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(1a. 33-43)

T. C. O'Brien

Excerpt

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## SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, 1a. 33, I

CONSEQUENTER CONSIDERANDUM EST de personis in speciali. Et primo circa personam Patris.

## Quæstio 33. de persona Patris

Circa quam quærentur quatuor:

1. nutrum Patri competat esse principium;
2. utrum persona Patris proprie significetur hoc nomine Patris;
3. utrum per prius dicatur in divinis Pater secundum quod sumitur personaliter quam secundum quod sumitur essentialiter;
4. utrum sit proprium Patri esse ingenitum.

*articulus 1. utrum competat Patri esse principium*

AD PRIMUM sic proceditur:<sup>1</sup> I. Videtur quod Pater non possit dici principium Filii vel Spiritus Sancti. Principium enim et causa idem sunt secundum Philosophum.<sup>2</sup> Sed non dicimus Patrem esse causam Filii. Ergo non debet dici quod sit ejus principium.

2. Præterea, principium dicitur respectu principiati. Si igitur Pater est principium Filii, sequitur Filium esse principiatum, et per consequens esse creatum. Quod videtur esse erroneum.

3. Præterea, nomen principii a prioritate sumitur. Sed in divinis *non est prius et posterius*, ut Athanasius dicit.<sup>3</sup> Ergo in divinis non debemus uti nomine principii.

<sup>1</sup>cf I *Sent.* 12, 2 ad 1; 29, 1; III, 11, 1 ad 5. *Contra errores Græcorum* 1, 1. *De potentia* x, 1 ad 8-ad 11

<sup>2</sup>Aristotle, *Metaphysics* IV, 2. 1003b24; see note c. The honorific *Philosophus*, the *Philosopher*, indicates Aristotle's pre-eminence for the medievals as an authority in matters of philosophy

<sup>3</sup>*Quicumque vult*. Denz 75. Athanasius (c. 296–373) anti-Arian Greek Father, is cited in this treatise always from the 'Athanasian Creed' (on the spurious texts in *Contra errores Græcorum*, see Intro., note 14). Attributed to Athanasius from the 7th to the 17th century, and accepted by use as an official symbol of faith, it was of Latin origin, author unknown, dating from c. 440–540

<sup>4</sup>Questions 33–43 continue the inquiry on the divine persons begun at Question 29, first by finishing the absolute consideration of each person (33–8), then by taking up a comparative study (39–43). See Introduction.

<sup>5</sup>The foreword's formulation of art. 1 has *competat esse*; the more frequent phrase will be *possit dici*; it indicates the concentration on names and language; see Introduction; Appendix 1 (3).

<sup>6</sup>*principium* (*archē*), origin, beginning, source (Aristotle, *Metaphysics* V, 1 & 2), in patristic use described the divinity in respect to creation and the Father in respect to

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## FATHER

WE NEED NEXT TO STUDY each of the divine persons in particular.<sup>a</sup> And first, the Father.

## Question 33. the Father

Here there are four points of inquiry:

1. whether to be principle belongs to the Father;
2. whether the name 'Father' means literally the person of the Father;
3. whether in God 'Father' as a personal term has precedence over 'Father' as an essential term;
4. whether to be unbegotten is proper to the Father.

article 1. *whether we may say that the Father is principle of the Son or of the Holy Spirit*

THE FIRST POINT:<sup>1</sup> 1. It does not seem that we can name<sup>b</sup> the Father 'principle'<sup>c</sup> of the Son or of the Holy Spirit. According to Aristotle<sup>2</sup> a principle and a cause are the same;<sup>d</sup> yet we do not say that the Father is the Son's cause; neither then should we name him the Son's 'principle'.

2. Further, a principle is so named in reference to something being begun from it. If the Father, then, is principle of the Son, it follows that the Son had a beginning and so was created.<sup>e</sup> That sounds erroneous.<sup>f</sup>

3. Further, the word 'principle' comes from the idea of being first.<sup>g</sup> But, as Athanasius teaches, in the godhead *there is no first and second*.<sup>3</sup> We should not, then, apply this term to the divinity.

the Son (see Athanasius, *Contra Arianos* iv. PG 26, 40; Augustine, in note 4 & *De Trinitate* v, 13. PL 42, 920). Here 1a. 32, 1 refers to the first use. In discussion of the relations among the divine persons 'principle' serves as a generic term to express the fundamental meaning of origin and relation as these involve 'one from whom another—one from another', see 1a, 27, 1 ad 3, 2 & ad 3, 4 ad 3; 28, 1 & 4. The present article takes the term more particularly as given by the *auctoritates* to designate the person of the Father, who alone is *principium non de principio* (see Lom 29, 3. 186). The application of the term to the divine persons is further developed in art. 4; 36, 4; 41, 4 & 5. See *In Joann.* 1, lect. 1.

<sup>a</sup>Aristotle (loc cit, note c. 1013a17) says that every cause (*aitia*) is a principle, but that the converse is not true; see also *In Meta.* v, lect. 1.

<sup>b</sup>The argument presents Arian subordinationism; early Trinitarian theology used *anarchos*, having no principle, of the Father; Son and Holy Spirit were described as not *anarchos*; from this the Arians argued that they were derived and created; see G. Prestige, *God in Patristic Thought* (London, 1936), Ch. VII; also 37–54 on the terms *agenētos*, *genētos*, underived, derived (from *ginomai*, to become) and *agennētos*, *gennētos*, unbegotten, begotten, (from *gennaō*, to beget).

<sup>c</sup>*erroneum*, not just inappropriate (*inconueniens*), but against the teaching of faith.

<sup>d</sup>*prioritas*, and the associated *per prius-per posterius*, are used with Aristotle's lexicon,

[Footnote continued on next page]

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## SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, 1a. 33, 1

SED CONTRA est quod dicit Augustinus, *Pater est principium totius Deitatis*.<sup>4</sup>

RESPONSIO: Dicendum quod hoc nomen principium, nihil aliud significat quam id a quo aliquid procedit. Omne enim a quo aliquid procedit quocumque modo dicimus esse principium, et e converso. Cum ergo Pater sit a quo procedit alius, sequitur quod Pater est principium.

1. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Græci utuntur in divinis indifferenter nomine causæ sicut et nomine principii; sed Latini doctores non utuntur nomine causæ, sed solum nomine principii. Cujus ratio est quia principium communius est quam causa, sicut causa communius quam elementum. Primus enim terminus vel etiam prima pars rei dicitur principium, sed non causa. Quanto autem aliquod nomen est communius, tanto convenientius assumitur in divinis, ut supra dictum est,<sup>5</sup> quia nomina quanto magis specialia sunt, tanto magis determinat modum convenientem creaturæ. Unde hoc nomen causæ videtur importare diversitatem substantiæ et dependentiam alicujus ab altero, quam non importat nomen principii. In omnibus enim causæ generibus semper invenitur distantia inter causam et id cuius est causa secundum aliquam perfectionem aut virtutem. Sed nomine principii utimur etiam in his quæ nullam hujusmodi differentiam habent, sed solum secundum quemdam ordinem; sicut cum dicimus punctum esse principium lineæ vel etiam cum dicimus primam partem lineæ\* esse principium lineæ.

*Metaphysics* v, 11, in mind. For the various possibilities of precedence connoted by *principium* (in position, in time, in perception, in meaning, in being, in causality) see *In Joann.* 1, *lect.* 1. The problem is to remove any suggestion of inferiority in being or duration from the term as applied to the divine persons. See 42, 3.

\*Piana: *frontem lineæ*

<sup>4</sup>*De Trin.* iv, 20. PL 42, 908. Lom 15, 9. 101; 29, 1. 183

<sup>5</sup>1a. 13, 11

<sup>1</sup>See also 39, 5 obj. 6; 8. *In Joann.* 1, *lect.* 1 notes that Origen and Augustine interpreted *principio* in *John* 1, 1 as referring to the Father. The Council of Toledo xi (675) referred to the Father as 'the font and origin of the whole godhead' (see Denz 525). The text reflects Greek 'monarchy', one principle in the godhead; see Cyril of Alexandria, *In Joann.* 1, 1. PG 73, 28; 36, 4 notes *a & f*.

<sup>2</sup>The reasoning rests on the meaning of *processio*, regarded as given in Scripture (*John* 8, 42), and equivalent to *origo* (see 1a. 27, Foreword; Vol. 6, ed. C. Velecky, p. 3, note *a & Appendix* 5). 'Principle' as the name of a person, *De potentia* II, 2 notes, implies reference to another person, not to the resources for action or for a created effect; see also 1a. 27, 5 ad 1.

<sup>3</sup>e.g. Basil, *Adv. Eunomium*. PG 29, 656; Gregory of Nyssa, *Ad Ablabium*. PG 45, 133; *Contra Eunomium* 1. PG 45, 369. See also *Contra errores Græcorum* 1, 1.

<sup>4</sup>While not knowing Greek (see 36, 2, note *o*) St Thomas was still aware that its idiom made certain terms acceptable in that language which were not so when brought over into Latin (see *De potentia* x, 1 ad 8; *Contra errores Græcorum*, proem.). For this and the following response, as well as for 36, 2 & 3, the remark that the difference between Greeks and Latins is one of terminology rather than of

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ON THE OTHER HAND there is Augustine's text, *The Father is principle of the whole godhead*.<sup>4b</sup>

REPLY: The word 'principle' means simply that from which something proceeds; we call 'principle' everything from which another comes forth in any way at all, and vice versa. Since, then, the Father is one from whom another originates, it follows that the Father is principle.<sup>1</sup>

Hence: 1. The Greek authors<sup>1</sup> use 'principle' and 'cause' interchangeably in referring to divinity;<sup>k</sup> the Latins, however, do not use 'cause', but only 'principle'. The explanation is that 'principle' is a broader term than 'cause', even as 'cause' is a broader term than 'element';<sup>l</sup> we say that the edge of something or even its first part is its beginning, but not its cause. As determined earlier,<sup>5</sup> the broader any name is, the more suited it is to being applied to God; for the narrower a name is, the more restricted is its meaning to a mode of being peculiar to creatures.<sup>m</sup> Wherefore this word 'cause' seems to connote a diversity of substances and the dependence of the one on the other; 'principle' does not. For with regard to every sort of cause,<sup>n</sup> we invariably discover a disparity based on perfection or power between the cause and that of which it is the cause. But we use the word 'principle' even with regard to matters wherein there is no such difference, but merely one based on some sort of order;<sup>o</sup> for example, when we say that the point, or even the first segment, is the beginning of the line.

meaning (*De potentia* x, 5) should be kept in mind. See Denz 1301, the Council of Florence's use of this idea of equivalence.

<sup>1</sup>See Aristotle, *Metaphysics* v, 1-3; 'Cause' adds to 'principle' the dependence in being of what proceeds from it in any of the four ways of causing; 'element' means an inner principle or component of a being. As the argument continues it refers to an agent or efficient cause, which is separate from its effect and superior in power. On the four causes, see Vol. 2, Appendix 11, ed. T. Gilby.

<sup>m</sup>Throughout 1a. 13 (see note 5; also *De potentia* VII, 2 ad 17) sees the inadequacy of all names attributed to God as consisting in their manner of signifying; this corresponds to the mode of conceiving what the name refers to (and that the grammatical form reflects, 41, 1 ad 3) and in turn to the mode of being that knowledge experiences; there is no way of being that matches the divine (see *De potentia* VIII, 1 ad 12). The more precise a name is, the more contracted the way of being it reflects. The 'analogy of names', then, is always the affirmation of diversity; it is an assertion of community of meaning not by referring God and creatures to a third element which they share, but by intending or by pointing towards the properly divine in virtue of the experienced being and perfection of that which depends on the divine.

<sup>n</sup>The allusion is not to the four causes, but to the efficient cause (see *De potentia* x, 1 ad 9), which may be, e.g. proximate or remote, universal or particular, necessary or contingent, natural or voluntary; the point is that a cause as such is actual, possessing the power to cause, and the effect as such is potential, the recipient of what the cause communicates.

<sup>o</sup>See note g.

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## SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, 1a. 33, 2

2. Ad secundum dicendum quod apud Græcos invenitur de Filio vel Spiritu Sancto dici quod principientur, sed hoc non est in usu doctorum nostrorum. Quia licet attribuamus Patri aliquid auctoritatis ratione principii, nihil tamen ad subjectionem vel minorationem quocumque modo pertinens attribuimus Filio vel Spiritui Sancto, ut vitetur omnis erroris occasio. Secundum quem modum Hilarius dicit, *Donantis auctoritate Pater major est; sed minor non est Filius cui unum esse donatur*.<sup>6</sup>

3. Ad tertium dicendum quod licet hoc nomen principium, quantum ad id a quo imponitur ad significandum videatur a prioritate sumptum, non tamen significat prioritatem, sed originem. Non enim idem est quod significat nomen et a quo nomen imponitur, ut supra dictum est.<sup>7</sup>

*articulus 2. utrum hoc nomen Pater sit nomen proprie divinæ personæ*

AD SECUNDUM sic proceditur:<sup>1</sup> 1. Videtur quod hoc nomen Pater non sit proprie nomen divinæ personæ. Hoc enim nomen Pater significat relationem. Persona autem est substantia individua. Non ergo hoc nomen Pater est proprie nomen significativum personæ.

2. Præterea, generans communius est quam pater; nam omnis pater est generans, sed non e converso. Sed nomen communius magis proprie dicitur in divinis, ut dictum est.<sup>2</sup> Ergo magis proprium nomen est personæ divinæ generans et genitor quam Pater.

3. Præterea, nihil quod secundum metaphoram dicitur potest esse nomen proprium alicujus. Sed verbum metaphorice apud nos dicitur

<sup>6</sup>*De Trinitate* IX, 54. PL 10, 325. Lom 16, 2. 105. St Hilary of Poitiers (c. 315–67), the Athanasius of the West, second only to Augustine as a Latin *auctoritas* in the treatise

<sup>7</sup>1a. 13, 2 ad 2, 8

<sup>1</sup>cf 1a. 40, 1

<sup>2</sup>1a. 13, 11

<sup>p</sup>*principientur*, literally 'are principled', as *causentur* would mean 'are caused'; the Latin form is taken to imply a passivity and dependence that the corresponding Greek terms need not convey.

<sup>q</sup>On *auctor* and *auctoritas*, taken from Hilary (see 36, 4 ad 7 & note f), *De potentia* X, 1 ad 17 remarks that 'authorship in the Father is simply the relationship of being principle'; see also CG IV, 24; *In Joann.* 14, lect. 8.

<sup>r</sup>The idea of origin does not of itself dispel for us that of priority; it is origin as the eternal, divine procession of one person from another that rules out priority of duration or causality; see 1a. 27, 1, 2 & ad 3; *In Joann.* 1, lect. 1; 16, lect. 4.

<sup>s</sup>The classification of divine names followed in this treatise is found in Peter of Poitiers (d. 1205) *Sent.* 1, 3. PL 211, 795; (see also Lom 22, 2, from Augustine *De Trinitate* V, 16. PL 42, 922). Names applied to God as knowable through created effects are classified in 1a. 13: names that do not bear directly on the divine being—negative names denying imperfection, positive causal names, expressing the dependence of creatures (Lord, Creator), metaphorical names (rock, fortress); names that do have bearing directly on the divine being are affirmative, absolute and literal (proper) names, both abstract (goodness) and concrete (good). Names applying to God on the basis of revelation of the Trinity are variously classified throughout the

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2. We do find Greek theologians saying of the Son and the Holy Spirit that they derive from a source,<sup>p</sup> but this is not the practice of the Latin doctors. The reason: even though we apply to the Father terms denoting authorship<sup>q</sup> because he is principle, to avoid even the chance of error we do not speak of the Son or the Holy Spirit in terms suggesting subjection or inferiority. In this vein Hilary writes, *The Father is greater with the authority of a giver, but the Son to whom the same one being is given is not less.*<sup>6</sup>

3. Even though the status of being first may well explain its derivation, the term 'principle' has as meaning not priority but simply origin.<sup>r</sup> We have settled earlier<sup>7</sup> that the meaning of a word and its derivation are not the same thing.

*article 2. whether the name 'Father' is properly the name of a divine person*

THE SECOND POINT:<sup>1</sup> I. The name 'Father' apparently is not one proper to a divine person.<sup>a</sup> 'Father' signifies a relation whereas a person is an individual substance. The name 'Father', then, is not one properly designating a person.<sup>b</sup>

2. Further, 'begetter' is a wider term than 'father'; every father is a begetter but not vice versa.<sup>c</sup> As noted,<sup>2</sup> the more general names are more suited for speech about God. Thus 'begetter' or 'progenitor' is more precise than 'Father' as a name for a divine person.

3. Further, a metaphor cannot be the proper name for anything. But terms like 'conception' or 'offspring' for the mental word are metaphors;

treatise. The first distinction is between names that signify essence or absolute attributes and those signifying personal relations or attributes (1a. 28, 2 ad 3, 4; 29, 4; 30, 1 ad 2); thus 'essential' vs. 'personal' terms (31, 3 & 4), the first being common to the three persons. The meaning of a proper name given here in the Reply, that it is distinctive of one person, presupposes 32, 3, that what is strictly proper and distinctively personal has reference to one of the four properties of the persons, unbegottenness, fatherhood, sonship, or procession. See Vol. 6, ed. C. Velecky, Appendix 9.

<sup>b</sup>On relation and person, see 28 & 29; Vol. 6, Appendix 6 & 7. Here, however, the point is simply the difference between the two basic Aristotelean categories, substance and accident (see *Categories* 4 & 5), relation (*pros ti*) being one of the nine categories of accident (ibid., 7). The term 'father' is most properly defined in relation to another, the offspring.

<sup>c</sup>The 'begotten not made' of the Creed suggests that in English 'to beget' is a more comfortable term than 'to generate'. In the credal formula *gennētos* or *gennēthenta* were used primarily to reject the Son's being a creature or created, i.e. made. A narrower and more technical sense of *generatio* comes into play in St Thomas's interpretation, i. e. the Aristotelean meaning of *genēsis*, the coming to be of a substance in matter, and then more precisely still, the coming to be of a living thing; see 1a. 27, 2; Vol. 10, ed. W. A. Wallace, Appendix 4 (2).

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## SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, 1a. 33, 2

genitum vel proles; et per consequens ille cuius est verbum metaphorice dicitur pater. Non ergo principium Verbi in divinis potest proprie dici Pater.

4. Præterea, omne quod proprie\* dicitur in divinis per prius dicitur de Deo quam de creaturis. Sed generatio per prius videtur dici de creaturis quam de Deo; verior enim ibi videtur esse generatio ubi aliquid procedit ab alio distinctum, non secundum relationem tantum, sed etiam secundum essentiam. Ergo nomen Patris, quod a generatione sumitur, non videtur esse proprium alicujus divinæ personæ.

SED CONTRA est quod dicitur in *Ps.*, *Ipse invocabit me: Pater meus es tu.*<sup>3</sup>

RESPONSIO: Dicendum quod nomen proprium cujuslibet personæ significat id per quod illa persona distinguitur ab omnibus aliis. Sicut enim de ratione hominis est anima et corpus, ita de intellectu hujus hominis est hæc anima et hoc corpus, ut dicitur in *Meta.*;<sup>4</sup> his autem hic homo ab omnibus aliis distinguitur. Id autem per quod distinguitur persona Patris ab omnibus aliis est paternitas. Unde proprium nomen personæ Patris est hoc nomen Pater, quod significat paternitatem.

1. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod apud nos relatio non est subsistens persona. Et ideo hoc nomen pater apud nos non significat personam, sed relationem personæ. Non autem est ita in divinis, ut quidam falso opinati sunt; nam relatio quam significat hoc nomen Pater est subsistens persona. Unde supra dictum est,<sup>5</sup> quod hoc nomen persona in divinis significat relationem ut subsistentem in divina natura.

2. Ad secundum dicendum quod secundum Philosophum,<sup>6</sup> denominatio rei maxime debet fieri a perfectione et fine. Generatio autem significat ut in fieri, sed paternitas significat complementum generationis. Et ideo potius est nomen divinæ personæ Pater quam generans vel genitor.

\*Piana omits *proprie*

<sup>3</sup>*Psalm* 88, 27

<sup>4</sup>Aristotle, *Metaphysics* VII, 11. 1037a9

<sup>5</sup>1a. 29, 4

<sup>6</sup>*On the Soul* II, 4. 416b23

<sup>6</sup>On 'Word' see 1a. 27, 2; 34, 1 & note b.

<sup>7</sup>See 1a. 13, 6.

<sup>8</sup>For 'distinct', 'different', 'diverse', see 1a. 31, 2; *essentia* here is taken as subject of existence, as distinct substance, in keeping with generation's meaning the coming to be of a substance. The argument presupposes that a distinction of persons consists purely in relation; see 1a. 28, 1 & 3; Vol. 6, Appendix 7.

<sup>9</sup>*proprium* is taken here not as distinct from metaphorical (see 1a. 13, 3), but from common or essential (see note a); its meaning is suggested by the logical class of predicates (predicables) called 'property' (Aristotle, *Topica* 1, 5. 102a18), applied to attributes belonging necessarily and exclusively to one subject; see also *proprietas personalis* in 1a. 32, 3, and the *Fides Damasi*, Denz 71.

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and so is the word 'father' for one whose word it is.<sup>d</sup> Thus the principle of the Word in the godhead cannot be named 'Father' literally.

4. Further, every term that applies properly to the divine applies to God first, then to creatures.<sup>e</sup> Now 'generation' appears to be a term applied with more reason to creatures than to God, for there seems more truly to be generation where from one being another issues, distinct not simply on the basis of relation, but of essence.<sup>f</sup> 'Father,' then, a name taken from generation, seems not to be proper to any divine person.

ON THE OTHER HAND there is the *Psalm*, *He shall cry out to me: Thou art my Father*.<sup>3</sup>

REPLY: A name proper to any person signifies that by which the person is distinct from all others.<sup>g</sup> The reason: just as body and soul make up the meaning of man, so also, as noted in the *Metaphysics*,<sup>4</sup> this particular soul and body make up the meaning of this individual man; through them he differs from all others.<sup>h</sup> Now that which distinguishes the person of the Father from all others is fatherhood. Thus the name 'Father', signifying his fatherhood, is the name proper to the person of the Father.<sup>1</sup>

Hence: 1. With us a relation is not a subsisting person; this is why for us the name 'father' does not mean the person, but just his relationship.<sup>j</sup> That is not, as some have falsely thought,<sup>k</sup> the case in divinity, since the relation that the name 'Father' points to is a subsisting person. Accordingly we have settled already<sup>5</sup> that in the godhead the name 'person' means a relation as subsisting in the divine nature.

2. According to Aristotle<sup>6</sup> anything ought to be named above all from its complete state and its end. Generation, however, denotes a coming to be; fatherhood, a generation completed. This is why the preferred name of the divine person is 'Father', not 'begetter' or 'progenitor'.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>d</sup>See 1a. 29, 4, which uses the same example in inquiring what 'person' as divine means; see *In Joann.* 16, lect. 4 (cf Richard of St Victor, *De Trin.* iv, 7. PL 196, 934-5). The point of it here is that 'Father' is a distinctively personal name, exclusively on the basis of the 'individuality' or uniqueness in the begetting of the Son.

<sup>e</sup>See 1a. 27, 2; 28, 4; also the expressions 'God's fatherhood is God the Father, who is the divine person' (29, 4); 'subsisting fatherhood is the person of the Father' (30, 22); 40, 1 ad 1; 42, 6 ad 3.

<sup>f</sup>i.e. taking the formal meaning denoted by the term.

<sup>g</sup>See 1a. 28, 2; the allusion is to Gilbert de la Porrée (d. 1154) and his followers, the *Porretani*, who maintained that fatherhood is not the person of the Father, but is 'attached from outside' as that by which God is Father. See Vol. 6, p. 28, note a.

<sup>h</sup>This meets the objection, but the privileged status of the term 'Father' rests on its use in the New Testament.



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## SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, 1a. 33, 3

3. Ad tertium dicendum quod verbum non est aliquid subsistens in natura humana; unde non proprie potest dici genitum vel filius. Sed Verbum divinum est aliquid subsistens in natura divina; unde proprie et non metaphorice dicitur Filius et ejus principium Pater.

4. Ad quartum dicendum quod nomen generationis et paternitatis, sicut et alia nomina quæ proprie dicuntur in divinis, per prius dicuntur de Deo quam de creaturis quantum ad rem significatam, licet non quantum ad modum significandi. Unde et Apostolus dicit, *Flecto genua mea ad Patrem Domini mei Jesu Christi, ex quo omnis paternitas in cælo et in terra nominatur.*<sup>7</sup> Quod sic apparet: manifestum est enim quod generatio accipit speciem a termino qui est forma generati. Et quanto hic fuerit propinquior formæ generantis, tanto verior et perfectior est generatio, sicut generatio univoca est perfectior quam non univoca, nam de ratione generantis est quod generet sibi simile secundum formam. Unde hoc ipsum quod in generatione divina est eadem numero forma generantis et geniti, in rebus autem creatis non est eadem numero sed specie tantum, ostendit quod generatio et per consequens paternitas per prius dicitur in Deo quam in creaturis. Unde hoc ipsum quod in divinis est distinctio geniti a generante secundum relationem tantum ad veritatem divinæ generationis et paternitatis pertinet.

*articulus 3. utrum hoc nomen Pater dicatur in divinis per prius secundum quod personaliter sumitur*

AD TERTIUM sic proceditur:<sup>1</sup> I. Videtur quod hoc nomen Pater non dicatur in divinis per prius secundum quod personaliter sumitur. Commune enim

<sup>7</sup>*Ephesians* 3, 14

<sup>1</sup>cf 3a. 23, 1-3. III *Sent.* 10, 2, 1, i & ii ad 1

<sup>m</sup>Implicit is the point that what is begotten or is an offspring literally is that which becomes an existing subject; our mental word remains 'an accident', an element in our thinking; see *De potentia* VIII, 1; *Compend. theol.* 1, 38; 1a. 27, 2 ad 2.

<sup>n</sup>The *Summa* emphasis on the analogy of the mental word should be balanced with the priority given to the names Father and Son in *CG* IV, 2, 'taking its beginning from what biblical teaching hands down to us on the secret of divine generation'; the subsequent chapters place first the texts on fatherhood and sonship. The coming forth of the Word is considered as the way in which the divine fatherhood and sonship are expressed, so that we may know the begetting is spiritual (see also *Compend. theol.* 1, 40); note also the agreement with Augustine's *eo dicitur Verbum quo Filius* in 34, 2 ad 3.

<sup>o</sup>This is in contrast with metaphorical names; see 1a. 13, 3 & 6. But the knowledge that the names 'Father' and 'Son' have a literal and unique meaning in the divinity comes only through the revelation of Jesus Christ. See Appendix 1.

<sup>p</sup>In Aristotle's theory change has its meaning from what the subject is to become; that in turn depends on the 'form' to be acquired, i.e. the element that is to be

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Excerpt

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## FATHER

3. A mental word is not something subsisting in human nature; this is why it cannot be termed 'offspring' or 'son' in a literal sense.<sup>m</sup> The divine Word, however, is subsisting in the divine nature; he is therefore called 'the Son' and his principle 'the Father' in a literal, not a metaphorical sense.<sup>n</sup>

4. While not as to their mode of signifying, as to the reality they signify, the names 'generation' and 'fatherhood', even as other names applicable properly to the divinity, are predicated first of God, then of creatures.<sup>o</sup> For this reason St Paul writes, *I bend my knee to the Father of my Lord Jesus Christ, from whom all paternity in heaven and on earth is named.*<sup>7</sup> The explanation: clearly generation takes its species from its term and this is the form of the one begotten.<sup>p</sup> Moreover the closer this offspring is to the form of the begetter, the truer and fuller is the generation; a univocal generation, e.g., is more completely a generation than a non-univocal one, for a begetter is one who begets something alike in form.<sup>q</sup> Hence that in divine generation the form of begetter and begotten is the same numerically, but in creaturely generation, is not the same numerically but only specifically, makes plain that generation, and so fatherhood, are present in a primary way in God, and then in creatures.<sup>r</sup> And the very fact that in God the distinction of begetter and begotten is based on relation alone is part of the genuineness of the divine begetting and fatherhood.<sup>8</sup>

*article 3. whether in divinity the name 'Father' as a personal term has priority*

THE THIRD POINT:<sup>1</sup> 1. Apparently the name 'Father' does not apply to divinity first as a personal term.<sup>a</sup> In meaning the common is prior to the

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introduced as shaping or determining matter so that a new being or way of being emerges.

<sup>q</sup>A 'non-univocal' generation refers either to the medieval idea of spontaneous generation (see 1a. 27, 2) or to terrestrial generative processes as depending on the function of heavenly bodies that are not one in kind with earthly bodies (see 1a. 104, 1; Vol. 10, ed. W. A. Wallace, Appendix 4 & 6).

<sup>r</sup>The literal acceptance of such texts as *Ephesians* 3, 14 is the basis for the affirmation here and ad 3 that God is literally Father, and that this meaning of his being Father is absolutely first. See Appendix 1.

<sup>8</sup>See 1a. 27, 2 and note that distinction by relation is the least removed from unity; see 28, 1 ad 2; 40, 2 ad 3; *CG* IV, 14; *De potentia* IX, 5 ad 2.

<sup>a</sup>Note that the issue as set up by the objections (1-3) and the *sed contra* is between no precedence and the precedence of the term as personal; for *dicere personaliter—dicere essentialiter*, see art. 2, note a. For the presupposition that sets the argument, see Appendix 1 (7). For obj. 1, see Lom 26, 6. 169, quoting Augustine *De Trin.* v, 11. PL 42, 919.