Cambridge University Press
0521838061 - From Apology to Utopia - The Structure of International Legal Argument - by Martti Koskenniemi
Frontmatter/Prelims


FROM APOLOGY TO UTOPIA

This book presents a critical view of international law as an argumentative practice that aims to ‘depoliticise’ international relations. Drawing from a wide range of materials, Koskenniemi demonstrates how this effort fails as international law becomes vulnerable to the contrasting criticisms of being either an irrelevant moralist Utopia or a manipulable façade for State interests. He examines the conflicts and paradoxes inherent in the main strands of international law – sources, sovereignty, ‘custom’ and ‘world order’ – and shows how legal discourse about such subjects can be described in terms of a small number of argumentative rules.

From Apology to Utopia was originally published in English in Finland in 1989, and though it quickly became a classic, it has been out of print for some years. Cambridge University Press is proud to reissue this seminal text, together with a substantial, freshly written Epilogue in which the author both responds to critics of the original work, and reflects on the effect and significance of his ‘deconstructive’ approach today.

MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI is Professor of International Law at the University of Helsinki and Global Professor of Law at New York University. He is also a member of the International Law Commission. His other publications include The Gentle Civilizer of Nations: The Rise and Fall of International Law 1870–1960.


FROM APOLOGY TO UTOPIA

The Structure of International Legal Argument

Reissue with a new Epilogue

MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI


CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS
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Published in the United States of America by Cambridge University Press, New York

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Information on this title: www.cambridge.org/9780521546966

Originally published in English as From Apology to Utopia: The Structure of International Legal
Argument by the Finnish Lawyers’ Publishing Company 1989 and © Martti Koskenniemi

Re-issued with Epilogue by Cambridge University Press 2005

© Martti Koskenniemi 2005

This book is in copyright. Subject to statutory exception
and to the provisions of relevant collective licensing agreements,
no reproduction of any part may take place without
the written permission of Cambridge University Press.

Printed in the United Kingdom at the University Press, Cambridge

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library

ISBN-13 978-0-521-83806-1 hardback

ISBN-10 0-521-83806-1 hardback

ISBN-13 978-0-521-54696-6 paperback

ISBN-10 0-521-54696-6 paperback

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the persistence or accuracy of URLs for external or
third-party internet websites referred to in this book,
and does not guarantee that any content on such
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All games have morals; and the game of Snakes and Ladders captures, as no other activity can hope to do, the eternal truth that for every ladder you climb, a snake is waiting just around the corner; and for every snake, a ladder will compensate. But it’s more than that; no mere carrot-and-stick affair; because implicit in the game is the unchanging twoness of things, the duality of up against down, good against evil; the solid rationality of ladders balances the occult sinuosities of the serpent; in the opposition of staircase and cobra we can see, metaphorically, all conceivable oppositions, Alpha against Omega, father against mother; here is the war of Mary and Musa, and the polarities of knees and nose … but I found … that the game lacked one crucial dimension, that of ambiguity – because, as events are about to show, it is also possible to slither down a ladder and climb to triumph on the venom of a snake.

Salman Rushdie, Midnight’s Children (Picador, London, 1981), p. 141

For T & L & A


CONTENTS

Preface to the reissue      page  xiii
Acknowledgements      xv
List of abbreviations      xvii
Introduction      1
1Objectivity in international law: conventional dilemmas      16
1.1The identity of international law: the requirements of normativity and concreteness      17
1.2Proving the objectivity of international law      23
1.2.1A preliminary point: international law as problem-solution      24
1.2.2Objectivity and the practice of legal problem-solution      28
1.2.2.1The basic position: objectivity and the judicial function      28
1.2.2.2The revised position: the doctrine of “relative indeterminacy”      36
1.2.3Objectivity in hard cases: the forms of modern doctrine      41
1.3The structure of international legal argument: the dynamics of contradiction      58
1.3.1The descending and ascending patterns of justification      59
1.3.2Indeterminacy as contradiction      60
1.3.3The structure of international legal argument      67
1.4Outline of the book      69
2Doctrinal history: the liberal doctrine of politics and its effect on international law      71
2.1The emergence and structure of the liberal doctrine of politics      74
2.1.1The structure of liberalism      76
2.1.2Liberalism and international law      89
2.2Early scholarship      95
2.3Classical scholarship      106
2.3.1Early classicists: Vattel      108
2.3.2The professionals      122
2.3.2.1Two deviationists: Austin and Jellinek      125
2.3.2.2Professional mainstream      130
2.3.2.3The coherence of professional writing: historicism and proceduralization      143
2.4Conclusion      154
3The structure of modern doctrines      158
3.1Modern interpretations of doctrine: descending and ascending arguments confirmed      159
3.2Modern interpretations of practice      171
3.3The relations of doctrine and practice reconsidered: four versions of modern doctrine      182
3.3.1Rule-approach: Schwarzenberger      189
3.3.2Scepticism: Morgenthau      197
3.3.3Policy-approach: McDougal      201
3.3.4Idealism: Alvarez      209
3.4Conclusions: descriptivism      218
4Sovereignty      224
4.1The structure of the problem: Schmitt v. Kelsen      226
4.1.1The “legal” and the “pure fact” approaches      228
4.1.2The continuing dispute about the extent and relevance of sovereignty      233
4.2The meaning of sovereignty      240
4.3The rise and fall of the legal approach: the temptation of analysis, domestic jurisdiction and the dilemma of interpretation      246
4.4The rise and fall of the pure fact approach: Lotus principle      255
4.5Constructivism: recourse to equity      258
4.6Example: statehood and recognition      272
4.7Example: territorial disputes      282
4.8Conclusion on sovereignty      300
5Sources      303
5.1Sources theory      307
5.1.1Consent v. justice      309
5.1.2Tacit consent: a reconciliation?      325
5.2Treaty interpretation      333
5.3Unilateral declarations      345
5.4Acquiescence and estoppel      355
5.5The structure of sources doctrine: examples      364
5.5.1Example 1: the Status of South West Africa opinion      365
5.5.2Example 2: the Reservations opinion      368
5.5.3Example 3: the Admission opinion      371
5.5.4Example 4: the Arbitral Award Case      379
5.5.5Example 5: the Temple Case      382
5.6Conclusion on sources      385
6Custom      388
6.1Custom as general law: two perspectives      389
6.2The identity of custom: the ascending and descending approaches      397
6.3Conventional theory: the psychological and the material element and the circularity of the argument about custom      410
6.3.1The rejection of pure materialism      411
6.3.2The rejection of pure psychologism      414
6.3.2.1The psychological element as the material one: collective unconscious      415
6.3.2.2Tacit agreement      416
6.3.2.3The psychological element as will and belief      417
6.3.2.4The phenomenological claim and the consequences of psychologism      424
6.3.3The re-emergence of materialism      427
6.3.4The re-emergence of psychologism: the circle closes      431
6.4Resulting dilemmas: general/particular, stability/change      438
6.4.1General v. particular      438
6.4.2Time and customary law: the antinomy of stability and change      450

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