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978-0-521-02932-2 - Summa Theologiae: Volume 24 - The Gifts of the Spirit, (1a2ae. 68-70)

Edward D. O'Connor C.S.C.

Excerpt

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SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, 1a2ae. 68, 1

## Quaestio 68. de donis

CONSEQUENTER CONSIDERANDUM est de donis. Et circa hoc quaeruntur octo:

1. utrum dona differant a virtutibus;
2. de necessitate donorum;
3. utrum dona sint habitus;
4. quæ, et quot sint;
5. utrum dona sint connexa;
6. utrum maneant in patria;
7. de comparatione eorum ad invicem;
8. de comparatione eorum ad virtutes.

*articulus 1. utrum dona differant a virtutibus*

AD PRIMUM sic proceditur:<sup>1</sup> Videtur quod dona non distinguantur a virtutibus. Dicit enim Gregorius, exponens illud *Job*,<sup>2</sup> *Nati sunt ei septem filii, Septem nobis nascuntur filii, cum per conceptionem bonæ cogitationis, Santi Spiritus septem in nobis virtutes oriuntur.*<sup>3</sup> Et inducit illud quod habetur *Isa.*,<sup>4</sup> *Requiescet super eum spiritus intellectus*, etc., ubi enumerantur septem Spiritus Sancti dona. Ergo septem dona Spiritus Sancti sunt virtutes.

2. Præterea, Augustinus dicit, exponens illud quod habetur *Matt.*,<sup>5</sup> *Tunc vadit, et assumit septem alios spiritus, etc., Septem vitia sunt contraria septem virtutibus Spiritus Sancti,*<sup>6</sup> idest septem donis. Sunt autem septem vitia contraria virtutibus communiter dictis. Ergo dona non distinguuntur a virtutibus communiter dictis.

3. Præterea, quorum est definitio eadem, ipsa quoque sunt eadem. Sed definitio virtutis convenit donis: unumquodque enim donum est *bona qualitas mentis qua recte vivitur*, etc. Similiter definitio doni convenit virtutibus infusis: est enim donum *datio irreddibilis*, secundum Philosophum.<sup>7</sup> Ergo virtutes et dona non distinguuntur.

4. Præterea, plura eorum quæ enumerantur inter dona sunt virtutes.

<sup>1</sup>cf. III Sent. 34, 1, 1. In *Isaiam* II. In *Gal.* 5, lect. 6

<sup>2</sup>*Job* 1, 2

<sup>3</sup>*Moralia* I, 27. PL 75, 544

<sup>4</sup>*Isaiah* II, 2

<sup>5</sup>*Matthew* 12, 45

<sup>6</sup>*Quæstiones evangeliorum* I, 8. PL 35, 1325. The exact text reads, *those seven vices which are contrary to the seven spiritual virtues.*

<sup>7</sup>*Topics* IV, 4, 12. 125a18. *dosis . . . anapodotos.*

<sup>8</sup>Beginning with Question 49, Thomas has been considering those deeply rooted dispositions for action which he calls *habitus*. These include chiefly the virtues, which he treats in Questions 55–67, and the vices, which he will begin treating in Question 71. But before taking up the latter topic, he must deal with another type

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## THE GIFTS

## Question 68. the Gifts

NEXT TO BE TREATED are the Gifts.<sup>a</sup> Here there are eight points of inquiry:

1. are they distinct from the virtues?
2. their necessity;
3. are they abiding dispositions?
4. how many are there and which are they?
5. are the Gifts connected with one another?
6. do they remain in heaven?
7. how do they compare with one another?
8. how do they compare with the virtues?

*article 1. are the Gifts distinct from the virtues?*

THE FIRST POINT:<sup>1</sup> 1. It would seem that the Gifts are not distinct from the virtues; for in commenting on the text of *Job*, *There were born to him seven sons*,<sup>2</sup> Gregory says, *Seven sons are born to us when the seven virtues of the Holy Spirit, conceived through good thought, are born in us*.<sup>3</sup> And he adduces the text of *Isaiah*, *There will rest upon him the spirit of understanding*,<sup>4</sup> in which the Seven Gifts of the Holy Spirit are listed. Therefore, the seven Gifts of the Holy Spirit are virtues.

2. Moreover, Augustine, in expounding the text of *Matthew*, *Then he goes and takes seven other spirits*,<sup>5</sup> says, *The seven vices are contrary to the seven virtues of the Holy Spirit*,<sup>6</sup> i.e., to the seven Gifts. But the seven vices are contrary to the virtues in the common sense of the term.<sup>b</sup> Therefore, the Gifts are not distinct from the virtues commonly so called.

3. Moreover, things which have the same definition are identical with one another. But the definition of virtue fits the Gifts; for each Gift is *a good quality of the soul by which one lives rightly*, etc.<sup>c</sup> Likewise, the definition of Gift fits the infused virtues; for *a gift is something given without recompense*, according to Aristotle.<sup>7</sup> Therefore, the virtues and Gifts are not distinct from one another.

4. Moreover, there are many virtues among what are listed as Gifts. For,

*of habitus*, similar to virtue but of another order, the Gifts of the Holy Spirit. And in conjunction with the Gifts, he takes up also the Beatitudes and Fruits, which he conceives as acts arising from the Gifts.

<sup>b</sup>Common sense of the term,<sup>7</sup> i.e. common to the moral, intellectual and theological virtues. The author does not mean as the term is used in common speech, although that would in fact coincide in this case. That the Gifts can be called divine virtues, he admits in the reply to objection 1; the question is whether they can be called virtues in the same sense as those that are not divine.

<sup>c</sup>This definition is discussed in 1a2ae. 55, 4.

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## SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, 1a2ae. 68, 1

Nam sicut supra dictum est,<sup>8</sup> sapientia et intellectus et scientia sunt virtutes intellectuales; consilium autem ad prudentiam pertinet; pietas autem species est iustitiæ; fortitudo autem quædam virtus est moralis. Ergo videtur quod virtutes non distinguantur a donis.

SED CONTRA est quod Gregorius, *Moral.*,<sup>9</sup> distinguit septem dona, quæ dicit significari per septem filios Job, a tribus virtutibus theologicis, quas dicit significari per tres filias Job. Et distinguit eadem septem dona a quatuor virtutibus cardinalibus, quæ dicit significari per quatuor angulos domus.<sup>10</sup>

RESPONSIO: Dicendum quod, si loquamur de dono et virtute secundum nominis ratione, sic nullam oppositionem habent ad invicem. Nam ratio virtutis sumitur secundum quod perficit hominem ad bene agendum, ut supra dictum est;<sup>11</sup> ratio autem doni sumitur secundum comparisonem ad causam a qua est. Nihil autem prohibet illud quod est ab alio ut donum esse perfectivum alicujus ad bene operandum: præsertim cum supra dixerimus quod virtutes quædam nobis sunt infusæ a Deo.<sup>12</sup> Unde secundum hoc, donum a virtute distingui non potest. Et ideo quidam posuerunt quod dona non essent a virtutibus distinguenda. Sed eis remanet non minor difficultas, ut scilicet rationem assignent quare quædam virtutes dicantur dona, et non omnes; et quare aliqua computantur inter dona quæ non computantur inter virtutes, ut patet de timore.

Unde alii dixerunt dona a virtutibus esse distinguenda; sed non assignaverunt convenientem distinctionis causam, quæ scilicet ita communis esset virtutibus quod nullo modo donis, aut e converso. Considerantes enim aliqui quod, inter septem dona, quatuor pertinent ad rationem, scilicet sapientia, scientia, intellectus et consilium; et tria ad vim appetitivam,

<sup>8</sup>1a2ae. 57, 2

<sup>9</sup>*Moralia* 1, 27. PL 75, 544. Gregory does not, of course, use the terminology *Gifts*, *theological virtues*, and *cardinal virtues*, which did not develop until the twelfth century. He calls the 'Gifts' virtues. The 'cardinal virtues' are for him virtues of primary and fundamental importance, variously designated. The 'theological virtues' have no technical designation in his vocabulary, and are not even called virtues. See the note on him in Appendix 2.

<sup>10</sup>op. cit. II, 49. PL 75, 592

<sup>11</sup>1a2ae. 55, 3 & 4

<sup>12</sup>1a2ae. 63, 3

<sup>13</sup>The Latin term *scientia* can be used both in the sense of science and in the sense of simple, non-scientific knowledge. It is also used for one of the Gifts of the Holy Spirit. We have no corresponding word in English. The intellectual virtue we call science, and the Gift of the Holy Spirit we normally speak of as Knowledge. Hence, the difficulty here treated rests upon an ambiguity of the Latin language which does not occur in English.

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as was said above, wisdom, understanding, and science<sup>d</sup> are intellectual virtues;<sup>8</sup> furthermore, counsel pertains to prudence, piety is a species of justice, and fortitude is one of the moral virtues. Therefore, the virtues do not seem to be distinct from the Gifts.

ON THE OTHER HAND Gregory distinguishes the seven Gifts, which he says are signified by Job's seven sons, from the three theological virtues, which he says are signified by Job's three daughters.<sup>9</sup> Moreover, he also distinguishes the same seven Gifts from the four cardinal virtues, which he says are signified by the four corners of Job's house.<sup>10</sup>

REPLY: So far as the meaning of the words is concerned, there is no opposition between *gift* and *virtue*. For the meaning of the term *virtue* comes from the fact that virtue perfects man so that he may act rightly, as was said above;<sup>11</sup> whereas the meaning of the term *gift* comes from the relationship of that which is given to the cause from which it derives. But there is no reason why that which comes from another as a gift should not perfect a person for right action; especially since we said above<sup>12</sup> that certain virtues are infused into us by God. Hence, on this basis, a Gift cannot be distinguished from a virtue. For this reason, some<sup>e</sup> have held that they ought not to be distinguished from one another. But such a position is left with the not inconsiderable difficulty of giving a reason why certain virtues are called Gifts, but all the virtues are not; and why some things are listed among the Gifts, but not among the virtues, as is evident in the case of Fear.

Hence, others have said that the Gifts are to be distinguished from the virtues; but they have not given a suitable reason for the distinction, namely a note which is common to the virtues without applying in any way to the Gifts, or conversely. Thus some<sup>g</sup> observed that four of the seven Gifts pertain to reason (namely, Wisdom, Knowledge, Understanding and Counsel), and three to the faculty of appetite (namely, Fortitude, Piety,

<sup>e</sup>The survey of opinions which begins here, follows Albert the Great, *In III Sent.* 34, 1. Cf Bonaventure, *In III Sent.* 34, 1, 1.

The view that the Gifts are not distinct from the virtues was proposed by Peter Lombard, *III Sent.* 34, and repeated later by William of Auxerre (d. 1231) and William of Auvergne (d. 1249). It was eventually to be adopted by Duns Scotus. See the historical survey, Appendix 3.

<sup>f</sup>This distinction was first affirmed by Philip the Chancellor a generation before Thomas, and with the patronage of Alexander of Hales became the common teaching. cf Appendix 3.

<sup>g</sup>This way of distinguishing the Gifts and virtues appeared at the end of the twelfth century, e.g. in Præpositinus of Cremona. Thereafter, it is commonly cited as an opinion of 'others'. cf Lottin, *P & M III* p. 339.

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scilicet fortitudo, pietas et timor, posuerunt quod dona perficiebant liberum arbitrium secundum quod est facultas rationis, virtutes vero secundum quod est facultas voluntatis: quia invenerunt duas solas virtutes in ratione vel intellectu, scilicet fidem et prudentiam, alias vero in vi appetitiva vel affectiva. Oporteret autem, si hæc distinctio esset conveniens, quod omnes virtutes essent in vi appetitiva, et omnia dona in ratione.

Quidam vero, considerantes quod Gregorius dicit,<sup>13</sup> quod *donum Spiritus Sancti, quod in mente sibi subjecta format temperantiam, prudentiam, justitiam et fortitudinem, eandem mentem munit contra singula tentamenta per septem dona*, dixerunt quod virtutes ordinantur ad bene operandum, dona vero ad resistendum tentationibus. Sed nec ista distinctio sufficit. Quia etiam virtutes tentationibus resistunt, inducentibus ad peccata quæ contrariantur virtutibus: unumquodque enim resistit naturaliter suo contrario. Quod præcipue patet de caritate, de qua dicitur *Cantic.*,<sup>14</sup> *Aquæ multæ non poterunt extinguere caritatem.*

Alii vero, considerantes quod ista dona traduntur in Scriptura secundum quod fuerunt in Christo, ut patet *Isa.*,<sup>15</sup> dixerunt quod virtutes ordinantur simpliciter ad bene operandum; sed dona ordinantur ad hoc ut per ea conformemur Christo, præcipue quantum ad ea quæ passus est, quia in passione ejus præcipue huiusmodi dona resplenduerunt. Sed hoc etiam non videtur esse sufficiens. Quia ipse Dominus præcipue nos inducit ad sui conformitatem secundum humilitatem et mansuetudinem, *Matt.*,<sup>16</sup> *Discite a me, quia mitis sum et humilis corde;* et secundum caritatem, ut *Joan.*,<sup>17</sup> *Diligatis invicem, sicut dilexi vos.* Et hæc etiam virtutes præcipue in passione Christi refulserunt.

Et ideo ad distinguendum dona a virtutibus, debemus sequi modum loquendi Scripturæ, in qua nobis traduntur non quidem sub nomine donorum, sed magis sub nomine *spirituum*: sic enim dicitur *Isa.*,<sup>18</sup> *Requiescet super eum spiritus sapientiæ et intellectus*, etc. Ex quibus verbis manifeste datur intelligi quod ista septem enumerantur ibi secundum quod sunt in nobis ab inspiratione divina. Inspiratio autem significat quandam motionem ab exteriori. Est enim considerandum quod in homine est duplex principium movens: unum quidem interius, quod est ratio; aliud

<sup>13</sup>*Moralia* II, 49. PL 75, 592. Cf. note 9 above

<sup>14</sup>*Canticle of Canticles* 8, 7. RSV: *Many waters cannot quench love*

<sup>15</sup>*Isaiah* II, 2

<sup>16</sup>*Matthew* II, 29. RSV: *for I am gentle and lowly in heart*

<sup>17</sup>*John* I5, I2

<sup>18</sup>*Isaiah* II, 2

<sup>19</sup>This distinction is not known to have been maintained by any author. It was

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and Fear). Hence, they took the position that the Gifts perfect the power of free choice in so far as it is a faculty of reason, while the virtues perfect it in so far as it is a faculty of the will, for they found only two virtues in the reason or intellect, namely faith and prudence, whereas the others are in the faculty of appetite or affection. However, if this distinction were apt, all the virtues ought to be in the appetitive power, and all the gifts in reason.

Others<sup>b</sup> followed the statement of Gregory, *The Gift of the Holy Spirit, which forms prudence, temperance, justice and fortitude in the soul that is subject to him, fortifies that the same mind against the various temptations by the seven Gifts*.<sup>13</sup> Hence they hold that the virtues are ordained to good action, and the Gifts to the resisting of temptations. But this distinction is likewise inadequate, because the virtues also resist temptations to sin. For the sins are contrary to the virtues, and every being naturally resists whatever is contrary to it. This is especially clear in the case of charity, about which the *Canticle of Canticles* says, *Many waters were not able to extinguish charity*.<sup>14</sup>

Still others, taking into account that Scripture speaks of these Gifts as they occurred in Christ, as is evident in *Isaiah*,<sup>15</sup> said that the virtues are ordained simply to right action, whereas the gifts are ordained to our being conformed through them to Christ, especially as regards his suffering (for it was especially in his Passion that these Gifts were manifested).<sup>1</sup> But this also seems to be inadequate, for our Lord himself summons us to be conformed to him especially in regard to humility and meekness, according to *Matthew*, *Learn from me because I am meek and humble of heart*,<sup>16</sup> and in regard to charity, according to *John*, *Love one another as I have loved you*.<sup>17</sup> Moreover, these virtues also were manifested in the Passion of Christ in a special way.

Consequently, in distinguishing the Gifts from the virtues, we ought to follow Scripture's own way of speaking. There they are spoken of as *spirits* rather than *gifts*. Thus it is said in *Isaiah*, *There shall rest upon him, the spirit of wisdom and understanding*.<sup>18</sup> From this way of speaking, we are obviously<sup>j</sup> given to understand that these seven are enumerated there as in us by divine inspiration. Inspiration, however, denotes a motion coming from the outside. For there are two principles of movement in man: one

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proposed dialectically by Philip the Chancellor and thereafter frequently cited as an opinion. Lottin, op cit. p. 362.

<sup>1</sup>Philip the Chancellor likewise proposes this view. Cf Lottin, *P. & M.* III, p. 364  
<sup>j</sup>obviously here does not imply that the argument is apodictic, but only that such argument as can be made from the text is based on what is manifest; or that the manifest sense of the text would seem to favour this way of speaking.

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autem exterius, quod est Deus, ut supra dictum est;<sup>19</sup> et etiam Philosophus hoc dicit, in cap. *de Bona Fortuna*.<sup>20</sup>

Manifestum est autem quod omne quod movetur necesse est proportionatum esse motori; et hæc est perfectio mobilis in quantum est mobile, dispositio qua disponitur ad hoc quod bene moveatur a suo motore. Quanto igitur movens est altior, tanto necesse est quod mobile perfectiori dispositione ei proportionetur: sicut videmus quod perfectius oportet esse discipulum dispositum ad hoc quod altiores doctrinam capiat a docente. Manifestum est autem quod virtutes humanæ perficiunt hominem secundum quod homo natus est moveri per rationem in his quæ interius vel exterius agit. Oportet igitur inesse homini altiores perfectiones secundum quas sit dispositus ad hoc quod divinitus moveatur. Et istæ perfectiones vocantur dona: non solum quia infunduntur a Deo; sed quia secundum ea homo disponitur ut efficiatur prompte mobilis ab inspiratione divina sicut dicitur *Isa.*,<sup>21</sup> *Dominus aperuit mihi aurem; ego autem non contradico,*

<sup>19</sup>1a2ae. 9, 4 & 6

<sup>20</sup>*De bona fortuna* 1, i.e. *Eudemian Ethics* VIII, 2 [= VII, 14]. 1248a 15ff. The text to which Thomas alludes is given below in Appendix 6.

<sup>21</sup>*Isaiah* 50, 5. RSV: *The Lord God has opened my ear, and I was not rebellious, I turned not backward.*

<sup>k</sup>The sense of this principle is illustrated by the example given a few lines farther on, as well as by the following: an appeal to love cannot move the heart of a selfish man, nor a gentle hint one who is callous or obtuse.

<sup>l</sup>The 'mobile as mobile' means a being that is to be moved by another, considered precisely as such. It may be more or less perfect in some other respect; but when it is considered as mobile, then it is more or less perfect precisely in so far as it is susceptible of being moved. Thus, a well-oiled engine is more perfect *as mobile* than one that is dry and creates friction. A hostess who is sensitive to the needs of her guests is, in this respect, more perfect than one who is insensitive.

<sup>m</sup>The author is not implying that teaching is a merely transitive action of the teacher on the disciple; see his analysis of the teaching process in 1a. 117, 1, and in the parallel references there cited. But in the limited sense in which the disciple can be said to be 'moved' by the teacher from ignorance to knowledge, the more receptive he is to this movement, the better disciple will he be. This is said without prejudice to the more aggressive qualities that perfect the student in so far as he is the agent cause of this own learning, but not in so far as he is a *disciple*.

Another example might illustrate the principle with less offence to contemporary pedagogical sensibilities: the members of an orchestra, considered precisely as such, will be more perfect in the measure that they are more responsive to the directions of the leader (other things being equal). This is said without prejudice to the fact that there are other qualities that make them more or less perfect as individual musicians, or as men.

<sup>n</sup>The human virtues are most properly the intellectual and moral virtues, the role of which is succinctly described below, in art 8. For a more lengthy exposition, see 1a2ae. 58:2. The theological virtues are more properly called divine virtues rather than human (cf 1a2ae. 62, 1 ad 2); but in so far as they are considered as human

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which is intrinsic to him, namely, reason; the other extrinsic, namely God, as was said above.<sup>19</sup> Aristotle also says the same.<sup>20</sup>

Now it is evident that whatever is moved must necessarily be proportionate to that which moves it.<sup>k</sup> Moreover, the perfection of the mobile, in so far as it is mobile, is the disposition by which it is disposed to be moved well by that which moves it.<sup>l</sup> Hence, the higher the mover, the more perfect must be the disposition by which the mobile is proportioned to it. Thus a student needs to be more perfectly disposed in order to receive a more profound doctrine from his teacher.<sup>m</sup> Now it is evident that the human virtues<sup>n</sup> perfect man in so far as it is his nature to be moved by reason in the things he does, both interiorly and exteriorly. There must,<sup>o</sup> therefore, be still higher perfections in man to dispose him<sup>p</sup> to be moved by God.<sup>q</sup> These perfections are called Gifts, not only because they are infused by God, but also because they dispose man to become readily<sup>r</sup> mobile to divine inspiration, as is said in *Isaiah, The Lord opened my ear; I do not contradict him, I did not pull back.*<sup>21</sup> Likewise, Aristotle says that it is not good for those who are moved by a divine prompting to take counsel according to human reason; but that they should follow their

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virtues, what is said here applies equally to them, i.e. that man exercises them through the judgment of his reason. This is the very grounds given in art 3 for why they need to be supplemented by the Gifts.

<sup>o</sup>Does Thomas mean by this argument to demonstrate *a priori* and rigorously the necessity of the Gifts? It would seem rather that he is simply exposing the rationale for Gifts, the fact of which he accepted as a *datum* of Christian tradition.

<sup>p</sup>This does not mean that God cannot move a man who lacks the appropriate dispositions; for God can, if he wills, provide the requisite dispositions also (cf 1a2ae. 112, 2 ad 3). But it means that for man to be moved by God in the way here intended, certain dispositions are requisite.

<sup>q</sup>God is the First Mover of every movement that takes place in man or any other creature, including those acts in which man moves himself by his own reason. This fundamental principle of Thomist theology (cf 1a. 2, 3, the first 'way') is not being forgotten or retracted here; in fact, art. 2 will expressly recall it. But over and above that divine prime movement which is presupposed even when man acts on the initiative of his own reason, there is another type of divine movement, the prompting of the Holy Spirit, which imparts to man a movement that his reason cannot impart, as will be explained in art. 2. It is of such movement that Thomas is speaking here.

The present article, which speaks generically of man being moved by God, needs to be completed by the following article, which specifies this movement as ordered to man's supernatural last end. Although the definition of the Gifts is already in effect given here, its proper sense does not appear until it is interpreted in the light of the next discussion.

<sup>r</sup>'readily'. The term *prompte* which is here translated, and which figures very importantly in Thomas's explanation of the Gifts, denotes not merely promptness, but the deeper disposition of readiness or availability from which promptness, and likewise ease, result.



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## SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, 1a2ae. 68, 2

*retrosum non abii.* Et Philosophus etiam dicit, in cap. *de Bona Fortuna*,<sup>22</sup> quod his qui moventur per instinctum divinum non expedit consiliari secundum rationem humanam, sed quod sequantur interiorum instinctum; quia moventur a meliori principio quam sit ratio humana. Et hoc est quod quidam dicunt, quod dona perficiunt hominem ad altiores actus quam sint actus virtutum.

1. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod huiusmodi dona nominantur quandoque virtutes secundum communem rationem virtutis. Habent tamen aliquid supereminens rationi communi virtutis, in quantum sunt quaedam divinae virtutes, perficientes hominem in quantum est a Deo motus. Unde et Philosophus in *Ethic.*<sup>23</sup> supra virtutem communem ponit quamdam virtutem *heroicam* vel *divinam*, secundum quam dicuntur aliqui *divini viri*.

2. Ad secundum dicendum quod vitia, in quantum sunt contra bonum rationis, contrariantur virtutibus, in quantum autem sunt contra divinum instinctum, contrariantur donis. Idem enim contrariatur Deo et rationi, cujus lumen a Deo derivatur.

3. Ad tertium dicendum quod definitio illa datur de virtute secundum communem modum virtutis. Unde si volumus definitionem restringere ad virtutes prout distinguuntur a donis, dicemus quod hoc quod dicitur, *qua recte vivitur*, intelligendum est de rectitudine vitae quae accipitur secundum regulam rationis. Similiter autem donum, prout distinguitur a virtute infusa, potest dici id quod datur a Deo in ordine ad motionem ipsius; quod scilicet facit hominem bene sequentem suos instinctus.

4. Ad quartum dicendum quod sapientia dicitur intellectualis virtus, secundum quod procedit ex iudicio rationis: dicitur autem donum, secundum quod operatur ex instinctu divino. Et similiter dicendum est de aliis.

*articulus 2. utrum dona sint necessaria homini ad salutem*

AD SECUNDUM sic proceditur:<sup>1</sup> Videtur quod dona non sint necessaria homini ad salutem. Dona enim ordinantur ad quamdam perfectionem ultra communem perfectionem virtutis. Non autem est homini necessarium ad salutem ut huiusmodi perfectionem consequatur quae est ultra communem statum virtutis: quia huiusmodi perfectio non cadit sub praepcepto, sed sub consilio. Ergo dona non sunt necessaria homini ad salutem.

2. Praeterea, ad salutem hominis sufficit quod homo se bene habeat et circa divina et circa humana. Sed per virtutes theologicas homo se habet

<sup>22</sup>cap. cit. note 20, 1248a32. See the citation given below in Appendix 6.

<sup>23</sup>*Ethics* VII, I. 1145a20

<sup>1</sup>cf. III *Sent.* 36, 3 ad 4, and art. 3 ad 1 above

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Excerpt

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## THE GIFTS

interior prompting, because they are moved by a better principle than human reason.<sup>22</sup> This is why some say that the Gifts perfect man for acts higher than the acts of virtue.<sup>5</sup>

Hence: 1. These Gifts are sometimes called virtues, in the common meaning of the word *virtue*. However, there is something in them that transcends the common meaning of virtue, in that they are divine virtues and perfect man in so far as he is moved by God. Hence Aristotle also posits what he calls *heroic* or *divine* virtue, by reason of which some are called divine men.<sup>23</sup>

2. In so far as the vices are contrary to the good of reason, they are opposed to the virtues; but in so far as they are contrary to the prompting of God, they are opposed to the Gifts. For one and the same thing is opposed to both God and reason, since reason derives its light from God.

3. The definition cited in the objection applies to virtue in so far as it is common to both virtues and Gifts.<sup>†</sup> If we want to restrict it to the virtues in so far as they are distinguished from the Gifts, we will say that the phrase, by which one lives rightly, is to be understood of rectitude of life as measured by the rule of reason. Likewise, a gift, in so far as it is distinguished from infused virtue, can be said to be that which God gives to dispose a person for his motion; it makes man follow God's promptings well.

4. Wisdom is said to be an intellectual virtue in so far as it arises from the judgment of reason; it is called a Gift, in so far as its work arises from divine prompting. Something similar is to be said of the other cases.

*article 2. are the Gifts necessary for salvation?\**

THE SECOND POINT:<sup>1</sup> 1. It would seem that the Gifts are not necessary for man's salvation. For the Gifts are ordained to a perfection that surpasses the common perfection of virtue. But it is not necessary for man's salvation that he attain a perfection beyond the common state of virtue, because such perfection is not a matter of precept but of counsel. Therefore the Gifts are not necessary for man's salvation.

2. Moreover, it suffices for salvation that a man be well off in regard to

<sup>5</sup>cf Appendix 3. This view was proposed by Philip the Chancellor, developing the obscure insight of Stephen Langton, and thereafter was adopted by many Paris theologians, notably Albert the Great, Bonaventure, and Peter of Tarentaise in their commentaries on III *Sent.* 34. The texts are given in Lottin, *P & M.* III. Thomas made this interpretation on the basis of his distinction between Gifts and virtues in his own commentary on III *Sent.* 34, 1, 1.

<sup>†</sup>literally: that definition is given of virtue according to the common mode of virtue.

<sup>\*</sup>This article seems to have no precedent, either in the works of Thomas, or in those of other theologians. However, the position taken here is expressly assumed in III *Sent.* 36, 3, ad 4. See Appendix 4.