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The Summa Theologiæ ranks among the greatest documents of the Christian Church, and is a landmark of medieval western thought. It provides the framework for Catholic studies in systematic theology and for a classical Christian philosophy, and is regularly consulted by scholars of all faiths and none, across a range of academic disciplines. This paperback reissue of the classic Latin/English edition first published by the English Dominicans in the 1960s and 1970s, in the wake of the Second Vatican Council, has been undertaken in response to regular requests from readers and librarians around the world for the entire series of 61 volumes to be made available again. The original text is unchanged, except for the correction of a small number of typographical errors.

The original aim of this edition was not narrowly ecclesiastical. It sought to make this treasure of the Christian intellectual heritage available to theologians and philosophers of all backgrounds, including those who, without claiming to be believers themselves, appreciate a religious integrity which embodies hardbitten rationalism and who recognise in Thomas Aquinas a master of that perennial philosophy which forms the bedrock of European civilisation. Because of this the editors worked under specific instructions to bear in mind not only the professional theologian, but also the general reader with an interest in the 'reason' in Christianity. The parallel English and Latin texts can be used successfully by anybody with a basic knowledge of Latin, while the presence of the Latin text has allowed the translators a degree of freedom in adapting their English version for modern readers. Each volume contains a glossary of technical terms and is designed to be complete in itself to serve for private study or as a course text.

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ST THOMAS AQUINAS SUMMA THEOLOGIÆ

st thomas aquinas SUMMA THEOLOGIÆ

Latin text and English translation, Introductions, Notes, Appendices and Glossaries



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> ALLOCUTIO PAULI PP. VI MCMLXIII

HIS HOLINESS POPE PAUL VI

WAS PLEASED to grant an audience, on 13 December 1963, to a group, representing the Dominican Editors and the combined Publishers of the new translation of the Summa Theologiæ of St Thomas, led by His Eminence Michael Cardinal Browne, of the Order of Preachers, and the Most Reverend Father Aniceto Fernandez, Master General of the same Order.

AT THIS AUDIENCE

THE HOLY FATHER made a cordial allocution in which he first welcomed the representatives of a project in which he found particular interest. He went on to laud the perennial value of St Thomas's doctrine as embodying universal truths in so cogent a fashion. This doctrine, he said, is a treasure belonging not only to the Dominican Order but to the whole Church, and indeed to the whole world; it is not merely medieval but valid for all times, not least of all for our own.

His Holiness therefore commended the enterprise of Dominicans from English-speaking Provinces of the Order and of their friends; they were undertaking a difficult task, less because the thought of St Thomas is complicated or his language subtle, than because the clarity of his thought and exactness of language is so difficult to translate. Yet the successful outcome of their efforts would undoubtedly contribute to the religious and cultural well-being of the English-speaking world.

What gave him great satisfaction was the notable evidence of interest in the spread of divine truth on the part of the eminent laymen concerned, members of different communions yet united in a common venture.

For these reasons the Holy Father wished it all success, and warmly encouraged and blessed all those engaged. He was happy to receive the first volume presented to him as a gesture of homage, and promised that he would follow with interest the progress of the work and look forward to the regular appearance of all the subsequent volumes.

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- 2 Existence and Nature of God (1a. 2-11)
- 3 Knowing and Naming God (1a. 12-13)
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- 5 The Will and Power of God (1a. 19–26)
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- 7 Father, Son, and Holy Ghost (1a. 33-43)
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GENERAL PREFACE

BY OFFICIAL APPOINTMENT THE SUMMA PROVIDES THE FRAMEWORK for Catholic studies in systematic theology and for a classical Christian philosophy. Yet the work, which is more than a text-book for professional training, is also the witness of developing tradition and the source of living science about divine things. For faith seeks understanding in the contemplation of God's Logos, his wisdom and saving providence, running through the whole universe.

The purpose, then, of this edition is not narrowly clerical, but to share with all Christians a treasury which is part of their common heritage. Moreover, it consults the interests of many who would not claim to be believers, and yet appreciate the integrity which takes religion into hard thinking.

Accordingly the editors have kept in mind the needs of the general reader who can respond to the reasons in Christianity, as well as of technical theologians and philosophers.

Putting the Latin text alongside the English is part of the purpose. The reader with a smattering of Latin can be reassured when the translator, in order to be clear and readable, renders the thought of St Thomas into the freedom of another idiom without circumlocution or paraphrase.

There are two more reasons for the inclusion of the Latin text. First, to help the editors themselves, for the author's thought is too lissom to be uniformly and flatly transliterated; it rings with analogies, and its precision cannot be reduced to a table of terms. A rigid consistency has not been imposed on the editors of the different volumes among themselves; the original is given, and the student can judge for himself.

Next, to help those whose native tongue is not English or whose duty it is to study theology in Latin, of whom many are called to teach and preach through the medium of the most widespread language of the world, now becoming the second language of the Church.

The Latin is a sound working text, selected, paragraphed, and punctuated by the responsible editor. Important variations, in manuscripts and such major printed editions as the Piana and Leonine, are indicated. The English corresponds paragraph by paragraph and almost always sentence by sentence. Each of the sixty volumes, so far as is possible, will be complete in itself, to serve as a text for a special course or for private study.

THOMAS GILBY O.P.

ST THOMAS AQUINAS SUMMA THEOLOGIÆ

VOLUME 4

KNOWLEDGE IN GOD

(Ia. 14–18) Latin text. English translation, Introduction, Notes & Glossary

THOMAS GORNALL S.J.



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EDITORIAL NOTES

THE LATIN TEXT

The choice of a Latin text for the purposes of the present translation presented nothing of special difficulty. To compare the 1926 text of the *Editions de la Revue des Jeunes* based on a choice from among manuscripts of the Paris tradition with the good *Editio Piana* of 1570–1 and the very good Leonine text of 1888 is to see that the variants though many are, as far as concerns the present five Questions, of small importance. The text here printed is based on information contained in the three sources mentioned, with a view to clarity. The more important variants and a few of the emendations adopted by the Leonine Edition are noted in the text.

FOOTNOTES

Those signified by a superior number are the references given by St Thomas, with the exception of no. 1 to each article which refers to parallel texts in his writings. Those signified alphabetically are editorial references and explanatory remarks.

REFERENCES

Biblical references are to the Vulgate, bracketed numbers to the Psalms are those of versions based on the Hebrew text. Patristic references are to Migne (PG, Greek Fathers; PL, Latin Fathers). Abbreviations to St Thomas's works are as follows:

Summa Theologiæ, without title. Part, question, article, reply; e.g. 1a. 3, 2 ad 3. 1a2æ. 17, 6. 2a2æ. 180, 10. 3a. 35, 8.

Summa Contra Gentiles, CG. Book, chapter; e.g. CG 1, 28.

Scriptum in IV Libros Sententiarum, Sent. Book, distinction, question, article, solution or quæstiuncula, reply; e.g. III Sent. 25, 2, 3, ii ad 3.

Compendium Theologiæ, Compend. Theol.

- Commentaries of Scripture (lecturæ, expositiones): Job, In Job; Psalms, In Psal.; Isaiah, In Isa.; Jeremiah, In Jerem.; Lamentations, In Thren.; St Matthew, In Matt.; St John, In Joan.; Epistles of St Paul, e.g. In ad Rom. Chapter, verse, lectio as required.
- Philosophical commentaries: On the Liber de Causis, In De causis. Aristotle: Peri Hermeneias, In Periherm.; Posterior Analytics, In Poster.; Physics, In Physic.; De Cælo et Mundo, In De Cæl.; De Generatione et Corruptione, In De gen.; Meteorologica, In Meteor.; De Anima, In De anima;

4—в

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> De Sensu et Sensato, In De sensu; De Memoria et Reminiscentia, In De memor.; Metaphysics, In Meta.; Nicomachean Ethics, In Ethic., Politics, In Pol. Book, chapter, lectio as required, also for Expositions on Boethius, Liber de Hebdomadibus and Liber de Trinitate, In De hebd. and In De Trin., and on Dionysius De Divinis Nominibus, In De div. nom. References to Aristotle give the Bekker annotation.

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INTRODUCTION

God is three Persons in one nature, and the first twenty-six Ouestions of the Summa treat of God in his one nature, forming what would today be called a treatise De Deo Uno. In this context the five Questions translated in the present volume find a natural place. The treatment is theological, that is, dependent on Revelation as contained in holy Scripture and tradition. But for St Thomas a theological treatment is also a rational treatment in that revealed truths may be ordered by reason into a coherent whole and our understanding of them deepened by such penetration into their meaning, relations and consequences as the human mind may attain to.¹ And since much in divine revelation about the nature of God and his operation in the world is in principle available to the human reason apart from revelation, a treatise De Deo Uno will contain much that would today find a place in what has come to be known as natural theology. There has of course been a good deal of discussion in modern times both within and without the Catholic Church about the theologian's principles as thus understood by St Thomas. The Protestant school of Karl Barth would diminish almost to extinction the rôle of mere reason in theology; while within the Catholic Church the notion of 'Christian philosophy' has received much controversial attention. But for the Catholic reader at any rate, no basic difficulty stands in the way of his taking up St Thomas and understanding him in a way that may be provisional and not very deep but need not be distorted. For the Catholic reader who would penetrate this work at the level of scientific theology there will be difficulties not merely, and obviously, of detail, but also about certain broader aspects of the method. It is true that in a certain sense he will have the goal of his quest preformed within him by the light of faith; but that will not dispense him from the labour of following processes of analysis and synthesis whose formulation has taxed to the utmost the greatest minds the Church has possessed. Even for the Catholic, to achieve the final illumination that breaks on him when he has at last seen the more fundamental problems of the philosophy and theology of God, and seen their answers, must be a matter of long and patient study. For the non-Catholic who comes to St Thomas unversed in the history of theology, especially if he should be a reader whose mental climate is the practical rationalism² to which the modern Western mind is

¹cf 1a. 1, 8: utrum sacra doctrina sit argumentativa

²The word is used in the religiously neutral sense for the attitude of mind that would mistakenly expect the matter of theology, like that of physical science, to be in principle within the scope of the finite mind's univocal, i.e. clear, distinct and specific, understanding.

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prone, St Thomas's work often gives rise to serious misunderstanding. Briefly, the difficulty comes from two points: first, the fact of the transcendence, i.e. the infinity, of God, and the analogical way of knowing him that is required by that fact; and second, how St Thomas's method is to be reconciled with the fact. The unprepared reader would be in some danger, as experience testifies, of consigning the transcendence of God to practical oblivion. The reasons why this is so arise partly from the nature of the case and partly from history. For the benefit, then, of all save trained theologians certain preliminary remarks or cautions may be of help.

Ι

It is useful for an understanding of St Thomas to remember that for eight hundred years before his time theological method in the West was dominated by St Augustine; and that St Augustine's thought is in turn largely constructed upon a framework of Plato's philosophy as mediated by Plotinus. Plotinus had postulated what he called the One, the original divine source of all reality, beyond the categories of being and of our thought. After the One he does not pass immediately to this world, but postulates intermediate emanations from the One, namely Mind and Soul. Mind, the first emanation, knows the One and contains within itself the whole hierarchy of the Platonic Forms or Ideas; and is so close to the One in derivation and in eternity and unchangeableness that he can call it simply divine mind. Augustine, unable to accept a Mind of God that should be an emanation of God in any sense that denoted a lower reality, but being obliged on the contrary to identify divine Mind with transcendent godhead, transferred the Platonic and Plotinian world of Ideas to the divine mind in his own sense, thus giving to God as he understood him the characteristics both of Plotinus's One and of Plotinus's Mind, with the correction that Mind is not an emanation of the One but identical with it. At the same time the Christian doctrine of the Trinity of divine Persons in one nature made it easier to see in the second Person, the Son, the Word of God, 'through whom all things were made', a certain likeness to the Plotinian Mind. Not that Augustine learned what to say about the Blessed Trinity from Plotinus: he learned it from Revelation. But the parallel was there and as a part of his mental background was bound to influence his thought and method to some extent. The situation is that for the theologian who has the difficult task of thinking and writing about the transcendent God, the temptation is ever present to find some univocal ground which should be divine and yet available to the direct ratiocination of the finite mind: and in Plotinus's Mind there was such an alleged ground ready made; for it is divine mind, and at the same time it is the place of the Ideas; and the Platonic Ideas are finite. It is cer-

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tain that God knows finite things, actual and possible, distinctly, i.e. in full detail. God knows them, and we know them; how easy to conclude from this that God knows as we know, thinks as we think. The false and very misleading imaginative background consists of three sections: above, the transcendent, infinite God; next, some Plotinian world of divine Ideas where the theologian finds his answers; and below, creation, including finite minds. The true imaginative background, which must be retained if theological thinking is to avoid shipwreck, is quite different. It consists of two sections only: above, the infinite, transcendent God; and below, creation, including finite minds. There is no middle territory. Yet the temptation to provide one—from the fact that God knows finite things, from the fact that he is creator, conserver and director of the world, from the fact of the Incarnation of the second Person—has claimed other victims besides Plotinus.

Π

What has been said above may be applied to provide brief answers to three questions arising out of the matter of the present volume: 1. What are the divine attributes—knowledge, will, life and the like—and how and why are they distinguished? 2. What can be said of the special case of the doctrine of divine Ideas? 3. How should we envisage God's knowledge of the creature's free acts?

1. The first of these questions is not in principle difficult to answer though it can puzzle beginners. The divine attributes are aspects which our mind distinguishes in considering the absolute simplicity of the infinite Being of God. In God the attributes are absolutely identical. His knowledge of himself is dynamic affirmation of himself, infinite affirmation, all that infinite will can mean; affirmation that is adequate, without change, for the free production of all possible creatures. All other positive attributes of God are merely richer expressions of this infinite intellect-will. In just the same way, if we consider that which in an existing thing founds our notion of its being, we conclude that it is identical with that which founds our transcendental notions of its truth, its goodness, and its unity.³ The attributes contain one another implicitly through their identity with the one, simple, infinite reality from which they are derived as partially distinct notions in our minds. Their distinction is a necessary human economy which is always to be understood with the necessary correction. It is an economy that is used by St Thomas extensively and in great detail, so that it becomes important not to overlook the correction which he explains in due place but which

³The transcendentals are so called because they are found in all reality and pass beyond its differences.

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elsewhere he almost always takes for granted. Nor does this situation reduce our knowledge of God to agnosticism. The intellect, will, life, holiness of God do not contradict the conceptions we have of them, which point to a Being who is all these things not in a finite or otherwise imperfect way, but in an infinite and perfect way. Thus for example when St Thomas says the knowledge of God is the cause of things secundum quod habet voluntatem coniunctam, 'when joined with his will', the meaning is not that the intellect of God is one thing and the will another, but that God's knowledge, identical with his will, freely affirms some things for existence and does not affirm others; that this dynamic, creative knowledge contains in its simplicity all that in ourselves would involve the multiplicity of knowledge, exemplary causes, the will to produce, and the action of producing. Thus, too, the distinction between God's 'knowledge of vision' and 'knowledge of simple understanding' is not part of some map of the divine mind, but part of the map of our thoughts about the divine mind, verified, indeed, in God in the sense that he knows both actual and possible things distinctly, but not an explanation of how he does so.

On the simplicity of God the reader may turn with profit to Question 3 of the *First Part*; and on the way we think of God, our analogical knowledge of him, to Question 13 of the same *Part* (in Volumes 2 and 3 respectively of the present translation) with, for the latter question, the parallel passages in *Contra Gentiles* 1, 30-6.

2. Next we may consider the question of where the doctrine of divine Ideas is situated from the point of view of method. The full history of the doctrine remains to be written. If St Thomas were writing it today he would want to take account of the fact that while St Albert the Great, his master, could associate himself with St Augustine in the view that 'to deny the divine Ideas is to deny the Son of God',⁴ a modern Thomist could characterize the doctrine as 'a useless fiction'.⁵ The problem is that while it is certain that God knows finite things, actual and possible, in full detail, we have to decide how to interpret the doctrine of a multitude of divine Ideas-whether as a statement of the fact or as an explanation of it. It seems that it would be a failure of correct method to say, 'These distinctions are in God, and this is how we explain the matter'; the legitimate human economy says only, 'These distinctions are in our thoughts about God and this is how we explain the matter'. We would say on general principles that it is not the case that we have on the one hand the divine essence and on the other hand the divine Ideas, and that we are called upon to explain the relation between the two and justify the multiplicity. God

cf Albert, In 1 Sent. d. 35, E, a. 7, 4th authority

⁵E. de Bruyne, S. Thomas d'Aquin (Paris, 1928), p. 158

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knows finite things: to explain how he does so would be to stray beyond the limits of our competence. Sertillanges has some judicious remarks on the subject.⁶ He suggests that had it not been for the Augustinian tradition St Thomas would not have included Question 15 on the divine Ideas; and he rightly emphasizes that 'in God there is nothing but God ... the divine Ideas are God and there are no others'. According to him St Thomas's true thought on the matter is to be found in De veritate III, 2; the true meaning is that the multitude of Ideas is not a matter of a multiple relation of the divine intellect to creatures but of creatures to God, and that God knows the creatures and the relations. This is no doubt true, but it does not answer the original question; it rather indicates that the question is one we ought not to have asked; and that if St Thomas in the Summa seems in fact to be answering the question, we should conclude that his answer is part of the human economy and not an account of what is verified literally in God. There are other difficulties. A multitude of divine Ideas seems to rest on the Platonic (metaphysical) and the Aristotelean (biological) notion of species clearly distinct from one another-a notion it is felt nowadays to be difficult to sustain; so that any attempt to envisage the number of the Ideas soon becomes lost in infinities. Perhaps these remarks may be sufficient to guide the reader in a matter that has caused some uneasiness to interpreters of St Thomas.

3. Lastly and most difficult of all, in the consideration of God's knowledge of the creature's free acts (Ia. 14, 13) much will depend on correct method. Catholic philosophers and theologians are agreed, with but few hesitant voices, on the following points: that God knows with certainty the free acts, past, present, and future, of all free creatures; that he knows them 'in himself', without dependence on the creature for his knowledgeon the contrary, the creature in its free acts depends on God's effective will for all that is good, and on his permissive will for all that fails of goodness; that his effective will is no contradiction of the creature's freedom, his permissive will in no way the cause of evil; that God knows the creature's free acts in eternity. It is always ultimately in terms of eternity that St Thomas explains God's knowledge of the creature's free acts. What is known in eternity is known not as past or future but in God's present, with the hypothetical necessity which belongs to what is actual and present. Nor does St Thomas treat the question of God's knowledge of the free acts of possible but not actual creatures. His knowledge and causality of good free acts without detriment to their freedom is readily explained by the transcendence of his knowledge and causality as expounded by St Thomas in

⁶cf A. D. Sertillanges, O.P., S. Thomas d'Aquin: Somme théologique, traduction française (Editions de la Revue des Jeunes, Paris, 1926), vol. 2, pp. 403-5

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In Peri Hermeneias I, lect. 14, §22;⁷ but the correlation of his knowledge of bad free acts with their occurrence remains unexplained except in terms of eternity. At this point St Thomas, we conclude, decides that human statement of fact joins divine infinity, that is, divine mystery. His silence after this point would seem to remind us that God's eternity is God, and that to attempt to explain, as distinct from stating, the relation of time to eternity would be to attempt to explain God by means of our thoughts about God, whereas nothing can explain God but God who is infinite explanation.

Perhaps the concept of mystery does not always receive in theology the explicit and extended treatment that is its due; so that the impression is sometimes conveyed that to say that a question issues in mystery is a confession of failure, something to be mentioned with embarrassed regret. A short digression on the subject may therefore be useful.

Mystery is truth of which the terms are certain and to us sufficiently clear; but that to which the terms add up, so to speak, or the content of the terms as verified in their object and their positive reconciliation, remains unclear.

Mystery is produced by the fact that the human mind is not only finite but also must acquire all its knowledge by way of the senses. With few exceptions nothing can be known quite overtly and definitively in this life. We understand the human soul, for example, by analogy only,

⁷Nam voluntas divina est intelligenda ut extra ordinem entium existens, velut causa quædam profundens totum ens et omnes ejus differentias. Sunt autem differentiæ entis possibile [i.e. liberum] et necessarium: et ideo ex ipsa voluntate divina originantur necessitas et contingentia [i.e. libertas] in rebus, et distinctio utriusque secundum rationem proximarum causarum. . . . Et secundum harum conditionem causarum, effectus dicuntur vel necessarii vel contingentes; quamvis omnes dependeant a voluntate divina sicut a prima causa quæ transcendit ordinem necessitatis et contingentiæ. 'The divine will is to be understood as existing outside the order of created things, as a cause from which proceeds the whole of being and all its differences. Created being may be divided into free and non-free; and therefore the divine will is the source of both necessity and freedom in things, and of the difference of the two in relation to their proximate causes. . . . According to the diversity of these causes, the effects are called non-free or free; and yet they all depend on the divine will as on the first cause which transcends the order of necessity and freedom.'-Not only is God equally the transcendent cause of both freedom and necessity; his causality of man's freedom and its exercise may justly be regarded as in itself more intelligible than his causality of the non-free and its exercise as exhibited in purely material things. For human freedom is a participation of divine freedom, and in its closer likeness to God is more intelligible in itself and in its dependence on him than is the non-free; though the intimate nature of the dependence is not directly available to our minds. It may be remarked that far from such problems causing surprise, we ought rather to be surprised that we can understand about God as much as we do, and to be on our guard against an over-facile understanding of such limited knowledge as we have.

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i.e. by hints and unclearly; much less can we know God directly and clearly.⁸

We can be certain either from reason or from revelation that certain facts about God are true; and our apprehension of the facts is informative and sufficient for our present needs. The imperfection of our understanding of the facts produces the mystery. On the other hand, mystery never announces an open contradiction.

Mystery is by no means confined to revealed truths about God such as the Blessed Trinity and the Incarnation; it is everywhere present in natural theology also. Every statement whatsoever about God must contain mystery as described above. If the content of any truth about God or the solution of any problem about God were in all respects perfectly clear, it would be certainly false.

In every question about God there comes a point where we can say no more. That point is always mystery, and in the present life brings our minds as close as possible to God as he really is. To expect such mysteries to be in principle soluble in this life would be to misconceive the whole nature of theology and of the philosophy of God.

Nevertheless the method of analogy, which consists of comparison, proportion and direction-finding, can when properly applied yield clues which to some extent mitigate the effects of our finite-mindedness, and provide not insight but what may be called presages of insight. To find and develop and convey such clues is an important part of the theologian's task.

To illustrate by a few examples. God is three Persons: we understand the terms sufficiently, but not well enough to see how they combine. God is infinite being: we know well enough the meaning of the terms 'being', 'not' and 'finite': but we do not see clearly what the terms add up to. God's eternity excludes beginning and end and all succession: the terms are clear but not the intimate nature of God's eternity. God is infinite knowledge: we know what we mean by knowledge, but not directly what infinite knowledge would be. God causes all reality: we are certain of the fact but we do not see clearly how God as well as man is the cause of an act of human free will. God creates freely: but we do not see how infinite, unchangeable being contains that kind of freedom. When we have defined our statements about God as accurately as possible and excluded all error and misunderstanding, the content of what remains is certain and meaningful but not clear and distinct.

To return to the question of God's knowledge and causality of the creature's free acts. The difficulty is more directly concerned with God's

⁸By contrast with the fixation of univocal knowledge, analogical knowledge involves an element of *dynamic movement* of the mind in a specified direction.

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efficacious willing than with his knowledge and an elaborate treatment of it is outside the scope of this volume. If in so extremely controversial a matter the present writer may offer a personal opinion, it would be that the rival theories which for centuries have disputed the field are all more or less faulty in method or conclusions; but that sounder historical and theological approaches are beginning to point to positions which are more faithful to St Thomas and will be found ultimately more satisfying.9 If the suggestions concerning method mentioned earlier are applied to our question, we shall conclude that in declaring the matter it is in no way necessary or possible to make distinctions or divisions in the divine knowledge itself, however much the human economy is used to put order into our thoughts about God. Between finite below and infinite above we draw a line which may not be crossed by univocal thought, i.e. thought working with fixed classifications or categories. Then we affirm without preoccupation all that is to be affirmed of the finite and all that is to be affirmed of the infinite. To be concerned about problems of reconciliation is to imagine a common ground on which we reconcile-to abandon fact for fiction. There is a true sense in which we never say how God is what he is: we only say that he is so. To refuse to explain when once we have traced back to God his effects of whatever kind is to respect the infinity of God. To attempt to explain is to turn the subject upside down and all unconsciously to make God finite or man infinite.

Finally, for the reader who comes to St Thomas for the first time, three minor points may be noticed: 1. S. Thomas formalissime loquitur—St Thomas keeps strictly to the matter in hand, takes one point at a time. Seldom can the Question or Article be safely considered in isolation. An article needs to be compared with neighbouring articles which often provide necessary qualifications; and all the five questions of the present volume need to be seen as informed by the general principles outlined above. 2. The objections at the beginning of each article are of varying weight and from the nature of the case will often use words with an ambiguity which the translation will retain. 3. The sed contra which comes after the objections in each article is often a mere approximation whose argument or cited authority cannot always be accepted without qualification.

⁹See for example M. de la Taille, S.J., 'Sur diverses classifications de la science divine', *Recherches de science religieuse*, vol. 13 (1923), 7-23, 535-42; Bernard Lonergan, S.J., 'St Thomas's Theory of Operation', *Theological Studies*, vol. 3 (1942), 375-402; 'St Thomas's Thought on *gratia operans*', ibid, 533-78

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