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(1a. 90-102)

Edmund Hill O.P.

Excerpt

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SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, 1a. 90, 1

DEINDE CONSIDERANDUM EST de prima hominis productione. Et circa hoc consideranda sunt quatuor:

- primo, de productione ipsius hominis;
- secundo, de fine productionis;
- tertio, de statu et conditione hominis primo producti;
- quarto, de loco ejus.

Circa productionem autem consideranda sunt tria:

- primo, de productione hominis quantum ad animam;
- secundo, quantum ad corpus viri;
- tertio, quantum ad productionem mulieris.

Quaestio 90. de productione hominis quantum ad animam

Circa primum quaeruntur quatuor:

1. utrum anima humana sit aliquid factum, vel sit de substantia ipsius Dei;
2. supposito quod sit facta, utrum sit creata;
3. utrum sit facta mediantibus angelis;
4. utrum sit facta ante corpus.

articulus 1. utrum anima sit facta, vel sit de substantia Dei

AD PRIMUM sic proceditur:¹ 1. Videtur quod anima non sit facta, sed sit de substantia Dei. Dicitur enim *Gen.*² *Formavit Deus hominem de limo terrae, et inspiravit in faciem ejus spiraculum vitae, et factus est homo in animam viventem.* Sed ille qui spirat aliquid a se emittit. Ergo anima qua homo vivit est aliquid de substantia Dei.

2. Præterea, sicut supra habitum est,³ anima est forma simplex. Sed forma est actus. Ergo anima est actus purus, quod est solius Dei. Ergo anima est de substantia Dei.

3. Præterea, quaecumque sunt et nullo modo differunt, sunt idem. Sed Deus et mens sunt et nullo modo differunt—quia oporteret quod aliquibus

¹cf II Sent. 17, 1, 1. CG II, 85. *Compend. Theol.* 94

²Genesis 2, 7

³Ia. 75, 5

*The questions on the soul, 75–89, have formed the introduction to the subject.

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MAN'S ACTUAL PRODUCTION AS FAR AS SOUL IS CONCERNED

NEXT WE MUST CONSIDER man's making at the beginning.³ And here there are four topics:

- first, man's actual production (90-2);
- second, the final product (93);
- third, man's state and condition when first produced (94-101);
- fourth, man's whereabouts in that state (102).

There are three things to be considered under the first head:

- first, man's production as far as the soul is concerned (90);
- second, as far as man's body is concerned (91);
- third, as far as the woman is concerned (92).

Question 90. man's actual production as far as his soul is concerned

Here there are four points of inquiry:

1. whether the human soul is something made, or is of God's own substance;
2. granted that it is made, whether it is created;
3. whether it is made through the agency of angels;
4. whether it is made before the body.

article 1. is the human soul something made, or of God's own substance?

THE FIRST POINT:¹ 1. It seems that the soul is not made, but is of God's own substance. For *Genesis* says,² *God formed man from the slime of the earth, and breathed into his face the breath of life, and man became a living soul.* But to breathe is to give something out of oneself. So the soul by which man lives is of God's own substance.

2. Again, as we have concluded,³ soul is an incomplex form. Now form is actuality. So soul is pure actuality, which only God is. Therefore soul is of God's substance.

3. Again, things that are, and diverge in no way at all, are identical. But God and mind^b are, and diverge in no way at all—since they would have

^b'Mind' is not here used in the usual and restricted sense of the intelligence, as distinct among other things from the will, but in the sense Augustine gives it in the *De Trinitate* of the spiritual part of the soul, thus including the will; or simply as signifying the soul as rational.

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differentiis different, et sic essent composita. Ergo Deus et mens humana idem sunt.

SED CONTRA est quod Augustinus⁴ enumerat quaedam quae dicit esse *multum aperteque perversa, et fidei catholicae adversa*; inter quae primum est quod quidam dixerunt *Deum animam non de nihilo, sed de seipso fecisse*.

RESPONSIO: Dicendum quod dicere animam esse de substantia Dei manifestam improbabilitatem continet. Ut enim ex dictis patet,⁵ anima humana est quandoque intelligens in potentia, et scientiam quodammodo a rebus acquirit, et habet diversas potentias; quae omnia aliena sunt a Dei natura, qui est actus purus, et nihil ab alio accipiens, et nullam in se diversitatem habens, ut supra probatum est.⁶

Sed hic error principium habuisse videtur ex duabus positionibus antiquorum. Primi enim qui naturas rerum considerare incœperunt, imaginationem transcendere non valentes, nihil præter corpora esse posuerunt. Et ideo Deum dicebant esse quoddam corpus, quod aliorum corporum iudicabant esse principium.⁷ Et quia animam ponebant esse de natura illius corporis quod dicebant esse principium, ut dicitur in *De Anima*,⁸ per consequens sequebatur quod anima esset de natura Dei. Juxta quam positionem etiam Manichæi,⁹ Deum esse quamdam lucem corpoream existimantes, quamdam partem illius lucis animam esse posuerunt corpori alligatam.

Secundo vero processum fuit ad hoc quod aliqui aliquid incorporeum esse apprehenderunt, non tamen a corpore separatum sed corporis formam. Unde et Varro dixit quod *Deus est anima mundum motu et ratione gubernans*,¹⁰ ut Augustinus narrat. Sic igitur illius totalis animæ partem aliqui posuerunt animam hominis, sicut homo est pars totius mundi;¹¹ non valentes intellectu pertingere ad distinguendos spiritualium substantiarum gradus, nisi secundum distinctiones corporum.

Hæc autem omnia sunt impossibilia, ut supra probatum est.¹² Unde manifeste falsum est animam esse de substantia Dei.

I. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod 'inspirare' non est accipiendum corporaliter; sed idem est Deum 'inspirare' quod 'spiritum facere'. Quamvis et homo corporaliter spirans non emittit* aliquid de sua substantia, sed de natura extranea.

*Leonine, Piana, *emittat* subjunctive.

⁴*De Origine Animæ* III, 15. PL 44, 522

⁵Ia. 77, 2; 79, 2; 84, 6

⁶Ia. 3, 1 & 7; 9, 1

⁷cf Ia. 44, 2. *CG* I, 20. Vide Augustine, *City of God* VIII, 2. PL 41, 226; 5. *ibid* 239.

Aristotle, *Physics* I, 4. 187a12

⁸I, 2. 405a3

⁹cf Augustine, *Heresies* 46. PL 42, 35. *De Gen. ad Litt.* VII, 11. PL 34, 361

¹⁰*City of God* VII, 6. PL 41, 199; cf IV, 31. *ibid* 138

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to diverge with some divergences in that case, and this would mean that they were complex. So God and the human mind are identical.

ON THE OTHER HAND, there is Augustine⁴ listing certain views which he calls *very and openly perverse, and contrary to Catholic faith*; and the first of them is the view expressed by some that *God did not make the soul from nothing, but from himself*.

REPLY: To say the soul is of God's own substance is obviously objectionable. As is clear from what we have seen,⁵ the human soul is sometimes only potentially understanding, and gets its knowledge in some fashion from things, and has various capacities; and all this is quite foreign to God's nature, who is pure actuality, and gets nothing from anything else, and has no variety in himself, as we have seen.⁶

This mistake, however, seems to have arisen from two assumptions of the ancients. The first men to consider the nature of things were unable to rise above the imagination, and so they assumed that there was nothing except bodies. And thus they said that God is some sort of body, which is the origin, they concluded, of other bodies.⁷ And because they assumed that soul is of that body's nature which they held to be the origin of things, as Aristotle tells us in the *De Anima*,⁸ it followed that soul would be of God's nature. This is also the Manichees' position,⁹ who think of God as some sort of bodily light, and adopt the view that soul is a part of that light attached to a body.

The next step was that some did grasp the idea of there being something not bodily, but only as the form of body, and thus necessarily embodied, not existing separate from body. Thus Varro said, so Augustine tells us, that *God is soul governing the world by movement and reason*.¹⁰ And so some concluded that man's soul is part of that total soul, just as man is part of the total world;¹¹ their minds were unable to get as far as distinguishing a grading of spiritual substances except in terms of a graded distinction of bodies.

But these are all impossible theories, as we have seen.¹² So it is plainly false that soul is of God's substance.

Hence: 1. 'Breathing' here is not to be taken in a physical sense; but for God to 'breathe into' means to 'make a spirit'.^c Though even when a man breathes in the physical sense, he does not give out some of his own substance, but something of an extraneous nature.

⁴Macrobius, *In Somnum Scipionis* I, 14

¹²Ia. 3, 1 & 8; 75, 1

^cThe word *spiritus* being derived from *spirare*, 'to breathe'. Breath or wind in the material sense have, of course, provided most languages with their primary sense analogues or symbols for the notion of spirit.

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SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, 1a. 90, 2

2. Ad secundum dicendum quod anima, etsi sit forma simplex secundum suam essentiam, non tamen est suum esse, sed est ens per participationem—ut ex supra dictis patet.¹³ Et ideo non est actus purus, sicut Deus.

3. Ad tertium dicendum quod differens, proprie acceptum, aliquo differt—unde ibi quæritur differentia ubi est convenientia. Et propter hoc oportet differentia esse composita quoddammodo, cum in aliquo differant et in aliquo convenient. Sed secundum hoc, licet omne differens sit diversum, non tamen omne diversum est differens, ut dicitur in *Meta*.¹⁴ Nam simplicia diversa sunt seipsis, non autem differunt aliquibus differentiis, ex quibus componantur. Sicut homo et asinus differunt rationali et irrationali differentiis, de quibus non est dicere quod ulterius aliis differentiis differant.

articulus 2. utrum anima sit producta in esse per creationem

AD SECUNDUM sic proceditur:¹ 1. Videtur quod anima non sit producta in esse per creationem. Quod enim in se habet aliquid materiale fit ex materia. Sed anima habet in se aliquid materiale, cum non sit actus purus. Ergo anima facta est ex materia; non ergo est creata.

2. Præterea, omnis actus materiæ alicujus videtur educi de potentia materiæ; cum enim materia sit in potentia ad actum, actus quilibet præexistit in materia in potentia. Sed anima est actus materiæ corporalis, ut ex ejus definitione apparet.² Ergo anima educitur de potentia materiæ.

3. Præterea, anima est forma quædam. Si igitur anima fit per creationem, pari ratione omnes aliæ formæ. Et sic nulla forma exhibit in esse per generationem—quod est inconveniens.

SED CONTRA est quod dicitur *Gen*.³: *Creavit Deus hominem ad imaginem suam*. Est autem homo ad imaginem Dei secundum animam. Ergo anima exivit in esse per creationem.

RESPONSIO: Dicendum quod anima rationalis non potest fieri nisi per creationem; quod non est verum de aliis formis. Cujus ratio est quia cum fieri sit via ad esse, hoc modo alicui competit fieri sicut ei competit esse. Illud autem proprie dicitur esse quod ipsum habet esse, quasi in suo esse subsistens. Unde solæ substantiæ proprie et vere dicuntur entia. Accidens

¹³Ia. 75, 5 ad 4¹⁴IV, 9. 1018a11¹cf Ia. 118, 2. II *Sent.* I, 1, 4. *De veritate* xxvii, 3 ad 9. *CG* II, 87. *De potentia* III, 9. *Quodl.* IX, 5, 1. *Compend. Theol.* 93²cf Ia. 75, 1. Aristotle, *De Anima* II, 1. 412a27³I, 27^aThe objection derived its force from ignoring the real distinction. See Appendix 1.^bThe word 'creation' is used in the strict, artificial sense of 'making out of nothing'.^bThe objection, like objection 2 to the previous article, is still based on ignoring the real distinction (see note *d* to art 1), but proceeds from the opposite premise.

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2. Even if soul is essentially a non-complex form, it is nonetheless not its own 'is', but it is a being by derivation—as is clear from what we have seen.¹³ It is not, therefore, pure actuality, like God.^d

3. Diverging, strictly speaking, means diverging in some particular—you look for divergence in the strict sense where there is also concurrence. And this is why divergent things must be complex in some way, since they diverge in some respect and concur in another. But according to this precise use of words, while everything that diverges is thereby other, not everything that is other thereby diverges, as Aristotle says in the *Metaphysics*.¹⁴ For incomplex things are other in themselves, but they do not diverge by divergent factors which enter into their make-up. Thus man diverges from donkey in the divergent factor of rational and irrational (while they concur in the common factor of animal); but you cannot go on to say that the rational and irrational diverge from each other in some further divergent factor—they are simply other.

article 2. is the soul created?

THE SECOND POINT:¹ 1. It seems that the soul is not brought into being by creation.^a For whatever has anything material about it is made out of matter. Now soul has something material about it, not being pure actuality.^b So it is made out of matter; not therefore created.

2. Again, every actuality of any matter seems in some way to be drawn out of its potentiality; for since matter is potential to actuality, any sort of actuality must pre-exist potentially in matter. But the soul is an actuality of bodily matter, as its definition shows.² Therefore the soul is drawn out of the potentiality of matter.

3. Again, the soul is a kind of form. If the soul then is made by creation, so by the same token should all other forms be. And so there will be no form that emerges into being by being generated—which seems very odd.

ON THE OTHER HAND, there is *Genesis*:³ *God created man to his own image.* Now it is by the soul that man is after God's image. So the soul emerged into being by being created.

REPLY: The rational soul cannot come to be except by creation; this is not the case with other forms. The reason is that since becoming is the way to being, the manner of a thing's becoming corresponds to the manner of its being. But a thing is only properly said to be if it has actual 'is', and as it were subsists in its own 'is'. So it is only substances that are properly and

The only real distinction the objector can conceive in a substance that is not pure actuality is that between matter and form. The only potentiality he recognizes is that of matter, the only actuality that of form. See Appendix 1.

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SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, 1a. 90, 3

vero non habet esse, sed eo aliquid est, et hac ratione ens dicitur; sicut albedo dicitur ens, quia ea aliquid est album. Et propter hoc dicitur in *Meta.*⁴ quod accidens dicitur magis entis quam ens. Et eadem ratio est de omnibus aliis formis non subsistentibus. Et ideo nulli formæ non subsistenti proprie competit fieri, sed dicuntur fieri per hoc quod composita subsistentia fiunt.

Anima autem rationalis est forma subsistens, ut supra habitum est.⁵ Unde sibi proprie competit esse et fieri. Et quia non potest fieri ex materia præjacente, neque corporali quia sic esset naturæ corporeæ, neque spirituali quia sic substantiæ spirituales in invicem transmutarentur; necesse est dicere quod non fiat nisi per creationem.

1. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod in anima est sicut materiale ipsa simplex essentia, formale autem in ipsa est esse participatum; quod quidem ex necessitate simul est cum essentia animæ, quia esse per se consequitur ad formam. Et eadem ratio esset, si poneretur composita ex quadam materia spirituali, ut quidam dicunt.⁶ Quia illa materia non est in potentia ad aliam formam, sicut nec materia cælestis corporis—alioquin anima esset corruptibilis. Unde nullo modo anima potest fieri ex materia præjacente.

2. Ad secundum dicendum quod actum extrahi de potentia materiæ nihil aliud est quam aliquid fieri actu quod prius erat in potentia. Sed quia anima rationalis non habet esse suum dependens a materia corporali, sed habet esse subsistens et excedit capacitatem materiæ corporalis, ut supra dictum est;⁷ propterea non educitur de potentia materiæ.

3. Ad tertium dicendum quod non est simile de anima rationale et de aliis formis, ut dictum est.

articulus 3. utrum anima rationalis sit producta a Deo immediate

AD TERTIUM sic proceditur:¹ 1. Videtur quod anima rationalis non sit producta a Deo immediate, sed mediantibus angelis. Major enim ordo est in spiritualibus quam in corporalibus. Sed corpora inferiora producuntur per

⁴vii, I. 1028a25. Aristotle (Book Z)⁵1a. 75, 2⁶cf 1a. 75, 5 & 6; vide Bonaventure, II *Sent.* 3, I, I, I, arg. 1 & 2. Alexander of Hales, *Summa* 1a. 2i, 106 (QR II, 134)⁷1a. 75, 2¹cf II *Sent.* 18, 2, 2. *Opusc. De Substantiis Separatis* 10. *Quodl.* III, 3, 1. *In De Causis*, lect. 3 & 5²I translate the Latin *accidens* 'concomitant', because 'accident' in English suggests chance and casual occurrence. Aristotle's word *συμβεβηκός* means literally something that 'goes with' something else, and 'concomitant' seems to me to convey just that meaning.³A subsistent form is one which is not realized in actuality by informing matter, like all physical substantial forms, but which exists in itself. Hence all spiritual substances, angels and human souls, are subsistent forms.

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truly called beings. A concomitant^c on the other hand does not really have 'is', but something else is such-and-such with it, and only to that extent is the concomitant called a being; for example, whiteness is called a being, because something else is white with it. That is why it says in the *Metaphysics*,⁴ that a concomitant is called not so much a being as a being's. And the same is true about all other forms that do not subsist in themselves (even the substantial forms of physical substances). So none of these forms, properly speaking, 'becomes' or comes to be, but they are said to come to be in so far as the subsistent things which they compose come to be.

But the rational soul is a subsistent form,^d as we have seen.⁵ So it is properly said both to be and to come to be. And it cannot come to be out of matter already there, either of a bodily kind, because that would give it a bodily nature, or of a spiritual kind, because that would involve spiritual substances being transmuted into each other;^e so it has to be said that it can only come to be by creation.

Hence: 1. In the soul the simple essence or form plays the part of the material element, while the formal element in it is its derived 'is'; and this is necessarily simultaneous with the soul's essence, because 'is' follows of itself on form. And the same reason would hold even if the soul were supposed to be composed out of some sort of spiritual matter, as some people say.⁶ For such matter could have no potentiality to any other form, as is also the case with the material of the heavenly bodies^f—otherwise the soul would be perishable. So it is quite impossible for the soul to come to be out of matter already there.

2. The drawing of actuality out of the potentiality of matter only means something becoming actual which was previously only potential. But because the rational soul does not have its 'is' dependent on any bodily matter, but has subsistent 'is' and surpasses the capacity of bodily matter, as we have seen,⁷ it follows that it is not drawn out of the potentiality of bodily matter.

3. The case of the rational soul is not like that of other forms, as we have seen.

article 3. is the rational soul brought into being directly by God, or by angelic agency?

THE THIRD POINT:¹ 1. It seems that the rational soul is not produced by God directly, but through the agency of angels. For there is a higher degree of order in the spiritual realm than in the bodily. But lesser bodies

^eSee Appendix 1. The idea of spiritual matter was favoured by Alexander of Hales and St Bonaventure, and many others.

^fSee Appendix 2.

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SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, 1a. 90, 4

corpora superiora, ut Dionysius dicit.² Ergo et inferiores spiritus, qui sunt animæ rationales, producuntur per spiritus superiores qui sunt angeli.

2. Præterea, finis rerum respondet principio: Deus enim est principium et finis rerum. Ergo et exitus rerum a principio respondet reductioni rerum in finem. Sed *infima reducuntur per prima*, ut Dionysius dicit.³ Ergo et infima procedunt in esse per prima, scilicet animæ per angelos.

3. Præterea, *perfectum est quod potest sibi simile facere*, ut dicitur in *Meteor*.⁴ Sed spirituales substantiæ sunt multo magis perfectæ quam corporales. Cum ergo corpora faciant sibi similia secundum speciem, multo magis angeli poterunt facere aliquid infra se secundum speciem naturæ, scilicet animam rationalem.

SED CONTRA est quod dicitur *Gen*.⁵ quod Deus ipse *inspiravit in faciem hominis spiraculum vitæ*.

RESPONSIO: Dicendum quod quidam posuerunt quod angeli, secundum quod operantur in virtute Dei, causant animas rationales.⁶ Sed hoc est omnino impossibile, et a fide alienum; ostensum est enim quod anima rationalis non potest produci nisi per creationem.⁷ Solus autem Deus potest creare, quia solius primi agentis est agere nullo præsupposito; cum semper agens secundum præsupponat aliquid a primo agente, ut supra habitum est.⁸ Quod autem agit aliquid ex aliquo præsupposito, agit transmutando. Et ideo nullum aliud agens agit nisi transmutando, sed solus Deus agit creando. Et quia anima rationalis non potest produci per transmutationem alicujus materiæ, ideo non potest produci nisi a Deo immediate.

Et per hoc patet solutio ad objecta. Nam quod corpora causant vel sibi similia vel inferiora, et quod superiora reducunt inferiora, totum hoc provenit per quamdam transmutationem.

articulus 4. utrum anima humana fuerit producta ante corpus

AD QUARTUM sic proceditur:¹ 1. Videtur quod anima humana fuerit producta ante corpus. Opus enim creationis præcessit opus distinctionis et

²*De Divinis Nominibus* 4, 4. PG 3, 697

³*De Ecclesiastica Hierarchia* 5, 4. PG 3, 504

⁴*Meteorologica* IV, 3. 380a14

⁵2, 7

⁶Avicenna, *Metaphysics*, tr. IX, 4; and other Arab philosophers.

⁷In the preceding article

⁸1a. 65, 3

¹cf infra 91, 4 ad 3 & 5; 1a. 118, 3. II *Sent.* 17, 2, 2. CG II, 83 & 84. *De potentia* III, 10

^cDenys, Dionysius the Areopagite, is the pseudonym of an anonymous writer of c. A.D. 500, probably from Syria. His works were first quoted at a council held in Tyre in A.D. 513 by Severus, Monophysite Patriarch of Antioch. In A.D. 532 they

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are brought into being through higher ones, as Denys says.² ^a So it follows that lower spirits, such as rational souls, are brought into being through higher spirits such as angels.

2. Again, the end of things corresponds to their beginning: after all, God is the beginning and end of all things. Therefore the emergence of things from their beginning corresponds to their return to their end. But *the lowest are brought back through the foremost*, as Dionysius says.³ Therefore the lowest emerge into being through the foremost, to wit souls through angels.

3. Again, *the perfect is what can make something like itself*, as Aristotle says.⁴ Now spiritual substances are much more perfect than bodily ones. So since bodies make things like themselves in kind, much more will angels be able to make something inferior to themselves in kind, to wit the rational soul.

ON THE OTHER HAND, there is *Genesis*,⁵ which says that God himself *breathed into the face of man the breath of life*.

REPLY: Some have held that angels, operating in God's power, cause rational souls.⁶ But this is utterly impossible, and foreign to the faith; for we have seen that the rational soul can only be produced by creation,⁷ and only God can create, because it is only the first maker who can do anything without anything else presupposed, while the secondary maker always presupposes a subject of his making, received from the first doer, as we have already settled.⁸ Now whatever works something out of something else presupposed, does it by a process of transmutation. So all other doers work by transmutation, while only God works by creation. And because the rational soul cannot be produced by transmuted some matter, it follows it can only be produced by God's direct action.

And this gives us the answers to the objections. For when bodies cause others like themselves, or higher things bring back lower things to their end, all proceeds by some sort of transmutation.

article 4. was the human soul produced before the body?

THE FOURTH POINT:¹ I. It seems that the human soul was produced before the body. For the work of creation preceded the work of distinction and

were rejected as spurious by the Catholic bishop Hypatius of Ephesus when they were produced by the Monophysites in a discussion held at Constantinople. But after that nobody questioned their authenticity until the sixteenth century. St Thomas had no doubts on the score. See article in D.T.C., *Denys (Pseudo-) l'Aréopagite*.