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978-0-521-02940-7 - Summa Theologiae: Volume 32 - Consequences of Faith, (2a2ae. 8-16)

Thomas Gilby O.P.

Excerpt

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## SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, 2a2æ. 8, I

DEINDE CONSIDERANDUM EST de dono intellectus et scientiæ, quæ respondent virtuti fidei.

## Quæstio 8. de dono intellectus

Et circa donum intellectus quærentur octo:

1. utrum intellectus sit donum Spiritus Sancti;
2. utrum possit simul esse in eodem cum fide;
3. utrum intellectus, qui est donum Spiritus Sancti, sit speculativus tantum vel etiam practicus;
4. utrum omnes qui sunt in gratia habeant donum intellectus;
5. utrum hoc donum inveniatur in aliquibus absque gratia;
6. quo modo se habeat donum intellectus ad alia dona;
7. de eo quod respondet huic dono in beatitudinibus;
8. de eo quod respondet ei in fructibus.

*articulus 1. utrum intellectus sit donum Spiritus Sancti*

AD PRIMUM sic proceditur:<sup>1</sup> 1. Videtur quod intellectus non sit donum Spiritus Sancti. Dona enim gratuita distinguuntur a donis naturalibus; superadduntur enim eis. Sed intellectus est quidam habitus naturalis in anima, quo cognoscuntur principia naturaliter nota, ut patet in *Ethic.*<sup>2</sup> Ergo non debet poni donum Spiritus Sancti.

2. Præterea, dona divina participantur a creaturis secundum earum proportionem et modum, ut patet per Dionysium.<sup>3</sup> Sed modus humanæ naturæ est ut non simpliciter veritatem cognoscat (quod pertinet ad rationem intellectus), sed discursive (quod est proprium rationis), ut patet per Dionysium.<sup>4</sup> Ergo cognitio divina, quæ hominibus datur, magis debet dici donum rationis quam intellectus.

<sup>1</sup>cf III *Sent.* 35, 2, 2, i

<sup>2</sup>Aristotle, *Ethics* VI, 6. 1140b31. St Thomas, *lect.* 5

<sup>3</sup>*De Divinis Nominibus* 4. PG 3, 720. St Thomas, *lect.* 16

<sup>4</sup>op cit 7. PG 3, 869. St Thomas, *lect.* 2

<sup>5</sup>The Gifts of the Holy Ghost, studied *ex professo* in 1a2æ. 68, Vol. 24 of this series, ed. E. D. O'Connor, may be taken as the counterpart in the order of grace to the movement of genius in the order of nature, to which Aristotle refers in the *Eudemian Ethics* VII, 14 and *Magna Moralia* II, 8. These sections were joined in a Latin compilation, the *Liber de Bona Fortuna*, which influenced medieval writers in their treatment of responses to the divinity below and beyond the level of deliberation and rational virtue, that is, of human and moral activity properly so called (1a2æ. 1, 1), even as charged with divine grace. The mode of operation of these responses is superhuman, or not to be resolved into activity of which man is the

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[More information](#)

## THE GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING

NEXT TO BE DISCUSSED are the Gifts of Understanding and of Science (9), which match the virtue of faith.<sup>a</sup>

## Question 8. the Gift of Understanding

Here there are eight points of inquiry:

1. is understanding a Gift of the Holy Ghost?
2. can it co-exist with faith?
3. is Understanding, which is a Gift of the Holy Ghost, just contemplative or practical as well
4. have all in a state of grace the Gift of Understanding?
5. is the gift to be found in those without grace?
6. how does the Gift of Understanding bear on the other Gifts?
7. which among the Beatitudes corresponds to it?
8. and which among the Fruits of the Spirit?

*article 1. is understanding a Gift of the Holy Spirit?*

THE FIRST POINT:<sup>1</sup> 1. It seems not. For gifts of grace are distinct from those of nature as being granted over and above them. Now understanding, as is clear from the *Ethics*,<sup>2</sup> is an inborn quality of mind which recognizes the first principles of natural reason. And so it should not be counted as a Gift of the Holy Spirit.

2. Again, Dionysius<sup>b</sup> holds that creatures share in divine gifts according to their own proportion and manner.<sup>3</sup> Yet it is not in the manner of human nature to know truth by simple insight, which is the function of understanding, but by the discursive process proper to reasoning: this Dionysius also shows.<sup>4</sup> Hence the divine knowledge given to men should be called a gift of reason rather than of understanding.

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proper and principal cause, and so is their effect, which is lifted above human responsibility: the thought is echoed by Shakespeare, 'Fortune brings in some boats that are not steered.' *Cymbeline* IV, 3.

Discussions on the appropriate Gift—the term is capitalized when it bears this special and technical sense—are appended to the *Summa* treatise on each theological and cardinal virtue, with the exception of temperance and this only for the methodical reason that all the accepted seven Gifts have already been found a niche in the plan.

<sup>b</sup>Dionysius. The author of a body of theological writings, which aimed to achieve a synthesis between Christian and Neo-Platonist doctrine and exercised a profound influence on medieval theology both in the West and in the East. At one time identified with the Areopagite of *Acts* 17, 34, but probably a Syrian monk, c. 500. Latin translation by John Scotus Eruigena.

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[More information](#)

## SUMMA THEOLOGICÆ, 2a2æ. 8, I

3. Præterea, in potentiis animæ intellectus contra voluntatem dividitur, ut patet in *de Anima*.<sup>5</sup> Sed nullum donum Spiritus Sancti dicitur voluntas. Ergo etiam nullum donum Spiritus Sancti debet dici intellectus.

SED CONTRA est quod dicitur *Isa.*, *Requiescet super eum Spiritus Domini, Spiritus sapientiæ et intellectus*.<sup>6</sup>

RESPONSIO: Dicendum quod nomen intellectus quamdam intimam cognitionem importat: dicitur enim intelligere quasi intus legere. Et hoc manifeste patet considerantibus differentiam intellectus et sensus; nam cognitio sensitiva occupatur circa qualitates sensibiles exteriores, cognitio autem intellectiva penetrat usque ad essentiam rei. Objectum enim intellectus est *quod quid est*, ut dicitur in *de Anima*.<sup>7</sup> Sunt autem multa genera eorum quæ interius latent, ad quæ oportet cognitionem hominis quasi intrinsicus penetrare. Nam sub accidentibus latet natura rei substantialis, sub verbis latent significata verborum, sub similitudinibus et figuris latet veritas figurata; res etiam intelligibiles sunt quodammodo interiores respectu rerum sensibilibus, quæ exterius sentiuntur, et in causis latent effectus, et e converso. Unde respectu horum omnium potest dici intellectus.

Sed cum cognitio hominis a sensu incipiat quasi ab exteriori, manifestum est quod quanto lumen intellectus est fortius, tanto potest magis ad intima penetrare. Lumen autem naturale nostri intellectus est finitæ virtutis: unde usque ad determinatum aliquid pertingere potest. Indiget ergo homo supernaturali lumine ut ulterius penetret ad cognoscendum quædam quæ per lumen naturale cognoscere non valet; et illud lumen supernaturale homini datum vocatur donum intellectus.

1. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod per lumen naturale nobis inditum statim cognoscuntur quædam principia communia, quæ sunt naturaliter nota. Sed quia homo ordinatur ad beatitudinem supernaturalem, ut supra dictum est,<sup>8</sup> necesse est quod homo ulterius pertingat ad quædam altiora; et ad hoc requiritur donum intellectus.

2. Ad secundum dicendum quod discursus rationis semper incipit ab intellectu, et terminatur ad intellectum; ratiocinamur enim procedendo ex quibusdam intellectis; et tunc rationis discursus perficitur quando ad hoc

<sup>5</sup>Aristotle, *De Anima* III, 9 & 10. 432b5 & 433a21. St Thomas, *lect.* 14 & 15

<sup>6</sup>*Isaiah* II, 2

<sup>7</sup>*De Anima* III, 6. 430b27. St Thomas, *lect.* 11

<sup>8</sup>*1a.* 12, 1. 1a2æ. 3, 8. 2a2æ, 2, 3

<sup>c</sup>understanding, see Glossary. Better etymology, *inter lego*, see into

<sup>d</sup>The Aristotelean teaching that 'essences' are known by the human mind has sometimes, and with some excuse from the treatment of 'quiddities' by late medieval scholastics, been taken to mean more than it says, and has been accord-

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Excerpt

[More information](#)

#### THE GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING

3. Besides, in dividing the soul's faculties the *De Anima* contrasts understanding with will.<sup>5</sup> However there is no Gift of the Holy Spirit called after the will. Correspondingly there should be none called after the understanding.

ON THE OTHER HAND *Isaiah* says, *On him the spirit of the Lord rests, a spirit of wisdom and understanding.*<sup>6</sup>

REPLY: 'Understanding' implies a certain intimate knowing; to understand, *intelligere*, is as it were to read within, *intus legere*.<sup>c</sup> This is evident when you consider the difference between intelligence and sense. For sense-knowledge is engaged with external empirical qualities, whereas intellectual knowledge penetrates as far as the essence of a thing, its objective interest being, according to the *De Anima*, what a thing really is.<sup>7d</sup> Now there are many degrees of reality, as it were inside it, to which a man's knowledge should reach. For under its accidents lies the substantial nature of a thing, under words lies what they signify, under likenesses and figures lies the truth which is represented; in some way also intelligible realities lie within outwardly experienced objects of sense, and so do effects in causes, and conversely. Accordingly we can refer 'understanding' to all such cases.

Yet since man's knowledge starts from the senses,<sup>e</sup> and from outside, so to speak, it is clear that the stronger the light of understanding the deeper its penetration. The natural light of our understanding is, however, of limited power, and can go only so far. Consequently man needs a supernatural light to penetrate further and know things for which natural light is not enough. And this supernatural light granted him is called the Gift of Understanding.

Hence: 1. Some common naturally evident first principles of thought are immediately recognized by the inborn light of understanding with which we are endowed. Yet because we are ordained to supernatural happiness, as we have seen,<sup>8</sup> we need to reach beyond to certain deeper truths. And for this we need the Gift of Understanding.

2. The process of reasoning always begins and finishes with understanding; when we reason we proceed from some truth being understood, and then our discourse is completed when we arrive at an understanding of

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ingly discredited. Its authentic claims, though firm, are modest: we can reach, not comprehensive knowledge of real wholes, but definitive meanings, sometimes largely negative, of natures embodied in our world, and make valid inferences about what lies beyond: cf. Ia. 84, 1; 85, 1 & 3; 86, 1; 88, 1 & 2.

<sup>e</sup>The empirical basis of human knowledge: cf. Ia. 84, 5 & 6.

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[More information](#)

## SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, 2a2ae. 8, 2

pervenimus ut intelligamus id quod prius erat ignotum. Quod ergo ratiocinamur ex aliquo præcedenti intellectu procedit. Donum autem gratiæ non procedit ex lumine naturæ, sed superadditur ei, quasi perficiens ipsum. Et ideo ista superadditio non dicitur ratio, sed magis intellectus quia ita se habet lumen superadditum ad ea quæ nobis supernaturaliter innotescunt sicut se habet lumen naturale ad ea quæ primordialiter cognoscimus.

3. Ad tertium dicendum quod voluntas nominat simpliciter appetitivum motum absque determinatione alicujus excellentiæ. Sed intellectus nominat quamdam excellentiam cognitionis penetrantis ad intima. Et ideo supernaturale donum magis nominatur nomine intellectus quam nomine voluntatis.

*articulus 2. utrum donum intellectus possit simul esse cum fide*

AD SECUNDUM sic proceditur: 1. Videtur quod donum intellectus non simul habeatur cum fide. Dicit enim Augustinus quod *id quod intelligitur intelligentis comprehensione finitur*.<sup>2</sup> Sed id quod creditur non comprehenditur, secundum illud Apostoli, *Non quod jam comprehenderim, aut quod perfectus sim*.<sup>3</sup> Ergo videtur quod fides et intellectus non possint esse in eodem.

2. Præterea, omne quod intelligitur, intellectu videtur.\* Sed fides est de non apparentibus, ut supra dictum est.<sup>4</sup> Ergo fides non potest simul esse in eodem cum intellectu.

3. Præterea, intellectus est certior quam scientia. Sed scientia et fides non possunt esse de eodem, ut supra dictum est.<sup>5</sup> Multo ergo minus intellectus et fides.

SED CONTRA est quod Gregorius dicit quod *intellectus de auditis mentem illustrat*.<sup>6</sup> Sed aliquis habens fidem potest esse illustratus mente circa audita: unde dicitur *Lucæ* ult. quod *Dominus aperuit discipulis suis sensum, ut intelligerent Scripturas*.<sup>7</sup> Ergo intellectus potest simul esse cum fide.

RESPONSIO: Dicendum quod hic duplici distinctione est opus, una quidem ex parte fidei, alia autem ex parte intellectus. Ex parte quidem fidei distinguendum est quod quædam per se directe cadunt sub fide, quæ naturalem rationem excedunt, sicut Deum esse trinum et unum, Filium Dei esse incarnatum; quædam vero cadunt sub fide, quasi ordinata ad ista secundum aliquem modum, sicut omnia quæ in Scriptura divina continentur.

\*Piana: *naturaliter*<sup>3</sup>*Philippians* 3, 12<sup>2</sup>*lxxxiii Quæst.* 15. PL 40, 14<sup>4</sup>2a2ae. I, 4; 4, 1<sup>5</sup>2a2ae. I, 5

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Excerpt

[More information](#)

## THE GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING

what was hitherto unknown.<sup>f</sup> That we reason at all comes from previous understanding. Now a gift of grace does not issue from a light of nature, but is added over and above that as an enhancement. This is named after 'understanding' rather than 'reason', since its relation to the things made known to us supernaturally is like that of the natural light of understanding to the things we instinctively recognize.

3. 'Willing' spells a motion of appetite without the qualification of achieving something valuable.<sup>g</sup> 'Understanding', however, implies a certain excellence of knowledge by inward penetration. Accordingly the supernatural Gift is called after understanding rather than willing.

*article 2. can the Gift of Understanding coexist with faith?*

THE SECOND POINT: 1. It would seem not. Augustine writes, *That which is understood is limited by the comprehension of the one understanding.*<sup>2</sup> Now what is believed cannot be comprehended; as St Paul puts it, *Not that I have yet grasped, or that I have yet won.*<sup>3</sup> It would seem, then, that faith and Understanding cannot coexist.

2. Again, that which the mind understands it sees. But, as we have agreed,<sup>4</sup> faith is of the unseen. Therefore it cannot go along with understanding.

3. Furthermore, understanding is surer than scientific knowledge. Yet it has been already held that there cannot be faith and scientific knowledge of the same object.<sup>5</sup> Much less, therefore, faith and understanding.<sup>a</sup>

ON THE OTHER HAND, Gregory holds that *understanding enlightens the mind on things it has heard.*<sup>6</sup> Now a person having faith can be so enlightened; thus, when our Lord commissioned his apostles, *he opened their minds to understand the Scriptures.*<sup>7</sup> Consequently understanding can go with faith.

REPLY: There is need here of a double distinction, one on the part of faith and the other on that of understanding. As for faith a distinction is to be drawn between matters exceeding natural reason which fall under faith directly and of themselves, for instance that God is three and one, and that the Son of God became flesh, and matters which fall under faith as bearing on it, for instance all facts recorded, in sacred Scripture.<sup>b</sup>

<sup>e</sup>*Moralia* 1, 32. PL 75, 547<sup>f</sup>*Luke* 24, 45<sup>g</sup>Reasoning, a process intermediate between understandings: cf 1a. 79, 8.<sup>h</sup>cf 1a2ae. 3, 4, the act of beatitude is immediately of the mind rather than of the will.<sup>a</sup>Believing contrasted with seeing and scientifically proving, 2a2ae. 1, 4 & 5.<sup>b</sup>cf 1a. 32, 4.

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[More information](#)

## SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, 2a2ae. 8, 3

Ex parte vero intellectus distinguendum est quod dupliciter dici possumus aliqua intelligere. Uno modo perfecte, quando scilicet pertingimus ad cognoscendum essentiam rei intellectæ, et ipsam veritatem enuntiabilis intellecti, secundum quod in se est; et hoc modo ea quæ directe cadunt sub fide intelligere non possumus durante statu fidei. Sed quædam alia ad fidem ordinata etiam hoc modo intelligi possunt. Alio modo contingit aliquid intelligi imperfecte, quando scilicet ipsa essentia rei, vel veritas propositionis non cognoscitur quid sit aut quomodo sit; sed tamen cognoscitur quod ea quæ exterius apparent veritati non contrariantur, inquantum scilicet homo intelligit quod propter ea quæ exterius apparent non est recedendum ab his quæ sunt fidei; et secundum hoc nihil prohibet, durante statu fidei, intelligere etiam ea quæ per se sub fide cadunt.

Et per hoc patet responsio ad objecta: nam primæ tres rationes procedunt secundum quod aliquid perfecte intelligitur; ultima autem ratio<sup>8</sup> procedit de intellectu eorum quæ ordinantur ad fidem.

*articulus 3. utrum donum intellectus sit speculativum tantum, an etiam practicum*

AD TERTIUM sic proceditur:<sup>1</sup> 1. Videtur quod intellectus, qui ponitur donum Spiritus Sancti, non sit practicus, sed speculativus tantum. Intellectus enim, ut Gregorius dicit, *altiora quædam penetrat*.<sup>2</sup> Sed ea quæ pertinent ad intellectum practicum non sunt alta, sed quædam infima, scilicet singularia, circa quæ sunt actus. Ergo intellectus, qui ponitur donum, non est intellectus practicus.

2. Præterea, intellectus qui est donum est dignius aliquid quam intellectus qui est virtus intellectualis. Sed intellectus qui est virtus intellectualis, est solum circa necessaria, ut patet per Philosophum.<sup>3</sup> Ergo multo magis intellectus qui est donum est solum circa necessaria. Sed intellectus practicus non est circa necessaria, sed circa contingentia aliter se habere, quæ opere humano fieri possunt. Ergo intellectus qui est donum non est intellectus practicus.

3. Præterea, donum intellectus illustrat mentem ad ea quæ naturalem rationem excedunt. Sed operabilia humana, quorum est practicus intellectus, non excedunt naturalem rationem, quæ dirigit in rebus agendis, ut ex supra dictis patet.<sup>4</sup> Ergo intellectus qui est donum non est intellectus practicus.

<sup>8</sup>sed contra, on the other hand <sup>1</sup>cf 2a2ae. 8, 6 ad 3 <sup>2</sup>Moralia I, 32. PL 75, 547

<sup>3</sup>Ethics VI, I. 1140b31. St Thomas, lect. 5

<sup>4</sup>1a2ae. 58, 2; 71, 6

<sup>c</sup>Thus the effort of theology summed up in Anselm's phrase, *Fides querens intellectum*. On this search for understanding, cf 1a. I, Vol. I of this series, ed. T. Gilby, Appendix 2, *Method of the Summa* (§6); 5, *Sacra Doctrina*; 6, *Theology as Science* (§§15-34); 7 *Revelation* (§§9-15).



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[More information](#)

## THE GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING

As for understanding a distinction is to be drawn between two ways in which we can be said to understand anything, namely completely and incompletely. The first is when we arrive at knowing the essence of the thing understood and the very truth itself of our expressed understanding. In this way, as long as we are in the state of faith, we cannot understand the thing understood and the very truth itself in our expressed understanding. other things which bear upon faith. Secondly, something can be incompletely understood when the very essence of a thing or the truth of the proposition expressing it is not known for quite what or how it is, yet nevertheless we know that outward appearances do not belie its truth, as when we understand that the things of faith are not to be abandoned because of things apparent to sense. In this way there is nothing to stop our understanding even of things which fall directly under faith while we are yet in the state of faith.

Hence: The position with regard to the opening arguments is clear. The first three are about the complete understanding of something, while the last<sup>8</sup> is about the understanding of things bearing on faith.<sup>9</sup>

*article 3. is the Gift of Understanding just contemplative or also practical?*

THE THIRD POINT: <sup>1a</sup> 1. Apparently it is contemplative only. For understanding, as Gregory remarks, *penetrates to the depths*.<sup>2</sup> The practical intellect, however, works more on the surface, namely with the individual occasions which engage our actions. Therefore the understanding which is set down as a Gift is not practical understanding.

2. Moreover, the Gift of Understanding is a nobler quality than the intellectual virtue of the same name. But, as Aristotle makes clear, this last is only about necessary truths.<sup>3</sup> All the more then is this so with the Gift. Now the practical intellect is engaged, not with necessary truths, but with contingent things which can be otherwise and which are wrought through human action. Therefore the understanding which is a Gift is not practical.

3. Further, the Gift of Understanding enlightens the mind on matters surpassing natural reason. But human deeds and works, which are the affair of practical understanding, are not beyond the scope of natural reason, which, as has been agreed, is directive of what we should do.<sup>4</sup> And so the Gift of Understanding is not practical understanding.

<sup>a</sup>Contemplative, *speculativum*, of an act of the theoretic mind, *intellectus speculativus*: 'speculative' and 'theoretic' are not used as translations here to avoid any suggestion of detachment and remoteness. Note that the author does not divide theory and practice so deeply as to set up two distinct abilities of mind concerning them: Ia. 79, 11. On the present art. Cajetan remarks that faith and Christian theology are higher and deeper than the distinction.



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[More information](#)

## SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, 2a2ae. 8, 4

SED CONTRA est quod in *Psal.* dicitur, *Intellectus bonus omnibus facientibus eum.*<sup>5</sup>

RESPONSIO: Dicendum quod, sicut dictum est,<sup>6</sup> donum intellectus non solum se habet ad ea quæ primo et principaliter cadunt sub fide, sed etiam ad omnia quæ ad fidem ordinantur. Operationes autem bonæ quemdam ordinem ad fidem habent. Nam *fides per dilectionem operatur*, ut Apostolus dicit.<sup>7</sup> Et ideo donum intellectus etiam ad quædam operabilia se extendit, non quidem ut circa ea principaliter versetur, sed in quantum in agendis regulamur *rationibus æternis, quibus conspiciendis et consulendis*, secundum Augustinum, *inheret superior ratio*,<sup>8</sup> quæ dono intellectus perficitur.

1. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod operabilia humana secundum quod in se considerantur non habent aliquam excellentiæ altitudinem; sed secundum quod referuntur ad regulam legis æternæ, et ad finem\* beatitudinis divinæ, sic altitudinem habent, ut circa ea possit esse intellectus.

2. Ad secundum dicendum quod hoc ipsum pertinet ad dignitatem doni, quod est intellectus, quod intelligibilia æterna vel necessaris considerat, non solum secundum quod in se sunt, sed etiam secundum quod sunt regulæ quædam humanorum actuum; quia quanto virtus cognoscitiva ad plura se extendit, tanto nobilior est.

3. Ad tertium dicendum quod regula humanorum actuum est ratio humana et lex æterna, ut supra dictum est.<sup>9</sup> Lex autem æterna excedit naturalem rationem. Et ideo cognitio humanorum actuum secundum quod regulantur a lege æterna excedit naturalem rationem, et indiget supernaturali lumine doni Spiritus Sancti.

*articulus 4. utrum donum intellectus insit omnibus habentibus gratiam*

AD QUARTUM sic proceditur: 1. Videtur quod donum intellectus non insit omnibus habentibus gratiam. Dicit enim Gregorius quod *donum intellectus datur contra hebetudinem mentis.*<sup>2</sup> Sed multi habentes gratiam adhuc patiuntur mentis hebetudinem. Ergo donum intellectus non est in omnibus habentibus gratiam.

2. Præterea, inter ea quæ cognitionem pertinent, sola fides videtur esse necessaria ad salutem, quia per fidem Christus inhabitat in cordibus nostris, ut dicitur *Ephes.*<sup>3</sup> Sed non omnes habentes fidem habent donum intellectus;

\*Piana: *fidem*, faith in

<sup>5</sup>*Psalms* 110 (111), 10

<sup>6</sup>art. 2

<sup>7</sup>*Galatians* 5, 6

<sup>8</sup>*De Trinitate* XII, 2 & 7. PL 42, 999 & 1005

<sup>9</sup>2a2ae.71, 6

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[More information](#)

## THE GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING

ON THE OTHER HAND is the verse from the *Psalms*, *A good understanding is theirs who carry it out*<sup>5</sup>

REPLY: As we have observed,<sup>6</sup> for the Gift of Understanding the field is not confined to matters which fall under faith primarily and principally, but includes as well all interests relevant to faith. Among them are good deeds, for, as St Paul says, *faith works through love*.<sup>7</sup> So the Gift of Understanding extends also to deeds to be done, not that they are its principal concern, but inasmuch as our actions are ruled by the eternal reasons to which the higher reason, according to Augustine, cleaves by contemplating and being advised by them.<sup>8</sup> This higher reason is perfected by the Gift of Understanding.<sup>b</sup>

Hence: 1. Considered in themselves, human deeds have no great depth. Yet in relation to the rule of Eternal Law and the goal of divine bliss they have depth enough to be matters of understanding.

2. The value of the Gift which is understanding lies in this, that eternal and necessary truths are considered not only as they are in themselves, but also as certain rules for human conduct. The wider the range of a cognitive power the better it is.

3. The measure for human activity is set both by human reason and by the Eternal Law, as we have seen.<sup>9</sup> Now the Eternal Law exceeds natural reason. Accordingly to know human acts as measured by Eternal Law likewise goes beyond natural reason, and accordingly calls for the supernatural light of a Gift of the Holy Ghost.<sup>c</sup>

*article 4. is the Gift of Understanding present in all who have God's grace?*

THE FOURTH POINT: 1. Apparently not. For Gregory presents it as a remedy for dullness of mind.<sup>2</sup> Yet many suffer from this though they have grace. The Gift of Understanding, then, is not in everyone having grace.

2. Moreover, of all kinds of knowledge faith alone seems necessary for salvation, for by faith, St Paul says, *Christ lives in our hearts*.<sup>3</sup> But not all believers have the Gift of Understanding; indeed Augustine tells us that

<sup>2</sup>*Moralia* II, 49. PL 75, 592

<sup>3</sup>*Ephesians* 3, 17

<sup>b</sup>The *ratio superior* and *ratio inferior*, notions taken from Augustine. The *Summa*, which treats them as referring to distinct functions, not powers or faculties (cf ra. 79, 9), makes no great use of them.

The admission of practicality into Understanding marks a revision of the author's earlier teaching; see art. 6 below.

<sup>c</sup>The Eternal Law, *Lex Aeterna*, in the mind of God, the archetype of all law: 1a2ae. 91, 1; 93, 1-6.