Introduction

The electoral victory of Donald Trump in the United States in 2016, Brexit in the same year, and particularly the emergence of right-wing populist movements in Europe (e.g., France, Germany, Austria, Hungary) and other parts of the world (e.g., India, Turkey, the Philippines) during the last few years have revived academic and political discussions about the roots and consequences of populism, especially for the future of liberal democracy. As it was suggested by David Runciman (2018), one of the most influential political theorists in Britain today, the political trajectory that is currently followed, particularly with the rise of right-wing populism and fascism in many countries around the world, may portend the end of democracy as we know it. The rise of right-wing populism is generally associated with nationalist, racist, xenophobic and homophobic rhetoric that creates stark oppositions between "pure people" and the "corrupt elite" or "others" (social, religious, ethnic groups) who threaten the "purity" of a nation-state (Mudde, 2007). A populist leader claims to be the only genuine representative of people's will, so populism tends to be premised on the mobilization of people around an opposition to shared "enemies," aiming at establishing inclusion–exclusion binaries and identities (Laclau, 2005a). As a political project, then, populism raises serious concerns about the future of democracy, because it threatens to dismantle fundamental liberal values such as equality and human rights (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2012).

Although the rise of right-wing populism has been linked to fundamental socioeconomic changes fueled by globalization and neoliberalism, these factors "can hardly fully explain the rise of the new right," as Salmela and von Scheve (2017, p. 567) point out. A number of scholars increasingly emphasizes that the current rise of right-wing populism and its consequences cannot be fully understood without examining the role of *affectivity* (Cossarini & Vallespin, 2019; Kemmer et al., 2019; Kinnvall, 2018; Salmela & von Scheve, 2017; Wahl-Jorgensen, 2018). The relevance of

affect and emotion in social and political processes and movements, including populism, is not something new, of course. Anger – to take one example, which is central in the rhetoric of Donald Trump and other leaders in the age of populism (Davies, 2020) – has long been viewed as a major political emotion and an important resource of collective mobilization and empowerment (Gould, 2012; Lyman, 2004). The affective dynamics in political arenas have particularly characterized far-right politics by the use of fear (e.g., Wodak, 2015), rage and anger (e.g., Ebner, 2017; Mishra, 2017), and hatred (e.g., Blee, 2002; Emcke, 2019). However, as Mühlhoff argues, "what does change in the course of history is the modes of affectivity, that is, the concrete interactive forms, mediated spaces, temporal patterns of affective dynamics, as well as the way affectivity is intertwined with discourse, with power structures and with hierarchies" (in Kemmer et al., 2019, p. 26). Indeed, affective dynamics can work to reproduce power structures and hierarchies, just as much as they may galvanize resistance – which is precisely where the transformative possibilities of modes of affectivity lie.

The purpose of this book is to theorize the entanglements of affect and right-wing populism and to argue that a critical inquiry into these entanglements can provide opportunities for renewing democratic education, especially when it opens up to a more complex understanding of the affective modes of right-wing populism and its implications for democratic life. Across the world, democracy and democratic ways of life appear to be in crisis, as they are threatened by populist parties, movements and politicians. Education and schools cannot be blamed for creating this crisis, but the case can be made that educational institutions and structures contribute to crisis, merely by reproducing the social and political status quo. One might argue, for this reason, that the liberal democratic traditions in education have not been able to stop the tide of populism, given the investment that has been made in them. But why have the current approaches such as intercultural and multicultural education failed? And, more importantly, is there anything that can be done by educators to reverse these failures?

I would argue that a deeper understanding of the affective modes of right-wing populism, especially at *this* historical juncture – that is, the aftermath of a terrible pandemic that ravaged the world in so many ways – is crucial in educational efforts to address these questions for two reasons. First, paying attention to the affective modes of right-wing populism enables educators to identify the forms of affecting and being affected (and their micropolitical presuppositions and consequences) that are

typical for those who engage or buy into right-wing populism that are so often dependent on conspiracy theories and "fake news" (Anderson in Kemmer et al., 2019). Hence, understanding the affective investments of youth who buy into populist ideas – e.g., fear or resentment of the "other" (Wodak, 2015) – begins to provide indications of what intercultural and multicultural education may have missed to make their message attractive intellectually, affectively and politically. Second, to move a step further, a deeper understanding of the affective modes of right-wing populism will lay out more clearly the challenge for educators in the current political climate; namely, how to create pedagogical spaces and opportunities for critical dialogue in democratic education wherein students not only identify how and why different people articulate themselves affectively in particular ways but also take action to respond critically and productively to those affective investments.

First, we must be clear on what we should expect from a project of this kind. Briefly, I would like to suggest that the best it can do is offer a comprehensive account of the affective power of right-wing populism and its consequences in various sectors of public life, especially education. Ideally, that account should also provide some new trajectories of how to deal pedagogically and educationally with the problem of right-wing populism and its affective power in schools, universities and other educational institutions, particularly in alerting us that a renewal of democratic education – both as a field of study and a practice – is more necessary than ever before. Needless to say, democratic education is not used here in lieu of intercultural and multicultural education to mark their failures in preventing the tide of populism. Although this book will shed some light to these failures, as those are intertwined with how affective dynamics work in public and education life, it would be shortsighted to leave the impression that the "problem" is our response to populism – e.g., intercultural and multicultural education – rather than populism itself. Hence, as I will argue in this book, the "response" to this problem is not more media literacy education or better "competences" for democratic education but rather how to formulate anti-fascist as well as new democratic practices that keep nationalist, racist, xenophobic and homophobic rhetoric from becoming normalized. To counteract these right-wing and fascist tendencies in public life and educational settings, educators must take into serious consideration the power of affective experiences and adopt strategic pedagogical approaches that not only avoid the risk of indoctrination but also provide affirmative practices that move beyond mere (i.e., negative) critique of right-wing populism and fascism.

My focus on democratic education in this book, rather than other education traditions or sectors, is grounded in the belief that despite the crisis of democratic education (Okoth & Anyango, 2014) or even voices against democratic education (Pennington, 2014), democracy and democratic education remain morally, politically and instrumentally appealing to many countries around the world (Sant, 2019). The crisis of democracy and democratic education though is real; there is no way one can turn a blind eye to it. It alerts us that reforms necessarily rely on renewing the faith on democratic institutions that has been lost (Asmonti, 2013) – especially after the 2008 financial crisis, the austerity measures and the strengthening of neoliberal policies in many countries. This is precisely the ground that is found by populist movements and political parties to promote their agendas, situating "the people" in opposition to "elites" who are considered both corrupt and illegitimate (Runciman, 2018). Although there is no doubt that democracy and, with it, democratic education need an urgent renewal to reconstitute democratic faith and strengthen the lost democratic participation and viability, it is equally important to not underestimate the urgency of resisting the temptations of populism. Needless to say, democratic education cannot stop populism, but it can certainly work with disaffected people who have been alienated from traditional politics to enact democracy in renewed ways (Petrie, McGregor & Crowther, 2019). As Petrie et al. point out, education can enrich democratic spaces "from below" by decoding populism and the factors that share and motivate it, and by testing out new ideas and experiences that inform democratic action.

Hence, it is crucial to examine how educators and students may invent pedagogical spaces of "affective counterpolitics" (Massumi, 2015b), namely, spaces at the micropolitical level that entail "hopeful criticism" (Anderson, 2017a) of right-wing populism – that is, criticism that is not merely negative but rather affirmative, creating spaces of hope for social transformation. This book emphasizes, then, that "negative" critique of the affective ideology of right-wing populism is not sufficient for developing a productive counterpolitics – neither in the public arena, and certainly, nor in education. An affirmative critique is also needed "to set alternative frames and agendas which endorse and disseminate alternative concepts, such as equality, diversity and solidarity" (Wodak, 2015 in Kinnvall, 2018, p. 538). This line of thinking can provide critical resources to democratic education for developing a culture and process of democracy that transcends the negativity of mere critique of either right-wing populisms or inadequate forms of democracy. In this sense, democratic education

includes educational efforts where students learn, not only *about* and *for* democracy (in juxtaposition to right-wing populism) but also, critically and affirmatively, *through* democracy. Without democratic participation and practice, bodily and affectively, in educational institutions at all levels, it is hard to imagine how youth and new citizens will embrace democratic ways of living.

While the number of books focusing on populism has increased in recent years (e.g., De la Torre & Arnson, 2013; Laclau, 2005a; Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2012; Müller, 2016; Panizza, 2005), many of those publications do not look specifically on the role of education and specifically how democratic education can respond to the affective modes of populism. A principal concern of this book, therefore, is to establish the nexus among affect, populism and democratic education as all of those are evinced within educational discourses and practices. Hence, this book explores an understanding of how right-wing populism and interrelated phenomena – including extremism, post-truth and (micro)fascism – are produced and reproduced within and through educational discourses and practices, and how those might be interrogated and undone. While my analysis is primarily theoretical, I provide specific examples of populist rhetoric in Europe and the United States to situate this analysis and make the discussion of pedagogical implications explicit.

In particular, the book draws from various theories (e.g., critical, decolonial, posthumanist, feminist, political and affect theories) as well as different theorists (e.g., Hannah Arendt, Judith Butler, Rosi Braidotti, Gilles Deleuze, Michel Foucault, Achille Mbembe, Chantal Mouffe and Iris Marion Young among others). Each of these theories and theorists has something important to teach us about democracy and affect, attuning us to the centrality of these ideas for understanding right-wing populism and advancing a critical and *agonistic* democratic education. By "agonistic," I refer to Mouffe's (2000, 2005, 2013) model of democracy that reframes antagonism and disagreement into productive forms of democratic engagement – namely, democracy as a continuous struggle for renewal rather than a "fixed" political system or practice. After Mouffe, I also theorize democratic education as agonistic to emphasize the intertwining of democracy and education and their relationship as an ongoing effort for renewing democratic participation and practice in educational settings. An important, yet neglected, aspect of building agonistic relations and practices, while preserving the reality of conflict, is not to eliminate affects from the public sphere in the name of consensus but rather to mobilize affects for

democratic ends. Populists know this lesson very well; only they use it to mobilize affects for other ends.

Just as democracy is in crisis, many have argued that democratic education is in a similar situation with democratic deliberation and engagement replaced by disaffection and cynicism (Biesta, 2013; Brown, 2015) as educational institutions at all levels are drowned in cultures of accountability and the pressures of neoliberal performativity (Biesta, 2010a). Although many countries around the world have introduced intercultural and multicultural education in their educational reforms during the last few decades, an increasingly crowded, yet narrow curriculum, fails to promote democratic models of participation and leadership in schools and universities (Clarke, Schostack & Hammersley-Fletcher, 2018; Fielding & Moss, 2011). These developments raise concerns not only about the status of democratic education and whether it really produces the qualities and dispositions of the democratic citizen or whether education in general creates democratic cultures and practices in schools and universities; they also raise questions whether education is complicit to the rise of populism by contributing to the general culture of disaffection and cynicism in public life. Hence, an analysis of affect, populism and education in this book contributes to the renewal of democratic education by specifically paying attention to the politicization of affects in education initiatives and their implications for pedagogical discourses and practices. Given the enormity of this task and its multiple complexities, my aim in this book is not to mount a comprehensive list of potential pedagogical actions for countering right-wing populism and promoting democratic education. Rather, my goal is much more modest and focuses on outlining some ideas that might inspire a more in-depth inquiry into concrete pedagogies and education initiatives that could respond to the current political crisis in effective ways.

In what follows, I begin by briefly outlining how I understand "affect," and present the theoretical assumptions underlying the use of this concept throughout this book. This analysis is important for two reasons. First, it provides the reader with a general presentation of how and why affect is understood as relational, political and embodied, rather than as an individualized or a psychologized entity. As will be clear in the chapters that follow, this theoretical and methodological understanding of affect is central in this book and enables the examination of forms of engagement that exist both at the individual and the sociopolitical levels. Second, this analysis of affect provides a crucial way of theoretically and pragmatically linking the micropolitics and macropolitics of right-wing populism, and

showing how democratic education is inevitably intertwined with "structures of feeling" (Williams, 1961) that may strengthen or weaken democratic deliberation and participation in educational institutions. I borrow Raymond Williams' famous term to describe the potential that lies for democratic education to both reproduce and resist affective relations of populism. This introduction ends with a discussion of the structure of the book.

Affect as Social, Political and Embodied

What has been called the affective turn in the social sciences and humanities in recent years marks "critical theory's turn to affect [. . .] at a time when critical theory is facing the analytic challenges of ongoing war, trauma, torture, massacre, and counter/terrorism" (Clough, 2007, p. 1). As Clough further explains, this turn signals a movement from a psychoanalytically and psychologically informed lens of identity, representation and trauma to engagement with affect that focuses on the economic circulation of bodily capacities. Affect, then, can be understood as that which encompasses and exceeds the more individualized conceptions of emotion, as the "body's *capacity* to affect and to be affected," that is, as interactive and embodied intensities that circulate as "forces of encounter" (Seigworth & Gregg, 2010, p. 2). Ahmed's (2010) response to debates whether there are any clear boundaries between affect and emotion is that

> while you can separate an affective response from an emotion that is attributed as such (the bodily sensations from the feeling of being afraid), this does not mean that in practice, or in everyday life, they are separate. In fact, they are contiguous; they slide into each other; they stick, and cohere, even when they are separated. (p. 231)

The approach to affect and emotion adopted in this book is close to the one suggested by Ahmed (2010) as well as Cvetkovich (2012), who see affect as a category that encompasses affect, emotion and feeling, and "includes impulses, desires, and feelings that get historically constructed in a range of ways" (Cvetkovich, 2012, p. 4). While the affective turn signifies a range of different theoretical movements and articulations of affect and emotion (Pedwell & Whitehead, 2012), it is generally united in the notion that what is felt "is neither internally produced nor simply imposed on us from external ideological structures" (Rice, 2008, p. 205). In other words, affects and emotions are conceptualized as entangled with the complexities, reconfigurations and rearticulations of power, body,

history and politics (Athanasiou, Hantzaroula & Yannakopoulos, 2008). To put this differently, affects and emotions are theorized as intersections of language, desire, power, bodies, social structures, subjectivity and materiality.

Importantly for my approach in this book, I somewhat depart from the conceptualization of affect as merely autonomous or completely a-social and a-cognitive – a conceptualization that has been challenged by some scholars (e.g., Fischer, 2016; Hemmings, 2005; Leys, 2011; Wetherell, 2013). For example, one of the criticisms is that the formulation of affect as visceral and pre-linguistic force that is contrasted with the discursive and the cognitive, and distinguished from "domesticated" emotion is problematic because it draws a dichotomy that is unsustainable. Although affect may be theorized as pre-linguistic, this does not imply that it is also pre-discursive, as bodies, emotions and affects "are depended on, and informed by, socially constructed boundaries and norms" (Morrow, 2019, p. 20). Also, emotion is not a fixed or predetermined entity "housed in bodies," but it is "one potential outward expression on the corporeal" (Morrow, 2019, p. 22). From this perspective, the affective turn represents a shift from "the text and discourse as key theoretical touchstones" toward the body (Seigworth & Gregg, 2010, p. 9). A reading of the material potentiality of the body emphasizes that the body has affective potential, yet it is still coded by and embedded within social, historical, cultural and political formations (Blackman & Venn, 2010; Pedwell & Whitehead, 2012; Wetherell, 2012).

As Morrow (2019) argues, the consideration of the dual capacity of bodies to affect and be affected broadens our understanding of affect/emotion, because bodies are not simply characterized as obedient or deviant, but rather they have the ability to enact varying affective experiences. As such, affective life may become *political* as a counter to forms of biopower that work through processes of normalization (Anderson, 2012). A theorization of affect as the capacity to act and an intensity that exists within the body and escapes the constraints of a socially constructed label offers theoretical resources for deepening our understanding of power and politics – hence, it is crucial in understanding the affective modes of right-wing populism. The dual capacity of bodies to produce affect and be affected suggests that we need to think of *power-affect* – that is, affects need to be understood as forces of becoming rather than governed by an overarching logic or regime (Schaefer, 2019). In this manner, suggests Morrow (2019, p. 20), "affect will always supersede attempts at control as engineered affects must always contend with bodies constantly feeding into

and informing the affective landscape." Consequently, political measures and practices that function under the assumption that they can simply control affect and emotion, says Morrow, "have an inherently flawed understanding of the very registers that they are reliant on" (2019, p. 21). The theorization advanced here, then, highlights that affect is not something that can be engineered in any controlled manner, but rather it is unpredictable which trajectories affect will follow.

The emphasis on the body as affective, material and political highlights three ideas: the fundamental relationality of all matter (bodies, things and social formations); attention to actions and events as assemblages that develop a network of habitual and non-habitual connections and are always in flux; and, the political potential of this relational ontology, that is, the power of the materiality of bodies for the pursuit of social change and transformation, and to address injustices and inequalities, whether by practice, by influencing policy or through activism (Fox & Alldred, 2017). Theoretically, then, a number of novel questions for exploration and analysis of democratic education may be raised, such as how do we (researchers, educators, policymakers, students) identify and trace the ways in which bodies experience specific political processes (e.g., democracy, populism) within or beyond educational institutions? In such spaces, "how can we disentangle ourselves from the cultural and political scripts and power structures, in order to critique their reductive use, and reliance on, affect and emotion?" (Morrow, 2019, p. 22) What are the dangers when educators and students use affective management techniques to negotiate political discourses and practices? Which kind of affective intensities are allowed to be cultivated in educational settings? "And which kinds are excluded or cut off?" (Juelskjær & Staunæs, 2016a, p. 196) How do collective affects (e.g., solidarity, empathy) become part of affective responses to counter populist discourses and practices?

These questions challenge our understandings of just what manifestations political agency may take in relation to affective infrastructures in educational institutions. Furthermore, these questions open up new ways of looking at and understanding affect and emotion and their relations to the corporeal – as these relations are born out of producing counter-practices that can "disrupt and rupture attempts at governance" (Morrow, 2019, p. 23) in micro or macropolitical spaces of populism. Attending, therefore, to affective life in educational institutions may constitute a crucial political intervention, because it does not merely "describe" the organization of affective life on the basis of politicization processes as norms, but it also enables the subversion and reversal of the

mechanisms and techniques of discipline and normalization (cf. Anderson, 2012). Hence, a theoretical framework that recognizes and examines the affective complexities of right-wing populism as those are entangled with biopower and biopolitics is likely to challenge the *invisible affective infrastructures* of social and political processes that erode democracy in educational institutions. Also, this theoretical framework offers opportunities that advance our understanding of how to invent renewed ways of democratic participations in educational institutions – in response to bringing the affective modes of right-wing populism to the fore.

Having outlined the theoretical framework driving my analysis in this book, I present briefly how the book is organized and structured.

Structure of the Book

Overall, the book is divided into three parts. Part I includes four chapters (Chapters 1–4) that "scan" the political landscape to describe right-wing populism and interrelated phenomena and how affectivity plays a crucial role in their circulation; this part provides some initial responses to what can be done pedagogically to address these phenomena. In particular, these chapters take three interrelated phenomena – right-wing populism, post-truth, microfascism – as points of entry to examine their affective dynamics and to explore how democratic education may be involved in attempts to instigate and help enact pedagogical processes of resisting the affective dynamics of these phenomena. So although each chapter takes a different phenomenon as a focal point, or point of entry, the analysis does not "end" with the phenomenon or its potential pedagogical "treatment," but rather it carries over to the following chapters in a spiral manner. However, the structure of each chapter is such that it can be read both in conjunction with other chapters and independently. Each chapter generally starts with situating the issue politically and theoretically, then specifies its affective connections, and finally discusses some pedagogical implications that are later picked up for further analysis in Parts II and III of the book.

Chapter 1 is the only one that begins with a focus on a particular affect – namely, shame – taking as its point of departure the politics of shame in the context of racism expressed by Donald Trump's rhetoric. This choice is purposive to set the political stage of a neglected, yet fundamental, affect that is central in driving populist movements. Shame constructs a collective affective community that unites people against all those who are considered the source of this feeling. In fact, Chapters 1 and 2 serve as illustrative of the wider phenomenon of right-wing populism. With