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978-0-521-02927-8 - Summa Theologiae: Volume 19 - The Emotions, (1a2ae. 22-30)

Eric D'arcy

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The *Summa Theologiae* ranks among the greatest documents of the Christian Church, and is a landmark of medieval western thought. It provides the framework for Catholic studies in systematic theology and for a classical Christian philosophy, and is regularly consulted by scholars of all faiths and none, across a range of academic disciplines. This paperback reissue of the classic Latin/English edition first published by the English Dominicans in the 1960s and 1970s, in the wake of the Second Vatican Council, has been undertaken in response to regular requests from readers and librarians around the world for the entire series of 61 volumes to be made available again. The original text is unchanged, except for the correction of a small number of typographical errors.

The original aim of this edition was not narrowly ecclesiastical. It sought to make this treasure of the Christian intellectual heritage available to theologians and philosophers of all backgrounds, including those who, without claiming to be believers themselves, appreciate a religious integrity which embodies hardbitten rationalism and who recognise in Thomas Aquinas a master of that perennial philosophy which forms the bedrock of European civilisation. Because of this the editors worked under specific instructions to bear in mind not only the professional theologian, but also the general reader with an interest in the 'reason' in Christianity. The parallel English and Latin texts can be used successfully by anybody with a basic knowledge of Latin, while the presence of the Latin text has allowed the translators a degree of freedom in adapting their English version for modern readers. Each volume contains a glossary of technical terms and is designed to be complete in itself to serve for private study or as a course text.

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THOMAS GILBY O.P., S.T.M., Ph.D.

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SUMMA
THEOLOGIAE

Latin text and English translation,
Introductions, Notes, Appendices
and Glossaries



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HIS HOLINESS POPE PAUL VI

WAS PLEASED to grant an audience, on 13 December 1963, to a group, representing the Dominican Editors and the combined Publishers of the new translation of the *Summa Theologiae* of St Thomas, led by His Eminence Michael Cardinal Browne, of the Order of Preachers, and the Most Reverend Father Aniceto Fernandez, Master General of the same Order.

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AT THIS AUDIENCE

THE HOLY FATHER made a cordial allocution in which he first welcomed the representatives of a project in which he found particular interest. He went on to laud the perennial value of St Thomas's doctrine as embodying universal truths in so cogent a fashion. This doctrine, he said, is a treasure belonging not only to the Dominican Order but to the whole Church, and indeed to the whole world; it is not merely medieval but valid for all times, not least of all for our own.

His Holiness therefore commended the enterprise of Dominicans from English-speaking Provinces of the Order and of their friends; they were undertaking a difficult task, less because the thought of St Thomas is complicated or his language subtle, than because the clarity of his thought and exactness of language is so difficult to translate. Yet the successful outcome of their efforts would undoubtedly contribute to the religious and cultural well-being of the English-speaking world.

What gave him great satisfaction was the notable evidence of interest in the spread of divine truth on the part of the eminent laymen concerned, members of different communions yet united in a common venture.

For these reasons the Holy Father wished it all success, and warmly encouraged and blessed all those engaged. He was happy to receive the first volume presented to him as a gesture of homage, and promised that he would follow with interest the progress of the work and look forward to the regular appearance of all the subsequent volumes.

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GENERAL PREFACE

BY OFFICIAL APPOINTMENT THE SUMMA PROVIDES THE FRAMEWORK for Catholic studies in systematic theology and for a classical Christian philosophy. Yet the work, which is more than a text-book for professional training, is also the witness of developing tradition and the source of living science about divine things. For faith seeks understanding in the contemplation of God's Logos, his wisdom and saving providence, running through the whole universe.

The purpose, then, of this edition is not narrowly clerical, but to share with all Christians a treasury which is part of their common heritage. Moreover, it consults the interests of many who would not claim to be believers, and yet appreciate the integrity which takes religion into hard thinking.

Accordingly the editors have kept in mind the needs of the general reader who can respond to the reasons in Christianity, as well as of technical theologians and philosophers.

Putting the Latin text alongside the English is part of the purpose. The reader with a smattering of Latin can be reassured when the translator, in order to be clear and readable, renders the thought of St Thomas into the freedom of another idiom without circumlocution or paraphrase.

There are two more reasons for the inclusion of the Latin text. First, to help the editors themselves, for the author's thought is too lissom to be uniformly and flatly transliterated; it rings with analogies, and its precision cannot be reduced to a table of terms. A rigid consistency has not been imposed on the editors of the different volumes among themselves; the original is given, and the student can judge for himself.

Next, to help those whose native tongue is not English or whose duty it is to study theology in Latin, of whom many are called to teach and preach through the medium of the most widespread language of the world, now becoming the second language of the Church.

The Latin is a sound working text, selected, paragraphed, and punctuated by the responsible editor. Important variations, in manuscripts and such major printed editions as the Piana and Leonine, are indicated. The English corresponds paragraph by paragraph and almost always sentence by sentence. Each of the sixty volumes, so far as is possible, will be complete in itself, to serve as a text for a special course or for private study.

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Latin text, English translation, Introduction,
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EDITORIAL NOTES

THE LATIN TEXT

THE TEXT is substantially that of the Leonine edition, with some of the more important variants from the Piana edition given in footnotes.

TRANSLATION AND INTRODUCTION

Translating the treatise *De passionibus animæ* raises some peculiar difficulties, which are summarized in the Introduction. In preparing to set these out I found that I could not, without some violence, separate two kinds of problem: first, some remarks about the general intellectual and philosophical context of the treatise which belong to an Introduction; and second, a number of special conceptual and linguistic points which, in other volumes of the present edition, are made in the Appendices. I have therefore gathered them all into a single account in the Introduction, to which the relevant references are made in the footnotes to the English text. Shorter explanations are given in footnotes, and no separate Appendices have been found to be necessary.

FOOTNOTES

Those marked by an asterisk etc., give the principal textual variants. Those signified by a superior number are the references given by St Thomas himself. Those signified alphabetically are editorial references and explanatory remarks.

REFERENCES

Biblical references are to the Vulgate; bracketed numbers to the Psalms are those of versions based on the Hebrew text. Patristic references are to Migne (PG, Greek Fathers; PL, Latin Fathers). Abbreviations to St Thomas's works are as follows:

Summa Theologiæ, without title. Part, question, article, reply; e.g. 1a. 3, 2 ad 3. 1a2æ. 17, 6. 2a2æ. 180, 10. 3a. 35, 8.

Summa Contra Gentiles, CG. Book, chapter; e.g. CG I, 28.

Scriptum in IV Libros Sententiarum, Sent. Book, distinction, question, article, solution or *quæstiuncula*, reply; e.g. III Sent. 25, 2, 3, ii ad 3.

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Commentaries of Scripture (*lecturae, expositiones*): Job, *In Job*; Psalms, *In Psal.*; Isaiah, *In Isa.*; Jeremiah, *In Jerem.*; Lamentations, *In Thren.*; St Matthew, *In Matt.*; St John, *In Joan.*; Epistles of St Paul, e.g. *In ad Rom.* Chapter, verse, *lectio* as required.

Philosophical commentaries: On the *Liber de Causis*, *In De causis*. Aristotle: *Peri Hermeneias*, *In Periherm.*; Posterior Analytics, *In Poster.*; Physics, *In Physic.*; *De Caelo et Mundo*, *In De Cael.*; *De Generatione et Corruptione*, *In De gen.*; *Meteorologica*, *In Meteor.*; *De Anima*, *In De anima*; *De Sensu et Sensato*, *In De sensu*; *De Memoria et Reminiscentia*, *In De memor.*; Metaphysics, *In Meta.*; Nichomachean Ethics, *In Ethic.*; Politics, *In Pol.* Book, chapter, *lectio* as required. Also for Expositions on Boëthius, *Liber de Hebdomadibus* and *Liber de Trinitate*, *In De hebdom.* and *In De Trin.*, and on Dionysius *De Divinis Nominibus*, *In De div. nom.* References to Aristotle give the Bekker annotation.

Quaestiones quodlibetales (de quolibet), *Quodl.*

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INTRODUCTION

THE TREATISE *De passionibus animæ* in the *Summa Theologiæ* is to be found in the *Prima Secundæ*. The whole of the *Pars Secunda* is concerned with man's journey to God. The first five questions investigate the ultimate goal of human life, and the remaining two hundred and ninety-eight questions are devoted to man's activity in so far as it bears upon his reaching that goal: the *Prima Secundæ* to general, and the *Secunda Secundæ* to special, considerations regarding that activity. In the *Prima Secundæ*, Questions 6–48 study the acts themselves, and Questions 49–114 the sources of those acts. In studying the acts, St Thomas first (qq. 6–21) takes acts that are exclusively human, and then (qq. 22–48) those acts which are common to man and the other animals. It is these last which he calls *passiones animæ*, or often simply *passiones*.

This Introduction falls into three parts. In the first, an attempt is made to state the principal general difficulty that confronts the modern reader, and especially the modern translator, of the treatise. Next, three specific problems of translation are discussed. Finally, I mention some philosophical issues raised by the treatise that strike me as particularly interesting.

I

In translating any part of the *Summa*, of course, one meets important terms and phrases for which there is no exact English equivalent: how is one to render, for instance, *forma*, *conveniens*, *per se* and *per accidens*, *intellectus in actu est intelligibile in actu*? But in translating the present treatise it is the opposite difficulty that is even more acute: there are many terms in the modern vocabulary of the emotions which had no exact counterpart in medieval Latin. There were more or less exact equivalents for words like *wood*, *kidney*, *camp*, *water*, *bread*, *wine*, *oil*. One says 'more or less' equivalent because, for instance, there are memories conjured up by the Latin word *panis* of which the English *bread* is quite innocent; and *wine* and *oil* have whole clusters of associations in Mediterranean countries which they do not have in most English-speaking countries. Mr George Steiner wrote, in the course of an article about the translation of poetry: 'Even the simplest words carry a charge of specific energy, of historical association, social usage, and syntactic tradition. They rise to the surface of speech from great depths of national or regional sensibility, barnacled with undeclared remembrance. *Pain* is not wholly rendered by *bread*. It has to a French ear resonances of want, of radical demand, which the English

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word does not; the two words differ in historical texture as does a French from an English loaf.' In the case of many words for mental attitudes, states, or experiences, the difference is even greater. What Latin words are the equivalent of *resentful, amused, tactful, selfish, insecure, frustrated, sanguine, falling in love, (feeling) romantic*? As several of these words show, the problem is not due simply to differences in etymology.

The difficulty that arises with one-one equivalents is often even more obvious in the drawing of distinctions. There were medieval Latin words to distinguish seven kinds of sword and nine kinds of laurel: but not to make many of the distinctions which we have discerned and labelled between emotional experiences and states. For instance, there are important differences between *loving* and *liking*; but St Thomas has to give a single account of *amor*. Professor Ryle, in discussing the emotions, distinguished between inclinations, moods, agitations and feelings; and in sorting through feeling-words alone, he distinguishes between pangs, qualms, glows, flutters, throbs, thrills, and twinges. Think of some of the distinctions that we make, cutting across both these sets of distinctions: e.g. *reserved, diffident, shy, nervous, embarrassed, abashed, offended, rebuffed; mawkish, callow, sentimental, tender, affectionate*. Again, there are French words that English has taken over without anglicizing: *chagrin, ennui, poignant, maladroit, blasé*. Now plainly, one part of St Thomas's task is to classify emotion-words; and he could not classify words that were not in use. Yet some of the terms just mentioned, and a great many others in our modern vocabulary, have Latin ancestry, and it would often be possible, without doing very great violence to the original, to make St Thomas look a good deal more 'modern' than his account really warrants.

For the problem is more than a matter of vocabulary: man's self-awareness, and his insight into his own passional and emotional life, have deepened and sharpened enormously since the thirteenth century. This is not the case in purely *philosophic* writing; modern philosophy has, until quite recently, been mainly concerned with the problem of knowledge, with the cognitive rather than the orectic aspects of human experience. It is true that there were Rationalist and Empiricist accounts of the passions: Descartes wrote a pamphlet *Les Passiones de l'Ame*, Locke wrote of them in Book II of the *Essay*, and Hume in Book III of the *Treatise*. But these were perhaps the parts of these philosophers' work that aroused the least interest, and would be generally ranked among their least successful. In the field of *literature*, however, the case is very different. Mr Cyril Connolly once remarked that, although the English language we use is that of Dryden and Milton, the intellectual world we inhabit is that of Flaubert and Baudelaire: a world enormously different from that of the high Middle Ages. Flaubert and Baudelaire themselves stand at the end of a long

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development that arose in the fifteenth century. We stand on the shoulders of Shakespeare and Rousseau and Dostoevsky; St Thomas wrote before Renaissance Humanism was born. To compare the depth and self-awareness of man's passionate and emotional life evidenced in the medieval lyrics and romances with that of the Shakespearian tragedies and problem plays is a little like comparing the anatomical knowledge of trecento painters with that of Michelangelo. One may therefore well hesitate to give the title 'The Emotions' to a translation of St Thomas's *De passionibus animæ* for fear that one will raise expectations in the modern reader that the treatise will disappoint. However, there are more specific reasons for hesitation over rendering the title; so, having made these general remarks, I turn to three specific problems that confront the translator.

II

(1) *Passiones animæ*. The first question concerns the title-term of the treatise, *passiones animæ* itself. Should one render it *passions* or *emotions*? I think that these are the only two real candidates; *affections* and *feelings* are possibilities, but not very serious ones.

Affections, on the one hand, is too restricted; to apply it to hope, despair, fear, daring, or anger would be rather odd: yet these five constitute one of the two classes of St Thomas's *passiones animæ*. *Feelings*, on the other hand, extends too widely. In one direction, it applies as readily to purely physical feelings as those experiences or states which St Thomas calls *passiones animæ*: to physical repletion or discomfort, to biliousness, muscular stiffness, physical euphoria, restlessness and fatigue, even to simply being hot or cold. In other directions, the English *feelings* applies to non-objectified moods like foreboding, anxiety, or boredom (whereas for St Thomas, every *passio animæ* has an object, and it is by this that each species of *passio* is differentiated from the others); it also applies to attitudes of will, e.g. to determination and reluctance; it even applies to purely intellectual attitudes, such as 'feeling profoundly suspicious' of the soundness of an argument or theory. The seat of St Thomas's *passiones*, on the other hand, is precisely the sensory orexis of the soul: not the intellect or will, and not the physical organism, though the physiological modification constitutes their *materia*.

To my mind, therefore, the choice for the English translation of *passiones animæ* lies between *passions* and *emotions*. Now there is quite a lot to be said for *passions*: and three things in particular. First, it is the term used by the classical philosophers writing on the subject in English: by Hobbes throughout *Leviathan* I, 6; by Locke in the *Essay* II, 20; by Butler (together with 'affections' and 'appetites') in the *Preface* to the

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Fifteen Sermons, and the Sermons themselves, especially the second and the eleventh; and by Hume throughout *Treatise II* and, of course, the *Dissertation on the Passions*. Second, the translation *passions* makes it easier to bring out some of the points that St Thomas makes by treating a *passio* as a case of *pati*, suffering or undergoing. The third, and quite the most important consideration, is a logical one. St Thomas frequently treats the *passiones animæ* as a sub-division of *passio*, passivity, being-acted-upon, the tenth of the *prædicamenta*: as opposed to *actio*, activity, the ninth of the *prædicamenta*. Aristotle's *kategoriai* was translated in Latin as *prædicamenta*, and his doctrine of the ten categories, as the list of irreducibly different types of thing which may be predicated of an individual, was taken into the Scholastic logic. His ninth category, *to poiein*, was rendered *actio*, and his tenth, *to paschein*, *passio*; and it is in the tenth category that St Thomas locates the *passiones animæ*.

A word must be said about this location, for it is clear that St Thomas frequently speaks about the *passiones animæ* as *acts*. For instance, in the prologue to 1a2æ. 6 he sets out the plan he means to follow throughout the rest of the *Pars Secunda*, and explains that in studying man's acts (11. 6–48) he will study first (qq. 6–21) those acts which are exclusively human, and then (qq. 22–48) those acts which are common to man and the other animals: and it is these latter that he calls the *passiones animæ*, or simply *passiones*. This would suggest, of course, that the *passiones* fall into the ninth category, *actio*. On the other hand, St Thomas often speaks of them as contrasting with, or parallel to, *actiones*. For instance, in the prologue to qq. 49–114, he says that he is turning from a consideration of *actus* and *passiones* to a study of the sources of human activity; and in 24, 4c he says that what was found (in 1a2æ. 1, 3 ad 3) to apply to *actus* must also be applied to the *passiones*. I do not think that this is an inconsistency; I think that St Thomas consistently assigns the *passiones* to the tenth category, *passio*: but he does not see them as pure inert passivity. Perhaps the English word that would best hit the point off is *reaction*: activity, yes, but an activity that is produced by some other agent: as Corvez renders it in French, *acte reçu*.¹ Lawrence Durrell speaks of one of his character's reflecting on 'the whole new range of emotions that Leila *liberated* in him'; he is indeed being acted upon, but is not inertly passive. A study by Peters and Mace shows that a thesis very like that of St Thomas is supported by ordinary usage in modern English.² They are arguing that the terms 'emotion' and 'motive'

¹M. Corvez, *Somme Théologique, Les Passions de l'Ame*, 1 (Paris: Revue des Jeunes, 1949), p. 242

²R. S. Peters and C. A. Mace, 'Emotions and the Category of Passivity': *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, 1961–2, pp. 120–1

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are not classificatory, but 'are rather terms used to relate states of mind such as fear, anger, and jealousy to the two distinctive frames of reference, activity and passivity'. They show that when it is *action* that is in question, these states of mind may often be referred to as *motives* for acting; we may say that a person acted *out of* fear, or jealousy, or anger. But in another sort of situation we may say that he is overcome by fear, anger, or jealousy, or disturbed by them; or that he has his actions invigorated, or his judgement clouded, distorted, or heightened, by them. In such cases the person is being *acted on*; and therefore, Peters and Mace remark, we use the term *emotion* and its derivatives to pick out the fact of the person's *passivity*. In logic, then, Peter's and Mace's position seems to be close to St Thomas's; but in the translating of St Thomas, the term *passion* would have the advantage of showing the conceptual kinship that St Thomas sees, and exploits, between *passio* = *passivity*, and *passio* = *these states of mind*. To render *passio* as *emotion* is to conceal this important point completely.

Despite these considerations, however, there are two points which seem to me to tell decisively against 'passion' and in favour of 'emotion'. First, in modern English, the term 'passion' is used only of visitations that are vehement, even violent; its spread is not much wider than the adjective 'passionate'. It is true that Hume speaks of the 'calm passions'; but even in the eighteenth century this was a little odd, and today would verge on the paradoxical. The second point is, I think, conclusive. St Thomas holds that there are eleven species of *passiones animæ*: love and hatred, desire and aversion, pleasure and sorrow, hope and despair, fear and daring, and anger; and he argues that, as a matter of conceptual necessity, all the others fall under one or other of these species. Now the term 'emotion' can be applied to each of these fairly naturally, whether vehemently felt or not; but the term 'passion' would be applied to hope and despair, fear and daring, only, I think, when one was straining a little after effect: and to the other seven only when they were vehemently felt.

Accordingly throughout Volumes 19 and 20 in the present edition, *passiones animæ*, or *passiones*, is rendered *emotions*. There are two exceptions: in 22, 1 and 26, 2 it is rendered *passions*, because this seemed the best way to bring out the point that St Thomas is drawing on his doctrine that the *passiones animæ* form a sub-division of *passio*, the tenth category. Finally, perhaps one may be permitted to insist that the word *emotions* is only the best translation available; it is not perfect. What we call 'emotions' are engaged by far more things than sensory-good and sensory-evil; what St Thomas calls *passiones* are not. It would be unfair to convey the suggestion that St Thomas was speaking weakly and lamely of all reactions to good and evil of any kind.

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[More information](#)(2) *Apprehensiva/appetitiva, concupiscibilis/irascibilis.*

St Thomas begins the treatise by inquiring where the emotions are seated, and he argues: in the soul rather than the body, though the physiological modification is the *materia* of each emotion; next, in the *pars animæ appetitiva* rather than *apprehensiva*; and next, in the *pars appetitiva sensitiva* rather than *intellectiva*. The translation of the terms *anima, sensitiva* and *intellectiva* as *soul, sensory* and *intellectual* respectively hardly calls for comment; but it may be helpful to say something about *apprehensiva* and *appetitiva*.

St Thomas divides the powers of the soul horizontally, so to say, into the vegetative, the sensory and the intellectual, and the latter two—vertically, one might say—into *apprehensiva* and *appetitiva*: i.e. there is both a sensory and an intellectual power of *apprehensio*, and both a sensory and intellectual *appetitus*.

Now the obvious English word for *appetitus* is, of course, *appetite*: but there are two things which tell too strongly against it. First, St Thomas's *appetitus* applies to the will, i.e. at the intellectual as well as the sensory level, whereas the English *appetite* does not: to say that a man is strong-willed is quite different from saying that he is a man of strong appetites. Even at the sensory level, *appetitus* applies to any kind of object, whereas *appetite* is commonly restricted to the areas of food, drink, and sex; and it would be very odd indeed to speak of hope, despair, fear, daring, and anger as reactions of the sensory appetite as they certainly are of the *appetitus sensitivus*. Second, the object of St Thomas's *appetitus* is the evil as well as the good, the unpleasant as well as the pleasant: it urges one away from what is undesirable as well as towards what is desirable. The English *appetite* does not; as Hobbes says, 'Endeavour when it is *towards* something which causes it, is called appetite; when *fromward* something, it is generally called aversion.' Russell has noted the common strain in these opposed experiences; he writes, 'Love and hate are ethical opposites, but to philosophy they are closely analogous attitudes towards objects.'

Since therefore the English word *appetite* fails to reproduce this dual aspect, I propose to render *appetitus* and *appetitiva* as *orexis* and *orectic*. This has two advantages: first, it may serve as a reminder that St Thomas's *appetitus* has much the same meaning and scope as Aristotle's ὀρεξις, rather than that of the English *appetite*; second, in modern psychology the terms *orexis* and *orectic* are used to distinguish the affective and conative aspects of an act from the cognitive.

This last point has prompted me to translate *apprehensiva* as *cognitive*. I am not best pleased at making a division in terms of a Latin-root word and a Greek-root word, but *cognitive* is much more readily intelligible than any more pedantically satisfying but factitious word such as *epi-*

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stemic; and *cognitive/orectic* has the advantage of current psychological usage.

St Thomas divides the sensory orexis into the *appetitus concupiscibilis* and the *appetitus irascibilis*. The object of the former is the pleasant or the unpleasant; the object of the latter is the pleasant that will be difficult to attain or the unpleasant that will be difficult to avoid (*bonum arduum vel malum arduum*). The division is important, since St Thomas classifies the eleven principal species of the emotions in terms of it: six are reactions of the *concupiscibilis*, and five of the *irascibilis*. How then should these terms be translated?

St Thomas himself suggests that the *concupiscibilis* is so named because, of all the emotions seated in it, *concupiscentia* (desire) is the one felt most keenly: and that the *irascibilis* is so named because, of all the emotions seated in it, *ira* (anger) is the one most readily perceived (25, 2 ad 1 and 3 ad 1); for in each case he accepts the rule that the name of a faculty is taken from its most significant characteristic. I doubt whether this is a rule of English terminology; and further, it would be odd to say that hatred and grief were emotions of the 'desiring' orexis, and downright misleading to say that hope and fear were emotions of the 'irascible' orexis. It may be better, then, to look at the provenance of the two terms; for St Thomas took the words from William of Moerbeke's Latin translations of Aristotle. In *De anima* III Aristotle divides the powers of the soul into the *logistikon*, the rational, and the *orexis*, the non-rational; then, within the non-rational, he divides the *aisthetike*, the sensory orexis, into *epithumetike* and *thumike*. These distinctions are assumed or applied in several other works of Aristotle. Moerbeke rendered *thumike* 'irascibilis' and *epithumetike* sometimes 'concupiscibilis' and sometimes 'appetitiva'; St Thomas consistently used *concupiscibilis*, which enabled him to use *appetitus* and *appetitiva* for either the intellectual or the sensory orexis, and for both the powers of the latter. Now Aristotle's distinction *logistikon*, *thumikon*, *epithumetikon* was continuous (though not synonymous) with that made in Plato's famous doctrine of the 'three parts of the soul': *logistikon*, *thumos*, *epithumia*; and this has been traditionally rendered Reason, Spirit, Affection or Desire. I therefore propose to translate *appetitus irascibilis* and *appetitus concupiscibilis* as *the spiritual orexis* and *the affective orexis* respectively.

(3) *Motus*. The term *motus* occurs in the fourth line of the treatise and runs through the whole of the twenty-seven questions devoted to the study of the emotions.

In many places I have felt quite free to translate *motus* with whatever English word most naturally fits the context: commonly, of course, with *movement* or *motion*, but also by *functioning* (24, 3), *reaction* (25, 3), *impulse*

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(23, 2), *process* (23, 2), *attraction* (23, 1 ad 3), and *affections* (22, 2 ad 3). I have allowed myself such freedom when it is clear that St Thomas is not using *motus* strictly as a model. Sometimes he makes this clear by the examples he chooses. For instance, in the first paragraph of 23, 2 he distinguishes two bases for contrasting one *motus* or *mutatio* with another: first, their standing in opposite relationships to the same term, e.g. generation, which is coming-into-existence, and dissolution, which is going-out-of-existence; second, their standing in the same relationship to opposite terms, e.g. bleaching and blackening. The natural word for these four *motus* is, I think, *process*, and the argument of the paragraph is not obscured by using it. Again there are other places where it is clear that St Thomas is not using *motus* strictly as a model, since he couples or contrasts a word that connotes *motus* in the literal sense with a word that does not: e.g. *movet* with *repugnans* (23, 1 ad 3); *motus* with *abominatio* (23, 4); *appetit* with *fugit* (23, 2). In such cases it seems quite safe to use the English word that makes the sentence read most naturally.

In many places, however—and they are central to the whole treatise—I have felt constrained to translate *motus* as *movement*: places, namely, when it is being used as a controlling model. This is perhaps the most interesting philosophical issue in all of these twenty-seven questions; so we may now look at it, together with some other matters that strike me as being of particular philosophical interest.

III

It is, of course, not only the philosopher who will find matters of importance and interest in these three volumes; they are, for instance, of great interest to the moral and ascetic theologian. From the sixteenth century onwards, there have been many spiritual writers who would have us distrust or even discount human feelings and emotions; they hardly ever speak of ‘affections’ without the adjective ‘inordinate’. This is not St Thomas’s attitude; he sees the emotions as an integral part of human and Christian life. For the philosopher, however, there are several matters of particular interest: and of these none, I think, is of greater interest than the role assigned to physical movement as a model of emotional experience.

Let us begin by looking at a crucial passage:

Passions are differentiated by the agents that produce them: these, in the case of those passions which are emotions, are their objects. Now there is a two-fold basis for distinguishing one agent from another: one, a difference in their intrinsic natures; the other, a difference in the active powers they exercise. When it is the emotions that are in question, this second kind of difference follows the pattern of physical agencies. Now a

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physical agent A either attracts the patient P, or repels it. In the case of attraction, A does three things. First, it produces in P an inclination or tendency to move towards A . . . Second, if P is outside its natural place, A will produce in it actual movement towards that place . . . Third, when it reaches the place, P will come to rest . . . A similar account holds for the case of repulsion.

When the movement in question is that of an orectic faculty F, it is a good G that plays the part of the attracting agent, and an evil the part of the repelling one. First then, G produces in F an inclination towards G, a sense of affinity with G, a sense that G and itself are naturally fitted for each other; this is the emotion called love. The corresponding contrary, when it is some evil which is the agent, is hatred. Second, if G is not yet possessed, it sets up in F a movement towards attaining this good which it has come to love. This is desire; the opposite is aversion or disgust. Third, once G is possessed, F finds repose in its possession. This is pleasure, or joy; the opposite is sadness, or grief.

The emotions of the spirited orexis, of course, presuppose that inclination or tendency towards the good or away from the evil which arises in the affective orexis, and which is concerned only with the good simply *qua* good or the evil simply *qua* evil. If the object is a good not yet possessed, we have either hope or despair. If it is an evil which has not yet befallen one, we have either fear or courage. If it is a good already possessed, there will be no corresponding emotion in the spirited orexis, for it is no longer a good 'to be attained only with difficulty'. But if it is an evil which is already in process of taking place, the emotion of anger is aroused.

One sees then that there are three pairs of emotions belonging to the affective orexis: love and hatred; desire and aversion; pleasure and sadness. There are also three in the spirited orexis: hope and despair; fear and courage; and anger, which has no contrary. The emotions therefore comprise eleven distinct species, six in the affective orexis and five in the spirited (23, 4).

Here clearly, as in several other key places, the reference to *movement* is not simply an *obiter dictum*. Furthermore, it is not made by way of mere illustrative analogy; it is used strictly as a model. Several reflections suggest themselves.

First, it would be pleasant to think that St Thomas was speaking of *movement* in some metaphorical sense: for instance, in the way that we speak of 'a moving performance', of being 'moved to tears' or 'moved to contribute'; or even in the sense that an organ 'moves' when it begins to twitch or pulse when the blood flows into it after a period of quiescence. However the passage just quoted, and others where movement is providing a strict model—e.g. 25, 2, 25, 3, 26, 2—leave room for no such interpretation. It is physical movement, involving local motion in the ordinary sense,

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that St Thomas plainly has in mind. Sometimes he is thinking in terms of the medieval theory of bodies having 'natural places'. The antiquated physics need not trouble us: one could easily transpose such cases into those of a body's being brought into the earth's gravitational field and acquiring an 'inclination' to move towards the centre of the earth, or a steel needle's being magnetized and acquiring a 'tendency' to point north and south. At other times St Thomas is obviously thinking of a human agent, for he speaks of the agent's *finis* coming 'first in one's intentions, but last in actual achievement' (e.g. in 25, 2); the human agent may be directing a projectile at a target, or himself setting out on a journey towards some chosen *finis*. Despite these minor variations, however, movement is serving as a model in all these passages.

The use of models has probably hindered progress more often than it has furthered it in many fields of intellectual inquiry. In theology, Aristotle's analysis of material substance in terms of prime matter and substantial form was used for a long time as a model in the analysis of the sacraments; it worked fairly well for baptism, and less and less satisfactorily as it was applied to the other six sacraments. In physics, progress has often consisted in replacing the old mechanical models with purely mathematical ones. In philosophy, Plato took the notion of function, which is useful and perfectly meaningful when applied to the organs of the body and to man-made instruments, and used it as a model for political institutions; and he postulated the division of the soul into three parts on the model of his division of the State into three classes. Hegel attempted to analyse the basic processes of reality in terms of the model of human debate. Aristotle and Hume, in analysing causal relationships, took as their respective models a man making a statue and a pair of billiard balls in collision; and this surely explains in some measure why these analyses took so little account of what Mr Warnock calls 'the variety of items which may be cited as cause and effect'—for instance, actions, happenings, changes, processes, permanent states, objects, failures to act, or non-occurrences. It is a remarkable fact in the history of philosophy that justification for the use of such models has usually not been attempted; it has been assumed, not argued, that the *explicandum* has the same logical structure as the model. In most cases, as Fr John Burnheim has remarked, philosophers have taken their stand on purely intuitive considerations such as the 'depth of insight' or 'degree of intelligibility' that the view of things suggested by their model affords.

Now to my mind St Thomas's use of movement as a model in his account of the emotions is another example of the same thing. As we have seen, it serves two related purposes. First, it provides a model for analysing a given emotional episode: the tripartite division *inclination/movement/*

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repose is paralleled by the tripartite division *love/desire/pleasure* and *hatred/aversion/grief*; and second, it provides the framework on which the emotions are classified into eleven distinct species. As in so many other cases where philosophers have used models, objections arise under three headings.

First, counter-examples suggest themselves. Take, for instance, the case of *admiratio*, surprise. St Thomas distinguishes *admiratio* about purely intellectual things, which we often call *wonder* in English, from the *passio* whose object is, of course, sensory; but his model compels him to divide this into sensory-good and sensory-evil which is in some way unexpected. He treats surprise at an unexpected good as a factor increasing pleasure, and classes surprise at an unexpected evil as a sub-species of fear. But we are often surprised at something unexpected or unusual that strikes us as neither good nor evil, pleasant nor unpleasant: simply 'surprising'. To express the same objection from a different point of view, the movement model demands that surprise should presuppose our liking or disliking the object in question: whereas in fact surprise does not necessarily presuppose an orectic attitude to the object, but simply a cognitive one, in the light of which the object strikes a person as unusual. It is a pity that such objections present themselves, for in so many cases what St Thomas writes on the point itself is very sensitive to the nuances of actual linguistic usage, and very acute in its observation of each stage in the experience itself. But the inflexibility of the model gives a rigidity to his total framework that is very different from his flexibility in studying the particular steps.

For this is a second heading of objection. The attempt to draw hard-and-fast lines does less than justice to the flexibility of emotional language and experience. It is perfectly true, for example, that we often distinguish between *amor* and *concupiscentia*. If a woman shows interest in something she sees in a shop window, and her husband asks, 'Do you like it?' and then, 'Do you want it?', he is asking two questions, not the same question twice. But in many situations the distinction is not so clear. To the question 'What did you think of the burgundy?', one might say with equal appropriateness, 'I liked it very much' or 'I enjoyed it very much'; and one would be puzzled by someone who said, 'Well, I liked it too, but I did not enjoy it.' The fact that St Thomas draws hard-and-fast lines in such cases, where neither ordinary language nor experience seems to warrant his doing so, is not due to a failure of sensitivity or acumen, but simply to the tyranny of the model. Here, as so often before and since in the history of philosophy, the use of a model seems to have created a kind of *a priori* framework into which a writer has been led to squeeze his concepts, rather than seeking to make explicit the logical structure already present in the language which expresses them.

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And this leads to the third objection. St Thomas offers no argument for the thesis that the *passiones animæ* follow the model of *motus*. He simply asserts, 'Where the emotions are in question, the pattern followed is that of physical agencies.' But what reason is there for thinking that the logical structure of the human emotions is the same as that of the movements of inanimate substances? Suppose that, instead of the division into discrete stages and species, we were to take Brentano's celebrated suggestion:

Sorrow—that is, longing for the absent good—hope that it will fall to our share—desire to produce it for ourselves—courage to undertake the attempt—decision to do the deed. The one extreme of the series is a feeling, the other an act of will, and they seem to be widely separated from each other. But if we consider the intermediate terms, and only compare with each other those that are neighbouring, do we not see the most intimate connexion and almost imperceptible transition?

How are we to choose between Brentano and St Thomas? Brentano puts forward some sort of reason; St Thomas really offers us none: his model of physical action or movement must be accepted, if at all, as self-justifying.

It is important to insist that this does not mean that all—or any—of St Thomas's theses are mistaken, but simply that they are not supported by argument. It would be possible to put forward very powerful arguments for many of them. For instance, St Thomas holds that every emotion has an object and, indeed, that its classification will be determined by its object. His reason is the parity with physical movement: emotions follow the model of movements; every movement is directed towards some goal; therefore, etc. Now Dr Anthony Kenny has put forward a similar thesis; but he has directly supported it with argument, particularly by attempting to make explicit the logical structure implicit in the language in which emotional experience is expressed. Mr Gosling has challenged him—not only his views, but also his arguments, and has himself brought forward counter-arguments at some length.¹ One thing that makes their discussion philosophically interesting and important is precisely the fact that they are not proposing two rival models, but have deployed arguments in considerable detail and of a high level of sophistication for opposing theses which are developed discursively and literally.

Perhaps it is even more important to insist that to express some regrets over St Thomas's use of the movement-model is by no means to imply that the account to which it led is of second-rate philosophical quality. It was no accident that, when I sought to recall other writers who have used

¹A. Kenny, *Action, Emotion and Will* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1963), especially Chapter IX. J. C. B. Gosling, 'Emotion and Object', *Philosophical Review*, October 1965

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models, the names that immediately suggested themselves were four of the very greatest in the history of philosophy. To show just how suggestive is St Thomas's study of the emotions I shall conclude this Introduction by drawing attention to one small point and one large point in his account.

The smaller point concerns his account of *love*. Love is distinct from desire, says St Thomas, as the *inclinatio* of a body to move is distinct from its actual movement. In English, of course, an inclination is very close to a desire, and a hard-and-fast distinction between the two would be even more odd than some of the other rigid distinctions which we have noticed. But when St Thomas comes to work out what, in the orectic reaction, is the parallel of the three stages in the physical model, he does not call the first stage *inclinatio*; he uses a number of terms, especially *coaptatio*, *complacentia*, and *connaturalitas*.

These words constitute another headache for the translator; hard enough in themselves, there is the additional difficulty that, despite the suggestion of *placere* in the word *complacentia*, one must not translate it with a word that suggests pleasure, since that belongs to the third, not the first, stage of the orectic process. I proposed to translate the words respectively *a sense of affinity with some object*, *a feeling of its attractiveness*, *a sense that it and oneself are naturally fitted for each other*. When I discussed this proposal with Dr Kenny, he objected, not only on the score of the clumsiness of the phrases, but also because they must accommodate 'natural love' as well as sensory and intellectual love, and therefore apply to inanimate things as well as animals and men; *sense and feelings*, he felt, failed on this count. His own suggestions were: *attachment to some object*, *innate tendency towards it*, *favourable attitude to it*. These suggestions were obviously far more elegant than my own; yet even to them I objected—very diffidently—among other things that 'innate tendency' would not apply to sensory love and intellectual love, which are acquired, not innate. If therefore it is true, as I have suggested earlier, that St Thomas lacked some of the linguistic resources that we now enjoy, it seems that in other ways he was much more richly equipped than we are: and I suspect that these were conceptual, not merely verbal, riches. Mr Nowell-Smith coined the term *pro-attitude*, and it covers several aspects of St Thomas's three words; but he expressed himself as dissatisfied with it even for the limited role he assigned it, and it certainly will not perform many of the tasks that St Thomas's terms carry out very successfully.

The larger point raises issues that ramify widely into several branches of philosophy. There is room here only to broach them.

St Thomas was much more free of mind/body dualism than were most philosophers from Descartes onwards until the middle of this century. Though he occasionally uses dualistic language, his *ex professo* doctrine is