

# INTERSECTIONS BETWEEN CORPORATE AND ANTITRUST LAW

Recent public debate on common ownership by institutional investors has brought awareness to one of the many intersections between the corporate and antitrust worlds. But the interplay between these two fields dates back to the dawn of US antitrust. This volume shines a light on the often underplayed and misunderstood connections between antitrust and corporate law and finance. It offers a multi-disciplinary perspective on highly trending issues, such as parallel equity holdings, interlocking directorships, the anticompetitive effects of certain corporate governance arrangements, and the relationships between ESG and not-for profit activities with antitrust law. This edited collection brings together leading experts from across the US, Europe, and Asia and provides a cross-border perspective on alternative policy approaches for the field.

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# Intersections Between Corporate and Antitrust Law

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