Cambridge University Press
0521856671 - Enforcing Obligations Erga Omnes in International Law - by Christian J. Tams
Frontmatter/Prelims

Enforcing Obligations Erga Omnes in International Law

The concept of obligations erga omnes – obligations owed to the international community as a whole – has fascinated international lawyers for decades, yet its precise implications remain unclear. This book assesses how this concept affects the enforcement of international law. It shows that all States are entitled to invoke obligations erga omnes in proceedings before the International Court of Justice, and to take countermeasures in response to serious erga omnes breaches. In addition, it suggests ways of identifying obligations that qualify as erga omnes. In order to sustain these results, the book conducts a thorough examination of international practice and jurisprudence as well as the recent work of the UN International Law Commission in the field of State responsibility. By so doing, it demonstrates that the erga omnes concept is now solidly grounded in modern international law, and clarifies one of the central aspects of the international regime of law enforcement.

CHRISTIAN J. TAMS is a Lecturer at the Walther Schücking Institute for International Law at the University of Kiel, Germany.

CAMBRIDGE STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW

Established in 1946, this series produces high quality scholarship in the fields of public and private international law and comparative law. Although these are distinct legal subdisciplines, developments since 1946 confirm their interrelation.

Comparative law is increasingly used as a tool in the making of law at national, regional, and international levels. Private international law is now often affected by international conventions, and the issues faced by classical conflicts rules are frequently dealt with by substantive harmonisation of law under international auspices. Mixed international arbitrations, especially those involving state economic activity, raise mixed questions of public and private international law, while in many fields (such as the protection of human rights and democratic standards, investment guarantees and international criminal law) international and national systems interact. National constitutional arrangements relating to ‘foreign affairs’, and to the implementation of international norms, are a focus of attention.

The Board welcomes works of a theoretical or interdisciplinary character, and those focusing on the new approaches to international or comparative law or conflicts of law. Studies of particular institutions or problems are equally welcome, as are translations of the best work published in other languages.

General Editors	James Crawford SC FBA
	Whewell Professor of International Law, Faculty of Law, and Director, Lauterpacht Research Centre for International Law, University of Cambridge
	John S. Bell FBA
	Professor of Law, Faculty of Law, University of Cambridge
Editorial Board	Professor Hilary Charlesworth University of Adelaide
	Professor Lori Damrosch Columbia University Law School
	Professor John Dugard University of Leiden
	Professor Mary-Ann Glendon Harvard Law School
	Professor Christopher Greenwood London School of Economics
	Professor David Johnston University of Edinburgh
	Professor Hein Kötz Max-Planck-Institut, Hamburg
	Professor Donald McRae University of Ottawa
	Professor Onuma Yasuaki University of Tokyo
	Professor Reinhard Zimmermann Universität Regensburg
Advisory Committee	Professor D. W. Bowett QC
	Judge Rosalyn Higgins QC
	Professor J. A. Jolowicz QC
	Professor Sir Elihu Lauterpacht CBE QC
	Professor Kurt Lipstein
	Judge Stephen Schewebel

A list of books in the series can be found at the end of this volume.

Enforcing Obligations Erga Omnes in International Law

Christian J. Tams

Walther Schücking Institute

University of Kiel (Germany)

CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS
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First published 2005

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ISBN-13 978-0-521-85667-6 hardback

ISBN-10 0-521-85667-1 hardback

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Foreword						page xiii
Preface						xv
Notes on citation						xvii
Table of cases						xviii
List of abbreviations						xxviii
Introduction						1
*Part I Background to the erga omnes* concept**						17
1	Clarifications					19
	1.1	Countermeasures and ICJ proceedings				19
	1.2	The notion of standing				25
		1.2.1	Standing as a normative concept			28
		1.2.2	Standing as a flexible concept			32
		1.2.3	The diversity of rules governing standing			36
		1.2.4	Interim conclusions			40
	1.3	Standing to enforce individual legal positions				40
		1.3.1	The basis of the distinction			41
		1.3.2	Categories of individual legal positions			42
			1.3.2.a	Bilateral legal rules and similar situations		42
			1.3.2.b	Special injury		44
	1.4	Concluding observations				46
2	Traditional approaches to standing					48
	2.1	Restrictive tendencies				52
		2.1.1	A structural analysis of multilateral obligations			53
			2.1.1.a	Three categories of obligations		54
			2.1.1.b	The legal regime		58
		2.1.2	A restrictive interpretation of treaty provisions: the South West Africa case			63
	2.2	Expansive tendencies				69
		2.2.1	Treaty-based rules of standing			70
			2.2.1.a	Unequivocal treaty clauses		71
			2.2.1.b	Equivocal clauses broadly interpreted: the Wimbledon case		76
		2.2.2	The position in the absence of special treaty regulations			80
			2.2.2.a	Interdependent obligations		80
			2.2.2.b	Status treaties		80
				Background		81
				Standing to react against breaches		83
			2.2.2.c	The duty to comply with judgments of the International Court of Justice		87
			2.2.2.d	Basic humanitarian standards		89
	2.3	Concluding observations				94
*Part II Legal issues raised by the erga omnes* concept**						97
3	Distinguishing types of erga omnes effects					99
	3.1	Terminological imprecision				101
	3.2	The traditional meaning of the term				103
	3.3	‘Other’ erga omnes effects in the ICJ’s jurisprudence				106
		3.3.1	The traditional meaning			107
		3.3.2	The territorial restriction of obligations			110
		3.3.3	The descriptive function			112
	3.4	Concluding observations				115
4	Identifying obligations erga omnes					117
	4.1	The question of sources				120
		4.1.1	The Court’s jurisprudence			121
		4.1.2	Further considerations			123
	4.2	Distinguishing obligations erga omnes from other customary obligations				128
		4.2.1	The structural approach			130
			4.2.1.a	The strong version		131
			4.2.1.b	The moderate version		133
			4.2.1.c	Interim conclusion		135
		4.2.2	The material approach			136
			4.2.2.a	The point of reference		136
			4.2.2.b	The required threshold of importance		138
				Obligations erga omnes and norms of jus cogens		139
					The merits of a comparative approach	141
					Implications for the erga omnes concept	146
					Interim conclusion	151
				Beyond jus cogens: obligation erga omnes not deriving from peremptory norms		151
					Dispositive obligations erga omnes?	152
					Relevant factors	153
	4.3	Concluding observations				156
5	Standing to institute ICJ proceedings					158
	5.1	The Barcelona Traction dictum				162
	5.2	Possible counter-arguments				165
		5.2.1	Isolated pronouncements?			165
		5.2.2	An obiter dictum lacking legal relevance?			167
		5.2.3	The international community as the exclusive beneficiary?			173
		5.2.4	Contradictions within the judgment?			176
		5.2.5	Inconclusive jurisprudence since 1970?			179
			5.2.5.a	The Nuclear Tests cases		180
			5.2.5.b	The East Timor case		182
				Obligations erga omnes and the indispensable third-party rule		183
				The issue of standing		185
			5.2.5.c	The Genocide case		187
			5.2.5.d	The Nicaragua case		187
			5.2.5.e	The Gab□íkovo case		190
			5.2.5.f	Summary		192
		5.2.6	A restrictive, contextual interpretation?			193
	5.3	Concluding observations				196
6	Standing to take countermeasures					198
	6.1	The Court’s jurisprudence				201
		6.1.1	The Barcelona Traction case			202
		6.1.2	The Namibia and Hostages cases			204
		6.1.3	The Nicaragua case			205
		6.1.4	Interim conclusions			207
	6.2	International practice				207
		6.2.1	Specific instances of state practice			208
			6.2.1.a	Actual violations		209
				Western countries – Uganda (1971–1978)		210
				European countries – Liberia (1980)		211
				G77 and socialist countries – colonial regimes (1970s–1990s)		211
				Western countries – Poland (1981)		213
				United States – Soviet Union (1981)		214
				Western countries – Argentina (1982)		215
				Western countries – Soviet Union (1983)		217
				Western countries – South Africa (1985–1986)		217
				Various countries – Iraq (1990)		219
				European and Commonwealth countries – Nigeria (1995)		220
				African States – Burundi (1996)		221
				European countries – Yugoslavia (1998)		223
				Various countries – Zimbabwe (2002–2003)		224
			6.2.1.b	Statements implying a right to take countermeasures		225
				G7 declarations on aircraft hijacking (1978/1981)		225
				Western countries – Iran (1979–1980)		226
			6.2.1.c	Actual non-compliance justified differently		227
				Netherlands–Surinam (1982)		227
				European countries–Yugoslavia (1991)		228
			6.2.1.d	An assessment		228
				A preliminary evaluation		230
				Counter-arguments examined		231
					The relevance of the erga omnes concept	232
					The selectivity of practice	234
					The dominance of western practice	235
					A lack of opinio juris	237
					The requirement of collective action	240
					Interim conclusion	241