Cambridge University Press
0521838061 - From Apology to Utopia - The Structure of International Legal Argument - by Martti Koskenniemi
Frontmatter/Prelims
This book presents a critical view of international law as an argumentative practice that aims to ‘depoliticise’ international relations. Drawing from a wide range of materials, Koskenniemi demonstrates how this effort fails as international law becomes vulnerable to the contrasting criticisms of being either an irrelevant moralist Utopia or a manipulable façade for State interests. He examines the conflicts and paradoxes inherent in the main strands of international law – sources, sovereignty, ‘custom’ and ‘world order’ – and shows how legal discourse about such subjects can be described in terms of a small number of argumentative rules.
From Apology to Utopia was originally published in English in Finland in 1989, and though it quickly became a classic, it has been out of print for some years. Cambridge University Press is proud to reissue this seminal text, together with a substantial, freshly written Epilogue in which the author both responds to critics of the original work, and reflects on the effect and significance of his ‘deconstructive’ approach today.
MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI is Professor of International Law at the University of Helsinki and Global Professor of Law at New York University. He is also a member of the International Law Commission. His other publications include The Gentle Civilizer of Nations: The Rise and Fall of International Law 1870–1960.
Reissue with a new Epilogue
MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI
CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS
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CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS
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Information on this title: www.cambridge.org/9780521546966
Originally published in English as From Apology to Utopia: The Structure of International Legal
Argument by the Finnish Lawyers’ Publishing Company 1989 and © Martti Koskenniemi
Re-issued with Epilogue by Cambridge University Press 2005
© Martti Koskenniemi 2005
This book is in copyright. Subject to statutory exception
and to the provisions of relevant collective licensing agreements,
no reproduction of any part may take place without
the written permission of Cambridge University Press.
Printed in the United Kingdom at the University Press, Cambridge
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library
ISBN-13 978-0-521-83806-1 hardback
ISBN-10 0-521-83806-1 hardback
ISBN-13 978-0-521-54696-6 paperback
ISBN-10 0-521-54696-6 paperback
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the persistence or accuracy of URLs for external or
third-party internet websites referred to in this book,
and does not guarantee that any content on such
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All games have morals; and the game of Snakes and Ladders captures, as no other activity can hope to do, the eternal truth that for every ladder you climb, a snake is waiting just around the corner; and for every snake, a ladder will compensate. But it’s more than that; no mere carrot-and-stick affair; because implicit in the game is the unchanging twoness of things, the duality of up against down, good against evil; the solid rationality of ladders balances the occult sinuosities of the serpent; in the opposition of staircase and cobra we can see, metaphorically, all conceivable oppositions, Alpha against Omega, father against mother; here is the war of Mary and Musa, and the polarities of knees and nose … but I found … that the game lacked one crucial dimension, that of ambiguity – because, as events are about to show, it is also possible to slither down a ladder and climb to triumph on the venom of a snake.
Salman Rushdie, Midnight’s Children (Picador, London, 1981), p. 141
For T & L & A
| Preface to the reissue page xiii | ||||
| Acknowledgements xv | ||||
| List of abbreviations xvii | ||||
| Introduction 1 | ||||
| 1 | Objectivity in international law: conventional dilemmas 16 | |||
| 1.1 | The identity of international law: the requirements of normativity and concreteness 17 | |||
| 1.2 | Proving the objectivity of international law 23 | |||
| 1.2.1 | A preliminary point: international law as problem-solution 24 | |||
| 1.2.2 | Objectivity and the practice of legal problem-solution 28 | |||
| 1.2.2.1 | The basic position: objectivity and the judicial function 28 | |||
| 1.2.2.2 | The revised position: the doctrine of “relative indeterminacy” 36 | |||
| 1.2.3 | Objectivity in hard cases: the forms of modern doctrine 41 | |||
| 1.3 | The structure of international legal argument: the dynamics of contradiction 58 | |||
| 1.3.1 | The descending and ascending patterns of justification 59 | |||
| 1.3.2 | Indeterminacy as contradiction 60 | |||
| 1.3.3 | The structure of international legal argument 67 | |||
| 1.4 | Outline of the book 69 | |||
| 2 | Doctrinal history: the liberal doctrine of politics and its effect on international law 71 | |||
| 2.1 | The emergence and structure of the liberal doctrine of politics 74 | |||
| 2.1.1 | The structure of liberalism 76 | |||
| 2.1.2 | Liberalism and international law 89 | |||
| 2.2 | Early scholarship 95 | |||
| 2.3 | Classical scholarship 106 | |||
| 2.3.1 | Early classicists: Vattel 108 | |||
| 2.3.2 | The professionals 122 | |||
| 2.3.2.1 | Two deviationists: Austin and Jellinek 125 | |||
| 2.3.2.2 | Professional mainstream 130 | |||
| 2.3.2.3 | The coherence of professional writing: historicism and proceduralization 143 | |||
| 2.4 | Conclusion 154 | |||
| 3 | The structure of modern doctrines 158 | |||
| 3.1 | Modern interpretations of doctrine: descending and ascending arguments confirmed 159 | |||
| 3.2 | Modern interpretations of practice 171 | |||
| 3.3 | The relations of doctrine and practice reconsidered: four versions of modern doctrine 182 | |||
| 3.3.1 | Rule-approach: Schwarzenberger 189 | |||
| 3.3.2 | Scepticism: Morgenthau 197 | |||
| 3.3.3 | Policy-approach: McDougal 201 | |||
| 3.3.4 | Idealism: Alvarez 209 | |||
| 3.4 | Conclusions: descriptivism 218 | |||
| 4 | Sovereignty 224 | |||
| 4.1 | The structure of the problem: Schmitt v. Kelsen 226 | |||
| 4.1.1 | The “legal” and the “pure fact” approaches 228 | |||
| 4.1.2 | The continuing dispute about the extent and relevance of sovereignty 233 | |||
| 4.2 | The meaning of sovereignty 240 | |||
| 4.3 | The rise and fall of the legal approach: the temptation of analysis, domestic jurisdiction and the dilemma of interpretation 246 | |||
| 4.4 | The rise and fall of the pure fact approach: Lotus principle 255 | |||
| 4.5 | Constructivism: recourse to equity 258 | |||
| 4.6 | Example: statehood and recognition 272 | |||
| 4.7 | Example: territorial disputes 282 | |||
| 4.8 | Conclusion on sovereignty 300 | |||
| 5 | Sources 303 | |||
| 5.1 | Sources theory 307 | |||
| 5.1.1 | Consent v. justice 309 | |||
| 5.1.2 | Tacit consent: a reconciliation? 325 | |||
| 5.2 | Treaty interpretation 333 | |||
| 5.3 | Unilateral declarations 345 | |||
| 5.4 | Acquiescence and estoppel 355 | |||
| 5.5 | The structure of sources doctrine: examples 364 | |||
| 5.5.1 | Example 1: the Status of South West Africa opinion 365 | |||
| 5.5.2 | Example 2: the Reservations opinion 368 | |||
| 5.5.3 | Example 3: the Admission opinion 371 | |||
| 5.5.4 | Example 4: the Arbitral Award Case 379 | |||
| 5.5.5 | Example 5: the Temple Case 382 | |||
| 5.6 | Conclusion on sources 385 | |||
| 6 | Custom 388 | |||
| 6.1 | Custom as general law: two perspectives 389 | |||
| 6.2 | The identity of custom: the ascending and descending approaches 397 | |||
| 6.3 | Conventional theory: the psychological and the material element and the circularity of the argument about custom 410 | |||
| 6.3.1 | The rejection of pure materialism 411 | |||
| 6.3.2 | The rejection of pure psychologism 414 | |||
| 6.3.2.1 | The psychological element as the material one: collective unconscious 415 | |||
| 6.3.2.2 | Tacit agreement 416 | |||
| 6.3.2.3 | The psychological element as will and belief 417 | |||
| 6.3.2.4 | The phenomenological claim and the consequences of psychologism 424 | |||
| 6.3.3 | The re-emergence of materialism 427 | |||
| 6.3.4 | The re-emergence of psychologism: the circle closes 431 | |||
| 6.4 | Resulting dilemmas: general/particular, stability/change 438 | |||
| 6.4.1 | General v. particular 438 | |||
| 6.4.2 | Time and customary law: the antinomy of stability and change 450 | |||
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