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978-0-521-02918-6 - Summa Theologiae: Volume 10 - Cosmogony, (1a. 65-74)

William A. Wallace, O.P.

Excerpt

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SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, 1A.

POST CONSIDERATIONEM SPIRITUALIS CREATURÆ, considerandum est de creatura corporali. In cuius productione tria opera Scriptura commemorat, scilicet opus creationis, cum dicitur, *In principio creavit Deus cælum et terram*, etc.;¹ opus distinctionis, cum dicitur, *Divisit lucem a tenebris*,² et *aquas quæ sunt supra firmamentum ab aquis quæ sunt sub firmamento*;³ et opus ornatus, cum dicitur, *Fiant luminaria in firmamento* etc.⁴

Primo, ergo, considerandum est:

de opere creationis;
secundo, de opere distinctionis;
tertio, de opere ornatus.

¹Genesis I, 1

²Genesis I, 4

³Genesis I, 7

⁴Genesis I, 14

⁵The *Summa* is divided into three main parts, namely, the *Prima Pars* or first part (Vols 1–15 of this series), the *Secunda Pars* or second part (Vols 16–47), and the unfinished *Tertia Pars* or third part (Vols 48–60). The present inquiry occurs about mid-way through the *Prima Pars*. For a plan of the whole *Summa*, see Vol. I of this series; and for the relation of Questions 65–74 to the rest of the *Prima Pars*, see the Introduction to the present volume.

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[More information](#)

CREATION OF THE MATERIAL UNIVERSE

THE MATERIAL UNIVERSE comes next for consideration after spiritual creation.^a Scripture makes mention of three tasks in its production, namely the work of creation, when it says, *In the beginning God created heaven and earth*, etc.;¹ the work of diversification, when it says, *He divided the light from the darkness*,² and *the waters which are above the firmament from those which are below it*;³ and the work of adornment, when it says, *Let there be light in the firmament*, etc.⁴ We discuss, therefore:

- first, the work of creation (65);
- secondly, that of diversification (66–69);
- thirdly, that of adornment (70–74).^b

^bThe three headings, those of the segments beginning at Questions 65, 66 and 70, are based on a medieval exegesis of *Genesis*, traceable in turn to the teachings of the Church Fathers. The headings derive from the text of *Genesis* itself, which, after a brief account of *creation* in verses 1 and 2, narrates next the work of *differentiation*, viz. of light from darkness, of the upper waters from the lower and of the seas from the dry land; and then the work of *ornamentation* or furnishing, where stars, fish, birds and animals are seen as populating the various regions of the universe. See also Appendices 7, 8 & 9.

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[More information](#)

SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, 1a. 65, 1

Quæstio 65. de opere creationis creaturæ corporalis

Circa primum quærentur quatuor:

1. utrum creatura corporalis sit a Deo;
2. utrum sit facta propter bonitatem Dei;
3. utrum sit facta a Deo mediantibus angelis;
4. utrum formæ corporum sint ab angelis, an immediate a Deo.

articulus 1. utrum creatura corporalis sit a deo

AD PRIMUM SIC PROCEDITUR:¹ Videtur quod creatura corporalis non sit a Deo. Dicitur enim *Eccles.*, *Didici quod omnia quæ fecit Deus, perseverant in æternum.*² Sed corpora visibilia non perseverant in æternum; dicitur enim *II Cor.*, *Quæ videntur, temporalia sunt; quæ autem non videntur, æterna.*³ Ergo Deus non fecit corpora visibilia.

2. Præterea, dicitur *Gen.*, *Vidit Deus cuncta quæ fecerat, et erant valde bona.*⁴ Sed creaturæ corporales sunt malæ: experimur enim eas in multis noxiis, ut patet in multis serpentibus, in æstu solis, et hujusmodi. Ideo autem aliquid dicitur malum, quia nocet. Creaturæ igitur corporales non sunt a Deo.

3. Præterea, id quod est a Deo, non retrahit a Deo, sed ducit in ipsum. Sed creaturæ corporales retrahunt a Deo; unde Apostolus dicit, *II Cor.*, *Non contemplantibus nobis quæ videntur.*⁵ Ergo creaturæ corporales non sunt a Deo.

SED CONTRA est quod dicitur in *Psal.*, *Qui fecit cælum et terram, mare, et omnia quæ in eis sunt.*⁶

RESPONSIO: Dicendum quod quorundam hæreticorum positio est, quod visibilia ista non sunt creata a bono Deo, sed a malo principio. Et ad

¹*De potentia III, 6. In Symbolum Apostolorum I*²*Ecclesiastes 3, 14*³*II Corinthians 4, 18*⁴*Genesis I, 31*⁵*II Corinthians 4, 18*⁶*Psalms 145, 6*

^{*}The topic being investigated is whether material creatures come from God as from an efficient cause, not whether they proceed from him by way of emanation. Pre-supposed is the entire treatise on creation in general (1a. 44-6). In dealing with

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[More information](#)

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Question 65. the creation of the material universe

Regarding the work of creation there are four points of inquiry:

1. do material creatures come from God?
2. were they made to manifest God's goodness?
3. were the angels God's intermediaries in making them?
4. did the forms of bodies come from angels or immediately from God?

article 1. do material creatures come from God?

THE FIRST POINT:¹ 1. It seems that material creatures do not come from God.^a For it is written, *I have learned that everything that God made lasts forever.*² This is not true of visible bodies, for St Paul says, *The things which are seen are temporal; but the things which are not seen are eternal.*³ Hence God did not make visible bodies.

2. Moreover, we read in *Genesis*, *God saw all the things that he had made, and they were very good.*⁴ But material creatures are evil, since man often suffers harm from them, as in the case of serpents, heat from the sun, and things of this kind. Now a thing is said to be evil because it is harmful. Material creatures therefore do not come from God.

3. Moreover, whatever comes from God does not withdraw men from him but rather leads them to him. Yet material creatures withdraw men from God, and on this account Paul says, *Let us not contemplate the things that we see.*⁵ Material creatures therefore do not come from God.

ON THE OTHER HAND, there are the words of the psalmist, *Who made heaven and earth, the sea, and all things that are in them.*⁶

REPLY: Certain heretics take the position that these visible things have not been created by a good God, but by an evil principle.^b And they use in

material creation, St Thomas must take account of a heretical position that would make matter an independent source of being apart from God. The difficulties he raises reflect a concern with this heresy, as well as with the general problem of evil; cf 1a. 48-9; Appendix 2.

^bThe reference is to the Manichæans, or followers of Manes (third century A.D.), a Persian who taught a system compounded of Zoroastrian dualism and Christian soteriology. St Augustine discusses their teaching in *De hæresi* 14; 21; 46. PL 42, 28, 29, 37. In *CG* II, 41, St Thomas traces their doctrine to Marcion and Cerdo and their followers, and through them to Pythagoras; cf 1a. 49, 3. *Denz.* 455-64.

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Excerpt

[More information](#)

SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, 1a. 65, 1

argumentum sui erroris assumunt quod Apostolus dicit, II *Cor.*, *deus hujus sæculi excæcavit mentes infidelium*.⁷ Hæc autem positio est omnino impossibilis.

Si enim diversa in aliquo uniantur, necesse est hujus unionis causam esse aliquam; non enim diversa secundum se uniuntur. Et inde est quod, quandocumque in diversis invenitur aliquid unum, oportet quod illa diversa illud unum ab aliqua una causa recipiant, sicut diversa corpora calida habent calorem ab igne. Hoc autem quod est esse, communiter invenitur in omnibus rebus quantumcumque diversis. Necesse est ergo esse unum essendi principium, a quo esse habeant quæcumque sunt quocumque modo, sive sint invisibilia et spiritualia, sive sint visibilia et corporalia.

Dicitur autem diabolus esse *deus hujus sæculi*, non creatione, sed quia sæculariter viventes ei serviunt; eo modo loquendi quo Apostolus loquitur ad *Philip.* 3, *Quorum deus venter est*.⁸

1. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod omnes creaturæ Dei secundum aliquid in æternum perseverant, ad minus secundum materiam; quia creaturæ nunquam in nihilum rediguntur, etiamsi sint corruptibiles. Sed quanto creaturæ magis appropinquant ad Deum, qui est omnino* immobilis, tanto magis sunt immobiles.† Nam creaturæ corruptibiles in perpetuum manent secundum materiam, sed mutantur secundum formam substantialem. Creaturæ vero incorruptibiles permanent quidem secundum substantiam, sed sunt mutabiles secundum alia; puta secundum locum, ut corpora cælestia, vel secundum affectiones, ut creaturæ spirituales.

Quod autem Apostolus dicit, *quæ videntur, temporalia sunt*, etsi verum sit etiam quantum ad ipsas res in se consideratas, secundum quod omnis creatura visibilis subjacet tempori, vel secundum suum esse vel secundum suum motum, tamen Apostolus intendit loqui de visibilibus secundum quod sunt hominis præmia. Nam præmia hominis quæ sunt in istis rebus visibilibus, temporaliter transeunt; quæ autem sunt in rebus invisibilibus,

*Omitted in the Piana edition and in the printed editions of 1473 and 1484

†The codices (thirteenth to fifteenth centuries) used by the Leonine editors all have: *immobilia*, unchangeable things

⁷II *Corinthians* 4, 4

⁸*Philippians* 3, 19

⁹More precisely, what is shared may be either a specific, a generic or an analogical attribute; the cause of the sharing may be an extrinsic cause on which the attribute depends, or, alternatively, one of the things sharing may itself be the cause of the attribute being present in the others; cf 1a. 13, 6. There is a more extended development of this reasoning in *De potentia* III, 6, through two other arguments: (1) evil, being a pure privation, cannot be an actual source of being; and (2) the manifest unity of all of creation rules out a duality of subsistent principles.

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Excerpt

[More information](#)

CREATION OF THE MATERIAL UNIVERSE

support of their error Paul's words, *The god of this world has blinded the minds of unbelievers.*⁷ Their position, however, is completely untenable.

Whenever different things share something in common, there must be some cause of this sharing; precisely as different, they themselves do not account for it.^c Thus it is that whenever some one element is found in different things, these receive it from one cause, just as different hot bodies get their heat from one fire. Existence,^d however, is shared by all things, however much they differ. There must therefore be a single source of existence from which whatever exists in any manner whatsoever, whether invisible and spiritual or visible and material, obtains its existence.

The devil is said to be *the god of this world*, not because he creates it, but because those who live in worldly fashion serve him—in Paul's manner of speaking, they are those *whose god is their belly.*⁸

Hence: 1. All of God's creatures do last for ever in a certain way, at least in terms of matter, for creatures are never dissolved into nothingness, even though they are corruptible. But those creatures that more resemble God, who is completely unchangeable, are themselves more unchangeable. Thus, whereas corruptible creatures last for ever as to their matter, they do undergo change in regard to their substantial form.^e Incorruptible creatures, on the other hand, last for ever in their substance; yet they are changeable in other respects, for example, with respect to place, in the case of the heavenly bodies, or with respect to knowledge and love, in the case of spiritual creatures.^f

St Paul's words, *the things which are seen are temporal*, are true with regard to what happens to the things themselves, since every visible creature has a time limit either for its enduring existence or for its motion; in any case, his intention is to speak of visible things as they are human rewards. These kinds of reward pass away in time, whereas those consisting of invisible things last for ever. For this reason in the previous verse

^a*Esse*, literally 'to be', is here rendered as 'existence', the act of existing, the most perfect actuality that comes to a thing, by which the thing and all its components stand as actually real; cf 1a. 45, 5.

^cIn the doctrine of hylomorphism, every natural body, while itself only one substance, is composed of two incomplete substantial principles, called primary matter and substantial form. Primary matter is incorruptible, and therefore creatures can be said to 'last forever as to their matter' in the sense that their primary matter perdure in some other thing even after they themselves have ceased to exist. See Appendix 4(2).

^fThe reference is to angels, who undergo changes or 'affections' in their acts of knowing and loving; cf 1a. 54–60. The problem here is not the eternal existence of the universe. Creation in time is a fact (cf 1a. 46). The point made is that material beings perdure in the sense that their matter does, and that spiritual substances, being more like God, endure forever in their whole being.

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[More information](#)

SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, Ia. 65, 2

permanent in æternum. Unde et supra præmiserat, *æternum gloriæ pondus operatur in nobis*.

2. Ad secundum dicendum quod creatura corporalis secundum suam naturam est bona, sed non est bonum universale, sed est quoddam bonum particulare* et contractum; secundum quam particularitatem et contractionem sequitur in ea contrarietas, per quam unum contrariatur alteri, licet utrumque in se sit bonum. Quidam autem, æstimantes res non ex earum natura, sed ex suo proprio commodo, quæcumque sibi nociva sunt, simpliciter mala arbitrantur; non considerantes quod id quod est uni nocivum quantum ad aliquid, vel alteri vel eidem quantum ad aliquid est proficuum. Quod nequaquam esset, si secundum se corpora essent mala et noxia.

3. Ad tertium dicendum quod creaturæ quantum est de se non retrahunt a Deo, sed in ipsum ducunt, quia *invisibilia Dei per ea quæ facta sunt, intellecta, conspiciuntur*, ut dicitur *Rom. I.*⁹ Sed quod avertant a Deo, hoc est ex culpa eorum qui insipienter eis utuntur. Unde dicitur *Sap.* quod *creaturæ factæ sunt in muscipulam pedibus insipientium*.¹⁰ Et hoc ipsum quod sic a Deo abducunt, attestatur quod sunt a Deo. Non enim abducunt insipientes a Deo, nisi alliciendo secundum aliquid boni in eis existens quod habent a Deo.

articulus 2. utrum creatura corporalis sit facta propter Dei bonitatem

AD SECUNDUM sic proceditur:¹ 1. Videtur quod creatura corporalis non sit facta propter Dei bonitatem. Dicitur enim *Sap.*, *Creavit Deus ut essent omnia*.² Ergo omnia sunt creata propter suum† proprium esse, et non propter Dei bonitatem.

2. Præterea, bonum habet rationem finis. Ergo id quod est magis bonum in rebus, est finis minus boni. Creatura autem spiritualis comparatur ad corporalem, sicut majus bonum ad minus bonum. Ergo creatura corporalis est propter spirituales, et non propter Dei bonitatem.

3. Præterea, justitia non dat inæqualia nisi inæqualibus. Sed Deus est justus. Ergo ante omnem inæqualitatem a Deo creatam, est inæqualitas a Deo non creata. Sed inæqualitas a Deo non creata, non potest esse‡ nisi quæ est ex libero arbitrio. Ergo omnis inæqualitas sequitur ex diversis

*Codices: *particulatum*, particularized

†Omitted in Piana and early editions

‡*potest esse*: several early codices give *est*, is

⁹*Romans I, 20*

¹⁰*Wisdom 14, 11*

¹*Ia. 47, 2*

²*Wisdom I, 14*

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Excerpt

[More information](#)

CREATION OF THE MATERIAL UNIVERSE

Paul states that things that are not seen *work for us an eternal weight of glory*.

2. Material creatures are by nature good, but not inexhaustibly and universally so, since they are particular and restricted. Thus contrariety is found among them: one is different from another, although each in itself is good. Yet certain thinkers, considering not natures but utility, regard harmful things as completely evil, failing to see that what is harmful to one being under a particular aspect is advantageous for another or even for the same being, when seen under a different aspect. This could never happen if bodies were intrinsically evil and harmful.

3. Creatures in themselves do not withdraw men from God, but lead them to him, *for the invisible things of God are clearly seen from the things that are made, once these are understood*, as Paul states.⁹ When creatures do turn men away from God, this is the fault of those making foolish use of them. Thus it is written that *creatures become a snare to the feet of the unwise*.¹⁰ And the very fact that they thus lead men away from God is evidence that they come from God; for they could not lead the foolish away from God unless they attracted through some good they contain; this they have from God.

article 2. were material creatures made in order to manifest God's goodness?^a

THE SECOND POINT:¹ I. Material creatures seem not to have been made to manifest God's goodness. In fact the Bible maintains that *God created all things that they might be*.² Therefore everything was created to have its own proper existence, not to manifest God's goodness.

2. Moreover, goodness has the quality of being a goal or end. Consequently, whatever has the more goodness is the goal of whatever has the less, and the spiritual creature may be compared to the material as the greater good to the less. Hence the material creature is made for the spiritual, not to manifest God's goodness.

3. Moreover, justice deals unequally only with things that are unequal.^b God being just, any inequality created by God must be preceded by an inequality not created by him. But the only possible inequality not created by God is that which comes from free choice. Thus all inequality ultimately

^aThe point of this article is not immediately obvious; it becomes clearer from the objections and their relation to Origen's teaching; cf Appendix 7(2). St Thomas uses the occasion to develop his own views on the finality of the universe.

^bThis difficulty conveys the burden of Origen's argument: since God is just, he must have made all creatures equal; if there are inequalities among creatures, these must derive from a creatural use (or abuse) of free will and not from a divine cause. See Appendix 2(2).

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Excerpt

[More information](#)

SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, 1a. 65, 2

motibus liberi arbitrii. Creaturæ autem corporales sunt inæquales spiritualibus. Ergo creaturæ corporales sunt factæ propter aliquos motus liberi arbitrii, et non propter Dei bonitatem.

SED CONTRA est quod dicitur *Prov.*, *Universa propter semetipsum operatus est Dominus.*³

RESPONSIO: Dicendum quod Origenes posuit quod creatura corporalis non est facta ex prima Dei intentione, sed ad pœnam creaturæ spiritualis peccantis. Posuit enim quod Deus a principio creaturas spirituales solas fecit, et omnes æquales. Quarum, cum essent liberi arbitrii, quædam conversæ sunt in Deum, et secundum quantitatem conversionis sortitæ sunt majorem vel minorem gradum, in sua simplicitate remanentes. Quædam vero, aversæ a Deo, alligatæ sunt corporibus diversis, secundum modum aversionis a Deo.

Quæ quidem positio erronea est. Primo quidem, quia contrariatur Scripturæ, quæ, enarrata* productione cujuslibet speciei creaturæ corporalis, subjungit, *Vidit Deus quia hoc esset bonum*,⁴ quasi diceret quod unumquodque ideo factum est quia bonum est ipsum esse. Secundum autem opinionem Origenis, creatura corporalis facta est, non quia bonum est eam esse, sed ut malum alterius puniretur.

Secundo, quia sequeretur quod mundi corporalis dispositio quæ nunc est, esset a casu. Si enim ideo corpus solis tale factum est ut congrueret alicui peccato spiritualis creaturæ puniendo, si plures creaturæ spirituales similiter peccassent sicut illa propter cuius peccatum puniendum ponit solem creatum, sequeretur quod essent plures soles in mundo. Et idem esset de aliis. Hæc autem sunt omnino inconvenientia.

Unde hac positione remota tanquam erronea, considerandum est quod ex omnibus creaturis constituitur totum universum sicut totum ex partibus. Si autem alicujus totius et partium eius velimus finem assignare, inveniemus primo quidem, quod singulæ partes sunt propter suos actus, sicut oculus ad videndum. Secundo vero, quod pars ignobilior est propter nobiliorem, sicut sensus propter intellectum, et pulmo propter cor. Tertio

*Piana: *narrata*, same sense

³*Proverbs* 16, 4

⁴*Genesis* 1, 10; 12; 18; 21; 25; 31

⁵Origen (c. 185–254); this teaching is contained in his *Peri Archon* III, 5. PG II, 329; also I, 6; 8; II, 9. PG II, 166; 178; 229; cf 1a. 47, 2.

⁶Here there is a twofold refutation of Origen: the first is Scriptural; the second is a somewhat strained argumentation based on the implausibility of any chance explanation for the order in the universe.

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Excerpt

[More information](#)

CREATION OF THE MATERIAL UNIVERSE

issues from the different uses of free will. Now material creatures are not the equal of spiritual ones. Therefore material creatures were made because of the uses of free will and not to manifest God's goodness.

ON THE OTHER HAND, Scripture states that *the Lord has made all things for himself*.³

REPLY: Origen^c maintained that material creatures were not at first intended by God, but were made as a punishment for the sin of spiritual creatures. He held that in the beginning God made spiritual creatures alone, and all of these equal. Having free will, some of these turned toward God, and, while remaining basically simple, attained a higher or a lower place as determined by the degree of their conversion to him. Others, turning away from God, were bound to various kinds of bodies depending on the manner of their aversion from God.

But this position is erroneous.^d First, because it goes against the Bible, which to its account of the production of each species of material creature adds the phrase, *God saw that it was good*,⁴ as if to say that each thing was made because it was good for it to exist. According to the opinion of Origen, however, corporeal creatures were not made because it was good for them to exist but rather to punish the wrong of another creature.

Secondly, because it would follow from Origen's position that the present arrangement of the material universe was purely haphazard. For if the sun were made to be a body as suitable punishment for the sin of a spiritual creature, and if several spiritual creatures sinned exactly as did the one whose sin was punished by the creation of the sun, it would follow that there would be several suns in the universe. And the same thing would be true of other bodies. This would be difficult to reconcile with the facts.^e

Rejecting this erroneous position, therefore, we should note that creatures make up the universe the way parts make up a whole. When assigning the end or goal of any whole and its parts, we find first that individual parts are directed to their proper operations, as the eye is to seeing; secondly, that inferior parts are for the sake of the more noble, as the senses serve the intellect and the lungs the heart;^f thirdly, that all parts are for the perfection of the whole, just as matter is for form, since parts are

^cSt Thomas held that each heavenly body is unique in its kind; see, for example, *CG* II, 93. 1a. 47, 2 & 119, 1. In *Meta.* VII, lect. 15. *De spiritualibus creaturis* 8. *De substantiis separatis* 12. In *De cælo* II, lect. 16; also Appendix 9(2).

^fIn medieval physiology, the heart was viewed as the centre of vital heat and thus as the central organ of the body. According to Galen (A.D. 129-200), the chief source of medieval anatomical knowledge, the *spiritus* or *pneuma* that was the principle of life was drawn in by the act of respiration, passed through the lungs, and thence to the heart, where it entered the blood.