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Eric D'arcy

Excerpt

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De passionibus animæ in generali

POST HOC CONSIDERANDUM est de passionibus animæ: et primo, in generali; secundo, in speciali. In generali autem quatuor occurrunt circa eas consideranda:

primo quidem, de subjecto earum;
secundo, de differentia earum;
tertio, de comparatione earum ad invicem;
quarto, de malitia et bonitate ipsarum.

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on emotions in general

NEXT WE MUST STUDY the emotions: first in general (22–25); then individually (26–48). The general questions fall under four headings:

- first, the seat of the emotions (22);
- second, their classification (23);
- third, their mutual relationships (25);
- fourth, their morality (24).

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SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, 1a.2æ. 22, I

Quæstio 22. de subjecto passionum animæ

Circa primum quærentur tria:

1. utrum aliqua passio sit in anima;
2. utrum magis in parte appetitiva quam in apprehensiva;
3. utrum magis sit in appetitu sensitivo quam intellectivo, qui dicitur voluntas.

articulus 1. utrum aliqua passio sit in anima

AD PRIMUM sic proceditur:¹ 1. Videtur quod nulla passio sit in anima. Pati enim est proprium materiæ: sed anima non est composita ex materia et forma, ut in Primo habitum est.² Ergo nulla passio est in anima.

2. Præterea, *passio est motus*, ut dicitur in *Phys.*;³ sed anima movetur, ut probatur in *De Anima*.⁴ Ergo nulla passio est in anima.

3. Præterea, passio est via ad corruptionem; nam *omnis passio magis facta abjicit a substantia*, ut dicitur in *Topic*.⁵ Sed anima est incorruptibilis. Ergo nulla passio est in anima.

SED CONTRA est quod Apostolus dicit, *Cum essemus in carne, passionem peccatorum quæ per legem erant, operabantur in membris nostris*.⁶ Peccata autem sunt proprie in anima. Ergo et passionem quæ dicuntur *peccatorum* sunt in anima.

RESPONSIO: Dicendum quod *pati* dicitur tripliciter. Uno modo communiter,

¹cf III *Sent.* 15, 2, 1, i. *De veritate* xxvi, 1 & 2

²1a. 75, 5

³*Physics* III, 3. 202a25

⁴*De Anima* I, 3. 405b32 ff

⁵*Topics* VI, 6. 145a4

⁶*Romans* 7, 5

^aJust as St Thomas heads Question 22 *De subjecto passionum animæ*, he will head Question 50 *De subjecto habituum*; but it would be quite misleading to translate each of them as 'The subject of the so-and-so's'. For the sense of Question 50 is, 'What kinds of things have dispositions?'; whereas the sense of the present Question is, 'In what part of the human person is emotion experienced?'

^bTwo explanatory remarks seem called for. (1) St Thomas' own term for the topic of this treatise is *passiones animæ*. The best English equivalent of this is 'The Emotions' (cf Introduction, pp. xix-xxi); but a literal translation would be 'The Passions of the Soul'. One therefore sees why the first question that occurs to him is, 'Is it possible for the soul to have passions?' Could there possibly be any passion in the soul? If so, then next, in which part of the soul are they to be located: the cognitive or the orectic? And next, if in the orectic, in which orexis, the sensory or

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THE SEAT OF THE EMOTIONS

Question 22. the seat of the emotions³

Under the first of these headings there are three points of inquiry:

1. can the soul be subject to passion?
2. are the emotions seated in the orectic part of the soul rather than in the cognitive?
3. are they seated in the sense-orexis rather than in the intellectual orexis, i.e. the will?

article 1. can the soul be subject to passion?^b

THE FIRST POINT:¹ 1. It would seem that the soul cannot be subject to passion. For the Latin noun *passio*^c is formed from the verb *pati*, to suffer. Now only material things are capable of suffering; and we have shown that the soul is not material.² The soul therefore cannot be subject to passion.

2. *Passion is a kind of movement*^d as Aristotle says;³ and he shows in another place that the soul does not move.⁴ The soul therefore cannot be the subject of passion.

3. Passion leads to dissolution: *as passion is intensified, a substance decays*, to quote Aristotle.⁵ But the soul is not liable to dissolution. It is therefore not subject to passion.

ON THE OTHER HAND St Paul says, *When we were merely our natural selves, the passions of sin to which the law bound us worked on our natural powers.*⁶ Now strictly speaking, it is in the soul that sin is present. So the soul is subject to those passions at least which are called 'the passions of sin'.

REPLY: The Latin verb *pati*, to suffer or undergo or be acted upon, is used

the intellectual (cf Introduction pp. xxi–xxiii)? (2) The Latin *passiones animæ*, usually abbreviated by St Thomas to *passiones*, is translated throughout the rest of this volume as 'emotions'; but in Article 1 it is translated 'passions'. This seems to be the best way of making it clear that St Thomas assumes that *passio* = *emotion* is a sub-division of Aristotle's tenth category *τὸ πάσχειν*, *passio* = *passivity*, *being-acted upon* (as opposed to the ninth category *τὸ ποιεῖν*, *actio* = *activity* (cf Introduction p. xx). The running together of these two senses of *passio* is not simply a play upon words; the subsequent discussion shows that St Thomas sees a conceptual kinship as well as a verbal identity between the two usages.

^c*pati* is the infinitive (*pator* is a deponent verb); it is from the perfect participle *passus* that the noun *passio* is formed.

^dThere is a double ambiguity here. 1. *Passion* may mean either (a) emotion, or (b) passivity—i.e. Aristotle's tenth of the categories he enumerates: *Categorías* 4. 1b25.

2. *Motion* may mean either (a) local motion, or (b) the passage from potentiality to actuality.

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SUMMA THEOLOGICÆ, 1a.2æ. 22, I

secundum quod omne recipere est pati, etiamsi nihil abjiciatur a re: sicut si dicatur ærem pati quando illuminatur. Hoc autem magis est perfici quam pati. Alio modo dicitur proprie pati, quando aliquid recipitur cum alterius abjectione; sed hoc contingit dupliciter. Quandoque enim abjicitur id quod non est conveniens rei: sicut cum corpus animalis sanatur dicitur pati, quia recipit sanitatem, ægritudine abjecta. Alio modo quando e converso contingit: sicut ægrotare dicitur pati, quia recipitur infirmitas, sanitate abjecta.

Et hic est propriissimus modus passionis. Nam *pati* dicitur ex eo quod aliquid trahitur ad agentem; quod autem recedit ab eo quod est sibi conveniens maxime videtur ad aliud trahi. Et similiter dicitur, quod quando ex ignobiliori generatur nobilior est generatio simpliciter, et corruptio secundum quid; e converso autem quando ex nobiliori ignobilior generatur.⁷

Et his tribus modis contingit esse in anima passionem. Nam secundum receptionem tantum dicitur quod *sentire et intelligere est quoddam pati*.⁸ Passio autem cum abjectione non est, nisi secundum transmutationem corporalem; unde passio proprie dicta non potest competere animæ nisi per accidens, inquantum scilicet compositum patitur. Sed in hoc est diversitas: nam quando hujusmodi transmutatio fit in deterius magis proprie habet rationem passionis quam quando fit in melius; unde tristitia magis proprie est passio quam lætitia.

1. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod pati, secundum quod est cum abjectione et transmutatione, proprium est materiæ; unde non invenitur nisi in compositis ex materia et forma. Sed pati, prout importat receptionem solam, non est necessarium quod sit materiæ, sed potest esse cujuscumque existentis in potentia. Anima autem, etsi non sit composita ex materia et forma, habet tamen aliquid potentialitatis secundum quam convenit sibi recipere et pati: secundum quod *intelligere pati est*, ut dicitur.

⁷*De generatione* 1, 3. 318b2

⁸*De Anima* 1, 5. 410a25

^eThe word *passions* is used here in the categorial sense: the mind is *acted upon*, in so far as it *receives* some new 'perfection' or quality, viz. some new knowledge or intellectual insight.

^fi.e. some physiological modification: e.g. a man goes red with anger and pale with fear, his pulse-rate quickens with desire, his muscles tense with hate. Modern physiology can state these modifications in much more explanatory detail: e.g. adrenalin or glucose is poured into the blood, the activity of the endocrine gland is increased or decreased, etc.

^gOn St Thomas' theory of actuality and potentiality any creature is to some extent in passive potentiality; only God is pure, unmixed actuality. The human soul is in

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in three ways. First, in a perfectly general sense, it is used whenever any quality is received, even if the recipient loses nothing in the process: for instance, one might say that the air 'suffers' or 'undergoes' illumination. However, this would be better styled 'acquiring' a new quality than 'suffering' something. More strictly, the word *pati* is used when a thing acquires one quality by losing another; and this may happen in two ways. Sometimes the quality lost is one whose presence was inappropriate in the subject: for example, when an animal is healed, it may be said to 'undergo' healing, for it recovers its health by shedding its illness. At other times, the opposite happens: for example, a sick man is called a 'patient' because he contracts some illness by losing his health.

It is this last kind of case which is called *passio* in the most correct sense. For the word *pati* is used when a thing is drawn to some agent; and the more a thing is withdrawn from that which properly belongs to it, the more naturally is it said to be drawn to something other than itself. Aristotle makes a rather similar point: he says that when an entity of a higher order arises from one of a lower order, we call the process 'generation' pure and simple, and 'corruption' only in some qualified sense; and vice versa.⁷

Now *passio*, in each of these three senses, may be found in the soul. For first, the remark *thinking and understanding are in some sense passions*^{8e} applies to that kind of passion which involves reception pure and simple. Those kinds of passion in which some quality is lost, however, always involve some bodily change;^f passion strictly so called cannot therefore be experienced by the soul except in the sense that the whole person, the matter-soul composite, undergoes it. But here too we must distinguish: the bodily change may be for the better or for the worse; and it is in the latter case that the term *passion* is used more properly. Thus sorrow is more naturally called a passion than is joy.

Hence: 1. Suffering of the kind that involves losing some quality can indeed take place only in material things. But suffering of the kind that involves merely receiving some quality is not so confined; it may occur in anything which is in some sort of potentiality. Now the soul, of course, is not material; but it is in that sort of potentiality which enables it to receive and, in this sense, to 'suffer'.^g Thus Aristotle can say, *thinking is a kind of passion*.^h

active potentiality in so far as it has the ability to perform the various kinds of mental and psychic acts; it is in passive potentiality in so far as it has the capacity to undergo the various kinds of mental and psychic experience.

^fi.e. there is a passive as well as an active element in our intellectual activity; some new knowledge or insight is acquired and therefore 'received'.

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SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, Ia.2æ. 22, 2

2. Ad secundum dicendum quod pati et moveri, etsi non conveniat animæ per se, convenit tamen ei per accidens, ut dicitur.⁹

3. Ad tertium dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de passione quæ est cum transmutatione ad deterius. Et hujusmodi passio animæ convenire non potest nisi per accidens; per se autem convenit composito, quod est corruptibile.

articulus 2. utrum passio magis sit in parte appetitiva quam in apprehensiva

AD SECUNDUM sic proceditur:¹ 1. Videtur quod passio magis sit in parte animæ apprehensiva quam in parte appetitiva. Quod enim est primum in quolibet genere videtur esse maximum illorum quæ sunt in genere illo, et causa aliorum, ut dicitur.² Sed passio prius invenitur in parte apprehensiva quam in parte appetitiva: non enim patitur pars appetitiva nisi passione præcedente in parte apprehensiva. Ergo passio est magis in parte apprehensiva quam in parte appetitiva.

2. Præterea, quod est magis activum videtur esse minus passivum; actio enim passioni opponitur. Sed pars appetitiva est magis activa quam pars apprehensiva. Ergo videtur quod in parte apprehensiva magis sit passio.

3. Præterea, sicut appetitus sensitivus est virtus in organo corporali, ita et vis apprehensiva sensitiva. Sed passio animæ fit, proprie loquendo, secundum transmutationem corporalem. Ergo non magis est passio in parte appetitiva sensitiva quam in apprehensiva sensitiva.

SED CONTRA est quod Augustinus dicit, quod *motus animi*, Græci πάθη, nostri autem quidam,* sicut Cicero, 'perturbationes', quidam 'affectiones' vel 'affectus', quidam vero, sicut in Græco habetur, expressius 'passiones' vocant.³ Ex quo patet quod passionem animæ sunt idem quod affectiones. Sed affectiones manifeste pertinent ad partem appetitivam, et non ad apprehensivam. Ergo et passiones magis sunt in appetitiva quam in apprehensiva.

*Piana reads παθος and omits *quidam*

⁹ibid, and id III, 4. 429b25

¹cf III *Sent.* 15, 2, 1, ii. *De veritate* xxvi, 3. *In De div. nom.* 2, lect. 4. *In Ethic* 11. 291–302, lect.

²Metaphysics II, 1. 993b24

³*De civitate Dei* IX, 4. PL 41, 258

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2. It is true that suffering and movement are not to be attributed to the soul directly; but they may be attributed to it indirectly or consequentially,¹ as Aristotle says.⁹

3. This argument holds for the kind of passion which induces a change for the worse. Such passions belong to the soul only consequentially; strictly speaking, they belong to the matter-soul composite, and that is certainly capable of dissolution.

article 2. are the emotions seated in the orectic part of the soul rather than in the cognitive?^{2a}

THE SECOND POINT:¹ 1. One would expect the emotions to be seated in the cognitive part of the soul rather than in the orectic. For the first member of a given genus is superior to, and the cause of, all the others, to paraphrase Aristotle.² Now an emotion must be present in the cognitive part of the soul before being present in the orectic part, since the latter does not feel it until the former has been affected by it. The emotions must therefore be thought of as seated in the cognitive rather than in the orectic part of the soul.

2. The more active a thing is, the less is it passive; for the categories of action and passion are mutually opposed. But the orectic part of the soul is obviously more active than the cognitive. Therefore the emotions, since they form a subdivision of the category *passion*, are seated rather in the cognitive part.

3. The experience of emotion always involves some physiological modification. But the faculty of sense-perception is a power of the physical organism as much as is the sense-orexis. There seems therefore no more reason to locate the emotions in the latter than in the former.

ON THE OTHER HAND, Augustine says, *Those motions of the soul which the Greeks call πάθη are called by some Latin writers, such as Cicero, 'agitations' and by some 'affections'; but others follow the Greek more closely, and call them 'passions'.*³ The emotions therefore, being passions of the soul, are identical with the affections. But the affections obviously belong to the orectic part of the soul, not the cognitive. The emotions must therefore be seated in the orectic rather than in the cognitive part.

¹For example, if a learned man makes a journey, it would be odd to say, *tout court*, that his learning 'moves'; but perhaps the statement could be made with suitable qualifications—one may compare such expressions as 'his secret went with him'.

^{2a}St Thomas' terminology for and classification of the faculties of the soul are summarized in Introduction, pp. xxii–xxiii.

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SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, 1a.2æ. 22, 2

RESPONSIO: Dicendum quod, sicut jam dictum est,⁴ nomine passionis importatur quod patiens trahatur ad id quod est agentis. Magis autem trahitur anima ad rem per vim appetitivam quam per vim apprehensivam. Nam per vim appetitivam anima habet ordinem ad ipsas res, prout in seipsis sunt: unde Philosophus dicit quod bonum et malum, quæ sunt objecta appetitivæ potentiæ, sunt in ipsis rebus.⁵ Vis autem apprehensiva non trahitur ad rem secundum quod in seipsa est; sed cognoscit eam secundum intentionem rei, quam in se habet vel recipit secundum proprium modum. Unde et ibidem dicitur quod *verum et falsum*, quæ ad cognitionem pertinent, *non sunt in rebus, sed in mente*.⁶ Unde patet quod ratio passionis magis invenitur in parte appetitiva quam in parte apprehensiva.

1. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod intensio e converso se habet in his quæ pertinent ad perfectionem, et in his quæ pertinent ad defectum.

Nam in his quæ ad perfectionem pertinent, attenditur intensio per accessum ad unum primum principium, cui quanto est aliquid propinquius tanto est magis intensum—sicut intensio lucidi attenditur per accessum ad aliquid summe lucidum, cui quanto aliquid magis appropinquat tanto est magis lucidum. Sed in his quæ ad defectum pertinent, attenditur intensio, non per accessum ad aliquod summum, sed per recessum a perfecto: quia in hoc ratio privationis et defectus consistit. Et ideo quanto minus recedit a primo tanto est minus intensum; et propter hoc in principio semper invenitur parvus defectus, qui postea procedendo magis multiplicatur.

Passio autem ad defectum pertinet, qui est alicujus secundum quod est in potentia. Unde in his quæ appropinquant primo perfecto, scilicet Deo, invenitur parum de ratione potentiæ et passionis; in aliis autem consequenter plus. Et sic etiam in priori vi animæ, scilicet apprehensiva, invenitur minus de ratione passionis.

2. Ad secundum dicendum quod vis appetitiva dicitur esse magis activa quia est magis principium exterioris actus. Et hoc habet ex hoc ipso ex quo habet quod sit magis passiva, scilicet ex hoc quod habet ordinem ad rem prout est in seipsa: per actionem enim exteriorem venimus ad consequendas res.

3. Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut in *Primo* dictum est, dupliciter organum animæ potest transmutari.⁷ Uno modo transmutatione spirituali

⁴art. 1

⁵This is a gloss upon, rather than a direct citation from, the passage in the *Metaphysics* quoted in the next sentence

⁶*Metaphysics* VI, 4. 1027b25

⁷1a. 78, 3

⁸It must not be taken from this that St Thomas thinks that we do not directly perceive material objects, but only sense-data. For him, the external object is not

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REPLY: The term 'passion' implies, as we have said,⁴ that the patient is drawn to something in the agent. But the soul is drawn to things by its orectic, rather than its cognitive, faculties. For through its orectic faculties the soul is drawn towards things as they are in themselves: as Aristotle says, good and bad (the objects of the orectic faculties) are in things themselves.⁵ But a cognitive faculty is not drawn to things as they are in themselves; it comes to know them by means of representations, which it either already has, or receives in the appropriate way:^b so Aristotle goes on to say, *true and false* (the objects of the cognitive powers) *are not in things themselves, but in the mind.*⁶ So passion, and therefore emotion, is seated in the orectic rather than in the cognitive part of the soul.

Hence: 1. There are opposite rules for measuring the degree of a quality according as it is excellence or defectiveness that is in question.

An excellence obviously increases as the first and unique source of the excellence is approached—somewhat as the brightness of a lighted object increases as it approaches the source of light. A deficiency increases, however, not with proximity to, but with distance from, what is perfect and supreme: that is precisely what makes a thing defective. Naturally then, the less a thing departs from the appropriate source, the less defective it is. So it is that defects are commonly slight to begin with, and grow worse as time goes by.

Now passion or passivity implies by its very nature some sort of deficiency: a thing is passive in so far as it is in potentiality to being actualized and thus improved. Those creatures therefore that come nearest to God, the first and completely perfect being, have little of potentiality and passivity in them; others, of course, have more. Accordingly one will find less of passivity, and so less of passion and the emotions, in the cognitive faculties, since they are the more primary powers of the soul.

2. The orectic powers are said to be the more active because they are more closely connected with our external activity. But this arises from the very thing which makes them, in the relevant sense, more passive—their relationship with things as they are in themselves;^c for by external activity we come to possess those things.

3. We have shown elsewhere that there are two ways in which an organ or faculty may be modified.⁷ First, there is non-physical modification,

logically inferred from our mental image of it, but immediately (i.e. without *logical medium*) perceived in it.

^cIn contrast, namely, with the cognitive powers, which are designed to generate within us *representations* of external things, not to take possession of the things in their physical reality.