The Summa Theologiæ ranks among the greatest documents of the Christian Church, and is a landmark of medieval western thought. It provides the framework for Catholic studies in systematic theology and for a classical Christian philosophy, and is regularly consulted by scholars of all faiths and none, across a range of academic disciplines. This paperback reissue of the classic Latin/English edition first published by the English Dominicans in the 1960s and 1970s, in the wake of the Second Vatican Council, has been undertaken in response to regular requests from readers and librarians around the world for the entire series of 61 volumes to be made available again. The original text is unchanged, except for the correction of a small number of typographical errors.

The original aim of this edition was not narrowly ecclesiastical. It sought to make this treasure of the Christian intellectual heritage available to theologians and philosophers of all backgrounds, including those who, without claiming to be believers themselves, appreciate a religious integrity which embodies hardbitten rationalism and who recognise in Thomas Aquinas a master of that perennial philosophy which forms the bedrock of European civilisation. Because of this the editors worked under specific instructions to bear in mind not only the professional theologian, but also the general reader with an interest in the 'reason' in Christianity. The parallel English and Latin texts can be used successfully by anybody with a basic knowledge of Latin, while the presence of the Latin text has allowed the translators a degree of freedom in adapting their English version for modern readers. Each volume contains a glossary of technical terms and is designed to be complete in itself to serve for private study or as a course text.

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die 30 Januarii 1963

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Westmonasterii, die 21 Junii 1963

ST THOMAS AQUINAS

SUMMA THEOLOGIÆ

ST THOMAS AQUINAS

SUMMA THEOLOGIÆ

Latin text and English translation,
Introductions, Notes, Appendices
and Glossaries

PIÆ MEMORIÆ

JOANNIS

PP. XXIII

DICATUM

ALLOCUTIO

PAULI

PP. VI

MCMLXIII

HIS HOLINESS POPE PAUL VI

WAS PLEASED to grant an audience, on 13 December 1963, to a group, representing the Dominican Editors and the combined Publishers of the new translation of the *Summa Theologiæ* of St Thomas, led by His Eminence Michael Cardinal Browne, of the Order of Preachers, and the Most Reverend Father Aniceto Fernandez, Master General of the same Order.

AT THIS AUDIENCE

THE HOLY FATHER made a cordial allocution in which he first welcomed the representatives of a project in which he found particular interest. He went on to laud the perennial value of St Thomas's doctrine as embodying universal truths in so cogent a fashion. This doctrine, he said, is a treasure belonging not only to the Dominican Order but to the whole Church, and indeed to the whole world; it is not merely medieval but valid for all times, not least of all for our own.

His Holiness therefore commended the enterprise of Dominicans from English-speaking Provinces of the Order and of their friends; they were undertaking a difficult task, less because the thought of St Thomas is complicated or his language subtle, than because the clarity of his thought and exactness of language is so difficult to translate. Yet the successful outcome of their efforts would undoubtedly contribute to the religious and cultural well-being of the English-speaking world.

What gave him great satisfaction was the notable evidence of interest in the spread of divine truth on the part of the eminent laymen concerned, members of different communions yet united in a common venture.

For these reasons the Holy Father wished it all success, and warmly encouraged and blessed all those engaged. He was happy to receive the first volume presented to him as a gesture of homage, and promised that he would follow with interest the progress of the work and look forward to the regular appearance of all the subsequent volumes.

VOLUMES

GENERAL PREFACE

BY OFFICIAL APPOINTMENT THE SUMMA PROVIDES THE FRAMEWORK for Catholic studies in systematic theology and for a classical Christian philosophy. Yet the work, which is more than a text-book for professional training, is also the witness of developing tradition and the source of living science about divine things. For faith seeks understanding in the contemplation of God's Logos, his wisdom and saving providence, running through the whole universe.

The purpose, then, of this edition is not narrowly clerical, but to share with all Christians a treasury which is part of their common heritage. Moreover, it consults the interests of many who would not claim to be believers, and yet appreciate the integrity which takes religion into hard thinking.

Accordingly the editors have kept in mind the needs of the general reader who can respond to the reasons in Christianity, as well as of technical theologians and philosophers.

Putting the Latin text alongside the English is part of the purpose. The reader with a smattering of Latin can be reassured when the translator, in order to be clear and readable, renders the thought of St Thomas into the freedom of another idiom without circumlocution or paraphrase.

There are two more reasons for the inclusion of the Latin text. First, to help the editors themselves, for the author's thought is too lissom to be uniformly and flatly transliterated; it rings with analogies, and its precision cannot be reduced to a table of terms. A rigid consistency has not been imposed on the editors of the different volumes among themselves; the original is given, and the student can judge for himself.

Next, to help those whose native tongue is not English or whose duty it is to study theology in Latin, of whom many are called to teach and preach through the medium of the most widespread language of the world, now becoming the second language of the Church.

The Latin is a sound working text, selected, paragraphed, and punctuated by the responsible editor. Important variations, in manuscripts and such major printed editions as the Piana and Leonine, are indicated. The English corresponds paragraph by paragraph and almost always sentence by sentence. Each of the sixty volumes, so far as is possible, will be complete in itself, to serve as a text for a special course or for private study.

THOMAS GILBY, O.P.

ST THOMAS AQUINAS

SUMMA THEOLOGIÆ

VOLUME 13

MAN MADE TO GOD'S IMAGE

(1a. 90–102)

Latin text. English translation, Introduction, Notes, Appendices & Glossary

EDMUND HILL O.P.

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EDITORIAL NOTES

THE LATIN TEXT AND THE TRANSLATION

I HAVE TAKEN the 1941 Ottawa edition of the *Summa Theologica* as my basic text, usually however incorporating in my text the Leonine edition readings which are there given in footnotes. This war-time Canadian edition is simply the one I happen to have to hand, and that is the only reason I followed it. Produced in difficult conditions, it is marred by a somewhat excessive number of misprints, which have presumably been corrected in later editions. They vary from faulty punctuation to one omission of a whole clause. I have tried to remedy these mistakes, without adding too many, I trust, of my own.

In translating St Thomas's technical scholastic Latin I have in principle fought shy of mere transliteration. However technical his use of them, the words he used had their roots in non-scholastic Latin; the analogy between their technical and their older non-scholastic meanings, or in the case of specially coined words that between their special meaning and their derivation, is usually not totally obscure to anyone familiar with non-scholastic Latin. Thus scholastic Latin is still anchored to 'real, ordinary meanings'. If its terms are merely transliterated into English, this ceases to be the case. Either the transliterated term simply has no English background, no grounding therefore in 'ordinariness' for the English reader—e.g. *species*, *genus*; or even more seriously, ordinary English has taken over technical scholastic words and altered their meaning almost beyond recognition, so the English reader will pick up all sorts of misleading echoes from the use of such words as transliterations of their Latin originals. And even if he makes the necessary adjustments, he will still be left with the erroneous and unfortunate impression that scholasticism actually *abhors* any analogical connection with 'ordinariness'. For this reason *act* and *potency* will not do, in my opinion, for *actus* and *potentia*, nor *passion* for *passio*, nor *habit* for *habitus*, nor *matter* and *form* for *materia* and *forma*.

Needless to say I have not consistently had the courage of my convictions. I would have liked, for this last pair, to have used in English *stuff* and *shape*, simply endowing them as it were by decree with the technicalities of hylomorphism. But my courage failed; I usually anglicize by *material* and *form*, rather than *matter* and *form*.

E. H.

FOOTNOTES

Those signified by a superior number are the references given by St Thomas, with the exception of no. 1 to each article which refers to parallel texts in his writings. Those signified alphabetically are editorial references and explanatory remarks.

REFERENCES

Biblical references are to the Vulgate, bracketed numbers to the Psalms are those of versions based on the Hebrew text. Patristic references are to Migne (PG, Greek Fathers; PL, Latin Fathers). Abbreviations to St Thomas's works are as follows:

Summa Theologiæ, without title. Part, question, article, reply; e.g. 1a. 3, 2 ad 3. 1a2æ. 17, 6. 2a2æ. 180, 10. 3a. 35, 8.

Summa Contra Gentiles, *CG*. Book, chapter; e.g. *CG*. 1, 28.

Scriptum in IV Libros Sententiarum, *Sent*. Book, distinction, question, article, solution or *quæstiuncula*, reply; e.g. III *Sent*. 25, 2, 3, ii ad 3.

Compendium Theologiæ, *Compend. Theol.*

Commentaries of Scripture (*lecturæ*, *expositiones*): Job, *In Job*; Psalms, *In Psal.*; Isaiah, *In Isa.*; Jeremiah, *In Jerem.*; Lamentations, *In Thren.*; St Matthew, *In Matt.*; St John, *In Joan.*; Epistles of St Paul, e.g. *In ad Rom.* Chapter, verse, *lectio* as required.

Philosophical commentaries: On the *Liber de Causis*, *In De causis*. Aristotle. *Peri Hermeneias*, *In Periherm.*; Posterior Analytics, *In Poster.*; Physics, *In Physic.*; *De Cælo et Mundo*, *In De Cæl.*; *De Generatione et Corruptione*, *In De gen.*; *Meteorologica*, *In Meteor.*; *De Anima*, *In De anima*; *De Sensu et Sensato*, *In De sensu*; *De Memoria et Reminiscentia*, *In De memor.*; Metaphysics, *In Meta.*; Nicomachean Ethics, *In Ethic.*, Politics, *In Pol.* Book, chapter, *lectio* as required, also for Expositions on Boëthius, *Liber de Hebdomadibus* and *Liber de Trinitate*, *In De hebd.* and *In De Trin.*, and on Dionysius *De Divinis Nominibus*, *In De div. nom.* References to Aristotle give the Bekker annotation.

Quæstiones quodlibetales (*de quolibet*), *Quodl.*

Main titles are given in full for other works, including the 10 series of *Quæstiones Disputatæ*.

INTRODUCTION

THESE QUESTIONS on the making of man form the second half of St Thomas's treatise on man, what he is and whence he comes, in this first part of the *Summa Theologiæ*. The treatise begins at question 75, and it will help us to situate our piece in its context if we have the prologue to that question before us. 'After our survey of the spiritual and bodily creation, we must go on to consider man, who is composed out of spiritual and bodily substance. And first we must deal with man's nature, secondly with his production.' First what man is, then how he came to be. So the questions here translated, which are concerned with human origins, have had the benefit of a whole elaborate prelude concerned with human nature. 'However,' he continues, 'it is the theologian's business to consider the soul part of man's nature, not the body part, except for its relationship with the soul. And therefore the first part of our discussion will be concerned with the soul.'[1] With this rather disconcerting remark that the theologian is only interested in the soul, not in the body of man, we can leave this prologue. The remark is disconcerting because it is uncharacteristic on the face of it; but if we suspend judgment on it and go on to look at the discussion of the soul that follows, we find that it is governed by Aristotelian principles which emphasize the status of the soul, the spiritual element in man's composition, as what one might almost call a function or value of the bodily organism.

When, furthermore, we come to the second half of the treatise on man, which is our immediate concern here, we find there is no more talk about considering only the soul and not the body. We investigate the production of man, soul and body, the original status of man, soul and body, the 'might-have-been' status of his children, soul and body. The reason for this is that Scripture talks about the origins and status of the whole man, not just of his soul, and in our theological investigations of origins we are following the revelation given us by Scripture. The theological procedure must not be misunderstood; it is not the case that the theologian is interested in the soul only, not the body, in the spiritual not in the physical—except of course where Scripture in its inconsequent way wanders off in pursuit of physical hares and obliges the theologian to trail primly after it. Such an idea is a thorough misunderstanding of theology, and indeed of religion. The fact is that the theologian is interested in neither soul nor body, neither the spiritual nor the physical, as objects of study in themselves. As such they are the business of other disciplines, not of theology.

[1]Vol 11, *Man* (1a. 75–83); Vol 12, *Human Intelligence* (1a. 84–9)

The object of the Christian theologian's study is God's revelation as it is given in Scripture and proclaimed in the Church. God's revelation of his saving truth has much of importance to say about what man is, and has been, and how he came to be, about man in the round, body and soul together, and indeed body more obviously than soul. So it is man thus revealed to himself in Scripture that the theologian is concerned to study scientifically in this treatise. But to be systematic, this study of a particular sector of revelation needs the benefit of some preliminary clarifications; these St Thomas provides in the first part of his treatise (roughly speaking); and what he means by saying that the theologian is concerned with man's soul rather than his body is, I suggest, that a consideration, mainly metaphysical, of the soul and its activities is an indispensable prelude to the theological study of man, whereas a biological or physiological consideration of the human body is not. There, surely, we can agree with him.

Thus the principal part of the treatise on man in the *Summa* is this second half, which is directly investigating for the most part what Scripture has to say about man's origins and his divinely given status and stature. The first half was introductory. The second half, more precisely, is an investigation of *Genesis* 2. The logic of this is evident when we remember that the treatise on man is itself only a section of the great treatise on creation which runs from question 44 to the end of the first part of the *Summa*; the treatise, to be more accurate, on the 'issue of creatures from God' (1a. 2, prol.). So the creation narratives of *Genesis* 1 & 2 are bound to be the focus of theological interest.

Even at the risk of labouring the point, it is necessary to insist that St Thomas is concerned as a theologian with the systematic understanding of *Scripture* and the revelation it conveys, because if this axiom is not firmly maintained a satisfactory solution will not be found to a problem with which the *Summa* is constantly facing the student, and nowhere more insistently than in these questions 90–102 on the making of man. In several parts of this section the author is manifestly discussing Scripture, e.g. in questions 91 & 92 on the making of the man from the slime of the earth and of the woman from the man, in questions 97 & 98 on the physical aspects of the state of innocence, and above all in question 102 on the earthly paradise; and nearly all of his exposition of Scripture in these passages, the reader will probably and pardonably feel, is obsolete. It is obsolete in itself, in the assumptions about Scripture it is based on, as well as in its cohesion with an obsolete medieval astronomy, physics, biology, and geography.

Faced with this fact, which not even the most ardent Thomist devotion could wholly eliminate, the student is tempted to skip these articles as theologically useless, or to read them merely as an antiquarian, and to

restrict his attentive reading to those articles alone in which he thinks to find the timelessly valid contributions of scholastic, Thomist, theology. He may even be tempted to forgo the study of St Thomas outright, judging him to be altogether out of date. This latter course, though apparently showing less discrimination, is perhaps less destructive of theological understanding than the former. It at least gives St Thomas credit for coherent thought, and does not reduce his exquisitely articulated *Summa* to uncoordinated shreds. But the chief error of the former course is that it induces us to dissociate theology and the study of Scripture. Thomist theology is thus in the practice of our every-day assumptions severed from its data, and so becomes harder and harder to distinguish from, and is practically treated as identical with, Thomist philosophy.

We are preserved from such faults if we start from the principle that the whole of this treatise, as indeed the whole of the *Summa*, is about Scripture, often to be sure indirectly so, but still about Scripture. This means that we can no longer treat the manifestly Scriptural articles as mere décor in an antiquated Gothic taste, but must see them as essential elements in the structure of the whole work, as essential as a roof is to a house or a conclusion to an argument. It also means that the problem of their being obsolete is a much more serious one. Let us first then look at the structure of the treatise, and then more closely at the problem.

This second and, as we consider, theologically more important half of the whole treatise of man includes under the heading of 'the first production of man' very much more than an investigation of origins; it delves into the possibilities of man and his destiny. The first man is more than just himself; he is the epitome of Man. And so throughout the treatise there is as it were a continual oscillation of attention from Adam to Man and back. This is implicit in the very name 'Adam', the Hebrew word for 'man', though I do not remember that St Thomas adverts to the fact.

He divides the half-treatise into four parts: the first production of man, questions 90–2; the goal or end-product of that operation, question 93, where in the discussion of the divine image in man the whole treatise on man, which began in question 75, reaches its climax; the state and condition of man as he was first made, questions 94–101; and lastly his proper place in that condition, namely Paradise, question 102.

We begin with the production of the soul, and here it is not Adam's soul in particular but the human soul in general that is being considered. Adam in his particularity is only briefly touched on in the last article of question 90. The doctrine is explained that the human soul is produced by direct divine creation. This is of faith, as Pius XII expressly stated in *Humani Generis* (Denzinger 2327). In the next two questions our attention is swung back to the first man and woman, and we consider the production

of their bodies, as described in *Genesis*. The ordinary production of human bodies by procreation is in itself the concern of the embryologist, not the theologian—which is not to say, of course, that it has no theological value, or that religion is not interested in it. But the bodily origin of the human race is in itself of direct theological as well as biological interest, because it directly concerns what revelation is about, namely the destiny appointed by God for man, and the divine purpose of salvation. It is of course the tremendous advance in scientific biology and the entry of palæontology into the field that have rendered St Thomas's answers untenable in this sphere. But his procedure, and notably his use of the scientific ideas of his day, is still of interest to the theologian. His discussion of the fitness of the human body being what it is in 1a. 91, 3 (where we have moved once more from Adam to Man) can be enlightening as well as very entertaining if read in the right spirit. His solutions may not be ours, but his interests surely should be.

In any case we can perhaps say that while the picture of human origins which science builds up for us today is in a style enormously diverse from the thirteenth-century picture, the substance of our theological and metaphysical ideas on the subject is not necessarily very different from St Thomas's. Theologically we are bound to accept a monogenist view of origins, that is one original couple from whom the whole human race has sprung, and whom we can conveniently call Adam and Eve. Though this is not in the strictest sense a point of Catholic faith, Catholics cannot reject it without, as far as we can see, compromising the doctrine of original sin, which *is* of faith. This too is all set out in the encyclical *Humani Generis*.

Metaphysically there is a principle which runs through the whole of St Thomas's treatment of the creation and of the condition and privileges of the first couple. It is that the perfect comes before the imperfect, the actual before the merely potential. The opposite is true for the history of the individual material substance, especially the living substance; it grows from imperfect to perfect, its potentialities are gradually actualized. But the principle is true for a series; imperfect individual (infant) implies perfect individual (parent). If this is denied, you get the sort of situation generally recognized as absurd, of an individual somewhere along the line 'pulling himself up by his own shoe-laces'. It follows that at the beginning —provided it is a strict parent-offspring, generative cause-effect series— you must have a perfect individual whose origin is *not* due to the same generative cause-effect series.

This is where the *picture* built up by science can be very misleading if it is automatically taken—as it very often is—for a straightforward representation of a metaphysical *idea*. The evolutionary picture treats the species

as a super-individual, so that mankind is considered under the appellation 'Man' as growing from imperfection to perfection, or as being the perfection that crowns a whole vast process of development. Imaginatively or symbolically this is an impeccable proceeding; it has much in common with some of the ancient cosmogonic myths in which everything springs originally from a world-egg, and actuality comes after possibility. At the origin of Man there is protoplasm, which it is meaningless to call Adam. The theological and, we suggest, the more adequate metaphysical view sees the origin of Man in a protoplast, in the first formed man, whom it is not meaningless to call Adam. The metaphysician and the theologian both require a first parent of the human race, and are not content with a first germ.

If this is accepted, then it is comparatively unimportant how you interpret *Genesis* 2, 7, 'The Lord God formed man from the slime of the earth'; whether like St Thomas you take the slime of the earth literally as elemental matter, or whether you take it, in deference to all the evolutionary evidence, as transposable into 'God formed man from a non-human member of the family Hominidæ (order Primates)'.[2] You are still left with the inescapable 'God formed', God establishing an original parent from whom the race descends. These two possible interpretations present imaginative pictures that are poles apart, but represent the same metaphysical idea.

After discussing the production of the first man we proceed in question 93 to investigate the term or goal of this divine act, which is the image of God in man. This, as we have observed, is the very heart of the treatise. This is what man was created to be. Once more we have passed from Adam to Man, to the unfolding of his possibilities, his destiny, and his task. The Augustinian background to St Thomas's thought on the subject is briefly summarized in Appendix 4.

In the next section, questions 94–101, St Thomas goes on to investigate the state of innocence, or of original justice, in which the perfection of the image, as it was intended by God, is displayed. Again there is the double reference, to Adam as an individual and to the race of which he is not merely a member but the parent or head. The value of the last three of these questions, 99–101, which deal with the condition of children born in the state of innocence, and which at first glance seem so hypothetical as to be of the most academic interest merely, lies in the distinction they bring out between the supernatural endowments which were conferred on mankind in Adam, which he would have transmitted to his descendants—and which they forfeited with him in his fall—and the privileges which

[2]We are not suggesting that the sacred author could have 'meant' this by his words, but that what he meant is not incompatible with this.

according to St Thomas were his precisely as first man or parent or head, and which would not therefore have been inherited by his progeny.

Of these privileges the most difficult perhaps for us to swallow is that of Adam's 'omniscience', asserted with extremely important qualifications in question 94, 3 and 4. St Thomas expressly ties this view to the complementary one that Adam, the first man, was formed physically as an adult; he had no childhood, he did not grow up, he was not indeed born, but formed by a process at the beginning of and therefore outside the succession of ordinary human generation. Likewise he was formed intellectually complete, at the beginning of and therefore outside the successive process of ordinary human learning or education or discovery. The same metaphysical principle is involved, that the perfect is prior to the imperfect, not in the individual but in the series.

Before proceeding to plead the merits of this view, without thereby necessarily committing ourselves to it, we should emphasize that it is not of faith. There is another theological opinion, as old if not older than St Irenæus[3] in the second century, that the innocence of Adam and Eve before the fall was the innocence of childhood, not the innocence of the perfect man. This opinion is quite permissible, and certainly imposes less of a strain on the imagination. But if one accepts the metaphysical maxim above mentioned, it is hard to square it with this picture of a childhood innocence in the original state, where ignorance is bliss.

One or two considerations may render St Thomas's opinion less imaginatively shocking. The first, which is elaborated in a note to the article in question, is that by *scientia*, which is the word he uses, he did not mean knowledge of facts. It is not a matter of Adam having known all the answers to every conceivable general knowledge examination. Only the divine omniscience covers, but of course does not consist in, such knowledge of all particular facts. The second is that our experience makes us associate knowledge, even in the sense St Thomas gives the word here of systematic comprehensive understanding, with civilization and all its achievements. But this is not a *necessary* connection. St Thomas does not discuss it, but I think he would surely not have maintained that Adam in the state of innocence was supremely cultured or civilized. After all, necessity is the mother of invention, and in the state of innocence Adam had no necessities. Had that happy state persisted, on St Thomas's premises, and presumably on biblical ones, men would have continued to be naked and unashamed, and would have developed few techniques of what we call civilization at all. They would have had more valuable things to think

[3] *Proof of the Apostolic Preaching* 12 (Eng. tr. A.C.W. series XVI, London, 1952): *Adversus Hæreses* III, 23, 5

about, their knowledge would have been contemplatively rather than practically engaged.

Other supernatural benefits were conferred on Adam as representative of the human race, so that he would communicate them to all his descendants. We might almost call them the effects of original justice, as the opposite pole to the effects of original sin. The chief of them was integrity of nature; that is to say there was no disorder, nothing out of joint either within man or between him and his environment. As his mind (in the large sense which includes the function of will as well as of thought) was entirely subordinate to God, so his feelings, passions, emotions, instincts, impulses, all the non-rational energy of the human psyche, was entirely and harmoniously subordinate to his mind; and so was his body and, with qualifications, his world. That man enjoyed this integrity in the state of innocence, and that it was supernatural, an effect of grace, is of faith, or rather it is so involved in solemn definitions of faith on original sin, that it cannot be denied without prejudice to faith. But whether man was created in grace, and endowed with these effects of it from the first moment of his existence, or whether they were conferred on him afterwards, is an open question: St Thomas is of the former opinion.

That original justice and integrity were supernatural endowments effected by divine grace, and not natural properties of man, he proves by the evidence of our experience, that we no longer enjoy them. The principle is that sin does not directly affect the natural properties of the creature; its essential nature remains the same, sin or no sin. The other chief effects of original justice were immunity from pain and death, or anything tending to the physical dissolution of man, and an effortless dominion over other terrestrial creatures. The former of these enjoys as great a degree of theological certitude as integrity of nature, if not greater; it is indeed a physical or bodily integrity corresponding to the psychic and moral integrity we have just been considering. Death, life, immortality, the central Christian event is directly to do with these things. If we deny man's conditional immortality and integrity at his original creation, it is hard to see how we can maintain the full meaning of his re-creation by the death and resurrection of our Lord. If we deny that man's death has anything to do with his sin, then it will be hard to assert that Christ's death has any value for his redemption.

It is important to bear in mind that these endowments of the state of innocence are not natural to man, but supernatural consequences of divine grace. There are two corollaries to this: *a.* only man among terrestrial creatures is capable of receiving divine grace, and so the rest of the animal kingdom in the state of nature would have been subject to the natural cycle of life and death and the struggle for survival as it is now, and all

that human sin has altered here is the relationship of this kingdom with man, its appointed king; *b.* as we are also now subject to this natural cycle of life, struggle and death, and over and above it to the internal struggle, peculiar to man, between higher and lower nature, 'spirit' and 'flesh', even when we have been restored to grace, again our imagination boggles at the *visible* consequences of grace postulated for the state of innocence. There is no help for it; it must be suffered to boggle away in patience. It has to endure the same uneasiness when we contemplate man's end in the resurrection, so there is no urgent need to spare it when we consider his beginnings.

When we come to the last question, 102, on the proper place for the state of innocence, which is Paradise, it is not difficulties of the imagination but ascertained facts of geography that disqualify St Thomas's answers. But the main interest of this question is that it brings us up squarely with the problem of St Thomas's obsolete interpretation of Scripture, and the question whether it may not perhaps invalidate his whole theology, regarded as systematic reflection on the revealed data of Scripture.

I would save the validity of St Thomas's theology against this sort of doubt by saying that his interpretation of Scripture uses *techniques* that are indeed obsolete, and therefore produces many results that are obsolete, but is controlled by *principles* that are of the essence of the Catholic tradition of reflection on Scripture, and therefore produces a work that is essentially valid. I would personally cite Origen as an example of a theologian of genius and admirable Christian devotion, whose work was essentially invalidated by wrong principles of interpretation introduced from outside into the Catholic possession of Scripture.[4]

An excellent illustration of sound principles and defective technique (by modern standards) is question 102, 1. The sound principle is that whatever was written as history should be interpreted as history; put in more comprehensive terms it is the principle that all holy Scripture, like any other literature, should be interpreted according to the mind of its particular author. Only when this has been done is it legitimate to go on and read other meanings into or out of it, and these, the 'spiritual' meanings, are only acceptable in so far as they are not merely consistent but coherent with the primary meaning the author had in mind. The terminology in which this impeccable principle was expressed by St Thomas, his predecessors, and his successors, is confusing in the extreme. Thus the meaning of a passage intended primarily by its author is called the literal sense, even though he may be using the most figurative, metaphorical hyperbolical, exaggerated or ironic language to convey it in. In other

[4]But de Lubac in his *Histoire et Esprit* vigorously defends Origen against this charge of defective historical principle in his exegesis.

words when St Thomas talks about the literal sense, he does not mean 'literal' literally. It is clearly high time the terminology was recast. Almost, but not quite as unsatisfactory is the appellation 'spiritual sense' for the secondary symbolic meanings of the things described in the sacred text, discerned behind or under or over the meaning primarily intended by the author. To *ignore* the literary intentions of the sacred writers was the error in principle of Origen; to *ignore* the revelational intention of the divine inspirer, not infrequently achieved in the so-called spiritual senses, is the error in principle of some modern interpreters.

It is when the interpreter comes to deciding in detail what the sacred writer's intentions actually were that his technique is brought into play, and it is here that St Thomas, or rather his age and those that preceded it, for want of all the equipment provided by modern researches, were at their weakest wherever they were not directly supported by the Church's theological tradition of what Scripture meant. Thus in this particular article St Thomas says, following St Augustine, that what *Genesis* says about Paradise is said 'in the form of historical narrative', whence he justly infers that it is to be interpreted as such and not as an allegory. But the term 'historical' is much more ambiguous than he supposes. Karl Rahner in an essay on monogenism[5] makes a valuable distinction between historical in content and historical in form. A text is historical in *form* when the author is intending to describe an actual situation or event. If he has his facts wrong, or is deliberately inventing or distorting them, it may be historical in form without having much or any historical content. If he is writing a historical novel he is using a rather complex form which disguises itself as historical. If he is writing a fairy-story neither form nor content is historical. But he may also wish to state a real situation or event without describing it, because he either cannot or will not. He may simply state the event baldly, as the assumption of the Blessed Virgin, for example, is stated in the Apostolic Constitution *Munificentissimus Deus* which defined the dogma. This document could be called historical in content, in so far as its author means to state an actual event, but it is clearly not historical in form. Or the author may choose to present the real situation of which he speaks in a figurative, symbolical, or picturesque manner for the gratification and instruction of his hearers. Something of the sort is the case, we would nowadays maintain, with the stories of *Genesis* 2 & 3, and indeed many other narratives of the Bible. Thus they are historical in content, telling of actual situations and events, not merely allegorizing about unchanging and unhistorical ideas; but they are not historical in form (except in a manner perhaps remotely analogous to that in which the

[5] *Theological Investigations* 1 (tr. C. Ernst, O.P.); London, 1961; p 253 note 1

historical novel is historical in form), because the author is not meaning to give us an accurate *description* of the events and situations, creation, innocence, and fall of man, which he sets before us. Precisely what literary form he was using, and what therefore he was meaning to convey, the modern interpreter will be much more hesitant about than St Thomas was. He will only be quite sure that the narrative is not meant to be read as *descriptively* historical.

The temptation of many of us nowadays is of course to deny that the *Genesis* narrative is historical in content either. We are goaded thereto by that boggling of our imaginations of which we have already spoken, and have to be restrained by the requirements of our faith. But this temptation has other grounds which St Thomas mentions in a startlingly modern objection in question 97, 4, where he is asking whether the tree of life would have conferred immortality. In the third objection he protests that the whole thing seems to be a return to the myths of the ancients, of the sort that Aristotle made fun of, and we cannot be expected to believe myths. Unfortunately, he so constructs his article, with a yes-and-no answer, that he avoids having to answer this fascinating objection, which has been raised against the Bible so much more vigorously in our own days. The fact is that the Bible, particularly in these early chapters of *Genesis*, does employ a number of images that were commonplaces in the myths of the ancient world: the tree of life itself is one; the garden, the rivers of paradise, the serpent, the fruit that was *tabu*, the cherub with the flickering sword, are all *motifs* that occur in the *fabulæ antiquorum*.

The inference many have drawn is that the *Genesis* narrative is of the same sort, and they make the objection St Thomas voiced their own. But we can distinguish 'mythical' as we distinguished 'historical', and even if we grant for the sake of argument that the narrative is mythical in form (which most scholars today would, I think, regard as a serious oversimplification), we need not infer that it is mythical in content. Thus a convenient, but probably oversimplified formula for these narratives, would be 'historical in content, quasi-mythical in literary form'.

But the important thing to grasp about these narratives, and indeed about all Scripture, is that whatever their superficial literary form may be and whatever their immediate content, they are above all else *revelational* in both form and content. They are God's word about God's deed to man. They form an integral part of the whole divine revelation, completed and fulfilled in Christ and his new and eternal covenant, and so they must be interpreted in the light of the whole revelation. The themes they deploy and the revelation they impart are taken up and developed and amplified in the Bible itself, and have to be theologically examined with all that development of revelation in mind. It is the constant loyalty of St Thomas and his

great predecessors the Fathers to this fundamental principle that makes their theology still valid for us today, when so many of the details of their biblical interpretation are no longer tenable. It is also the compelling reason why we must try to avoid an unprincipled eclecticism in our approach to our theological inheritance from our fathers in the faith. We do not have to swallow St Thomas whole, but we must try to understand him whole, instead of dismembering this thought and picking fastidiously at the pieces.

[An excellent book to read on the topic of this volume is *Le Péché Originel et les Origines de l'Homme*, by M.-M. Labourdette, O.P. (Paris, 1953).]