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Index

[More Information](#)

Index

- acceptability graph, 285
- action, 615
- additive valuation, 594
- adverse selection, 626
- agent, 614
- algorithm
 - greedy, 51
 - online, 50
 - random, 52
- allocation problem, 92
- ascending auction, 579
- assignment, 362
- assignment game, 450
- assortative matching, 436, 444
- asymptotic incentive compatibility, 368
 - of pseudomarkets, 368
- auction, 93
- Bayesian persuasion, 662
- Bayesian regret, 659
- best edge, 267
- bipartite graph, 4
- bipartite preference profile, *see* preference profile, bipartite
- Birkhoff–von Neumann theorem, 362, 601
- block
 - matching with salaries, 83
 - set of contracts, 86
- blocking pair, 4, 9, 11, 17, 285, 601
- b*-blocking, 266
- bounded search tree algorithms, 297
- budget, 362
- bundle, 375
- capacity function, 3
- cardinal property, 91
- centralized market, 428
- cheapest bundle property, 364
- cheapest purchase property, 364
- choice function, 85
- Choo and Siow formula, 560
- clock auction, 161
- combinatorial choice domain, 243
- combinatorial choice function, 243
- combinatorial choice model, 243
- combinatorial demand correspondence, 243
- combinatorial demand model, 243
- competitive ratio, 51
- complementary slackness, 134
- complete preference profile, *see* preference profile, complete
- congestion, 476
- connected graph, 272
- constraints, 377
- consumer surplus, 100
- contract, 615
- contract theory, 614
- convex duality, 552, 556, 558
- coordinate descent, 565
- core, 4
 - matching with salaries, 83
 - costly signaling, 471
- data reduction rules, 295
- decentralized market, 428
- deferred acceptance, 602
- deferred acceptance algorithm, 6, 7
- descending clock auction, 170
- dictator, 96
- dictatorial social choice function, 105
- differentiable economics, 591
- direct-revelation mechanism, 103
- dominant strategy, 103
 - implementation, 103
- dominant-strategy equilibrium, 103
- dominant-strategy incentive compatible, 14, 103
- domination, 266

INDEX

- downward distortion, 621
 dual program, 556
 duality, 134
 EGAL-SMI-DEC, 287
 EGAL-SRI-DEC, 287
 EGAL-SRTI-DEC, 287
 L -edge-choosable graph, 276
 L -edge-coloring of a graph, 276
 k -edge-choosable graph, 276, 656
 efficiency, 369
 - of pseudomarkets, 370
 efficient outcome, 94
 egalitarian cost, 287
 egalitarian stable matching, *see* matching,
 egalitarian stable
 empirical model, 531
 - random utility model, 531
 - school choice, 533
 endowment, 92
 entropy, 559
 envy-freeness, 94, 375
 envy-freeness of pseudomarkets, 375
 equilibrium, 362
 estimation using final matches
 - many-to-one matching, 537
 - one-to-one matching, 535
 - stability, 534
 estimation using rank-order lists, 543
 - manipulated reports, 545
 - truthful reports, 543
 ex ante justified envy, 601
 ex ante stable, 601
 ex post regret, 594, 606
 ex post stability, 440
 exchange economy, 92
 exhausted, state of worker, 291
 existence of pseudomarket equilibria, 363
 exploding offers, 432
 extended entropy, 563
 favor, 290
 feasibility, 362
 feasible payoff profile, 450
 feasible profile for the matching μ , 450
 finite distributive lattice, 19
 $F(\mathcal{P})$, 294
 firm-optimal matching, 10
 firm not matched to capacity, 11
 first–last property, 268
 fixed pair, 294
 fixed-parameter algorithms, 294
 $\gamma(F(\mathcal{P}))$, 294
- $\gamma(\mu)$, 287
 $\hat{\gamma}$, 295
 generalized entropy, 559, 562
 gradient descent, 566
 guaranteed payoff, 622
 Gumbel distribution, 559
 heterosexual marriage market, 552
 hidden actions, 614
 hidden information, 614
 identification, 552, 556, 559, 567
 implementable allocation function, 628
 incentivized exploration, 656
 incomplete preference profile, *see* preference
 profile, incomplete
 INDEPENDENT SET, 287
 individual rationality, 596, 601
 individual stability, 258
 individual-rationality violation, 606
 individually rational
 - matching with salaries, 83
 - set of contracts, 86
 induced-value theory, 512
 information asymmetry, 654
 interim stability, 440
 iterative proportional fitting procedure (IPFP),
 565
 join operation, 19
 joint surplus, 553, 555, 557, 562, 563
 joint surplus function, 552, 567
 Karush–Kuhn–Tucker optimality conditions,
 554
 kernel, 295
 kernelization algorithms, 295
 Király’s approximation algorithm, 290
 lack of justified envy, 377
 Lagrangian optimization, 597
 Lagrangian relaxation, 135
 large market, 366
 lattice, 19
 - canonical finite distributive, 26
 Legendre–Fenchel transform, 558
 limited liability, 617
 linear constraints, 377
 linear contract, 623
 Logit, 553, 560, 563, 564
 man-optimal stable matching, 270
 many-to-one property, 278
 market clearing, 363

INDEX

- matched to capacity, 11
- matching, 285, 450
 - egalitarian stable, 287
 - perfect, 285
 - stable, 285
- b*-matching, 11, 265
- matching function, 560
- matching patterns, 553
- Matsubara formalism, i, 3, 23, 37, 66, 90, 107, 109, 130, 155, 180, 201, 217, 219, 238, 264, 283, 303, 323, 343, 361, 381, 402, 428, 448, 467, 484, 509, 511, 530, 552, 573, 575, 591, 614, 635, 655, 676
- MAX-SMTI, 286
- MAX-SMTI-DEC, 288
- MAX-SMTI-TF, 290
- maximal matching, 9, 51
- maximum likelihood estimator, 561
- maximum-score method, 564
- mechanism, 101
 - for hidden-information models, 627
- meet operation, 19
- messages, 101
- messaging policy, 658
- moment-matching estimator, 561
- monotone contract, 618
- monotone convex hidden-action problem, 618
- moral hazard, 615
- multi-armed bandits, 658
- multiple-unit demand, 375
- neural network, 591
- firm not matched to capacity, 11
- obvious strategy-proofness, 577
- online algorithm, 50
- open offers, 432
- optimal matching, 564, 567
- optimal partner, 7
- optimal transport, 552
- ordinal property, 91
- ordinal strategy-proofness, 602
- outside option, 363, 615
- parametric model, 560
- Pareto
 - dominated, 94
 - efficiency, 369
 - optimal, 94
 - weakly optimal, 94
- perfect matching, 4, *see* matching, perfect
- perfectly transferable utility, 552, 553
- pessimal partner, 7
- Poisson process, 567
- Poisson regression, 563
- pre-arranged matches, 431
- preference aggregation rule, 96
- preference profile, 285
 - bipartite, 286
 - complete, 285
 - incomplete, 285
- preference relation, 90
- preference signaling, 470
- price, 362
- primal program, 555, 559
- principal, 614
- principal-agent framework, 614
- priorities, 377
- promoted worker, 290
- proper edge-coloring of a graph, 276
- pseudomarket equilibrium, 362
- pseudomarket mechanism, 365
- pseudomarket representation of efficient assignments, 372
- public goods, 98
- pure strategy, 58
- quality signaling, 471
- quasilinear utility, 92
- random mechanism, 440
- random permutation model, 138
- random priority, 371, 602
- random serial dictatorship, 602
- random utility model, 531
- randomized matching, 601
- rank, 285
- realm of possibilities, 7, 10
- regret, 659
- RegretNet, 594
- regular distribution, 366
- regular economy, 367
- revealed preference, 245
- revealed strict preference, 245
- revenue-optimal auction, 593
- risk aversion, 617
- rotation, 18, 22
- rural hospital theorem, 11
- screening, 626
- separability, 552, 556
- separation lemma, 374
- sheepskin effect, 479
- signaling, 467
- simultaneous multiple-round auction, 159
- single-unit demand, 362
- Sinkhorn's algorithm, 565
- social choice environment, 101

INDEX

- social welfare function, 98
- SMI, 286
- SMTI, 286
- SRI, 286
- SRTI, 286
- STABLE MARRIAGE, 285
- STABLE ROOMMATES, 285
- stability, 377, 554, 601
- stability and strategy-proofness: impossibility of, 602
- stability violation, 604
- stable *b*-matching, 266
 - instance, 266
 - matching, stable
 - instance, 265
 - lattice, 19
 - set of contracts, 86
- stochastic dominance, 440
- strategy, 103
- strategy-proofness, 103, 365
- strategy-proofness of pseudomarkets, 366
- substitutability, 86
- surplus, 616
- technology, 615
- tie, 285
- token money, 362
- types, 556, 559, 566
- unit-demand valuation, 594
- unobserved heterogeneity, 552, 555, 558, 560, 567
- unrestricted preference domain, 105
- upper bound, 19
 - least, 19
- utilitarian solution, 99
- utility function, 91, 92
- utility possibility set, 99
- $V(F(\mathcal{P}))$, 294
- $V^r(\mathcal{P})$, 294
- $V^u(\mathcal{P})$, 294
- valid contract, 616
 - with limited liability, 617
- valid mechanism, 627
- value of a game, 59
- Vickrey auction, 165
- virtual surplus for hidden-information model, 630
- virtual value for hidden-information model, 630
- WARSPrío, 254
- weak axiom of revealed preference, 246
- weak axiom of revealed strict priority, 254
- welfare theorem, first, 370
- welfare theorem, second, 372
- woman-optimal stable matching, 270
- worker-optimal matching, 10
- zero-sum game, 58