

The Summa Theologiæ ranks among the greatest documents of the Christian Church, and is a landmark of medieval western thought. It provides the framework for Catholic studies in systematic theology and for a classical Christian philosophy, and is regularly consulted by scholars of all faiths and none, across a range of academic disciplines. This paperback reissue of the classic Latin/English edition first published by the English Dominicans in the 1960s and 1970s, in the wake of the Second Vatican Council, has been undertaken in response to regular requests from readers and librarians around the world for the entire series of 61 volumes to be made available again. The original text is unchanged, except for the correction of a small number of typographical errors.

The original aim of this edition was not narrowly ecclesiastical. It sought to make this treasure of the Christian intellectual heritage available to theologians and philosophers of all backgrounds, including those who, without claiming to be believers themselves, appreciate a religious integrity which embodies hardbitten rationalism and who recognise in Thomas Aquinas a master of that perennial philosophy which forms the bedrock of European civilisation. Because of this the editors worked under specific instructions to bear in mind not only the professional theologian, but also the general reader with an interest in the 'reason' in Christianity. The parallel English and Latin texts can be used successfully by anybody with a basic knowledge of Latin, while the presence of the Latin text has allowed the translators a degree of freedom in adapting their English version for modern readers. Each volume contains a glossary of technical terms and is designed to be complete in itself to serve for private study or as a course text.



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
ST THOMAS AQUINAS SUMMA THEOLOGIÆ



ST THOMAS AQUINAS

SUMMA THEOLOGIÆ

Latin text and English translation, Introductions, Notes, Appendices and Glossaries





> PIE MEMORIA JOANNIS

> > PP. XXIII

DICATUM



IN AN AUDIENCE, 13 December 1963, to a group representing the Dominican Editors and the combined Publishers of the New English Summa, His Holiness Pope Paul VI warmly welcomed and encouraged their undertaking. A letter from His Eminence Cardinal Cicognani, Cardinal Secretary of State, 6 February 1968, expressed the continued interest of the Holy Father in the progress of the work, 'which does honour to the Dominican Order, and the Publishers, and is to be considered without doubt as greatly contributing to the growth and spread of a genuinely Catholic culture', and communicated his particular Apostolic Blessing. The assurance was repeated in a letter, 5 February 1973 from the present Secretary of State, His Eminence Cardinal Villot.



To
Richard and Margery Anne Shunick
Fides quæ per caritatem operatur. Galatians 5, 6



ST THOMAS AQUINAS SUMMA THEOLOGIÆ

VOLUME 31

FAITH

(2a2æ. 1-7)

Latin text, English translation, Introduction Notes, Appendices & Glossary

T. C. O'BRIEN



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THE TEXT AND TRANSLATION

THE LATIN text corresponds at most points to the Leonine edition, commissioned at the end of the last century by Leo XIII. Variant readings from the Piana edition of 1570-1, commissioned by Pius v (modern edition, Ottawa, 1941-5) are noted throughout, and where they seem more in keeping with the sense, substituted in the text. Paragraphing and punctuation of the Latin text are those of the editor. The English has been prepared to be read independently, but reference to the Latin text is encouraged and facilitated in this edition. Conviction about the style of St Thomas as well as experience with students having no prior acquaintance with his thought nor knowledge of Latin have inclined me towards plainness in the translation. The Latin is deliberately impersonal, sparse, colourless; the vocabulary is neither rich nor imaginative; the phraseology is often dependent on academic conventions or even the history of a particular point. Literary grace is not the author's preoccupation; reading his Latin requires a degree of intus legere; the editor believes that a translation should not require more than this 'reading inside', but that it should not by flair or folksiness put the reader off from the requirement of getting inside to the ideas. Finally, it is of some importance in this volume to mention that biblical texts are quoted from the Douay translation of the Vulgate; the Vulgate language sets the lines of debate on many points.

FOOTNOTES

Those signified by a superior number are usually the references given by St Thomas and tracked down by the Leonine Commission, with the exception of no. I to each article which refers to parallel texts in his writings. Those signified alphabetically are editorial references and explanatory remarks.

REFERENCES

Biblical references are to the Vulgate; Patristic references to Migne (PG, Greek Fathers; PL, Latin Fathers). When the English titles are well known, references to the works of St Thomas and Aristotle are in English. Titles of St Thomas's works are abbreviated as follows:

Summa Theologiæ, without title. Part, question, article, reply; e.g. 1a. 70, 1 ad 2. 2a2æ. 25, 4.

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Summa Contra Gentiles, CG. Book, chapter; e.g. CG 11, 14.

Scriptum in IV Libros Sententiarum, Sent. Book, distinction, question, article, solution or quæstiuncula, reply; e.g. 11 Sent. 15, 1, 1, ii ad 3.

Compendium Theologiæ, Compend. theol.

Scriptural commentaries (lecturæ, expositiones, reportata): Job, In Job; Psalms, In Psal.; Isaiah, In Isa.; Jeremiah, In Jerem.; St. Matthew, In Matt.; St. John, In Joann.; Epistles of St Paul, e.g. In 1 Cor. Chapter, verse, lectio as required.

Philosophical commentaries: On the Liber de Causis, In De causis. Aristotle: Peri Hermeneias, In Periherm.; Posterior Analytics, In Poster.; Physics, In Physic.; De Cælo et Mundo, In De cæl.; De Generatione et Corruptione, In De gen; Metereologica, In De metereor.; De anima, In De anima; De sensu et sensato, In De sensu; De memoria et reminiscentia, In De memor.; Metaphysics, In Meta.; Nicomachean Ethics, In Ethic.; Politics, In Pol., Book, chapter, lectio as required; also for Expositions on Boethius, Liber de Hebdomadibus and Liber de Trinitate, In De hebd. and In De Trin., and on Dionysius De divinis nominibus, In De div. nom. References to Aristotle give the Bekker numeration.

Quæstiones quodlibetales, Quodl.

Complete titles are given for other works, including the 10 series of Quæstiones Disputatæ.

Denz refers to Denzinger-Schönmetzer, Freiburg, 1963.



INTRODUCTION

'IN SENDING his disciples to preach our Saviour enjoined three tasks upon them: the first, that they teach the faith; the second, that they confer the sacraments on those who believe; the third, that they guide believers endowed with the sacraments in the keeping of God's commandments. For at the end of Matthew we read, as to the first, Going therefore teach ve all nations; as to the second, baptizing them in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit; as to the third, teaching them to observe all things whatsoever I have commanded you. Among these three ministries, the teaching of faith is rightly placed first. For it is faith that is the foundation of all the goods of the spirit; Hebrews II, I, Faith is the substance (i.e. foundation) of the things to be hoped for. It is through faith that the soul is brought to life by grace; Galatians 2, 20, And that I live now in the flesh, I live in the faith of the Son of God; and Habakkuk 2, 4, The just shall live in his faith. It is through faith that the soul is purged of sin; Acts 15, 9, Purifying their hearts by faith. It is through faith that the soul is adorned with righteousness; Romans 3, 22, The justice of God by the faith of Jesus Christ. It is through faith that the soul is wedded to God; Hosea 2, 20, I will espouse thee to me in faith. It is through faith that we are adopted unto being sons of God; John 1, 12, He gave them power to be made the sons of God, to them that believe in his name. It is through faith that we draw near to God; Hebrews 11, 6, He that cometh to God must believe. Finally, it is through faith that we gain the prize of eternal life; John 6, 40, And this is the will of my Father that sent me: that everyone who seeth the Son and believeth in him may have life everlasting.'1

The St Thomas of this pastoral text might sound more like the vir evangelicus, the Friar Preacher, than the St Thomas of the Summa-treatise on faith. He would not agree; to him sacra doctrina in its most intense intellectualizing is a high form of serving God and preaching God's word. The whole mental virtuosity of this man of the Gospel, who as such is the catholicæ veritatis doctor, bears down upon the pages of this treatise. The litany of convictions, expressed in the text quoted and derived from his reading of the Scriptures, explains why. If faith is so crucial and foundational, then the articulation of 'how what is said about it is true'2 calls forth the richest resources the theologian can bring to his task.

¹Expositio primæ decretalis ad Archidiaconum Tudertinum (n. 1138 in ed. Marietti, 1954, Opuscula theologica I, pp. 417–18). The text on which St Thomas comments to the archdeacon of Todi in Umbria, is the confession of faith of the Fourth Lateran Council, held in 1215 under Innocent III, as found in the Decretals of Gregory IX, (I, I, I. Denz. 800–2).

²Quodl. IV, 18



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One of the functions of any introduction, he himself remarks, is to render the reader attentive, alert, by pointing to the difficulty of the treatise being introduced.³ For the very reason that their author has given them his best, the Questions on faith are difficult. Eulogy is not the point; the interest of those who read the text in order to understand what St Thomas himself intended is.

The reader can be assisted with the medieval, scholastic vocabulary and style; in this volume notes on their historical status in theology illumine the handling of certain specific points about faith. But there is a craggier challenge: the retrieval of the overview that guides St Thomas's own choice of the procedures and categories in which to cast the meaning of faith. That reaching back can be deflected by the influence of preconceptions diametrically at variance with St Thomas's own. For example: however remotely and unobtrusively, much contemporary theological thought concedes in whole or in part that Kant destroyed the possibility of a defensible intellectual knowledge which achieves the ontological structure of the real. How can a faith described in terms of intellection and truth have any meaning as a real relationship with God? In two of the Appendices of this volume I use the word 'realism' to refer to St Thomas's own presuppositions; the choice of that term, become so ambiguous, is deliberate.4 I intend by it to draw attention to the literalness, the simplicity with which St Thomas accepted the reality of the grace-life that faith begins. From his own works this volume provides a background of the theological presuppositions and philosophical categories that this acceptance guided. Taken at face value, these do serve to articulate his vision of grace. The paraphrases and exegesis given in the notes and appendices may seem literal, even banal to some; they do represent a choice, perhaps the kind of choice that remains, for example, between hearing, Jesu, Joy of Man's Desiring as Bach wrote it and hearing it twanged on electric guitars. If St Thomas is worth reading at all, he is worth reading first in his own terms. Only then can the judgment be made whether, for the legendary Bene scripsisti de me, Thoma, to remain true, he must or can be translated into a contemporary philosophical idiom.

As to St Thomas's overview: in dealing with the Summa it is usual to look for its formal, organizing principles of coherence. This volume begins with the Foreword to the Secunda Secunda and a resumé of the ordered processes of moral science under the normative primacy of end over

³In De Anima I, lect. I

⁴It was prompted by this description of faith by Fr Chenu: 'Connaissance réaliste, c'est-à-dire qui touche la chose divine. Perception directe, impregnée de l'affectivité eminemment personnelle.' M.-D. Chenu, 'L'Unité de la foi: Réalisme et formalisme', in La Foi dans l'intelligence (Paris, 1964) pp. 15–16



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human actions. A reason is thus provided for the theological virtues having first place in the *Secunda Secundæ* and even for the order in which they themselves are to be dealt with. But this formal organization is not first; it rests on a concrete view of the reality being 'organized'. The ruling theological presupposition is the literal acceptance of the gospel of grace, expressed in these terms:

There is another, special love whereby God draws the rational creature above the condition of his nature to share in the divine good. It is in terms of this love that God loves anyone in a complete sense, because by it he wills to that person the eternal good which is himself.⁵

This is the understanding of the revelation that God's gracious love communicates a share in his own blessedness, his own life that is beatitude, to man. Because faith is taken to be that which 'makes our future blessedness to exist in us inchoatively', the treatise on faith comes first. But the relationship of faith to this blessed share in God's own life runs throughout the treatise; the conviction that *Hebrews* II, I is pointing to this guides the development.

This is quite clear, for example, in the constant conjunction of faith with charity. Yet even the analyses, the divisions, the 'faculty psychology' language of the treatise are understood properly only against the background of the intent to describe faith within the total personal union that God's love establishes. The discussion of faith under the heading of virtue is explained by St Thomas's being utterly sure that God's gratuitous love effects a union of man with himself. That by grace we are made to be partakers of the divine nature (I Peter 1, 4) is accepted quite seriously.8 That cannot mean a pantheistic union whereby we exist by the divine being's becoming ours; but it does mean that there is a union with God by operations of knowing and loving that terminate in God himself. These operations are made possible to us, not because we literally receive a new substance, but because 'that which exists in God as his own substance, comes to exist as an accidental quality in the soul of one who becomes a sharer in God's own good'. 9 Virtue, in St Thomas's understanding of it, has as its meaning that it is an accidental quality, a betterment of man's powers, and its whole bearing is upon operation. And so the choice to describe faith, as well as hope and charity, through the category of virtue, is dictated not by the equivalence, but by the adaptability of this concept to

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⁵1a2æ. 110, 1

⁶See 1a. 26, 1

⁷Compend. Theol. 1, 2

⁸Cited in 1a2æ. 62, 1 & 110, 3 on the existence of the theological virtues

¹²²æ. 110, 2 ad 2



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the accepted reality of the grace-life. If this is obvious, it nevertheless bears stating, if we are to recognize his priorities.

A more specific characteristic of the treatise is the classification of faith as a form of knowing. The classification itself is not original; 10 St Thomas's own philosophical interpretations of the mystery of knowing, however, are rich and distinctive. Yet even if we can recapture them despite the morass of subsequent epistemologies, knowledge as such may seem to be an unreligious category, too philosophical; it may perhaps suggest the attempt to measure God, to bring God under control. Can we say, 'The believer knows God', when we also say, 'The entomologist knows fruit flies'? The reader of St Thomas will, of course, recognize that there is such a factor as analogy. But it needs to be pointed out that the primum analogatum in the theological overview here is beatitude itself, in which the blessed see and love God as God sees and loves himself. In this conception knowledge is not primarily informational, acquisitive, manipulative; it is a pure contemplative union, exalted enough to hint even at God's own life of eternal, trinitarian blessedness. The beatific vision, inseparably united to loving rest in God, is an immediate share in the divine life of Father, Son and Holy Spirit. Above all by its relation to that blessedness faith is described as knowing God, as that by which the mind shares in God's own knowing.¹¹ Like the vision of which it is the beginning, faith has to do immediately with God; but it is not yet that vision and it is therefore a knowing of God himself in the only other way possible, by clinging to him in belief. And like the beatific vision, that belief has the quality it is intended to have by God's gift only when it is conjoined to and suffused with love. The cognitional categories are only appreciated when the fundamental principles of this treatise—that faith rests upon the divine truth, God himself, as its motive; 12 that its assent is under the loving prompting of the will¹³—are seen against this background. Faith as a knowing is then recognized as before all an acceptance of God, a holding fast to him, a surrender of self to him and a response made possible only by the same effective divine love that wills the blessed destiny that faith begins.

Acceptance that the loving vision of God is man's destiny also radiates upon the comparison of faith with other forms of knowing. Such a comparison is to be expected in a theology that seeks by analogies with the more familiar to gain some fruitful understanding of mystery. Faith is the beginning of eternal life; it is not yet vision; but it is a beginning. In holding fast to God himself, faith accepts what God proposes, and accepts it

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¹⁰See Appendix 4

¹¹See 122æ. 110, 4

¹²See 2a2æ. I, I

¹³See 2a2æ. 2, 1 & 2



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as true. The implication is that God has begun man's divinization by a humanization of himself, in Christ above all, but also in his biblical word. This humanizing does not mean relativizing, subjectivizing, mythologizing; it does mean an address to man whose mind God has made for the truth, for the contemplation of his creation as it really is. Faith is compared to other acts and conditions of the human mind's knowing above all as these are ranked in reference to the attainment of truth. What faith endows man with by its adherence to God himself speaking is the assurance that the contents of faith really are the wondrous works of God wrought for our salvation, that God himself truly is what the doctrine of faith, however inadequate its concepts, proposes him to be. No more than other mental acts is faith closed within itself, propositional in that sense; rather the concepts and propositions in which it is expressed exist as the opening of the mind on to the real, the objective, things as they are. 'The mind of the believer terminates not in a proposition, but in a reality.'14 The discussion of faith in terms of knowing evinces the conviction that God's gracious love drawing man to share in his own life does not involve a superimposition, irrelevant to the being that man is. For it is the one God who creates man and calls him to faith. Nor are the terms and the teachings of faith devoid of sense to the human mind or unrelated to the reality of God as he is in himself. They express the truth; faith's assurance is that God guarantees as much. They are the decisive truth, the truth that saves and is the way to blessedness. That God himself witnesses to the believer that these are part of the way to blessedness is the reason why his sanctifying the Church includes its rightly proposing and safeguarding his message of salvation. St Thomas views faith as the beginning of that salvation and blessedness as, in keeping with the plan of the Summa, he traces its essential lines; he will see their ultimate meaning in Christ, in whom both God speaking and the message he speaks are incarnate and who 'thus showed us in himself the way of truth, by which we can by rising reach the blessedness of immortal life'. 15

¹⁴²a2æ. 1, 2 ad 2

¹⁵³a. Foreword



Prologus

POST COMMUNEM considerationem de virtutibus et vitiis et aliis ad materiam moralem pertinentibus, necesse est considerare singula in speciali. Sermones enim morales universales minus sunt utiles, eo quod actiones in particularibus sunt. Potest autem aliquid in speciali considerari circa moralia dupliciter: uno modo, ex parte ipsius materiæ moralis, puta cum consideratur de hac virtute vel hoc vitio; alio modo, quantum ad speciales status hominum, puta cum consideratur de subditis et prælatis, de activis et contemplativis, vel quibuscumque aliis differentiis hominum. Primo ergo considerabimus specialiter de his quæ pertinent ad omnes hominum status; secundo vero, specialiter de his quæ pertinent ad determinatos status.

Est autem considerandum circa primum quod si seorsum determinaremus de virtutibus, donis, vitiis et præceptis, oporteret idem multoties dicere. Qui enim sufficienter vult tractare de hoc præcepto, *Non mæchaberis*, necesse habet inquirere de adulterio, quod est quoddam peccatum, cujus etiam cognitio dependet ex cognitione oppositæ virtutis. Erit ergo compendiosior et expeditior considerationis via si simul sub eodem tractatu consideratio procedit de virtute et dono sibi correspondente et vitiis oppositis et præceptis affirmativis vel negativis. Erit autem hic considerationis modus conveniens ipsis vitiis secundum propriam speciem;

^aThe Summa Theologiæ, after its opening epistemological Question (1a. 1) on sacra doctrina, has a three-part division: the Prima Pars, on God himself; the Secunda Pars, on the progress of man towards God; the Tertia Pars, on Christ, the way of that progress. St Thomas's cross-reference here is to the Prima Secundæ, i.e. the Prima Pars Secundæ Partis, the first part of the second part of the Summa. (See note to on the division of the Secunda Pars.) Vol. 16-30 of this series contain the 114 Questions of the Prima Secundæ. On the structure and division of the Summa, see Vol. 1, ed. T. Gilby, Appendix 1 & 10.

bThese opening lines (see Aristotle, Ethics II, 2) imply several points about sacra doctrina as it is at once speculative (contemplative) and practical (see Ia. I, 4). One basis for a distinction between a speculative and a practical science is that the aim of the first is comprehending truth; of the second, guiding an activity (see In De Trin. V, I; Ia. 79, II). On this basis all of sacra doctrina is at once speculative and practical; all theological truths are to be contemplated, but also to be directed towards salvation (see Ia. I, I & 4). A second basis for the distinction is that a speculative science considers an order of things that are not of our doing, but given in reality, while practical science considers the order we place in our own actions or artefacts (see In Ethic. I, lect. I). From this standpoint the Secunda Pars is practical as moral science, concerned with the 'operable', the progress of the rational creature towards God. As its Foreword indicates, the Secunda Pars is most broadly divided into a consideration of the final end, a prerequisite to theological, moral judgments (142æ. I-5) and of the human act, in which the process towards or away from God



Foreword

HAVING SET out the general theory on vices, virtues and other topics related to morals, a we must turn now to specific details about each. Generalities about morals have a limited value because actions are so individual. There are two ways available for dealing with any specific point about morality: the one is to look at the moral topics themselves, examining, for example, one or another particular virtue or vice; the second is to look at people in their respective callings, for example, to subjects and superiors, those pursuing the contemplative and those pursuing the active life, or to other differences among people. Accordingly our own specific consideration will concern, first, themes related to all stations in life; secondly, details related to particular callings.d

As to the first of these two headings, observe that to resolve problems about virtues, Gifts, vices and precepts one after the other would mean repetition on some points. For example, to treat adequately of the commandment, *Thou shalt not commit adultery*, would entail going into the meaning of adultery, a specific sin, knowledge about which depends on a knowledge of the virtue it opposes. The method will be more concise and pointed if within the same treatise the discussion includes together with a virtue the corresponding Gift, the opposite vices, and the applicable

takes place (1a2æ. 6-2a2æ. 189). The Foreword here alludes to an epistemological canon already mentioned in 1a2æ. 6, Foreword: the Secunda Pars must deal with particulars because moral science fulfils its proper and complete function only when it gets to particulars, the field of human actions. This is not simply a quest for data; the point is that moral science 'is directed towards action' (In De Trin. v, 1 ad 4); 'has as its aim, not the manifestation of truth, but the good of action' (In Ethic. II, lect. 9); 'terminates in some particular act to be done' (ibid VI, lect. 2; cf 1a. 79, 11; In Meta. 11, lect 2; In Poster. 1, lect. 41). Indeed, 'the aim of moral science is not to know virtue, but to become virtuous' (In Ethic. X, lect. 14); 'the end of this teaching is not knowing truth but becoming good' (ibid. II, lect. 11). Since the useful is that which is proportionate to an end (In Ethic. 1, lect. 5), moral generalities are less useful, valuable, not simply to knowing (see ibid. II, lect. 2 & 8), but to becoming good, to doing what is virtuous in a particular situation. For the actual creation of the virtuous act, the virtue of prudence is required, and the act itself is not an act of moral science but of a virtue (see In De Trin. v, 1 ad 3); yet moral science must come as close as possible to prudence and the virtuous act in order to be a help (see In Ethic. 11, lect. 2). Implicit in the reason for the particularity of moral science is that even its own right judgments presuppose the right moral dispositions of the moralist (see In Ethic. 1, lect. 3; x, lect. 14). A careful and invaluable study of these points is made in W. A. Wallace, The Role of Demonstration in Moral Theology (Washington, D.C., 1962) pp. 71-94; 102-6.

^e2a2æ. 1–170 ^d2a2æ. 171–89

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PROLOGUS

ostensum est enim supra¹ quod vitia et peccata diversificantur specie secundum materiam vel objectum, non autem secundum alias differentias peccatorum, puta cordis, oris et operis, vel secundum infirmitatem, ignorantiam et malitiam, et alias hujuscemodi differentias. Est autem eadem materia circa quam virtus recte operatur et vitia opposita a rectitudine recedunt.

Sic igitur tota materia morali ad considerationem virtutum reducta, omnes virtutes sunt ulterius reducendæ ad septem. Quarum tres sunt theologicæ, de quibus primo est agendum; aliæ vero quatuor sunt cardinales, de quibus posterius agetur. Virtutum autem intellectualium una quidem est prudentia, quæ inter cardinales virtutes continetur et numeratur. Ars vero non pertinet ad scientiam moralem, quæ circa agibilia versatur, cum ars sit recta ratio factibilium, ut supra dictum est.² Alia vero tres intellectuales virtutes, scilicet sapientia, intellectus et scientia, communicant etiam in nomine cum donis quibusdam Spiritus Sancti, unde simul de eis considerabitur in consideratione donorum virtutibus etiam correspondentium. Aliæ vero virtutes morales omnes aliqualiter

¹¹a2æ. 72

²1a2æ. 57, 3 & 4

eNote that this procedure corresponds to the order in which the properly human sources of acting are discussed in 1a2æ: virtue (55-67); Gifts of the Spirit (68); vices and sins (71-89); law (90-108).

¹See Appendix 1.

g'matter, here means the person or things that is the term of a human action; see Appendix 1.

^hThe intent to systematize concisely, laid down in the Foreword of the Summa, determines the preceding paragraph. Part of the systematizing for the medievals was a task of classifying literature, the Scriptural data and the texts of the theological tradition surrounding the sacred page, i.e. 'the technique authorities' (see M.-D. Chenu, Towards Understanding St Thomas, tr. A. M. Landry & D. Hughes, Chicago, 1964, 126-49; Vol. 41, ed. T. C. O'Brien, Introduction). Hence, the treatises on the virtues in the Secunda Secunda are marked by the integration of literature on the various virtues. The choice of virtue as the organizing point is also prompted by Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics; St Thomas worked out his Sententia libri Ethicorum at the same time as the Secunda Pars, not as a course, but as a tool for his moral theology (see R. A. Gauthier, 'Saint Thomas et l'Ethique à Nicomaque', in *Tabula Ethicorum*, Sancti Thomae de Aquino, Omnia Opera, XLVIII (Romæ, 1971) pp. xxiv-xxv; the argumentum of the Ethics centres on virtue. Such a central focus, finally, expresses St Thomas's own conception of a moral of the good, of the good as interiorly intended out of affinity for the good, a moral of the good as meant (see Vol. 18, ed. T. Gilby, Appendix 10, p. 167). Virtue is that affinity; all other interests of moral science, sins and precepts included, are subordinated to the ideal of the

¹See 1a2æ. 62, which fits faith, hope and charity into the general structure of the moral life, using analogies and language that should be reread before the present treatise. The theological virtues are considered first because of the primacy of end



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precepts,^e affirmative or negative. Such a method is suited, moreover, to the specific meaning of the various vices; we have already shown¹ that vices and sins are differentiated in kind on the basis of their matter or objective,^f not on the basis of other variations, e.g. sins of thought, word or deed, sins of weakness, ignorance or malice, and so on; it is the same matter^g about which virtues do right and vices opposite go wrong.

The entire subject matter of morals being thus condensed under a discussion of virtues, h these, in turn are to be reduced to seven. Three are theological, and they must be the first topic; the other four are cardinal, and will be the second. As to the intellectual virtues, prudence is one of them and is included and listed among the cardinal virtues. Since, as already shown, art is a right conception about things of our making, it does not come under moral science, the concern of which is actions of

in the whole Secunda Pars (see 1a2æ. Foreword); they alone have as their direct and immediate object God, the final, supernatural end of human life (see 1a2æ. 62, 1). The right order to the final end is presupposed by the moral virtues, which are concerned with particular and subordinate ends (see 1a2æ. 65, 2, 3 & ad 1). The implication here is that the other virtues that theology properly considers are the moral virtues, virtues of character, because these make not just a power (see 1, 3 note d) effective, but a person good (see 1a2æ. 56, 3). Intellectual virtues, virtues of mind, enter moral discourse to the degree that they have reference to beatitude, i.e. as their exercise is motivated by justice or charity, and as contemplation is a faint beginning of beatitude (1a2æ. 57, 1 ad 2; cf 1a2æ. 3, 7). Their meaning also provides St Thomas with analogies to articulate the meaning of grace-given knowledge. Among moral virtues four, prudence, justice, courage and temperance, have the name 'cardinal virtues' (probably from St Ambrose), i.e. principal virtues, both as they name characteristics common to all virtuous activity and as they are specific virtues, concerned with major issues of the moral life (see 1a2æ. 61; De

Virtutibus cardinalibus I ad 12).

Aristotle in Ethics I, 13. 1103a3-10 states the distinction between intellectual and moral virtue, and as examples of the first mentions philosophic wisdom (sophia) and practical wisdom (phronësis). In Book VI he discusses each of the intellectual virtues, dividing them into those perfective of the mind as contemplative or speculative, and those perfective of the mind as practical, directive. The first kind are understanding or insight into first principles (nous), knowledge of necessary conclusions, i.e. science (epistēmē) and the highest form of science, philosophic wisdom (sophia). The virtues of the mind as practical are practical wisdom, directive of man's actions (phronēsis) and art (technē), directive of the making of things (see Ethics VI, 3. 1139b14-16). St Thomas outlines his interpretation of the intellectual virtues in Iazæ. 57; art embraces not only liberal, but also mechanical arts; see In De Trin. V, I ad 3 & 4.

¹See 1a2æ. 57, 4; prudence is related to appetite because the rightness of its judgment depends on rightness in appetite; see also 1a2æ. 57, 5; 58, 2, 4 & 5; 61, 1-4; 65, 1. On St Thomas's transformation of Aristotle's phronesis as a key to his Christian interpretation of Aristotle's whole moral theory, see R. A. Gauthier, Aristote, L'Ethique à Nicomaque (2e éd., Louvain, 1970) 1, Introduction, pp. 273-83.

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reducuntur ad virtutes cardinales, ut ex supradictis patet;³ unde in consideratione alicujus virtutis cardinalis considerabuntur etiam omnes virtutes ad eam qualitercumque pertinentes et vitia opposita. Et sic nihil moralium erit prætermissum.

³1a2æ. 61, 3

mAristotle's distinction between poiēsis and praxis (Ethics VI, 4. 1140a1-5) is given in 1a2æ. 57, 4 as a distinction between actio or agere and factio or facere. It is a distinction between an immanent, inner action, one essentially consisting in knowledge or affectivity within a person, and a transitive, out-going action, the producing of a thing. The goodness of the first makes the person acting good; the goodness of the second makes the product made good. Art, as right judgment about things to be produced, is not of concern to moral science, which intends to make a person good. See R. A. Gauthier, La morale d'Aristote (Paris, 1963) pp. 31-7.

"The intent to indicate the synthesis planned might give the impression that the Gifts are included as a means of accounting for the intellectual virtues. The correspondence of the Gifts to the virtues, however, is the matter of substance here. That correspondence is not simply a means of systematizing moral literature. The import of 1a2æ. 68, 1 & 2 on the nature and need of the Gifts should make the reader aware that St Thomas's understanding of the Christian life and so of virtue essentially includes dependence upon the special intervention of the Holy Spirit,

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our doing.^m The other three virtues of the mind, namely, wisdom, understanding and knowledge, share a common name with certain Gifts of the Holy Spirit, and so we will examine them in conjunction with the discussion of Gifts corresponding to certain of the virtues.ⁿ A point made earlier³ is that all other moral virtues are in some way reducible to the cardinal virtues; consequently as part of the treatment of each cardinal virtue, we will include all other virtues annexed to it in any way, along with the opposed vices.^o In this way, then, we will pass over nothing of significance to morals.

receptivity to whom is the meaning of the Gifts. The reader should anticipate that the treatise on any virtue in the Secunda Secundæ is completed only with the consideration of the corresponding Gift; and the significance of the superhuman mode of the Gift has to be read back as a limiting interpretation of the way each virtue functions and is described. This amounts to the perception that acting virtuously has as its ultimate theological meaning the experiencing of need and the creating of passivity for the assistance of the Holy Spirit, even to reach the measure and ideal of virtue.

^oThe outlines of this kind of reduction, namely through a consideration of various parts of the virtues, are given in 2a2æ. 48; see also Vol. 41, ed. T. C. O'Brien, Introduction.