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978-0-521-02929-2 - Summa Theologiae: Volume 21 - Fear and Anger,
(1a2ae. 40-48)

John Patrick Reid O.P.

Excerpt

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SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, 1a2ae. 40, 1

CONSEQUENTER CONSIDERANDUM est de passionibus irascibilis:

- primo, de spe et desperatione;
- secundo, de timore et audacia;
- tertio, de ira.

Quaestio 40. de passionibus irascibilis

Circa primum quaeruntur octo:

1. utrum spes sit idem quod desiderium vel cupiditas;
2. utrum spes sit in vi apprehensiva, vel in vi appetitiva;
3. utrum spes sit in brutis animalibus;
4. utrum spei contrarietur desperatio;
5. utrum causa spei sit experientia;
6. utrum in juvenibus et ebriosis spes abundet;
7. de ordine spei ad amorem;
8. utrum spes conferat ad operationem.

articulus 1. utrum spes sit idem quod desiderium vel cupiditas

AD PRIMUM sic proceditur:¹ 1. Videtur quod spes sit idem quod desiderium sive cupiditas. Spes enim ponitur una quatuor principalium passionum. Sed Augustinus, enumerans quatuor principales passiones, ponit cupiditatem loco spei, ut patet in *de Civ. Dei*.² Ergo spes est idem quod cupiditas vel desiderium.

2. Præterea, passiones differunt secundum objecta. Sed idem est objectum spei et cupiditatis sive desiderii, scilicet bonum futurum. Ergo spes est idem quod cupiditas sive desiderium.

3. Si dicatur quod spes addit supra desiderium possibilitatem adipiscendi bonum futurum, contra: Id quod per accidens se habet ad objectum, non variat speciem passionis. Sed possibile se habet per accidens ad bonum futurum, quod est objectum cupiditatis vel desiderii et spei. Ergo spes non est passio specie differens a desiderio vel cupiditate.

¹cf 1a2ae. 25, 1. III *Sent.* 25, 1, 3; 2, 3, 1 (2). *De virtutibus* IV, 1. *Compend. Theol.* II, 7

²*De civitate Dei* XIV, 3, 7 ff. PL 41, 406

^{*}The treatise on the emotions is divided first into a general (22–5) and special consideration (26–48); the latter division deals with the impulse emotions (26–39) and the contending emotions (40–8). The complex and often subtle relationships between impulse and contending appetites is a frequent topic of discussion. Highlights of this relationship are touched on in Appendix 1; Questions 40–8, which comprise

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[More information](#)

HOPE AND DESPAIR

NEXT WE MUST CONSIDER the contending emotions:^a

- first, hope and despair (40);
- second, fear and daring (41-5);
- third, anger (46-8).

Question 40. hope and despair

Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry:

1. is hope the same as desire or longing?
2. is hope an act of cognition or of appetite?
3. is there hope in brute animals?
4. is despair the contrary of hope?
5. is experience the cause of hope?
6. does hope abound in the young and the inebriated?
7. how is hope related to love?
8. does hope have a bearing on action?

article 1. is hope the same as desire or longing?

THE FIRST POINT:¹ 1. It seems that hope is the same as desire or longing. Hope is counted as one of the four principal emotions.^b But in his survey of these principal emotions Augustine includes longing in place of hope.² Therefore hope is the same as longing or desire.

2. Again, the emotions are distinguished by their objects. Now the object of hope is the same as that of longing or desire, namely, a future good. Therefore hope is the same as longing or desire.

3. Again, it might be objected that hope adds to desire the possibility of acquiring a future good: but the answer to this is that an accidental modification of object does not entail a specifically different emotion. Possibility is accidental to a future good, the object of longing or desire and of hope. Hence hope is not a specifically different emotion from desire or longing.

the present text, abound in references to the preceding questions dealing with the impulse emotions. Man's emotional life forms a single whole composed of varied, interacting, possibly clashing forces.

^bcf 1a2ae. 25, 4. A couplet from Boëthius' *Consolation of Philosophy* (1, 7. PL 63, 657) provides St Thomas's authority and *sed contra*: 'All joy forsaking, fear thou must fly, And hopes defy, no sorrow taking.' The principal emotions—delight, sorrow, hope and fear—are absolutes, fundamental psychological impulses in the face of the sensibly attractive and repulsive.

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[More information](#)

SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, 1a2æ. 40, 2

SED CONTRA, diversarum potentiarum sunt diversæ passiones specie differentes. Sed spes est in irascibili; desiderium autem et cupiditas in concupiscibili. Ergo spes differt specie a desiderio seu* cupiditate.

RESPONSIO: Dicendum quod species passionis ex objecto consideratur. Circa objectum autem spei quatuor conditiones attenduntur. Primo quidem, quod sit bonum: non enim, proprie loquendo, est spes nisi de bono. Et per hoc differt spes a timore, qui est de malo. Secundo, ut sit futurum: non enim spes est de præsentī jam habito. Et per hoc differt spes a gaudio, quod est de bono præsentī. Tertio, requiritur, quod sit aliquid arduum cum difficultate adipiscibile: non enim aliquis dicitur aliquid sperare minimum quod statim est in sua potestate ut habeat. Et per hoc differt spes a desiderio vel cupiditate, quæ est de bono futuro absolute: unde pertinet ad concupiscibilem, spes autem ad irascibilem. Quarto, quod illud arduum sit possibile adipisci: non enim aliquis sperat id quod omnino adipisci non potest. Et secundum hoc differt spes a desperatione.

Sic ergo patet quod spes differt a desiderio, sicut differunt passiones irascibilis a passionibus concupiscibilis. Et propter hoc, spes præsupponit desiderium: sicut et omnes passiones irascibilis præsupponunt passiones concupiscibilis, ut supra dictum est.³

1. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Augustinus ponit cupiditatem loco spei, propter hoc quod utrumque respicit bonum futurum: et quia bonum quod non est arduum quasi nihil reputatur; ut sic cupiditas maxime videatur tendere in bonum arduum, in quod etiam tendit spes.

2. Ad secundum dicendum quod objectum spei non est bonum futurum absolute, sed cum arduitate et difficultate adipiscendi, ut dictum est.⁴

3. Ad tertium dicendum quod objectum spei non tantum addit possibilitatem super objectum desiderii, sed etiam arduitatem, quæ ad aliam potentiam facit spem pertinere, scilicet ad irascibilem, quæ respicit arduum, ut dictum est.⁵ Possibile autem et impossibile non omnino per accidens se habent ad objectum appetitivæ virtutis. Nam appetitus est principium motionis: nihil autem movetur ad aliquid nisi sub ratione possibilis; nullus enim movetur ad id quod existimat impossibile adipisci. Et propter hoc, spes differt a desperatione secundum differentiam possibilis et impossibilis.

articulus 2. utrum spes sit in vi apprehensiva an in vi appetitiva

AD SECUNDUM sic proceditur:¹ I. Videtur quod spes pertineat ad vim cog-

*Piana, *et*, and

³1a2æ. 25, I

⁴In the body of the article

⁵1a. 81, 2; cf 1a.2æ. 23, I

¹cf 2a2æ. 18, I. III *Sent.* 26, I, I; 2, 2. *De veritate* IV, 2

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[More information](#)

HOPE AND DESPAIR

ON THE OTHER HAND distinct powers mean specifically distinct emotions. Now hope is an act of the contending appetite, while desire and longing belong to the impulse appetite. Hence hope differs specifically from desire or longing.

REPLY: Object determines the nature of an emotion. The object of hope has four characteristics: first, it is good; properly speaking we hope only for some good, and in this respect hope differs from fear, whose object is an evil. Secondly, it is in the future: we do not hope for what is at present within our grasp, and this distinguishes hope from delight, whose object is a good that is present. Thirdly, it must be something arduous, attainable only with difficulty: we do not speak of hoping for a trifle which lies easily within our grasp. In this way hope differs from desire or longing which have for their object a future good without qualification. Hence desire is an impulse emotion whereas hope is a contending emotion. Fourthly, it must be possible to attain this arduous good, and this makes the difference between hope and despair.

Hope, therefore, clearly differs from desire in the sense that contending emotions differ from impulse emotions. This means that hope presupposes desire, for we have seen³ that all the contending emotions presuppose the impulse emotions.

Hence: 1. Augustine included longing in place of hope because both have as object a future good and because a good which is not arduous is counted as nothing. This is the sense in which an arduous good, the object of hope, is especially the object of longing.

2. The object of hope is not simply a future good but one whose attainment involves effort and difficulty, as we have seen.⁴

3. The object of hope adds to the object of desire the note of arduousness as well as of possibility. This additional note assigns hope to another power, the contending appetite, which we have seen is properly concerned with what is arduous.⁵ Further, possibility and impossibility are not entirely accidental with respect to the object of an appetite. Appetite is the source of movement and an agent is moved only towards what is possible; certainly no one would be attracted by an object which he judged impossible of attainment. This is why hope differs from despair, in terms of the possible and the impossible.

article 2. is hope an act of cognition or of appetite?

THE SECOND POINT:¹ 1. It seems that hope is an act of cognition.^a Hope is a

^aThe cognition in question is at the sensory level, a knowledge of what is immediately suitable or agreeable to imagination or instinct. The cognitive implication of *expectancy* is stronger in the Latin: *expectare* has the meaning of *watch out for*.

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[More information](#)

SUMMA THEOLOGICÆ, 1a2æ. 40, 2

nitivam. Spes enim videtur esse expectatio quaedam: dicit enim Apostolus,² *Si autem quod non videmus speramus, per patientiam expectamus*. Sed expectatio videtur ad vim cognitivam pertinere, cuius est exspectare. Ergo spes ad cognitivam pertinet.

2. Præterea, idem est, ut videtur, spes quod fiducia: unde et sperantes *confidentes* vocamus, quasi pro eodem utentes eo quod est confidere et sperare. Sed fiducia, sicut et fides, videtur ad vim cognitivam pertinere. Ergo et spes.

3. Præterea, certitudo est proprietas cognitivæ virtutis. Sed certitudo attribuitur spei. Ergo spes ad vim cognitivam pertinet.

SED CONTRA, spes est de bono, sicut dictum est.³ Bonum autem, in quantum huiusmodi, non est objectum cognitivæ, sed appetitivæ virtutis. Ergo spes non pertinet ad cognitivam, sed ad appetitivam virtutem.

RESPONSIO: Dicendum quod, cum spes importet extensionem quamdam appetitus in bonum, manifeste pertinet ad appetitivam virtutem: motus enim ad res pertinet proprie ad appetitum. Actio vero virtutis cognitivæ perficitur non secundum motum cognoscentis ad res, sed potius secundum quod res cognitæ sunt in cognoscente. Sed quia vis cognitiva movet appetitivam, repræsentando ei suum objectum, secundum diversas rationes objecti apprehensi subsequuntur diversi motus in vi appetitiva. Alius enim motus sequitur in appetitu ex apprehensione boni, et alius ex apprehensione mali; et similiter alius motus ex apprehensione præsentis et futuri, absoluti et ardui, possibilis et impossibilis. Et secundum hoc, spes est motus appetitivæ virtutis consequens apprehensionem boni futuri ardui possibilis adipisci, scilicet extensio appetitus in huiusmodi objectum.

1. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, quia spes respicit ad bonum possibili, insurgit dupliciter homini motus spei, sicut dupliciter est ei aliquid possibile; scilicet secundum propriam virtutem et secundum virtutem alterius. Quod ergo aliquis sperat per propriam virtutem adipisci, non dicitur exspectare, sed sperare tantum. Sed proprie dicitur exspectare quod sperat ex auxilio virtutis alienæ: ut dicatur 'expectare' quasi 'ex alio spectare', in quantum scilicet vis apprehensiva præcedens non solum respicit ad bonum quod intendit adipisci, sed etiam ad illud cuius virtute adipisci sperat; secundum illud,⁴ *Respiciens eram ad adiutorium hominum*.

²Romans 8, 25³In the preceding article⁴Ecclesiasticus 51, 10^bWe thus translate *extensio appetitus* and variants thereof: the movement spoken of is

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Excerpt

[More information](#)

HOPE AND DESPAIR

kind of expectancy, as the Apostle says, *But if we hope for what we do not see, we wait for it with patience.*² Now expectancy appears to be a matter of cognition. Therefore hope is an act of cognition.

2. Again, hope and trust seem to be identical; hence we call those who hope trusting, using the words trust and hope interchangeably. But trust, like faith, surely belongs to a cognitive power. So also hope.

3. Again, certitude is proper to cognition. But we attribute certitude to hope. Hence hope is a cognitive act.

ON THE OTHER HAND the object of hope is a good, as we saw.³ But good as such is the object of an appetitive and not of a cognitive power. Hence hope is a matter of appetitive and not of cognitive activity.

REPLY: Since hope involves a psychological tendency^b towards a good, it belongs obviously to an appetite. Movement towards things is proper to appetite; the activity of a cognitive power is engaged not in impelling the knower toward things but by the presence of what is known in the knower. But cognition arouses appetite, presenting its object to it, so that various appetitive movements correspond to the various aspects of the object considered. One sort of movement of the appetite is aroused by a consideration of the agreeable,^c another sort by a consideration of the disagreeable. Movements differ, also, when what is perceived is present or future, uncomplicated or difficult, possible or impossible. Thus hope is a movement of appetite aroused by the perception of what is agreeable, future, arduous, and possible of attainment. It is the tendency of an appetite towards this sort of object.

Hence: 1. Hope is concerned with a possible good, and since there are two ways in which something may be possible, there are two ways in which hope may arise in a man; by reason of his own ability and by reason of another's ability. Thus when one hopes to attain something on his own, he is not said to stand in waiting, but simply to hope for it. Expectancy is properly said of what one hopes for with outside help; it means, as it were, looking to someone else, so that there is regard both for the good which one hopes to acquire and the agency by which one hopes to attain it; hence *Ecclesiasticus* says, *I looked for the succour of men.*⁴ This is why the act of

mental, psychic, immanent, at least essentially and primarily. It may be, and is as a matter of course, followed by an actual physical or bodily movement.

^bThis will be our usual translation of the *bonum* which is the object of the sense appetites; *malum* is rendered as disagreeable. *Good* and *evil* are chosen only occasionally to avoid awkward construction.

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Excerpt

[More information](#)

SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, 1a2ae. 40, 3

Motus ergo spei quandoque dicitur expectatio, propter inspectionem virtutis cognitivæ præcedentem.

2. Ad secundum dicendum quod illud quod homo desiderat et æstimat se posse* adipisci credit se adepturum: et ex tali fide in cognitiva præcedente motus sequens in appetitu fiducia nominatur. Denominatur enim motus appetitivus a cognitione præcedente, sicut effectus ex causa magis nota: magis enim cognoscit vis apprehensiva suum actum quam actum appetitivæ.

3. Ad tertium dicendum quod certitudo attribuitur motui non solum appetitus sensitivi, sed etiam appetitus naturalis: sicut dicitur quod lapis certitudinaliter tendit deorsum. Et hoc propter infallibilitatem quam habet ex certitudine cognitionis quæ præcedit motum appetitus sensitivi, vel etiam naturalis.

articulus 3. utrum spes sit in brutis animalibus

AD TERTIUM sic proceditur:¹ 1. Videtur quod in brutis animalibus non sit spes. Spes enim est de futuro bono, ut Damascenus dicit.² Sed cognoscere futurum† non pertinet ad animalia bruta, quæ habent solum cognitionem sensitivam, quæ non est futurorum. Ergo spes non est in brutis animalibus.

2. Præterea, objectum spei est bonum possibile adipisci. Sed possibile et impossibile sunt quædam differentię veri et falsi, quæ solum sunt in mente, ut Philosophus dicit.³ Ergo spes non est in brutis animalibus, in quibus non est mens.

3. Præterea, Augustinus dicit⁴ quod *animalia moventur visis*. Sed spes non est de eo quod videtur, *nam quod videt quis, quid sperat?* ut dicitur *Rom.*⁵ Ergo spes non est in brutis animalibus.

SED CONTRA, spes est passio irascibilis. Sed in brutis animalibus est irascibilis. Ergo et spes.

RESPONSIO: Dicendum quod interiores passionibus animalium ex exterioribus motibus deprehendi possunt. Ex quibus apparet quod in animalibus brutis est spes. Si enim canis videat leporem, aut accipiter avem, nimis distantem non movetur ad ipsam, quasi non sperans se eam posse adipisci; si autem sit in propinquo movetur, quasi sub spe adipiscendi. Ut enim supra

*Early codices, *possibile*, possible

†Piana, *future*

¹cf III *Sent.* 26, 1, 1

²*De Fide Orthod.* II, 12. PG 94, 929

³*Metaphysics* V, 12. 1019b30

⁴*Super Gen. ad litt.* IX, 14. PL 34, 402

⁵*Romans* 8, 24

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Excerpt

[More information](#)

HOPE AND DESPAIR

hope is at times called expectation, in virtue of the consideration or act of cognition which it presupposes.

2. What a man desires and thinks is attainable, he believes he will succeed in obtaining; it is because of this faith, preceding in consideration, that we designate the subsequent movement of appetite as an act of trust. We identify the psychological impulse by the knowledge which it follows, as an effect by a cause better known to us. Of course we know cognitive acts better than acts of appetite.

3. Even natural appetite,^d and not only sense appetite, acts with a kind of certitude: so we speak of a stone as certain to drop. The basis of this way of speaking is the infallibility deriving from cognitive certitude and characterizing the act of sense appetite and even that of a natural appetite.

article 3. is there hope in brute animals?

THE THIRD POINT:¹ I. It seems that there is no hope in brute animals. We hope for a future good, as Damascene says,² but brutes are incapable of a knowledge of the future, They are limited to sense knowledge, which does not extend to the future. Hence hope is not to be found in brute animals.

2. Again, the object of hope is agreeable and attainable. But possibility and impossibility are distinguishing marks of truth and falsity, which exist only in the mind, according to Aristotle.³ Since brute animals are mindless, they are incapable of hope.

3. Again, Augustine remarks that *animals are moved at the sight of things*.⁴ But the object of hope is not visible, as we read in *Romans*, *For how can a man hope for what he sees?*⁵ Hence the brute animals have no hope.

ON THE OTHER HAND hope is a contending emotion. But there is a contending appetite in brute animals.⁶ Hence they must have hope.

REPLY: We infer the presence of inner emotions in the animals from their outward behaviour. It is clear on this basis that hope is to be found in them. If a dog sees a hare or a hawk spies a bird that is too far away it does not go after it, as though it had no hope of catching it. But if the prey be nearby it

^dThe analogy of appetite—natural, sense, rational—is traced in 1a. 80, 1 & 2, and, with specific application to emotional activity, in 1a2ae. 22, 2 & 3.

⁶Man shares with other animals, at least of the higher and more advanced orders, emotional capacity, both impulsive and contending. There is question of a common, generic system of action and reaction, not an identical way of behaving. In man emotional life is not ultimate or autonomous; it naturally responds to the direction and prompting of reason. In the reply, towards the end, no more than an analogy is suggested, one whose basis is the universal divine providence and governance of creatures.

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[More information](#)

SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, 1a2ae. 40, 4

dictum est,⁶ appetitus sensitivus brutorum animalium, et etiam appetitus naturalis rerum insensibilium, sequuntur apprehensionem alicujus intellectus, sicut et appetitus naturæ intellectivæ, qui dicitur voluntas. Sed in hoc est differentia, quod voluntas movetur ex apprehensione intellectus conjuncti, sed motus appetitus naturalis sequitur apprehensionem intellectus separati, qui naturam instituit; et similiter appetitus sensitivus brutorum animalium, quæ etiam quodam instinctu naturali agunt. Unde in operibus brutorum animalium, et aliarum rerum naturalium, apparet similis processus sicut et in operibus artis. Et per hunc modum in animalibus brutis est spes et desperatio.

1. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, quamvis bruta animalia non cognoscant futurum, tamen ex instinctu naturali movetur animal ad aliquid in futurum, ac si futurum prævideret. Hujusmodi enim instinctus est eis inditus ab intellectu divino prævidente futura.

2. Ad secundum dicendum quod objectum spei non est possibile, prout est quædam differentia veri: sic enim consequitur habitudinem prædicati ad subjectum. Sed objectum spei est possibile quod dicitur secundum aliquam potentiam. Sic enim distinguitur possibile in *Meta.*⁷ scilicet in duo possible prædicta.

3. Ad tertium dicendum quod, licet id quod est futurum non cadat sub visu, tamen ex his quæ videt animal in præsentia, movetur ejus appetitus in aliquid futurum vel prosequendum vel vitandum.

articulus 4. utrum spei contrarietur desperatio

AD QUARTUM sic proceditur:¹ I. Videtur quod desperatio non sit contraria spei. *Uni enim unum est contrarium*, ut dicitur in *Meta.*² Sed spei contrariatur timor. Non ergo contrariatur ei desperatio.

2. Præterea, contraria videntur esse circa idem. Sed spes et desperatio non sunt circa idem; nam spes respicit bonum, desperatio autem est propter aliquid malum impeditivum adeptionis boni. Ergo spes non contrariatur desperationi.

3. Præterea, motui contrariatur* motus; quies vero opponitur motui ut privato. Sed desperatio magis videtur importare immobilitatem quam

*Piana, non contrariatur

⁶1a2ae. I, 2; 26, 1; 35, 1

⁷loc cit note 3

¹cf 1a2ae. 23, 2; 45, 1 ad 2; III *Sent.* 26, 1, 3 ad 3

²*Metaphysics* X, 4, 5. 1055b19; 1055b30

^bAn intelligent agent is one who acts in that the will responds to the agent's own judgment about objectives. Non-intelligent agents manifest purposefulness in the appetitive response to definite objectives. This design presupposes the conception of mind, the mind of God the author of nature and its purposes.

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[More information](#)

HOPE AND DESPAIR

makes a try for it, as though it hoped to capture it. We have noted⁶ that the sense appetite of brute animals as well as the natural appetite of non-sentient things is aroused by the knowledge of some intellect, as is the appetite of an intelligent agent, called the will. But there is this difference, that the will is aroused by the knowledge of an intellect present to it, while a natural appetite reacts to the knowledge of a separated intellect, the author of nature.^b Likewise the sense appetite of brute animals functions as if by a natural instinct. That is why we observe a process in the actions of brute animals and other natural agents similar to the production of works of art. For this reason, too, there is hope and despair in brute animals.

Hence: 1. Brute animals do not know the future but an animal may by natural instinct pursue a future object as if it saw into the future. This instinct is bestowed by the divine intellect which does foresee the future.

2. Hope is not concerned with possibility as a differentiation of the true; this involves the relationship of a predicate to its subject. The possible which is the object of hope is that which refers to the scope of an agent.^c We are here following the distinction set forth in the *Metaphysics*⁷ of the two kinds of possibility we have indicated.

3. What is future is not visible; still the animal's appetite may be aroused in pursuit or avoidance of a future objective in virtue of what it sees at the present moment.

article 4. is despair the contrary of hope?

THE FOURTH POINT:¹ 1. It seems that despair^a is not the contrary of hope. Each thing has only one contrary, according to the *Metaphysics*.² Since the contrary of hope is fear, it cannot be despair.

2. Again, contraries seem to refer to the same thing. This is not so in the case of hope and despair; the object of hope is something agreeable, while despair is a reaction to something disagreeable, an obstacle to the attainment of a good. Hence hope is not contrary to despair.

3. Again, one movement is contrary to another, but rest eliminates movement. Now despair seems to involve immobility rather than movement.

⁶Logical possibility is a truth function: the supposition is that predicate and subject are compatible; falsity would be involved in denying the compatibility. Psychological or dynamic possibility comprises the real capacity of a subject to act or produce an effect. It is the latter possibility which hope envisages.

^aBecause despair itself is supremely unpleasant and defeatist, it is not easy to keep in mind that its object is something quite agreeable, a positive good. The appetite shrinks and turns away in face of what is regarded as excessively valuable, beyond one's means or capabilities. The object retains its positive quality; despair is negative because its psychological tendency suppresses the forward thrust of hope.