Introduction

> Schellenberg's name was known to have received a certain prominence in the World Press, not only because of the important position in the G.I.S. [German Intelligence Service], that he held during the greater part of the war, but also on account of the leading part he had played in certain peace negotiations.
>
> Final Report on the Case of Walter Schellenberg[1]

Intelligence combines information and understanding. In spring 1952, an unexpected piece of information rippled through the international postwar intelligence community: Walter Schellenberg, the head of Nazi Germany's political foreign intelligence service, *Amt* VI of Heinrich Himmler's *Reichssicherheitshauptamt* (RSHA) – Office VI of the Reich Security Main Office – and advisor to and confidant of Himmler had died in Italy. A flurry of intelligence activity took place, meant to confirm a death that despite the man's longstanding ailments came as a surprise. An understanding and appreciation of the facts settled in soon. There would be no further need by the various intelligence services to concern themselves with the former spymaster.[2]

Walter Schellenberg's career had been illustrious. Born in 1910, he was fresh out of law school when Adolf Hitler was appointed chancellor on January 30, 1933. Quickly aligning himself with the new government, Schellenberg joined the NSDAP and SS, *Schutzstaffel* – Protective Squads – and was shortly thereafter recruited into the SD,

[1] Final Report on the Case of Walter Schellenberg, NA, RG 319, IRR, XE 001725, Walter Schellenberg, Folders 7 and 8. Until recently, this report was among the lesser-known documents about Walter Schellenberg and could only be found in RG 319. The declassification effort at the National Archives in Washington, DC, has uncovered the same document in both the CIA and FBI files. Reinhard Doerries has published the report, including its twenty-three appendices, introduced by a biographical sketch, as *Hitler's Last Chief of Foreign Intelligence: Allied Interrogations of Walter Schellenberg* (London: Frank Cass, 2003).

[2] Chief of Station, Frankfurt to Chief WE, Specific—Dr. Walter Schellenberg, May 6, 1952, NA, RG 263, Entry ZZ-18, Box 112, File: Schellenberg, Walter, vol. 2, 2 of 2.

Sicherheitsdienst – Security and Intelligence Service – of the SS. Over the course of the next decade, Schellenberg, taking all opportunities given to him and creating additional ones along the way, made a stellar career that brought him close to the head of the SD, Reinhard Heydrich and Himmler. In the summer of 1941, Walter Schellenberg was appointed to lead Office VI, the political foreign intelligence service, of Heinrich Himmler's main instrument of power and terror, the RSHA. Having headed the Gestapo's counterintelligence department in the two years prior to this, Schellenberg was no stranger to intelligence matters. He had written on it, tried to define it in its new, Nazified context, and played a prominent role in broadly defined counterespionage matters, notably in the abduction of two British intelligence officers across the Dutch border in November 1939. Until the end of the war, Schellenberg strove to create in Office VI what he deemed a unified, objective, and infallible foreign intelligence service for all of Germany. Along the way, Schellenberg's upstart agency swallowed Germany's seemingly well-entrenched military intelligence service, the *Abwehr* – literally: the Defense – in February 1944 and battled the *Auswärtige Amt* – Foreign Office – under Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop. Prominently involved in Himmler's last-ditch efforts to negotiate ith the Western Allies in the spring of 1945, Schellenberg managed to extract himself from the fate that befell many of his SS and SD peers. The end of the war found him in Sweden and he subsequently managed to parlay his short-term stint as Himmler's peace emissary, his perception of himself as a reasonable politician, and his knowledge about the inner workings of Nazi Germany into the role of a friendly witness for the Western Allies. Put on trial during the so-called subsequent Nuremberg proceedings, Schellenberg found himself on the docket with members of the Foreign Office. The erstwhile spymaster had morphed into a diplomat. At Nuremberg, he received a lenient sentence of six years but was released on a medical pardon in 1950. Schellenberg spent the last months of his life near Lake Como in Italy, furtively writing and editing his memoirs, which were published after his death, and regaling visitors with his wartime exploits. A myth of Schellenberg's making gained currency.

Walter Schellenberg has remained an enigma and so has the organization he headed. Who was this man? What did he and his organization stand for? What did Office VI do? How did Office VI collect intelligence and how did it use it? How Nazified, how ideological was Office VI? Where was Office VI's locus in Nazi Germany's intelligence universe? Should Office VI be considered an intelligence service in the first place? Schellenberg's own answers to these broad questions – given in interrogations and in his memoir – are as straightforward as they are predictable:

he was not a Nazi but a German patriot doing his selfless best in trying times; Office VI was an ordinary intelligence service intent on collecting up-to-date and relevant information needed for Germany's leadership to make informed decisions; and Nazi ideology and its adherents played a perfunctory and marginal role in the intelligence service, unless Hitler, Himmler, or Heydrich ordered the opposite.

This book is the first analytical study of Nazi Germany's political foreign intelligence service and the man who led it. It addresses two broad historiographical needs at once. As a biographical treatment – not a full biography – it follows Schellenberg's career, paying due attention to his many activities, largely at Heydrich's behest, as an administrator of the *Sicherheitsdienst*, who tried to define policing and intelligence in the context of the National Socialist state, and as the head of the Gestapo's counterintelligence department before his 1941. It then discusses Schellenberg's role and activities at the helm of Office VI. It is also an institutional history of Office VI and its forerunner, the *SD-Ausland* – literally: SD-Abroad – even though it does not account for all its activities. Taking this institutional-biographical approach, the book tells the story of Schellenberg and the service he eventually headed. It locates the service in its proper pedigree of the SS; investigates the office's activities; discusses Office VI and its activities in relation to its two main rivals – the Abwehr and the Auswärtige Amt; considers the role Nazi ideology played in the activities of the office's leading personnel and in their conceptualization and execution of foreign intelligence; and shows that Schellenberg attempted to make Office VI into an Alternative Foreign Office, based solidly in Himmler's universe.

In the early 1930s, when Heinrich Himmler's recently founded SD was consolidating, "foreign intelligence" was already a crowded field in Germany. Civilian and military entities collected foreign intelligence, focusing on information at the core of their respective mandates. The most important civilian, ministerial organization collecting information was the diplomatic service.[3] It was – and is – at the core of a diplomat's brief to gather political intelligence but diplomats' positions and roles are clearly circumscribed: per longstanding international customs, they are not to engage in espionage or run agents. Rather, they collect political information from open sources such as the media or by using general

[3] Other ministries kept information-gathering entities as well, see: Michael Geyer, "National Socialist Germany: The Politics of Information," in Ernest R. May, ed., *Knowing One's Enemy: Intelligence Assessment Before the Two World Wars* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 322–325; David Kahn, *Hitler's Spies: German Military Intelligence in World War II* (New York: Macmillan, 1978; reprint, Cambridge, MA: DaCapo Press, 2000), 55.

contacts established in their host countries.[4] Their primary customer is their minister and other foreign policy decision makers in their home countries. International diplomatic customs also provide an above-board venue for the collection of military information: the military attaché. His job is to keep tabs on the military developments in the host country and to liaise with its military personnel. He is a snoop rather than a spy and in a perfect, theoretical world the exchange of military attachés should safeguard countries from surprises. A military attaché's customers are the foreign minister and decision makers in the military. The Auswärtige Amt of the early 1930s adhered to established international norms; it was, argues Michael Geyer, "static" and had largely withdrawn "from military matters."[5]

Straight military intelligence – for operational and tactical purposes – was collected and evaluated by the services' separate intelligence entities.[6] In this context, the army's intelligence service is the most relevant one. Its evaluation section, the *Nachrichtenabteilung*, Intelligence Branch, originated with the Prussian Great General Staff during the wars of 1866 and 1870/71 but was always drawn down at the end of the military campaigns. Intelligence held a low priority in the Prussian – and later the German – military and was also not considered a place in which ambitious military men could make great careers. Indeed, for the longest time intelligence gathering was not regarded as a separate activity and designated intelligence officers did not exist at the lower levels. This changed during the Great War and in June 1917, the evaluation section, the Intelligence Branch of the General Staff was renamed *Abteilung Fremde Heere*, Foreign Armies Branch. After the war and in violation of the Versailles Treaty, the General Staff remained in a disguised existence as the *Truppenamt*, Troops Department, and so did Foreign Armies, reemerging in the open with the remilitarization of Germany in 1935. Foreign Armies focused on operational and tactical matters – this is what interested its leadership most – but was not averse to bringing into its analyses nonmilitary issues and thus an "aura of completeness." Part of the *Oberkommando des Heeres*, High Command of the Army, Foreign Armies was divided into *Fremde Heere West*, Foreign Armies West, and *Fremde Heere Ost*, Foreign Armies East, in 1939. With this, the former "nerve center of the army's foreign intelligence mutated into a system of theater-intelligence forces,"

[4] "Political Intelligence," in Bruce W. Watson, Susan M. Watson, and Gerald W. Hopple, eds., *United States Intelligence: An Encyclopedia* (New York: Garland Publishing, 1990), 447–449.
[5] Geyer, "Politics of Information," 312; Kahn, *Spies*, 55.
[6] "Military Intelligence," in *United States Intelligence: An Encyclopedia*, 353–354.

yet it is worth keeping in mind that the so-called nerve center largely restricted itself to operational military foreign intelligence.[7]

What came to be known in the 1920s as the Abwehr also originated with the General Staff of the Prussian Army during the German War of 1866 when General Helmuth von Moltke created the *Nachrichtenbüro*, the Intelligence Bureau, to gather covertly foreign intelligence with a focus on, but not restricted to, military matters and strategic military intelligence. It took some time before this entity found a permanent institutional locus in the General Staff but it was eventually designated O.Q. III b, Oberquartiermeister III B and by the turn of the century, its funds and staffing levels were rising. By 1901, III b employed some 120 officers, running agents from War Intelligence Posts abroad. Yet there existed a great schism between the acquisition of foreign intelligence and espionage, handled by III b, and its evaluation, which took place in the Intelligence Branch of the General Staff.[8] Before the Great War, then, the acquisition of foreign intelligence had become largely the military's responsibility; foreign intelligence was understood primarily as intelligence related to military matters; there was no centralized evaluation of all intelligence; there was little communication between military and civilian entities; and the military as a whole continued to underappreciate intelligence as a field. And there was little interest or patience for "politics, psychology, economics, social problems, and other intangibles," as these were unlikely to influence the military's immediate – tactical – decision-making process.[9] If anyone dealt with these intangibles, it was the Auswärtige Amt. Certainly not the best set-up, it was workable still and in a society as dominated by the military as Wilhelmine Germany, it is not surprising that the military – and not civilian entities – dominated the collection and evaluation of foreign intelligence or that foreign intelligence was conceived as military intelligence.

After the Great War, during which III b, then headed by Walther Nicolai, saw both success and lackluster performances, the entity came to the Troops Department as well.[10] Renamed *Abwehr Gruppe*, Abwehr

[7] Kahn, *Spies*, 30–31, 35, 50; Geyer, "Politics of Information," 319, 330–335.
[8] Kahn, *Spies*, 32. Different in Gert Buchheit, *Der Deutsche Geheimdienst: Die Geschichte der militärischen Abwehr* (München: List Verlag, 1966), 19–20. See also Tom Polgar, "The Intelligence Services of West Germany," *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence*, 1, no. 4 (1986), 82–83.
[9] Heinz Höhne, *Der Krieg im Dunkeln: Macht und Einfluß der deutschen und russischen Geheimdienste* (Gütersloh: Bertelsmann, 1985; reprint Berlin: Ullstein, 1988), 48.
[10] On the Great War, see: Kahn, *Spies*, 34–41; Polgar, "The Intelligence Services," 83–84; Buchheit, *Geheimdienst*, 20–31; also Walter Nicolai, *Geheime Mächte: Internationale Spionage und ihre Bekämpfung im Weltkrieg und Heute* (Leipzig: K.F. Köhler, 1923).

Group – to put adequate emphasis on its supposedly defensive nature, and as Kahn stresses to "camouflage [its] espionage functions" – it was a small entity with big tasks: the collection of intelligence, espionage, and counterintelligence and counterespionage. The late 1920s saw an attempt to centralize foreign intelligence. In 1928, defense minister Wilhelm Groener pulled the Abwehr out of the Troops Department and the naval intelligence out of the Naval Command. Combining it with the Cipher Service, it became the *Abwehr-Abteilung*, the Abwehr Branch. It was eventually integrated into the *Ministeramt*, Ministry Office and declared its sole intelligence-gathering unit. The Abwehr was to focus on strategic and military-political information for the minister, its main customer, and his office "as the military-political nerve center of the state." The plan did not work out, as there was a lack of cooperation and no consensus on national strategies, the precondition, as Geyer emphasizes, for any centralization of German intelligence efforts to work out.[11] In 1932, the Abwehr was placed under naval Captain Konrad Patzig and another navy man, Wilhelm Canaris, replaced Patzig in January 1935. Patzig's appointment can be read as indicative of the Abwehr's limited relevance in the eyes of career army personnel, yet naval officers had a leg-up on their army colleagues: they tended to have more foreign experience. This was certainly true in the case of Wilhelm Canaris.[12] Put differently, directing the Abwehr was not the most coveted assignment but there was also the growing realization that some foreign experience was a useful precondition for it. Geyer argues that at the time of Canaris' appointment in 1935, the Abwehr was on a downward slope. Some of the changes of the late 1920s had been undone: communication intelligence had been returned to the respective services and some of the more ambitious cipher personnel had joined Hermann Göring's *Forschungsamt*, Research Office. Canaris then focused his office's work on something in which nobody else wanted to engage: espionage, counterespionage, and sabotage.[13] And he did well. In 1938, after the dismissal of the War Minister Werner von Blomberg

[11] Kahn, *Spies*, 224; Geyer, "Politics of Information," 316–317; Thomas Menzel, "Organisationsgeschichte des Amtes Ausland/Abwehr im Spiegel der Aktenüberlieferung im Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv Freiburg i. Br.," *Militärgeschichtliche Zeitschrift* 67/1 (2008), 105–115.

[12] Normal Polmar and Thomas B. Allen, *Spy Book: The Encyclopedia of Espionage* (New York, NY: Random House, 1997), 4. On Canaris, see: André Brissaud, *Canaris: The Biography of Admiral Canaris, Chief of German Military Intelligence in the Second World War*, trans. Ian Colvin (New York, NY: Grosset & Dunlap, 1974); Ian Goodhope Colvin, *Master Spy: The Incredible Story of Admiral Wilhelm Canaris, Who, While Hitler's Chief of Intelligence, Was a Secret Ally of the British* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1951); Heinz Höhne, *Canaris*, trans. by J. Maxwell Brownjohn (New York, NY: Doubleday, 1979), and Kahn, *Spies*, 226–230.

[13] Geyer, "Politics of Information," 317–318.

and the abolishment of the ministry, the *Oberkommando der Wehrmacht* (OKW), High Command of the Armed Forces, was created; it inherited the Abwehr from the ministry and created, in essence, a new entity, as of October 1939 called *Amt Auslandsnachrichten und Abwehr*, Office for Foreign Information and Counterintelligence. Its Foreign Information section collected and disseminated foreign political material, sometimes likened to "news update[s] in a good newspaper," but its key activities happened in the three branches of the Abwehr. Abwehr I focused on military espionage; Abwehr II on sabotage and covert operations; and Abwehr III on counterespionage. The Office provided both the OKW and OKH – and anyone else who showed interest – with situation reports that also included some rudimentary evaluation.[14] The dislocations of the early 1930s notwithstanding, domestically and abroad the Abwehr was understood as Germany's foreign intelligence service and it was considered successful.

The German case was unusual, then, in that the entity that had the greatest potential and the strongest claim to become a centralized organization for the collection and evaluation of military and political foreign intelligence, the Abwehr, was part of the military. Yet the military held intelligence in low estimation and was primarily interested in operational and tactical and not in strategic intelligence, which went beyond its immediate interests. In Great Britain, in contrast, the services' intelligence units addressed the respective intelligence needs of the services while MI 6, a centralized, clandestine collection agency, answered primarily to the Foreign Office, where most evaluation took place. MI 6 also enjoyed reasonable relations to MI 5, which dealt with counterintelligence in Britain and the colonies, except India, where counterintelligence fell under the responsibility of the Government of India. No integrated service existed, on the other hand, in the United States in the 1930s. Indeed, there – as well as in France – the division between military and political information was more clearly defined and seemingly more workable.[15] Put differently,

[14] Kahn, *Spies*, 47; Geyer, "Politics of Information," 336–337. Menzel, "Organisationsgeschichte," 118–121.

[15] Philip H.J. Davies, *Intelligence and Government in Britain and the United States: A Comparative Perspective. Vol I: Evolution of the US Intelligence Community* (St. Barbara: Praeger, 2012), 167–172; Keith Jeffery, *MI 6: The History of Secret Intelligence Service, 1909–1949* (London: Bloomsbury, 2010), IX–XII; 725–747; Robert J. Young, "French Military Intelligence and Nazi Germany, 1938–1939," in Ernest R. May, ed., *Knowing One's Enemy: Intelligence Assessment Before the Two World Wars* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 272–279; Cameron Watt, "British Intelligence and the Coming of the Second World War in Europe," in Ernest R. May, ed., *Knowing One's Enemy: Intelligence Assessment Before the Two World Wars* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 242–244; Wesley Wark, *The Ultimate Enemy: British Intelligence and Nazi Germany, 1933–1939* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1985), 20–22.

while not free of conflict, Western intelligence universes, notably the admired British one, had developed reasonable and workable structures. The German intelligence universe, on the other hand, remained in flux, especially after 1933 and its soft spots – fragmentation, decentralization, lack of evaluation, and the unresolved tension between military and political information, tactical and strategic intelligence, domestic and foreign issues – obvious. It was a potential opening for ambitious men and organizations that believed themselves to be the state's elite and to have – qua ideology – the correct answers to questions and problems that had vexed many before them.

There is no shortage of publications about Nazi foreign intelligence efforts, ranging from the sensational to the scholarly with the former outnumbering the latter. Most studies focus on the military intelligence service, the Abwehr.[16] All of them, although for different reasons, declare German foreign intelligence efforts a failure. David Kahn's seminal study *Hitler's Spies*, which focuses on the Abwehr but mentions Office VI, proposes convincing and nuanced explanations for this failure. Unjustifiably arrogant, Germany lost touch with reality; waging an aggressive war, Germany ignored the need for good intelligence until the tide of the war turned against it; many high ranking officers were hostile to the very concept of foreign intelligence; the authority structure of Nazi Germany and the inefficiency of the party state led by a charismatic *Führer* impaired the collection of foreign intelligence; and anti-Semitism deprived the German intelligence community of many scholars who could have benefitted it. Most importantly, Hitler's and Himmler's ideological irrationalism impeded foreign intelligence, "Hitler's charisma devastated German intelligence."[17] In short: already in dire straits due to German hubris, arrogance, and hostility toward the concept of foreign intelligence, Nazi Germany's ideology, structure, and Hitler's personality administered the death blow to German foreign intelligence efforts. Rebecca Ratcliff, on the other hand, focuses more on German traditions than on Nazism. She argues that the German failure to realize that Enigma, the German code-system, had been broken is to be found in German military, intelligence, and cultural traditions. Ratcliff highlights the German penchant for decentralization and specialization; the lack of cooperation; the permanent rivalries for funds and personnel;

[16] Kahn, *Spies*; Lauran Paine, *The Abwehr: German Military Intelligence in World War II* (London: Robert Hale, 1984); Richard Breitman et al., eds., *U.S. Intelligence and the Nazis* (Washington, DC: National Archives Trust Fund for the Nazi War Crimes and Imperial Japanese Records Interagency Working Group, 2004).

[17] Kahn, *Spies*, 524–536.

the wish to hire the "right people," as defined by race, class, and military loyalty; and the low priority of intelligence work in the thinking of the military leadership with its concomitant focus on the instant gratification of tactical intelligence. The latter was of particular importance for the practitioners of intelligence; not considered real military men, their need for tangible, quick successes was tantamount – as was their desire to give their work a particular intellectual sheen. Ratcliff posits that many of these traits suited Hitler and the Nazi leadership but came courtesy of German traditions. Nazi rule exacerbated the existing systemic and cultural issues – and associated blind spots – of the German military.[18] How did these issues play out in Office VI, a foreign intelligence outfit that originated with the SS, Nazi Germany's ideological elite? The answer – oftentimes a resounding "it depends" – adds additional nuance to the question and talks broadly to matters of foreign intelligence in the German context.

Most serious studies of German intelligence efforts are written outside of Germany. In the same way that intelligence held low priority among military planners, the study of intelligence has held low priority among historians in Germany – a situation that is slowly changing. There is scant information on intelligence in the official, multivolume, (West-) German study of World War II, *Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg*.[19] And the few German-language books on German intelligence efforts are dated and were frequently penned by authors who had been involved in the activities they describe.[20] While both the Abwehr as well as army intelligence efforts find mention in any number of studies on World War II, broad scholarly studies on foreign intelligence efforts, thematic or synthetic, as they are common in the United States or Great Britain, do not exist in the German case.[21] As a consequence, it is, for example, surprisingly difficult to piece together something as basic as the structure and institutional affiliations of the component parts of Germany's

[18] Rebecca A. Ratcliff, *Delusions of Intelligence: Enigma, Ultra, and the End of Secure Ciphers* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006).
[19] Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsinstitut, ed., *Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg*.
[20] For example: Buchheit, *Geheimdienst*.
[21] For example: Davies, *Vol. I: Evolution of the US Intelligence Community*; Philip H.J. Davies, *Intelligence and the Government in Britain and the United States. Vol. II: Evolution of the UK Intelligence Community* (Santa Barbara: Praeger, 2012); Barry M. Katz, *Foreign Intelligence Research and Analysis in the Office of Strategic Service 1942–1945* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989); Jeffery, *MI 6: The History of Secret Intelligence Service, 1909–1949*; Wark, *The Ultimate Enemy*. For a recent organizational history of German intelligence: Menzel, "Organisationsgeschichte," 105–136.

intelligence universe – military and civilian – before and after 1933, their relationships with each other, and their respective customers.[22] Much work still needs to be done.

These general problems come into even starker relief in the few works on Office VI and its forerunner, the SD-Ausland. Memoirs and thinly disguised memoirs, problematic primary sources at best but rarely treated as such, make up much of the field.[23] Sensationalist journalistic accounts, relying heavily on the aforementioned memoirs and other problematic accounts, round out these offerings.[24] These works hold that Hitler, Himmler, and Heydrich thwarted good intelligence work for ideological reasons. Different from what Kahn argues when it comes to Hitler's role, here these statements are meant to exculpate. That said, like many other politicians, Hitler, Himmler, and Heydrich were, indeed, allergic to intelligence they did not like and which did not conform to perceptions; an extensive literature on the role of perceptions among intelligence customers and its contribution to intelligence failures speaks to this.[25] Yet the leadership's dislike of some of Office VI's findings does not make it good intelligence. However, the focus on the leadership's distaste for certain information, carefully selected parts of Kahn's book, and exculpatory explanations peddled by former Office VI men came to define the understanding of Office VI. Differentiations between the Abwehr, the military foreign intelligence service, and Office VI, the political foreign intelligence service, disappeared or conclusions initially germane – if not necessarily accurate – to studies of the Abwehr were furthermore transferred to Office VI. In addition, scholars and journalists alike did not seem to know what to make of Office VI and its head Schellenberg. There is a palpable uneasiness with an entity that does not conform to what one

[22] Still most useful but focusing on 1933 to 1941: Geyer, "Politics of Information," 310–346.

[23] Walter Schellenberg, *The Labyrinth: Memoirs of Walter Schellenberg, Hitler's Chief of Counterintelligence*, intr. Allan Bullock, trans. Louis Hagen (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1956; reprint, Cambridge, MA: Da Capo Press, 2000); Wilhelm Höttl, *Die Geheime Front: Organisation, Personen und Aktionen des deutschen Geheimdienstes* (Linz and Vienna: Nibelungen, 1950); Wilhelm Höttl, *Unternehmen Bernhard: Ein historischer Tatsachenbericht über die größte Geldfälschaktion aller Zeiten* (Wels: Westermühl, 1955); Wilhelm Höttl, *Im Einsatz für das Reich: Im Auslandsgeheimdienst des Dritten Reiches* (Koblenz: Verlag S. Bublies, 1997). Abwehr personnel also wrote exculpatory memoirs.

[24] For example: Andre Brissaud, *The Nazi Secret Service*, trans. Milton Waldman (New York: Norton & Company, 1974); Edmond L. Blandford, *SS Intelligence: The Nazi Secret Service* (Shrewsbury, UK: Airlife Publishing Ltd., 2000).

[25] Richard K. Betts, "Analysis, War, and Decision: Why Intelligence Failures are Inevitable," *World Politics. A Quarterly Journal of International Relations* 31 (1978/1979), 61–89; Michael I. Handel, *War, Strategy, and Intelligence* (London: Frank Cass, 1989), Chapter 4.