INTRODUCTION

In 1993, when I was a student of grade eight in a private school in Lahore, our class was divided up in four groups for a geography project on Pakistan. The group of which I was a part had to make a sculptural map of Pakistan, demonstrating the diverse physical and social qualities of its landscape. And so we had set about carving our country with stuff like styrofoam, cotton, and cardboard. In the final map that we made, the region of Gilgit-Baltistan—then the 'Northern Areas'—had remained unlabelled and unpeopled, marked only with mountains made of clay.

Even today, nature remains the primary modality through which Gilgit-Baltistan is understood within the Pakistani national imagination. Its magnificent peaks and breathtaking valleys invoke within Pakistanis a simultaneous sense of emotional attachment and proud ownership, permitting them to claim Pakistan as 'beautiful'. But while Gilgit-Baltistan is externally produced as an idyllic tourist destination, it is internally managed as a suspect security zone. This is because the region is internationally considered as part of the disputed area of Kashmir—a territory that both Pakistan and India claim, and have turned into the most militarized zone in the world over the last seven decades. This is also because Gilgit-Baltistan is the only Shia-dominated political unit in a Sunni-dominated Pakistan.

Ironically, at the heart of the territory of Kashmir—which Pakistan claims on the basis of its 'Muslim' identity—lies the region of Gilgit-Baltistan which

contradicts this identity by being home to a different kind of Muslim than that endorsed by Pakistani nationalism. Such territorial and religious anxieties transform Gilgit-Baltistan from a place of mythical beauty into a zone of treachery, proudly claimed yet disavowed at the same time. Meanwhile, the inhabitants of the region express a strong yearning for recognition and inclusion within the Pakistani nation-state, and feel a deep love and loyalty towards it—only to find themselves constantly alienated and betrayed. This book charts such dynamics of attachment and alienation, placing at its centre the emotionalities—of love and betrayal, loyalty and suspicion, beauty and terror—that help us grasp how the Kashmir conflict is affectively structured and experienced on the ground. After all, Kashmir is not just a matter of national security in India and Pakistan, but a place that has become the emotional heart of these nationalisms. How this 'heart of hostility' translates into political subjection and intimately felt struggle in the terrain of Gilgit-Baltistan is the story that I wish to narrate in this book.[1]

THE ANGUISH OF LOVE

Pakistan ne hamaray ehsasaat ke saath khela hai!
'Pakistan has played with/manipulated our emotions!'

This is a refrain that is often heard in Gilgit-Baltistani protests against the Pakistan state, and came up repeatedly during my interviews in the region. People in Gilgit-Baltistan attribute their political predicament not just to the lack of rights as a result of being entangled in the Kashmir dispute, but fundamentally to the lack of 'trust' *(bharosa/aitmad*) in the region by the Pakistani state authorities, which signifies a 'betrayal' (*bewafai/dhoka*) of the region's own 'love' (*muhabbat*) and 'loyalty' (*wafadari*) to Pakistan. As one interviewee commented to me, the real problem is that 'Pakistan is not *sincere* with us'.[2] Across the border, in Srinagar, Kashmiris voice-related grievances against the Indian state: 'They [Indians] *can't feel or represent* our sentiments'.[3] Such feeling-thoughts compel us to rethink the state–citizen relation in deeply emotional and intimate terms, in place of purely legalistic logics. This is

especially true in conflict zones like Kashmir, where the attitudes of aggressive hyper-nationalism and struggles of self-determination have become immersed in multiple emotional histories. These emotional structures, histories, and experiences are central for gaining a grounded understanding of the Kashmir conflict, as well as of the state–citizen dynamic in general.

Let me recognize at the outset that this dynamic, as well as the emotionality of rule and resistance, operates differently in the different regions that form part of the conflict of Kashmir. In Gilgit-Baltistan, intriguingly, love is a compelling constellation through which we may chart how the dynamic of citizenship operates on the ground. In order to grasp the politics of love and emotional attachment in the case of state-making in Gilgit-Baltistan, it is crucial to first note the profound significance of love in the very structuring of individual subjectivity and social being in South Asia. If South Asian legends, poetic thought, and popular culture particularly from Pakistan and north India are an indicator, then we might say that the history of all hitherto existing society is not the history of class struggles, but of love struggles.[4] The struggles of legendary lovers—from Heer Ranjha to Mirza Sahiban, Laila Majnun to Sassi Punnu, and Shirin Farhad to Sohni Mahiwal—form the foundational motif in the dominant literary traditions of the Perso-Indian cosmopolis from the medieval period onwards. Narratives of love-martyrs embodied the paradigmatic theme of separation and union, but also that of defiance and rebellion against patriarchal, priestly, and class oppression.[5] Performed through poetic storytelling and illustrated through painting, the power of love in these narratives embraced a transcendental spirit of piety and collective oneness, and served to define the moral universe and cognitive hearts of local populations. If language reflects the life-worlds of its speakers and their frames of meaning and value, then we might grasp how cherished love is by witnessing the many modes of referring to a beloved soul: *yaar, jaan, jaaneman, jigar, dost, rafeeq, habeeb, sanam, sajan, dildar, dilbar, piya, mehboob, saaqi, saheb, saiyaan, mahi, mitwa, mitr*—at least nineteen terms just in the Gujrati-Urdu-Hindi tongue that I am familiar with.

Alongside a devotional affection and life-consuming desire for the beloved, expressive traditions of love in South Asia are necessarily inscribed with themes of anguish and alienation—particularly since the beloveds are always obstructed by hostile environments. Moreover, love is deemed to characterize

all human and human–divine relations, not just the affair of romance. As Gold (2006) notes in the illuminating edited volume *Love in South Asia: A Cultural History*, idioms of love tend to be more expansive in South Asia and are used to describe not only spiritual love, as has been widely recognized, but also intimately felt community ties and ecologies. These factors take us closer to the argument that I wish to make here: that it this expansive, cultural–poetic constellation of love which is being drawn upon by Gilgiti subjects, as they articulate their feelings of love, loyalty, and longing for the Pakistani nation/state. It is because of the pathos of this same paradigmatic constellation that they speak of insincerity, betrayal, and *be-wafai*— no-loyalty—in return. This doubleness in relation to love is even indicated by the term *khelna*, which is referred to in the quotation at the beginning of this section. The Urdu word *khelna* means the light-hearted, joyous play that is involved in love, but depending on the way it is used, it can simultaneously mean a kind of insincere play, a pretense, and ultimately, the state of manipulated love.

It is precisely this state of manipulated love that Pakistan has come to represent in Gilgit-Baltistan, in betrayal of the true love that Gilgitis feel they have expressed towards the country. This longing for love, attachment, and national belonging is a formative factor that is often eclipsed in analyses of power and state-making, which are often focused on disciplinary practices of rule and regulation. Of particular relevance here is James Scott's now canonical work, *The Art of Not Being Governed* (2009), in which he argues that hill communities in upland Southeast Asia and Northeast India have historically been focused on evading centralized state authority, and it is only the result of top-down practices of internal colonialism that successive states have brought them under their rule—a process that has accelerated since the 1950s. Gilgit-Baltistan is not unlike Scott's description of hill peoples at state frontiers, but here the chronicle of internal colonialism—while extremely present and pertinent—is simply insufficient. Already out-of-the-way subjects are not trying to run away further, but longing to belong. Their strong desire for inclusion and recognition is a yearning for identity in a world where modernity and the nation-state—no matter how evident their violences are—remain both seductive and enchanting, and a necessary existent without which no vision of life is deemed possible. In Gilgit-Baltistan, this yearning is also historically linked to the affective power of a moral Muslim community

promised in the form of Pakistan in 1947, which was deemed more appealing than either Hindu-ruled Kashmir or Hindu-dominated India at the moment of partition.

Such a yearning is not only unexplainable within Scott's framework, but also within that of Judith Butler (1997), who productively raised the question of love, the psyche, and the formation of the subject in *The Psychic Life of Power*. Recognizing that love is what is missing from Althusser's theorization of rule and regulation, Butler rightly guides us that passionate attachments form the psychic ground of power. And yet this attachment seems to be always a disciplinary cultivation. While not denying the possibility of a narcissistic attachment to subjection, I wish to highlight that we also need to recognize the possibility of an affirmative attachment constituted by desire and surrender. This is offered in the language of the heart, and deemed to be abused through the language of force and the law. It is precisely because social emotionality in South Asia inhabits this sensibility of love-offerings, moral community, and affective expectations, that leaders like Gandhi and Baccha Khan—who embraced a politics of love—had such a deep resonance across South Asia. And it is also for this reason that the local struggles for substantive citizenship that I discuss later in the book—poetic, faith-based, and ecological—are fundamentally tied to the ethical–emotional aspirations of promoting *insaaniyat* (humanism) instead of prejudice and ecological stewardship instead of greed.[6]

In *Muslim Becoming*, Naveeda Khan (2012) productively brings our attention to the question of aspiration in Pakistan. Yet her analysis seems to be limited to the striving for a better Muslim-ness that Pakistanis seem to be constantly engaged in. This emphasis occludes attention to other kinds of ethical–political struggles that may be linked to Islam—such as the faith-based movement for textbook reform that I discuss in Chapter 3—but cannot be exhausted only by reference to Islamic discourses and theological argumentation between differently pious subjects. The understanding of Pakistani subjects as 'Muslims' tends to somehow pigeonhole them as pious-or-not, and fails to attend to how they negotiate the state as political, cultural, and development subjects. Moreover, while Khan's emphasis on skepticism also rings true for everyday, middle-class life in Pakistan, it nevertheless fails to capture the sense of anguish that is actually felt due to devastated, betrayed aspirations in the state.

This is perhaps most visible, not from the Lahori streets at the heart of Punjab which form the ethnographic site for Khan, but from marginal, Gilgiti ones in Pakistan's borderlands. Such border territories also make more visible the contradictions that lie at the core of nationalism and state-making in Pakistan.

DELUSIONAL STATES

Several scholars have explored the socio-political and class-centred basis for the emergence of Pakistan, unravelling the constructed idea of Islamic nationalism which eventually came to be identified as the basis for the country's creation.[7] Post-1947, this ideological fixation with Islam as the *raison d'ĕtre* of the Pakistani nation was transformed and coupled with an ideological obsession with India, the presumed opposite of an Islamic Pakistan. Notwithstanding the contradictions of such a vision—such as the presence of many more Muslims in India and the familial ties that continued across a yet-to-be-consolidated border—the portrayal of India as an aggressive, overbearing enemy came to constitute a central pillar of state-formative ideology as propagated in particular by military leaders in Pakistan. In this portrayal, the Pakistani state is deemed to face a permanent existential threat from India, and must constantly battle to uphold the glory of Islam as well as its own glory as a Muslim state.

It is often recognized that such hawkish national imaginaries in Pakistan have served to entrench military interests by helping to justify high defense expenditures, a prioritization of the needs of military personnel, as well as direct military intervention in politics. What is less emphasized and theorized is the sheer extent of *delusion* that such an imaginary inculcates in the political and social order. This sense of delusion might be especially visible in the case of Pakistan, but is certainly not limited to it. Rose (1996) has long alerted us to the fundamental role of fantasy in the construction of modern nations and states. Fantasy, though, almost feels too light a term for the kind of paranoid state sensibilities we have actually witnessed in the twentieth- and twenty-first century. Particularly under conditions of the 'war on terror', it would not be far-fetched to argue that delusion has become a global condition of stateness, sustained by simultaneous beliefs of persecution and grandeur and

also instrumentalized to justify extreme surveillance regimes as well as highly militarized societies.

The delusional state is most evident, in fact, in a context that is considered decisively incomparable to Pakistan in terms of classic comparative analysis: the United States. Given the historical, political, and economic connections between the US and Pakistan since 1947, the comparison is perfectly apt and necessary. In making this comparison, I am following Philip McMichael (1990) where he critiques the ahistoricity of the conventional comparative method and argues for a historically grounded 'incorporated comparison' approach that reveals the relationality of social processes.

One of the most illuminating theses on the US as state of delusion is offered by Ann McClintock in *Paranoid Empire* (2009). Reflecting on the obscene specters of violence embodied by Guantanamo and Abu Ghraib—'shadowlands of empire', as she compellingly calls them—McClintock argues that the US as empire and nation-state 'has entered the domain of paranoia' where 'fantasies of global omnipotence' combine with 'nightmares of impending attack'. Her elaboration of this double-edged nature of paranoid power is worth quoting at length here:

> … for it is only in paranoia that one finds simultaneously and in such condensed form both deliriums of absolute power and forebodings of perpetual threat. Hence the spectral and nightmarish quality of the 'war on terror', a limitless war against a limitless threat, a war vaunted by the US administration to encompass all of space and persisting without end. But the war on terror is not a real war, for 'terror' is not an identifiable enemy nor a strategic, real-world target. The war on terror is what William Gibson calls elsewhere 'a consensual hallucination', and the US government can fling its military might against ghostly apparitions and hallucinate a victory over all evil only at the cost of *catastrophic self-delusion* and the infliction of great calamities elsewhere.[8]

I would like to expand McClintock's insightful argument by contending that the shadowlands of empire generated by such 'catastrophic self-delusion' are not limited to post-9/11 extraordinary prisons. Nation-states likes Pakistan have long served as shadowlands of empire. As Saadia Toor demonstrates

in *The State of Islam: Culture and Cold War Politics in Pakistan* (2012), the state in Pakistan has been intimately structured by US foreign policy since its inception, and it continues to be implicated in the nightmarish violence under US-led terror wars that have been so foundational to global political rule in the new millennium. Coached and contained as a Cold War ally, Pakistan has come to mirror its imperial master in its delusional, omnipotent sense of power combined with a perpetual threat of engulfment. In both contexts, the delusions and their spectral violence are not spontaneous responses to incidences of attack, but rather outcomes of a long-standing paranoid state militarism that justifies itself through the social production of fear.

In the specific context of Pakistan, the machinery of paranoia and surveillance has expanded to such an extent that a Pakistani journalist has fittingly termed the country as the 'Intelligence Republic of Pakistan' in place of its official label—the Islamic Republic of Pakistan. Nowhere is this paranoid state of permanent existential threat deemed more at stake than in disputed Kashmir, where the twin imperatives of defending Islam and defending the border against India converge. And within Kashmir, Gilgit-Baltistan poses a particularly vexed territorial and religious anxiety because its majority-Shia populace contests the dominant Muslim sensibility that a Sunni-ized Pakistani state has sought to normalize for its citizens. How does the delusional state play out in this fraught region? In addressing this question in the book, my purpose is to shift attention away from the trite narrative of how regionalisms constantly threaten the imagined order of the nation-state. Instead, I provide an ethnographic glimpse of the lived practices through which the state-citizen relation is made, felt, and reworked in the most contested border zone of Pakistan.

Feelings are central to the story of state-citizen relations that I wish to tell, not only because the state and its regions are imagined through particular emotional logics, but also because rule is desired and inhabited emotionally by state subjects.[9] Love, trust, and betrayal is one aspect of how this dynamic is felt in Gilgit-Baltistan, as discussed in the previous section. The other linked dynamic is that of loyalty and suspicion, and in the book, I demonstrate how this dynamic unravels in the context of state-formative processes of militarization and sectarianization. Gilgiti male subjects are not just loving but also especially loyal, and this has to do with the history of male employment as military

wage-labour in this frontier region. The 'political economy of defence' in Pakistan—a foundational framing for understanding the Pakistani 'state of martial rule'[10]—is thus underpinned and buttressed in Gilgit-Baltistan by a political economy of feeling. This is a state where militarization is critically linked to livelihoods and cultural orientations, shaping popular understandings of life and politics and hence reordering people's identities and aspirations. These aspects of the cultural–economic politics of militarization have been most compellingly explored in the context of the United States by the pioneering feminist scholar Catherine Lutz (1999, 2004), and it is thus the US again, which provides a frame of connection and comparison for me as I attempt to understand the militarized reality in Pakistan.

My key argument is that the employment of Gilgit-Baltistani men in the military creates loyal subjects who have come to revere the military and the military-state, hence producing the conditions of possibility for continued military authoritarianism in the region. At the same time, the activities of the intelligence agencies—key creators and enactors in the delusional state—constantly render people into permanent suspects and sources of threat. Suspicion is thus integral to the emotional structure of state power as people are *assumed* to be suspect *by definition* because they live in a Shia-majority, disputed border zone. This presumed suspicion is translated into a regime of monitoring and intimidation by the military–intelligence establishment, for which the suspicion serves as a convenient rationale for maintaining its own political and economic authority. More worryingly, the military–intelligence state also accomplishes its rule by promoting suspicion *amongst* citizens, most notably between the Shia and Sunni communities in Gilgit through state-backed sectarianizing discourses and practices. These practices have led to heightened feelings of emotional ill-will amongst these communities, and have damaged the cultures of pluralism that have historically dominated the region. Apart from suspected subjects, thus, the delusional state also produces suspicious subjects.

This strategy has further served to create the effect and affect of Gilgit-Baltistan as a quintessentially sectarian space where Shia–Sunni conflict can 'erupt' anytime unless prevented by an ever-vigilant, supposedly neutral state. Brimming with sectarian sentimentality, the people of Gilgit-Baltistan are thus imagined as irrational and non-political—as in, they are considered

incapable of being proper political subjects and agents. By sectarianizing citizenship and politics, the question of substantive citizenship rights in Gilgit-Baltistan is thus trumped, reinforcing the securocratic interests of the state in relation to Kashmir. Ultimately, the political economy of feelings based on loyalty and suspicion results in a militarization of citizenship in Gilgit-Baltistan. It embodies forms of emotional regulation that are paradoxical yet not contradictory: loyalty to an employment-giving military integrates people into the nation and accomplishes rule by creating consent, while suspicion services state power by emotionally disintegrating the region and hindering the possibilities of regional political solidarity and resistance.

BETWEEN BEAUTY AND TERROR

Far from being a harbinger of order, thus, the delusional state in Pakistan ironically thrives by producing a state of disorder—one that is very much perceived as such by Gilgit-Baltistani subjects and constantly critiqued for its duplicity and dangerousness. The spectacular deception of the state, however, is erased in the national imaginary because the region itself is projected as the source of danger instead of state policy. Delusion after all is always underpinned by denial. Simultaneously, the political repression and religious manipulation in Gilgit-Baltistan is invisibilized by the continued representation of the region as a mythical space of immense beauty. Indeed, in national texts and self-imaginings, the region's mountains, glaciers and forests are made central to the very definition of the physical structure, geographical landscape, and ecological constitution of the Pakistani nation and state. This aesthetic politics of nature constitutes another aspect of the affective production of state power in Gilgit-Baltistan, as the imagination and incorporation of the region within the Pakistani nation/state is centrally grounded in the emotional attachments invoked by nature. If maps produce the geo-body of the nation—as Winichakul (1997) has argued—then representational practices surrounding the ecology of particular regions serve to constitute what I call the eco-body of the nation, converting natural splendor into territorial essence and epitome.[11] Moreover, I demonstrate how this eco-body is configured on the ground through