In this original and controversial book Professor Rawls argues that Durkheim’s The Elementary Forms of Religious Life is the crowning achievement of his sociological endeavour and that since its publication in English in 1915 it has been consistently misunderstood. Rather than a work on primitive religion or the sociology of knowledge, Rawls asserts that it is an attempt by Durkheim to establish a unique epistemological basis for the study of sociology and moral relations. By privileging social practice over beliefs and ideas, it avoids the dilemmas inherent in philosophical approaches to knowledge and morality that are based on individualism and the tendency to treat concepts as the limit of knowledge, both tendancies that dominate western thought. Based on detailed textual analysis of the primary text, this book will be an important and original contribution to contemporary debates on social theory and philosophy.
Anne Warfield Rawls is Associate Professor of Sociology at Bentley College, Waltham, Massachusetts. She has a background in both sociology and philosophy and has published extensively on social theory and social justice.
Anne Warfield Rawls
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© Anne Warfield Rawls 2004
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First published 2004
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Typeface Plantin 10/12 pt. System LATEX 2e [TB]
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library
Library of Congress Cataloguing in Publication Data
Rawls, Anne Warfield, 1950–
Epistemology and practice: Durkheim’s The elementary forms of religious life / Anne Warfield Rawls.
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 0 521 65145 X
1. Durkheim, Emile, 1858–1917. Formes âlâmentaires de la vie religieuse. 2. Religion. 3. Totemism. I. Title.
GN470.D83.O69 2004
306.6 – dc22 2004045120
ISBN 0 521 65145 X hardback
For Ty and Martin
| Acknowledgements | page ix | ||
| Introduction | 1 | ||
| Durkheim’s Epistemology: the Neglected Argument | 7 | ||
| Epistemological Crisis | 8 | ||
| Religion and Reason | 11 | ||
| Perception versus Emotion | 15 | ||
| Mis-Communication Between Disciplines | 17 | ||
| Order of Argument | 22 | ||
| 1 | Durkheim’s Outline of the Argument in the Introductory Chapter | 28 | |
| Section i: Consideration of Religion | 33 | ||
| Section ii: The Introduction of Epistemology | 46 | ||
| Concluding Paragraphs | 68 | ||
| 2 | Durkheim’s Dualism: an Anti-Kantian Anti-Rationalist Position | 72 | |
| Durkheim’s First Distinction: “Double Man” | 78 | ||
| Second Distinction: “Two Layers of Knowledge” | 90 | ||
| The Social as Sacred versus the Individual as Profane | 100 | ||
| Sociology of Knowledge: Idealism versus Concrete Practices | 101 | ||
| Conclusion | 105 | ||
| 3 | Sacred and Profane: the First Classification | 108 | |
| Durkheim’s Conception of Religion | 112 | ||
| Animism versus Naturism | 124 | ||
| Totemism | 135 | ||
| Conclusion | 137 | ||
| 4 | Totemism and the Problem of Individualism | 139 | |
| The Totem as the Origin of the Sacred | 141 | ||
| Totemic Classification as a Logical System | 149 | ||
| The Status of Individual and Sexual Totemism | 152 | ||
| Conclusion | 161 | ||
| 5 | The Origin of Moral Force | 162 | |
| Mana as the Origin of the Idea of Moral Force | 164 | ||
| Logic and Collective Representations | 177 | ||
| Personhood and Myths versus Rites | 188 | ||
| Conclusion | 192 | ||
| 6 | The Primacy of Rites in the Origin of Causality | 194 | |
| Book Ⅲ, Chapter One: The Negative Cult | 196 | ||
| Book III, Chapter Two: The Positive Cult | 202 | ||
| 7 | Imitative Rites and the Category of Causality | 212 | |
| Book Ⅲ, Chapter Three, Section i: Description of Imitative Rites | 212 | ||
| Book Ⅲ, Chapter Three, Section ii: The Principle Behind Imitative Ritual | 213 | ||
| 8 | The Category of Causality | 230 | |
| Book Ⅲ, Chapter Three, Section iii | 234 | ||
| Durkheim’s Socio-Empirical Argument for Causality | 258 | ||
| 9 | Logic, Language and Science | 262 | |
| Section i: Practice/Real versus Belief/Ideal | 266 | ||
| Section ii: Religion and Science | 283 | ||
| Section iii: The Social Origins of Logic and Language | 288 | ||
| 10 | Durkheim’s Conclusion Section iv: Logical Argument for the Categories | 301 | |
| The Six Categories of the Understanding | 301 | ||
| Conclusion | 316 | ||
| The Development of Two Conflicting Durkheims | 321 | ||
| The Fallacy of Misplaced Abstraction | 324 | ||
| The Sociological Dilemma | 326 | ||
| Scientific Things versus Social Things | 328 | ||
| Recognizable by Design | 330 | ||
| Intelligibility as a Constraint on Practice | 334 | ||
| Bibliography | 339 | ||
| Index | 345 |
The research comprising this book has been in the works for almost fifteen years and during that time has benefited from a great deal of support, advice and encouragement. The debt I owe is large and the number of people who were generous enough to lend their valuable time to the support of this project humbling.
That Durkheim was making an argument for an epistemology in the classical sense, and that he intended this argument to ground his entire sociology, first came to me as I was teaching a graduate seminar at Wayne State University in the early 1990s. Good ideas have often come to me in this way during public close readings of texts, and I think of the phenomenon as a dialogue in the best Socratic sense. To the students in that and subsequent seminars, in particular Gary David, Lynetta Mosby, Bonnie Wright, Derek Coates and Jennifer Dierickx, I owe a great deal.
Through this dialogue I was able to hear myself think in ways that are impossible for an individual alone. I hope those students understand the contribution they made to my thinking. I also hope that they learned from the exercise that the study of any single great text is at the same time a study of almost everything. The idea that one must sample a large number of great texts to get a broader view I think is wrong. Mastery is essential – but sampling tends toward superficiality. Great texts like true lovers do not reveal themselves easily. They require a deep commitment of time, openness, energy and even kindness. The prevalence of the tendency to skim, sample, classify and judge has had unfortunate consequences for the teaching of sociological theory. Any author of major significance holds that status precisely because they struggled with the most important dilemmas of their time. Classical texts don’t reflect “dead men’s ideas,” as it has become popular to say, rather they reflect the birth pains and continuing trauma of the world we live in.
Many colleagues supported my efforts. In the early stages of writing I sent the first draft of a manuscript to Randy Collins and Norbert Wiley, both of whom took the time to make very extensive and helpful comments. They were particularly helpful in orienting me toward aspects of Durkheim scholarship with which I had been unfamiliar. With their advice and encouragement I was able to write the article that was published in the American Journal of Sociology in 1996 as “Durkheim’s Epistemology: The Neglected Argument.” Others who were helpful at this point were Donald Levine, Charles Lemert and Harold Garfinkel. David Britt and Albert Meehan also read and commented on early versions. Garfinkel and Lemert in particular offered essential support over the course of the project.
During one of our phone conversations I confided to Harold that I was writing about the epistemological argument in Durkheim’s Elementary Forms. Expressing great skepticism, as one would expect, he asked to see a copy of the manuscript. Much to my delight he considered what I had written to be in essential respects more empirical than theoretical, and proceeded to encourage me in various ways. Over the next few years Harold incorporated his own thinking on Durkheim into manuscripts that he was then working on, eventually deciding to subtitle the book which I edited with him “Working Out Durkheim’s Aphorism.”
Harold also sent a draft of the article to various people, a number of whom replied directly to me. I thank all of them and in particular Pierre Bourdieu, for their comments and their time. They must have wondered at Garfinkel’s interest in the manuscript and I hope that in the writing of this book I have in some small measure answered their questions.
I was also the beneficiary of discussions with several students of Parsons, including Garfinkel and Joe Feagin, of their recollections of having studied The Elementary Forms and other works by Durkheim, with Parsons. Joe took the time to talk with me at a point when he was particularly busy. Their recollections of Parsons’ reading of Durkheim, experienced first hand as graduate students in Parsons’ theory courses, and discussions of the difference between that reading and my own – in particular with regard to Durkheim’s treatment of practice – were particularly valuable. I was struck by the experience reported of reading the book again and finding the actual text somehow transformed by my own reading.
There is no way really to properly thank Charles Lemert for his support of my work. His involvement with this manuscript has been a major factor in its publication. His comments on the manuscript were extensive and helpful and his encouragement profoundly heartening.
To Roberto Serrai I owe the loan of his apartment in Florence (Firenze) in the fall of 1998 in which to complete the first full draft of the book. The inspiration of an eighth floor balcony overlooking the birthplace of modern humanism cannot be overestimated. I need also thank Roberto for his fine translation of my work on Durkheim into Italian. While in Firenze Alessandro Pizzorno and Gianfranco Poggi, both at the International Institute in Fiesoli at the time, were gracious with their time and advice, inviting me out for wonderful dinners and lunches to discuss Durkheim’s texts.
Wes Sharrock and several of his graduate students made themselves available for discussions of Durkheim, Garfinkel and practice over beer in a Manchester pub in the summer of 2001. These discussions inspired revisions to both my introduction to Ethnomethodology’s Program: Working Out Durkheim’s Aphorism and to this book.
I am indebted to the editors and translators of the Mauss review, Alain Caille and Stephane Dufoix in particular, for translations of my work on Durkheim in the review and for their efforts as organizers of the GEODE conference on globalization and social theory in the summer of 2003 bringing together a diverse spectrum of social theorists in Paris. Their efforts with regard to the subsequent translation and publication of papers presented at that conference are much appreciated. I owe a special thanks to Lorenza Mondada for accompanying me on that occasion.
Thanks are owed also to Michel de Fornel, editor of Enquete, and the various commentators on my article for that journal (to appear in the spring of 2005). I thank Albert Ogien also for our discussions of my work in Paris in the summer of 2003.
My thanks to Sandro Segre of the University of Genoa, Gino Muzzetto and his colleagues at the University of Pisa, Carmen Leccardi and Nino Salamone, of the University of Milan-Bicocca, and members of the Italian Sociological Association, who invited me to present a series of lectures and to speak at a conference on ethnomethodology and phenomenology at the University of Genoa in January 2004. They were gracious hosts and offered an invaluable opportunity to present and discuss the developing connection between Durkheim, Garfinkel, practice and globalization in my work. I found many Italian colleagues with similar interests and greatly enjoyed long hours of discussion and debate with interested and committed scholars over fabulous food. Thank you.
I have also to thank members of the Charles Institute in Prague for their invitation to speak at a Thursday seminar in January 2004. A special thanks to Zdenek Konopasek for forging a unique line of inquiry in Prague – which he has done in the face of the growing popularity of statistical sociology there – and for his intelligence and fortitude in doing so. The insights from our talks helped cement several issues in place.
To Svetlana Bankovskaya and her students and colleagues (particularly Victor and Dimitri who were sometimes my able escorts) in Moscow who invited me to lecture on both Durkheim and Garfinkel at The Higher School of Economics in May 2004 as I was putting the finishing touches on this manuscript. I also very much enjoyed my talks with Andrei Korbut (of Minsk University) who is collaborating with Svetlana on a translation of Garfinkel’s work into Russian. The discussion of translation issues with regard to texts has been very instructive in deeply theoretical ways and am greatly indebted to both Svetlana and Andrei for the opportunity. The hospitality of my hosts in Moscow was exceptional and the food and conversation everything one could hope for. The vibrant social dynamic unfolding there at such speed echoes Durkheim’s concern with the increasing importance of practice in modern society and provided much food for both thought and conversation, particularly with regard to the problem of marginalization, the focus of Svetlana’s research.
This book was preceded by the publication of several articles and I must thank the editorial staff at the AJS and also John O’Neal, Craig Calhoun and Norman Denzin for their guidance and support in seeing these articles through the publication process in journals they edited. I must thank also David Fassenfest who was instrumental in helping to publish my recent work on Durkheim’s Division of Labor in Society.
Several colleagues have stood by me from the start, and been generous in support of my career even though they may not always have understood the way in which it was unfolding. I thank especially Doug Maynard, Peter Manning and Harold Garfinkel in this regard. Doug was instrumental in bringing me to the University of Wisconsin as a postdoctoral fellow in the 1980s and has worked with me on the institutional development of ethnomethodology for many years. I place a high value on his friendship.
To Harold I owe a debt I am only just beginning to realize the enormity of and will never be able to repay. To have had the opportunity of discussing ideas with him over two decades is an immeasurable gift.
Peter Manning is one of a very few people with a mastery of a broad literature on social theory and philosophy who also sustain a deep and abiding commitment to interaction as a locus for the doing of both good work and good theory. Conversations with him over many years, beginning in 1987 when he asked me to replace him at the University of Michigan during a sabbatical year, have been a constant source of both inspiration and good sense. Most importantly, Peter has always been a touchstone against which I could test my ideas.
I also owe a debt of gratitude to various persons who have disagreed with me over the years. They have often pushed me to clarify my ideas in useful ways. I would like particularly to thank Jeffrey Alexander and Warren Schmaus in this regard. Warren provided an opportunity to sharpen my discussion of epistemology in my response to his reply in AJS. Jeff has for many years been generous in spite of disagreements between us and magnanimous in the face of my continued criticism.
To those who tried to teach me philosophy and social theory, Tom McCarthy, Alisdaire MacIntyre, Bernard Elevitch, Erasim Kohak, Kurt Wolff, Harold Garfinkel, John Findley, Gila Hayim, Ephriam Isaac, Jeff Coulter, George Psathas, Francis Waksler and James Schmidt, I thank you. Jeff Coulter and George Psathas in particular helped to focus a rebellious mind. To Francis Waksler I owe an additional debt for awakening my interest in social theory and introducing me to both ethnomethodology and phenomenology. A special thanks to Burten Dreben who read over my AJS paper and my reply to Schmaus and made helpful comments and suggestions.
Bentley College has provided an invaluable haven at a critical point in my career and the friendship and support of my colleagues, in particular Tim Anderson and Gary David have quite literally kept me going through difficult times. Tim in particular has encouraged my work from the first and it is a great pleasure to be answerable to him now.
My sons Martin and Ty have shown more appreciation and understanding of my preoccupations with thought over the years than I could ever have asked for.
Finally, I thank my father for instilling in me a deep respect for classic texts and the belief that clarifying matters of reason and justice can make a real difference.