

# Author index

Allingham, M., 125  
 Archibald, P., 112, 125  
 Armbruster, W., 232  
 Arrow, K. J., 2, 7, 11, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26,  
     27, 33, 35, 42, 178, 195, 229, 312,  
     342, 356  
 d'Aspremont, C., 1, 6, 7, 244  
 Aumann, R. J., 231, 253, 254  
 Austen-Smith, D., 125

Bar-Hillel, M., 125  
 Barone, E., 22  
 Baumol, W., 124  
 Bentham, J., 20  
 Bergson, A., 2, 22, 341  
 Billera, L. J., 102  
 Billingsley, P., 234  
 Bixby, R. E., 102  
 Blackorby, C., 45, 60, 61  
 Blackwell, D., 46, 48, 50  
 Blair, D. H., 152, 155, 159  
 Blau, J. H., 37  
 Böge, W., 232  
 Border, K. C., 159  
 Bordes, G., 30  
 Brimmer, A., 263  
 Brock, W., 124  
 Brown, K., 266

Campbell, W. M., 266  
 Capen, E. C., 266  
 Carlson, R., 100  
 Carson, D., 263

Cassady, R. Jr., 262, 286  
 Champsaur, P., 116  
 Clapp, R. V., 266  
 Cox, J., 263, 274  
 Crawford, V., 121, 123, 124, 221

Dahl, R. A., 23  
 Daniel, T., 119  
 Dasgupta, P., 6, 13, 176, 178, 179, 191,  
     192, 193, 194, 195  
 Debreu, G., 2, 59, 117  
 Demange, G., 123  
 Diamond, P. A., 295  
 Donaldson, D., 45, 60, 61, 64, 112, 125  
 Dubey, P., 218, 224, 225  
 Dubins, L. E., 293  
 Dummet, M., 331  
 Dutta, B, 203

Edgeworth, F. T., 21  
 Engelbrecht-Wiggans, R., 265, 283

Farquharson, R., 202, 331  
 Farrell, M. J., 37  
 Feldman, A., 110, 111, 113, 137  
 Fleming, M., 39  
 Foley, D. K., 3, 107, 109, 220, 293, 342,  
     347  
 Friedman, M., 263

Gaertner, W., 125  
 Geanakopolis, J., 225  
 Gérard-Varet, L.-A., 6, 7, 244

Cambridge University Press

0521023955 - Social Goals and Social Organization: Essays in Memory of Elisha Pazner

Edited by Leonid Hurwicz, David Schmeidler and Hugo Sonnenschein

Index

[More information](#)360 **Author index**

- Gevers, L., 29, 45, 52, 58, 64  
 Gibbard, A., 37, 135, 137, 194, 331  
 Girschick, M. A., 46, 48, 50  
 Gnedenko, B. V., 335  
 Goldstein, H., 263  
 Goodman, S., 23, 110, 113  
 Graaff, J. de V., 341  
 Green, J., 211, 214  
 Griesmer, J., 265  
 Groves, T., 1, 7, 174, 212  
 Guesnerie, R., 161, 162
- Hahn, F., 2, 356  
 Hammond, P., 6, 11, 30, 53, 54, 176,  
 191, 192, 193, 194, 195  
 Harris, M., 250, 265, 270, 271, 273  
 Harsanyi, J. C., 7, 19, 65, 66, 67, 68, 71,  
 90, 100, 174, 225, 230, 231, 232, 238,  
 312, 317, 346  
 Hayek, F. A. von, 2  
 Heckathorn, R. D., 100  
 Heller, W., 121, 124  
 Hicks, J. R., 343  
 Holt, C. A., Jr., 265  
 Hotelling, H., 22  
 Hurwicz, L., 3, 5, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 122,  
 123, 174, 181, 207, 208, 209, 210,  
 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 219,  
 220, 226, 244, 314, 318  
 Hutcheson, F., 20
- Immai, H., 100
- Jaskold-Gabszewicz, J., 111  
 Jaynes, G., 217  
 Jordan, J. S., 159
- Kalai, E., 2, 100, 146, 154, 155, 346  
 Kaldor, N., 343  
 Kemp, M. C., 30  
 Kihlstrom, R. E., 96  
 Kim, K., 147, 155, 156, 157  
 Kirman, A., 110, 113  
 Kleinberg, N., 116  
 Kohlberg, E., 211  
 Kolm, S., 69, 109, 121, 125  
 Koopmans, T. C., 2  
 de Koster, R., 96  
 Kreps, D., 286  
 Kuhn, H., 121
- Laffont, J.-J., 161, 162, 196, 197, 211, 214  
 Lange, O., 2  
 Laroque, G., 116  
 Ledyard, J., 1, 7, 174, 211, 212  
 Lee, T., 280
- Leffler, K., 116  
 Lensberg, T., 101  
 Lerner, A. P., 2, 22, 66, 312, 317  
 Levitan, R., 265  
 Little, I. M. D., 20, 22  
 Long, J., 116  
 Luce, R. D., 23, 51
- McLennan, A., 116  
 Markowitz, H., 23  
 Mas-Colell, J. A., 116, 218, 225  
 Maskin, E., 2, 6, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 59,  
 122, 123, 156, 176, 178, 179, 180,  
 181, 188, 191, 192, 193, 194, 195,  
 196, 197, 198, 199, 200, 201, 202,  
 214, 215, 216, 221, 224, 226, 270, 273
- Matthews, S., 265  
 Mead, W. J., 285  
 Mertens, J. F., 231, 232, 234, 235, 237  
 Milgrom, P. R., 4, 265, 266, 273, 275,  
 276, 278, 279, 280, 281, 283, 284, 285
- Mileron, J.-C., 3  
 Milnor, J., 23, 46, 51  
 Mirman, L. J., 96  
 Mirrlees, J. A., 295  
 Miura, R., 10  
 Morgenstern, O., 19, 231  
 Moulin, H., 123, 189, 190, 200, 203  
 Mount, K., 3  
 Muller, E., 2, 146, 152, 154, 155, 159  
 Musgrave, A. R., 323  
 Myerson, R. B., 2, 225, 255, 269, 270
- Nash, J. F., 82, 174, 346  
 Neumann, John von, 19, 231  
 Ng, Y., 23, 30, 33  
 Nozick, R., 36, 112, 297
- Okuna, M., 217  
 Ortega-Reichert, A., 265, 268, 285  
 Osana, H., 3  
 Otani, Y., 211  
 Otsuki, M., 120
- Pareto, V., 21  
 Parks, R. P., 30  
 Pattanaik, P., 194, 203  
 Pazner, E. A., 2, 24, 111, 117, 118, 119,  
 120, 217, 220, 318, 322, 323, 326,  
 331, 342, 347, 349  
 Peleg, B., 189, 200, 203  
 Peters, H. J. M., 100  
 Phelps, E., 297  
 Pigou, A. C., 19, 21  
 Pollak, R. A., 30, 31

Postlewaite, A., 1, 2, 8, 9, 10, 12, 119, 174, 211, 214, 215, 216, 222, 224, 225, 226  
Pratt, J. W., 96  
Raiffa, H., 23, 51, 232  
Raviv, A., 250, 265, 270, 271, 273  
Rawls, J., 19, 65, 66, 69, 70, 71, 110, 297, 311, 312, 323, 348, 349  
Reece, D. K., 265  
Reiber, M., 263  
Reichelstein, S., 10  
Reiter, S., 3  
Riley, J., 265, 269, 270, 273  
Ritz, Z., 153, 154, 155, 168  
Robbins, L., 22  
Roberson, B., 263, 274  
Roberts, J., 1, 30, 31, 35, 48, 58, 59, 174, 194, 196, 211  
Roth, A. E., 96, 97, 98, 100  
Rothblum, U. G., 97, 98  
Rothkopf, M., 265  
Roush, F., 147, 155, 156, 157  
Rubinstein, A., 30  
Russell, T., 116  
  
Samuelson, P. A., 2, 3, 5, 21, 22, 30, 121, 265, 269, 270, 341, 343  
Sato, F., 3  
Satterthwaite, M., 2, 11, 137, 162, 163, 164, 166, 168, 194, 331  
Savage, L. J., 233  
Scarf, H., 117  
Scheinkman, J., 124  
Schmeidler, D., 8, 96, 108, 109, 111, 112, 113, 117, 118, 119, 120, 123, 181, 212, 214, 217, 218, 220, 222, 224, 225, 318, 322, 323, 326, 331, 342, 347, 349  
Schweizer, U., 280  
Scitovsky, T., 343  
Segal, V., 100  
Seidl, C., 37  
Sen, A. K., 24, 26, 27, 29, 35, 36, 37, 40, 43, 53, 54, 295, 317  
Shapley, L. S., 83  
Shubik, M., 216, 217, 218, 219, 225, 265  
Sicilian, J., 211

Sidgwick, H., 21  
Simon, J. L., 25  
Singer, E., 121  
Smith, V., 263, 274  
Smorodinsky, M., 346  
Sobel, J., 124  
Sonnenschein, H., 11, 162, 163, 164, 166, 168, 331  
Spanier, E. H., 293  
Spence, M., 250  
Steinhaus, H., 121  
Stephen, J. N., 336  
Stigler, G. J., 21  
Strasnick, S. L., 39  
Suppes, P., 24, 40  
Sussangkarn, C., 110, 113  
Svensson, L., 124  
  
Thomson, W., 1, 11, 100, 110, 111, 113, 114, 122, 123, 124  
Tijs, S. H., 100  
Tsao, C., 277  
  
Ulph, D., 125  
Ungern-Sternberg, T. von, 280  
  
Varian, H. L., 1, 109, 110, 111, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 125, 220, 318, 322, 323, 347  
Vickrey, W., 22, 262, 265, 268, 270, 331  
Vignola, A., 277  
Vind, K., 108, 111, 112, 113, 117, 222  
  
Walker, M., 8, 13, 214  
Weber, R. J., 265, 266, 273, 275, 276, 278, 279, 280, 281, 283, 284, 285  
Weiman, D., 110, 111  
Wesley, G., 331  
Wettstein, D., 10, 216  
Wilson, R., 214, 265, 266, 281, 282  
Woods, D., 282  
  
Yaari, M., 96, 109, 117, 125  
Yannelis, N., 116  
Young, H.P., 39  
  
Zamir, S., 231, 232, 234, 235, 237  
Zeuthen, F., 346

Cambridge University Press

0521023955 - Social Goals and Social Organization: Essays in Memory of Elisha Pazner

Edited by Leonid Hurwicz, David Schmeidler and Hugo Sonnenschein

Index

[More information](#)

## Subject index

- admissible preference, 142
- adverse selection, 229
- affiliation, 275
  - inequality, 275
- affine transformation of utility scale, 80
  - invariance under, 80
- allocation, 298, 352, 354
  - feasible, 134
  - mechanism, 131
- anonymity, 40
  - weak, 51
- Arrow–Debreu production economy, 342, 350
- Arrow’s impossibility theorem, 140–2
- auction, 261
  - discriminatory, 262
  - Dutch, 262
  - English, 262
  - sequential, 269
  - uniform-price, 262
  - Vickrey, 262
- balanced allocation, 119, 324
- bargaining problem, 77–8
- Bayesian collective choice problem, 246
- Bayesian equilibrium, 174
- Bayesian game, 230
- Bayesian incentive problem, 255
- Bergsonian social welfare function, *see*
  - Bergson–Samuelson social welfare function
- Bergson–Samuelson social welfare function, 29, 33, 342
- binding agreement, 88
- Borel–Cantelli lemma, 339
- broadly applicable allocation mechanism, 162
- cardinality
  - and noncomparability, 43
  - and origin comparability, 43
  - and unit-comparability, 45
- cheatproofness (*see also* strategy-proofness)
  - coalitional, 331, 332
  - individual, 333
- coalition, 338, 339
  - important, 338
- co-cardinality, 44
  - almost, 46
- common knowledge, 231
- common-value assumption, 265
- communication game, 243
- competitive equilibrium allocation, 300
- Condorcet correspondence, 176
- consistency, 183
- consistent beliefs, 238
- constitution, 26
- constrained excess demand function, 214
- constrained Walrasian allocation, 214
- constrained Walrasian correspondence, 226
- consumption-output fairness, 301, 302, 303
- continuous outcome mechanisms, 10
- continuous solution, 88
- co-ordinality, 44

Cambridge University Press

0521023955 - Social Goals and Social Organization: Essays in Memory of Elisha Pazner

Edited by Leonid Hurwicz, David Schmeidler and Hugo Sonnenschein

Index

[More information](#)**Subject index**

363

- correlated equilibrium, 253
- decisiveness, 144–6
- decomposable domain, 146, 151
- decomposition into stages, 93
- descriptive mechanisms, 207–9
- dictatorial mechanism, 136
- dictatorship, 181
- difference comparability, 45
- difference principle, 38
- direct-revelation mechanism, 6
- disagreement point, *see* threat point
- discontinuous balanced mechanism, 8
- distributional assumptions, 265
- divide and choose process, 221
- dominance-solvable equilibrium, 203
- dominant strategy, 183, 190
  - mechanism, 135
- economy, 298, 351
  - Arrow–Debreu production, 342, 350
  - egalitarian, 304, 342
  - exchange, 298
  - perfectly competitive, 299
  - production, 298
- effectivity function, 189
- efficiency, *see* Pareto optimality
- egalitarian allocation, 299
- egalitarian contract, 349
  - social, 314, 317
- egalitarian distribution, 312, 313, 345
- egalitarian economy, 304, 342
- egalitarian-equivalent allocation, 111, 220, 304, 329, 342, 352
- egalitarian-reference-bundle, 351, 352
- egalitarian solution, 91, 92, 93
  - multiperson, 102
  - ordinal, 95
- endowment, initial, 299
- entirety bidding, 286
- envy-freeness (*see also* fairness)
  - of allocation, 108, 220
  - coalitional, 111
  - of net trade, 113–115
- equal-income Walrasian allocation, 112, 115–7, 125–6, 220
- equally distributed equivalence utility level, 63
- equilibrium, competitive, 299
- equitable final allocation, *see* fair-equivalent allocation
- equivalence theory of equity, 304
- essential allocation mechanism, 150
- essential rational mechanism, 155
- evaluation equivalence, 240
- evaluation function, 239
- fair-equivalent allocation, 111, 305, 326, 328
- fairness, 66, 299, 318, 325
  - in allocations, 114, 293–5, 299, 328, 347, 352
  - in distribution, 108
- favorable twists, 96
  - monotonicity in, 97
- feasible mechanism, 214–6
- feasible set, 78
- finite belief-closed subsets, 237
- full-income-fair allocation, *see* income-fair allocation
- game, 121
  - Bayesian, 230
  - form, *see* mechanism; outcome function
- generalized Gini relative index, 64
- Gibbard–Satterthwaite impossibility theorem, 137
- grading principle, 40
  - m*-person, 40
  - inch to ell, 40–1
- Hammond's equity, *see* two-person equity
- Hurwicz mechanism, 8
- ideal point, 84
- implementation, 173, 177
  - double, 201
  - full, 174
  - ordinary, 177
  - truthful, 191
  - weak, 6, 176
- imposed mechanism, 136
- incentive compatability, 6, 11, 231, 244
- incentive efficiency, 246
- income-fair allocation, 117, 118, 323
- incomplete information, 231
- independence of irrelevant alternatives, 82, 141
  - for pairs, 34
- independent private-values model, 266
- individual preference profile, 26
- individual rationality, 80, 81, 187, 200
  - strong, 80, 81
- interpersonal (utility) comparisons, 22–5
  - just-noticeable-difference, 23–5
  - principle of extended sympathy, 24–5
- invariance
  - under transformation of utility scale, 81
  - under translation, 91
- jeopardized action, 254
- jeopardized type, 250

Cambridge University Press

0521023955 - Social Goals and Social Organization: Essays in Memory of Elisha Pazner

Edited by Leonid Hurwicz, David Schmeidler and Hugo Sonnenschein

Index

[More information](#)364      **Subject index**

- Kalai–Smorodinsky solution, 84, 85
- Kolm–Pollak function, 60–2
- k*-order beliefs, 234
- lexical individual dictatorship, 51
- lexical rank-dictatorship theorem, 58
- leximax, 57
- leximin rule, 38
  - m*-person, 53
- Lindahl allocation correspondence, 4, 7–8
- Lindahl equilibrium, 4
- Lindahl mechanism, 3–5
- Lindeberg condition, 335
- linkage principle, 278
- local, 83
- manipulability, 134, 331
- Maschler–Perles solution, 85, 88
- maximin social contract, 314, 315
- mean, global, 60
- mechanism (*see also* outcome function), 5, 173, 211–4, 243
  - realization, 121
- minimal equity, 57
- minimax regret criterion, 316
- monotone values assumption, 274
- monotonically closed domain, 193
- monotonicity, 178
  - of allocation mechanisms, 141
  - of bargaining solutions, 92, 102
  - in favorable twists, *see* favorable twists
  - independent person-by-person, 191
  - individual, 85
  - of performance correspondence, 215
- moral hazard, 229
- Nash bargaining solution, 81
  - multiperson, 101
  - n*-person, 99
- Nash equilibrium, 173
- Nash performance correspondence, 225, 226
- neutrality, 187
  - relative, 31
  - strong, 27–9
- nonbossy allocation mechanism, 166
- noncorruptible mechanism, 153
- nondictatorship
  - mechanism, 137, 146–9
  - social choice function, 332
  - social welfare ordering, 42
  - weak, of mechanism, 150
- nondifferentiable allocation mechanism, 159
- nonimposed social choice functions, 332
- nonmanipulability, *see* cheatproofness; strategy-proofness
- nonnegative response, 195
- no-veto power, weak, 177
- opportunity-fair allocation, 112
- ordered pairs, 144
  - trivial, 144
- ordered triples, 143
- order-preserving transformation, 95
- order statistics, 286
- ordinality and noncomparability, 42
- outcome function (*see also* mechanism), 7, 173, 225
- Paretian liberal paradox, 35–7
- Pareto correspondence, 6, 174, 226
- Pareto criterion, 137
- Pareto efficiency, *see* Pareto optimality
- Pareto-efficient-egalitarian-equivalent allocation, 345
- Pareto frontier, 186
- Pareto indifference, 34
- Pareto optimality, 80, 108, 181, 298, 328, 347, 352
  - strong, 39, 153
  - weak, 33, 39, 80, 81
- per-capita-fair allocation, 325–6, 328
- performance correspondence, 225
- plurality rule, 336, 337
- potential-income-fair allocation, *see* income-fair allocation
- potentially-fair allocation, 302
- preference profile, 225, 331, 334, 337
- principle of insufficient reason, 317
- private-values assumption, 265
- quasilinear preference, 195
- rank-dictatorship theorem, 57
- rational allocation mechanism, 141
- ratio scale and comparability, 45
- regular point, 163–4
- relative index of inequality, 63
- restricted preferences, 157
- revelation mechanism, 206–11
- revelation outcome function, 225
- revelation principle, 182, 185, 244
- revenue equivalence principle, 269
- risk aversion, 96
- screening level, 278
- separability, 39
- sequential auctions, 269

Cambridge University Press

0521023955 - Social Goals and Social Organization: Essays in Memory of Elisha Pazner

Edited by Leonid Hurwicz, David Schmeidler and Hugo Sonnenschein

Index

[More information](#)**Subject index**

365

- social aggregation function, 185
- social choice function, 173, 176, 332, 337
  - single valuedness of, 191
- social choice rule, *see* social choice function
- social decision function, 26, 195
- social decision functional, 26
- social welfare function, 63, 140, 195
- social welfare functional, 26
  - unrestricted domain for, 27–9
- social welfare ordering, 29
- status quo point (threat point), 78, 79
- strategic outcome function, *see* outcome function
- strategy domain, 5
- strategy-proofness (*see also* cheatproofness), 132, 146–9
  - group, 152
- strong equilibrium, 198
- superadditivity, 87
- symmetric allocation mechanism, 150
- symmetric solution, 81
- theory of fundamental preference, 68–9
- threat point (status quo point), 78, 79
- tightness, 189
- transitivity, 151
- two-person equity, 54
- type of player, 230
- universal belief space, 235
- unrestricted individual utility profile, 31
- utilitarianism, 38
  - in bargaining solution, 90–1
  - generalized, 41
  - generalized *m*-person, 46
  - weak *m*-person, 46
- utility, 20
  - free disposal of, 85
  - virtual, 248
  - von Neumann–Morgenstern, 79
- value assumptions, 265
- veil of ignorance, 14, 312
- virtual utility, 248
- von Neumann–Morgenstern utility, 79
- Walker mechanism, 8
- Walrasian correspondence, 226
- wealth-fair allocation, 118, 302, 322
- welfarism theorem, 29
- winner's curse, 265