knowledge of him; the unbeliever does not. The sin, then, of not believing in God is worse than hating him.

3. Also, people hate God only because of those effects which stand against man's will. And that which most stands against it is punishment. Now since hating punishment is not the worst sin, neither would hating God be the worst.

ON THE OTHER HAND *the opposite of the best is the worst*, as Aristotle says.<sup>4</sup> The opposite of loving God, which is man at his best, is hating God, or man at his worst.

REPLY: As mentioned above,<sup>5</sup> sin's deficiency consists in a turning away from God, and this would not be sinful unless it were voluntary. Thus the guilt of sin lies in the voluntary turning from God which is directly implied in hating him. In other sins it is implied only indirectly and by a certain sharing. What we love we cling to directly; so we directly repulse what we hate. Thus when someone hates God his will turns directly away from him.

In other sins, as in fornication for example, one does not turn away from God directly, but rather indirectly. Connected with fornication is a turning from God, to be sure, but only through the desire for pleasure. Now since the direct is always more important than the indirect,<sup>6</sup> hatred of God is worse than other sins.

Hence: 1. Gregory writes,<sup>7</sup> *It is one thing not to do good, but quite another to hate the giver of the good. The same difference lies between doing something evil without thinking and doing it deliberately.* The implication is that hating God, the giver of all good, is deliberate and a sin against the Holy Spirit. In so far then as a sin against the Holy Spirit is described in a general way, hating God is its fullest exemplification. The reason it does not fall under the special kinds of sin against the Holy Spirit is that it is found in every one of them.

2. Unbelief must also be voluntary to be sinful, and the more it is voluntary the more it is sinful. But how does it become voluntary except by hating the truth proposed? Thus, the sinfulness about unbelief arises from hatred of God whose truth calls for faith. So then, since the cause is

<sup>4</sup>2a2ae. 10, 3

<sup>6</sup>See 2a2ae. 23, 6; 26, 12 ad 1; 27, 6 ad 1; 44, 1

<sup>7</sup>*Moralia* xxv, 11. PL 76, 339

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## SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, 2a2ae. 34, 3

causa est potior effectu, ita odium Dei est majus peccatum quam infidelitas.<sup>8</sup>

3. Ad tertium dicendum quod non quicumque odit poenas odit Deum poenarum auctorem: nam multi odiunt poenas qui tamen patienter eas ferunt ex reverentia divinæ justitiæ.<sup>9</sup> Unde et Augustinus dicit<sup>10</sup>, quod mala poenalia Deus *tolerare jubet, non amari*. Sed prorumpere in odium Dei punientis, hoc est habere odio ipsam Dei justitiam: quod est gravissimum peccatum. Unde Gregorius dicit,<sup>11</sup> *Sicut nonnunquam gravius est peccatum diligere quam perpetrare, ita nequius est odisse justitiam quam non fecisse*.

*articulus 3. utrum omne odium proximi sit peccatum*

AD TERTIUM sic proceditur:<sup>1</sup> 1. Videtur quod non omne odium proximi sit peccatum. Nullum enim peccatum invenitur in præceptis vel consiliis legis divinæ: secundum illud *Prov.*,<sup>2</sup> *Recti\* sunt omnes sermones mei: non est in eis pravum quid nec perversum*. Sed *Luc.*<sup>3</sup> dicitur, *Si quis venit ad me et non odit patrem et matrem, non potest meus esse discipulus*. Ergo non omne odium proximi est peccatum.

2. Præterea, nihil potest esse peccatum secundum quod Deum imitamur. Sed imitando Deum quosdam odio habemus: dicitur enim *Rom.*, *Detractores, Deo odibiles*.<sup>4</sup> Ergo possumus aliquos odio habere absque peccato.

3. Præterea, nihil naturalium est peccatum: quia peccatum est *recessus ab eo quod est secundum naturam*, ut Damascenus dicit.<sup>5</sup> Sed naturale est unicuique rei quod odiat id quod est sibi contrarium et quod nitatur ad ejus corruptionem. Ergo videtur non esse peccatum quod aliquis habeat odio inimicum suum.

SED CONTRA est quod dicitur *1 Joan.*,<sup>6</sup> *Qui fratrem suum odit in tenebris est*. Sed tenebræ spirituales sunt peccata. Ergo odium proximi non potest esse sine peccato.

RESPONSIO: Dicendum quod odium amori opponitur, ut supra dictum est.<sup>7</sup> Unde tantum habet odium de ratione mali quantum amor habet de ratione boni. Amor autem debetur proximo secundum id quod a Deo habet, id est secundum naturam et gratiam: non autem debetur ei amor secundum id quod habet a seipso et diabolo, scilicet secundum peccatum et justitiæ defectum.<sup>8</sup> Et ideo licet habere odio in fratre peccatum et omne illud quod pertinet ad defectum divinæ justitiæ: sed ipsam naturam et gratiam fratris

\*Vulgate, *justi*, just<sup>2</sup>2a2ae. 34, 2 ad 2<sup>10</sup>*Confessions* x, 28: PL 32, 795<sup>1</sup>cf *In Psalm.* 24. 2a2ae. 25, 6<sup>9</sup>1a. 21, 4 ad 3<sup>11</sup>*Moralia* xxv, 11. PL 76, 339<sup>2</sup>*Proverbs* 8, 8<sup>3</sup>*Luke* 14, 26

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more important than the effect, hating God is worse than not believing in him.<sup>8</sup>

3. Not everyone who hates punishment hates the God who sends it. Many hate the punishments they must suffer, yet bear them patiently out of reverence for the divine justice.<sup>9</sup> Augustine says,<sup>10</sup> *God tells us to accept, not to love punishment.* But to turn in hatred against God when he sends punishment is to hate his justice, the gravest sin. So Gregory writes,<sup>11</sup> *Sometimes it is worse to love sin than to sin; so it is worse to hate justice than to avoid doing it.*

*article 3. is every kind of hatred for neighbour a sin?*

THE THIRD POINT:<sup>1</sup> 1. It would seem that not every kind of hatred for neighbour is a sin. What is commanded or counselled by God is no sin, after all, we read in Scripture,<sup>2</sup> *All the words I say are right, nothing twisted in them, nothing false.* But then we also read,<sup>3</sup> *If any man comes to me without hating his father, mother . . . he cannot be my disciple.* Not every kind of hatred for neighbour then is a sin.

2. Moreover, one cannot sin by imitating God. But even doing that we may hate certain people, for example, the *detractors, hateful to God.*<sup>4</sup> Thus it is possible to hate someone without sin.

3. Again, since sin is a *departure from nature*, as Damascene says,<sup>5</sup> staying with nature cannot be sinful. But it is natural for anything to hate its contrary and to work towards its undoing. It seems then that hating one's enemies is no sin.

ON THE OTHER HAND we read, *Anyone who hates his brother is still in the dark.*<sup>6</sup> But dark areas of the spirit are sins. One cannot then be without sin while hating his brother.

REPLY: As we have said above,<sup>7</sup> hatred is the precise opposite of love. Thus to the extent that loving is good, hating is bad. Now we ought to love our neighbour by reason of the goods he has from God, goods of nature and grace, but not by reason of the things he has on his own or from the devil, namely, sin and failure of justice.<sup>8a</sup> It is all right then to hate the sin in

<sup>4</sup>Romans 1, 30 (b). *Slanderers, enemies of God* (J) basing enemies on 5, 10 & 8, 7

<sup>5</sup>De fide orth. II, 4, 30; IV, 30. PG 94, 876, 976, 1196

<sup>6</sup>1 John 2, 9

<sup>7</sup>1a2æ. 29, 1 s. c.; 2, obj. 1 & ad 2

<sup>8</sup>See 1a. 20, 2 ad 4; 2a2æ. 25, 6; 31, 2 ad 2; 32, 9 ad 1; 64, 6; 83, 16

<sup>8a</sup>peccatum et iustitiæ defectum, but 'justice' here is obviously being used in the wide sense of righteousness or conformity to God's will



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## SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, 2a2ae. 34, 4

non potest aliquis habere odio sine peccato. Hoc autem ipsum quod in fratre odimus culpam et defectum boni, pertinet ad fratris amorem: eiusdem enim rationis est quod velimus bonum alicujus et quod odimus malum ipsius. Unde, simpliciter accipiendo odium fratris, semper est cum peccato.

1. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod parentes, quantum ad naturam et affinitatem qua nobis junguntur, sunt a nobis secundum præceptum Dei honorandi, ut patet *Exod.*<sup>9</sup> Odiendi autem sunt quantum ad hoc quod impedimentum præstant nobis accedendi ad perfectionem divinæ justitiæ.<sup>10</sup>

2. Ad secundum dicendum quod Deus in detractoribus odio habet culpam, non naturam. Et sic sine culpa possumus odio detractores habere.

5. Ad tertium dicendum quod homines secundum bona quæ habent a Deo non sunt nobis contrarii: unde quantum ad hoc sunt amandi. Contrariantur autem nobis secundum quod contra nos inimicitias exercent, quod ad eorum culpam pertinet: et quantum ad hoc sunt odio habendi. Hoc enim in eis debemus habere odio, quod nobis sunt inimici.

*articulus 4. utrum odium proximi sit gravissimum peccatorum quæ in proximum committuntur*

AD QUARTUM sic proceditur.<sup>1</sup> 1. Videtur quod odium proximi sit gravissimum peccatum eorum quæ in proximo committuntur. Dicitur enim 1 *Joan.*,<sup>2</sup> *Omnis qui odit fratrem suum homicida est.* Sed homicidium est gravissimum peccatum quæ committuntur in proximum. Ergo et odium.

2. Præterea, *pessimum opponitur optimo.*<sup>3</sup> Sed optimum eorum quæ in proximo exhibemus est amor: omnia enim alia ad dilectionem referuntur. Ergo et pessimum est odium.

SED CONTRA, malum dicitur *quod\* nocet*, secundum Augustinum.<sup>4</sup> Sed plus aliquis nocet proximo per alia peccata quam per odium: puta per furtum et homicidium et adulterium. Ergo odium non est gravissimum peccatum.

Præterea, Chrysostomus, exponens illud *Matt.*,<sup>5</sup> *Qui solverit unum de mandatis istis minimis, dicit, Mandata Moysi, Non occides, Non adulterabis, in remuneratione modica sunt, in peccato autem magna: mandata autem Christi, idest Non irascaris, Non concupiscas, in remuneratione magna sunt, in peccato autem minima.*<sup>6</sup> Odium autem pertinet ad interiorem motum, sicut et ira et concupiscentia. Ergo odium proximi est minus peccatum quam homicidium.

\*Piana: *quia*, because

<sup>9</sup>*Exodus* 20, 12

<sup>10</sup>See 2a2ae. 25, 6; 26, 2 s. c.; 26, 7, obj. 1 and ad 1; 101, 4, obj. 1 and ad 1

<sup>1</sup>cf *De Malo* XII, 4. 2a2ae. 158, 4

<sup>2</sup>1 *John* 3, 15

<sup>3</sup>*pessimum opponitur optimo, Ethic.* VIII, 12, 1160b9-12 <sup>4</sup>*Enchirid.* 12. PL 40, 237

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one's brother and whatever comes under deficiencies in following the divine will. But to hate nature itself or grace in a man cannot be done without sin. As a matter of fact, hating the sin or the lack of good in our brother is a part of our loving him, since, for the same reason we desire good for someone, we hate the evil he has. Without all these distinctions, however, hatred for our brother is always a sin.

Hence: 1. Regarding our parents we are told by God to honour them.<sup>9</sup> They belong to us by nature and kinship. But we have got to hate them, that is, hate their being a hindrance to our striving to do God's will perfectly.<sup>10</sup>

2. God hates the detractor's sin, not his nature. So we may hate detractors in the same way without sin.

3. Men are not hostile to us by reason of the goods they have from God. We ought to love them on that account. But in so far as they do wrong things against us<sup>b</sup> they are hostile, and to blame for it. We ought then to hate them in so far as they set up this kind of enmity.

*article 4. is hatred the worst sin of all against our neighbour?*

THE FOURTH POINT:<sup>1</sup> 1. It would seem that hatred is the worst sin of all those we can commit against our neighbour. St John writes,<sup>2</sup> *To hate your brother is to be a murderer*. But murder is the worst we can do against him. So why not hatred?

2. Also, *the worst faces off against the best*.<sup>3</sup> But the best we have for our neighbour is love. All other good things can be traced to love's influence. Hatred then is the worst.

ON THE OTHER HAND we say something is evil *if it hurts us*, as Augustine notes.<sup>4</sup> But we can hurt our neighbour more by other sins than hatred, for example, by stealing, murder and adultery. Hatred would not be the worst then.

Again, on the text from *Matthew*,<sup>5</sup> *The man who infringes even one of the least of these commandments*, Chrysostom comments in this way,<sup>6</sup> *The reward we get for keeping the Mosaic commands not to kill, not to commit adultery is rather small while the punishment for breaking them is great. But the reward for keeping Christ's commands not to get angry, not to have evil desires is great while the punishment for breaking them is rather small*. Now just as anger and evil desire pertain to interior movement so also does hatred. It would be a lesser sin than murder.

<sup>5</sup>Matthew 5, 19

<sup>6</sup>*Opus imperfectum in Matt.* 10, on 5, 19. PG 56, 688. Pseudo-Chrysostom

<sup>b</sup>*contra nos inimicitias exercent*