Introduction

How do states come to succeed or fail in co-managing international crises? This is an important question to ask. These days, purely unilateral crisis responses are the exception. Attempts to arrive at joint responses with other states and involving international organisations are the rule. This applies to all kinds of crises, ranging from health to environmental ones, and from economic to military ones. From 2014 to 2015, when the Ebola outbreak in West Africa occurred, Guinea, Liberia, Mali, Nigeria and Sierra Leone, along with global actors such as the United States, China and the European Union (EU) and international organizations ranging from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), via the African Union (AU) and the United Nations (UN) to the World Health Organization (WHO), attempted to curb the epidemic together. In 2004, when a tsunami in the Indian Ocean killed more than 200,000 people, states in the region, acting partly through the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN), as well as global actors such as the United States and the World Bank, tried to take co-ordinated steps to help the affected states cope with the aftermath. From 2007 to 2008, a plethora of actors tried to cope with the global financial crisis. This involved many states, which occasionally put co-ordinating fora such as the G20 and international organizations such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to use.

Crises about war and peace are anything but an exception in this regard. Since 2014, competing coalitions of states have sought to shape the outcome of the secessionist conflict in Ukraine's Donbass region. They have often fuelled rather than coped with the crisis successfully, but there were phases when a broader crisis co-management yielded some success. Belarus, France, Germany and Russia, partly working through the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) helped to establish a cease-fire between the Ukrainian government and the separatists in 2015. The number of states trying to address the Syrian civil war exceeds twenty. By splitting into competing coalitions, they, too, often escalate rather than de-escalate the situation. Yet even in Syria there

were some successes of a broader co-management. After the first confirmed chemical weapons attack, states with very different positions, including China, Denmark, Germany, Italy, Russia and the United States, working through the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), made the Syrian government destroy stockpiles of chemical weapons.

Evolving diplomatic practices addressing such crises reflect this turn towards crisis co-management. In the last couple of decades, new diplomatic formats were invented to facilitate co-management, for instance contact groups at the United Nations in New York. These are a legacy of the violent breakdown of Yugoslavia. Existing formats were adapted, often on an ad hoc basis, in order to make them usable as crisis co-management bodies. This way, diplomatic fora such as the G8 became important facilitators for reaching agreements on issues squarely outside of their original prerogatives, for example putting an end to the Kosovo War. Solidarity clauses, long lying dormant, came to be used for managing crises together. This applies to Article 5 of the Atlantic Charter (invoked by the United States after the 11 September 2001 attacks) as much as it does to Article 42(7) of the Treaty on European Union (invoked by France after the 13 November 2015 attacks). Two years later, and despite all its problems amidst Brexit as well as deep disagreements about migration and economics, the EU initiated the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) in order to integrate twenty-five national armed forces.

The literature on international crises, however, seriously lags behind this turn towards crisis co-management. Crisis management remains to be analysed as something that is done by a state alone. This book reaches beyond these confines. Building upon existing research, it takes seriously the insights on reasoning (George 1969; Janis 1972; Lebow 1981; Goldgeier 1994) and communication (Mueller 1973; Fearon 1994; Entman 2004) produced by earlier studies. At the same time, it adapts these to study broader and more diverse settings. It remains important to study how leaders come to figure out what to do. But this figuring out what to do is not just about what stance a single state is to take in a crisis, but also about how it is to assert itself while interacting with other co-managing states. Studying domestic communicative flows remains as important as ever. They push and shove the reasoning of leaders. But international ones, ranging from summit diplomacy to transnational encounters, are equally important. They leave a mark on the reasoning of leaders, too.

My usage of the concepts of 'crisis' and 'crisis management' follows much of the existing literature. A crisis is a series of unfolding events that poses a major threat to what actors hold dear, involves high degrees of

uncertainty, and makes it appear to these actors that they have to act fast in order to prevent things from getting even worse than they already are (Freedman 2014; Boin et al. 2016: 5–7). Crises are triggered by disruptive events (Brecher and Wilkenfeld 1997: 5) that actors interpret as a stark escalation. They end with events that actors understand as a marked de-escalation. Crisis management is the process through which actors try to defuse a crisis. They attempt to decrease the risks of further escalation and work towards de-escalation (Swaine 2006: 3). I borrow the concept of co-management from other fields of study.[1] For the purposes of this book, crisis co-management is simply the process through which actors try to defuse a crisis together.

Explaining crisis co-management poses a number of analytical challenges. Some of these are identical to the ones research on crisis management has grappled with for decades. Most importantly, there is the persisting question of how leaders come to make up their minds. Research on crisis management has produced many important debates on this issue, but it is further away than ever from settling these debates. Other analytical challenges are due to this book's focus on co-management. There is an array of different communicative encounters. The interaction of leaders with and across domestic actors, such as advisors, journalists and, more broadly speaking, public opinion, await analysis. So do the sometimes more direct and sometimes more diffuse communicative flows of leaders with one another and other actors in the international realm. This applies not only to private diplomatic encounters (Holmes 2013; Bjola 2014) but also to public diplomacy (Melissen 2005; Pamment 2012), transnational journalism (Seib 2010; Williams 2011) and transnational activist networks (Keck and Sikkink 1998; Tarrow 2011).

In order to meet these analytical challenges, I develop a novel theoretical framework. Its conceptual building blocks are *judgement* and *justification*. Making judgements is practical reasoning. Actors orient themselves by selecting universals from a constellation of repertoires at their disposal and subsuming the particulars of an unfolding situation under these universals. Again putting this constellation to use, actors communicate with one another about whether there are good reasons for their judgements. These two building blocks are conceptually linked together by a *three-circuit map*. Actors make pre-judgements (*perimeter circuit*), revisit these while exchanging justifications (*resonance circuit*), and

[1] Studies on international crises hardly use the term, and, if so, merely in passing (Zhao 2007: 623). Research on fisheries employs the concept frequently (Richard and Pike 1993; Jentoft and McCay 1995; Carr and Schreiber 2002; Defeo and Castilla 2005). So do studies on health policies (Unger et al. 2006) and disaster relief (Tompkins 2005).

these processes of judging and justifying feed back into the constellation of repertoires (*structuration circuit*).

This map helps trace the pathways through which states come to co-manage international crises. Co-management becomes possible if there are *overlaps* across the repertoires leaders put to use; their perimeter judgements, selecting universals from these overlaps, come to *intersect*; and resonance judgements, pushing and shoving these perimeter judgements closer together, become more *consonant*. These intersections and consonances widen the *overlaps* across repertoires, making it easier for the leaders to arrive at intersecting perimeter judgements and consonant resonance judgements when co-managing the next crisis.

At the same time, the map also underlines how difficult it is for states to co-manage international crises. Even if there are overlaps across national repertoires, these are not necessarily put to use by leaders making perimeter judgements. Leaders may rely on idiosyncratic universals,[2] or privilege universals that are confined to a state rather than shared beyond it. Even if leaders draw heavily from universals that are shared across state boundaries, consonances may prove to be elusive in the resonance circuit. With flows of communication often moving more easily within states than across states, consonances are not always easily produced. What is worse, the structuration circuit may engrave the lack of intersections and consonances in the constellation of repertoires for some time to come. Due to these diminished overlaps, leaders find it even more difficult to co-manage the next international crisis.

This book puts the three-circuit map to use to analyse how states come to succeed or fail to co-manage international crisis in which war and peace are at stake. My focus on this kind of crisis is not to suggest that other kinds – I mentioned health, environmental and economic above – do not matter. They, too, are worthy of being studied[3] and the conclusion of this book sketches the applicability of the three-circuit map to examine these kinds of crisis. But in times in which military expenditure continues to rise in several parts of the world, new nuclear powers arise (e.g., North Korea), major international disputes – often territorial in nature – remain unresolved (e.g., Russia–Ukraine), the positioning of great powers appears to change, these powers intervene militarily on opposite sides of violent conflicts (e.g., Syria), or embolden other powers and warring factions to

[2] Some scholars refer to these as schemas (Axelrod 1973; Goldgeier 1994; Larson 1994; Fiske 2010).
[3] Scrutinising how actors employ securitising strategies and practices (Buzan and Wæver 1998; Hansen 2015; Wæver 2015; Senn 2017) to make sense of these kinds of crisis should be high up on the research agenda.

wage war (e.g., Yemen), studying crises in which war and peace are at stake remains as important as ever.

My empirical research puts under scrutiny how three crisis co-managers – France, Germany and the United Kingdom – together came to succeed or fail to manage four international crises – Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq. During these crises, the three co-managers were connected by a dense web of international institutions designed to co-manage international crises, especially the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) but also the EU and the OSCE. Furthermore, they were all allied with the United States, which asserted itself strongly during the crises in Afghanistan and Iraq. Nevertheless, the co-management record varied significantly across these four crises. During the Bosnian Crisis, it took France, Germany and the United Kingdom years to take more determined action. During the Kosovo Crisis, they moved much faster towards peace enforcement. While the three co-managers supported the United States during the Afghanistan Crisis, France and Germany came to vigorously oppose the Washington-led and London-supported war against Iraq. What explains this variance?

The three-circuit map provides a highly useful conceptual guidance for analysing how France, Germany and the United Kingdom came to succeed or fail to co-manage the four international crises under scrutiny. My analysis focuses on the judgements of the leaders in power during the analysed crises (François Mitterrand, Jacques Chirac, Helmut Kohl, Gerhard Schröder, John Major and Tony Blair), how these judgements gave rise to justifications sent by them, and how justifications sent by others reshaped these judgements. At the risk of oversimplifying and cherry-picking among my empirical findings, I briefly summarise these findings, moving from overlaps (prior constellation) via intersections (perimeter circuit) and consonances (resonance circuit) back to overlaps (structuration).

Prior to the onset of the Bosnian Crisis, there were dominant – albeit not uncontested – repertoires on how to deal with international crises in France, Germany, and the United Kingdom. These nationally dominant repertoires diverged from one another to a considerable extent. There were, for instance, universals on *Realpolitik* and the use of force in the French and British repertoires while military restraint was widely shared in Germany. The prevailing repertoires in France, Germany and the United Kingdom included universals of friendship with the United States but interpreted this friendship differently. The dominant French interpretation was about not aligning itself with the United States, the British one about a special relationship, and the German one was situated in between. But there were also *notable overlaps across national repertoires*.

These included emphases on human rights and democracy, diplomatic means of crisis management, and the rule of international law. The six leaders under scrutiny shared most of the universals constituting the dominant repertoires in their countries, including cross-national convergences and divergences. But they also embraced some idiosyncratic (interpretations of) universals. Some of these diminished overlaps across national boundaries, such as Mitterrand's reliance on old alliances and Blair's strong interpretation of the special relationship. Others, for example Schröder's pragmatic interpretation of military restraint, added to existing overlaps.

During all four crises under analysis, the *perimeter circuits yielded some intersections* across the perimeter judgements of the leaders. The intersections were largest during the crises in Kosovo and Afghanistan. Chirac, Schröder and Blair saw the Kosovo crisis very much in light of Bosnia. After 11 September 2001, the three leaders relied heavily on their friendship universals with the United States. Intersections were significantly smaller during the crises in Bosnia and Iraq. Only when Chirac replaced Mitterrand and the genocide at Srebrenica added to the leaders' pre-judgements did the intersections across the French, German and British leaders increase to an extent that allowed them to move beyond coercive diplomacy in Bosnia. Intersections remained very tentative throughout the Iraq Crisis, when Blair relied as heavily on the special relationship and his demarcation from Saddam Hussein, as Chirac and Schröder built their understandings of the crisis on multilateralism and the 'actorness' of the EU. But even during this crisis, there were some intersections, for instance the shared intuition to seek UN authorisation for the intervention.

During the crises in Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan, justificatory encounters *made the leaders' judgements more consonant*. Partly, this was due to the three leaders pushing and shoving one another's judgements. Chirac's interventionist justifications left a mark on Kohl and Major during the latter stages of the Bosnian Crisis, and his multilateralist justifications were also quite successful in building upon Schröder's and even Blair's pre-judgements early on during the Kosovo Crisis. Blair's justifications were successful in pushing Chirac's and Schröder's judgements more towards intervention during the crises in Kosovo and Afghanistan, while Chirac's and Schröder's justifications contributed to moving Blair's judgements towards a diplomatic ending of these crises. Partly, this was due to a range of other actors, ranging from civil society to political advisors and international bureaucrats to other leaders of befriended nations, most of all the United States. All in all, these actors helped create more consonances than dissonances during the Balkan

crises and the Afghanistan Crisis. With the Iraq Crisis, it was a different matter altogether. While exchanging justifications made the judgements of Chirac and Schröder increasingly consonant, it *generated more and more dissonances between Chirac's and Schröder's judgements on the one hand and Blair's on the other*. Direct encounters between the three leaders played their part in producing this divide. So did justificatory pressures emanating from other domestic and international sources. Public opinion and the George W. Bush Administration featured especially prominently.

Judging and justifying during these four crises *did not leave the overlaps across repertoires prevailing in France, Germany and the United Kingdom untouched*. As alluded to above, the structuration effects of the Bosnian Crisis increased the overlaps. The particular of Srebrenica became a new universal. This was of crucial importance for the co-management of the Kosovo Crisis. Another important change was the reinterpretation of the military restraint universal in Germany during the Balkan crises. Pacifistic interpretations weakened while more pragmatic ones became stronger. There were, however, also structuration effects that diminished cross-national overlaps. Blair's idiosyncratic universals, especially his linkage of ethical foreign policy and the use of military force as well as his strong interpretation of the special relationship, made it more and more into the dominant repertoire. This moved the British repertoire further away from the French and German ones during the Kosovo and Afghanistan crises. Chirac's heavy emphasis on multipolarity and balancing the hegemony of the United States, also increasingly finding their way into the dominant French repertoire, contributed to this drifting apart of repertoires, too. Without these developments, it is impossible to understand the failures to co-manage the Iraq Crisis.

These findings contribute to three clusters of the scholarly literature. First, they *move the study of crisis management towards the study of crisis co-management*. It remains as important as ever to understand the reasoning of leaders. They matter a great deal during crises. It remains as important as ever to grasp domestic communication flows and how they affect the reasoning of leaders. Leaders do not stand apart from politics, not even during a crisis. They are embedded in it and politics, especially in crisis situations, revolves very much around communication. At the same time, however, it has become more important than ever to analyse communication that transcends state boundaries as well. The three-circuit map provides an analytical device for tracing how the pre-judgements of leaders are moulded in domestic, international and even transnational communicative encounters. Direct communication among leaders as well as more indirect communication across state boundaries, ranging from international bureaucrats to journalists, and from foreign ministers to

civil society activists, are of major salience as well. They, too, play their part in moving vague prejudgements towards more concrete judgements on how a situation is like and what is to be done about it.

Second, this book *adds to our understanding of the dynamics of security governance* broadly conceived, including alliances and security communities. Analysing these dynamics requires paying close attention to how leaders reason and how they revisit this reasoning while communicating with others. It is, for the sake of parsimony, tempting to reduce reasoning to computation based on exogenously given preferences (Dover 2005; Davidson 2011). It is also tempting to circumvent studying communicative processes by assuming communicative encounters within coalition governments (Auerswald and Saideman 2014) or parliaments (Houben 2005; Baltrusaitis 2010) to yield predictable political outcomes. The findings of this study, however, underline that such analytical shortcuts, employed in literatures on NATO burden-sharing and EU crisis responses, come at a considerable analytical cost. Reasoning is much messier and communicative flows much more complex. Furthermore, these processes of reasoning and communication have repercussions for the aftermath of a crisis, too. Judging and justifying with and against one another broadens and diminishes, respectively, the pool of shared ideas available for co-managing the next crisis. This is an important finding that adds to our understanding of how the ideas constituting a security community (Deutsch 1957; Adler and Barnett 1998; Williams and Neumann 2000; Zaiotti and Mérand 2014; Bremberg 2016) evolve.

Third, this study *contributes to international relations theory*. Not only does it highlight the importance of studying micro-foundations (judgements) and communicative interaction (justifications) in detail but it also provides a map for how to put the interplay between them under close scrutiny. The three-circuit map, along with an epistemological perspective that I label compositionist pragmatism, is sufficiently broad as to allow the analyst to trace the winding roads of reasoning and communication that agents travel, as opposed to super-imposing overly narrow scholarly categories onto these winding roads. Most importantly, the three-circuit map does not a priori take sides in debates about logics of action. While I caution against reducing consequentialist reasoning to rational choice assumptions, I borrow from (social-)psychological accounts of reasoning that by no means exclude consequentialism (Tetlock 2005; Kahneman 2011). My findings also allude to traces of appropriateness (Berger 1996; Herman 1996), argumentation (Müller 1994; Risse 2000) and practice (Pouliot 2008; Hopf 2010) in the processes through which leaders come to make up their minds. They also provide evidence for the salience of dimensions of human reasoning that

routinely remain sidelined in scholarly debates. Emotions (Lebow 2005; Druckman and McDermott 2008) are among these. Actors routinely intertwine what scholars, almost equally routinely, keep apart or even neglect altogether.

This book is organised into six chapters. The first reviews existing research on international crises, develops the three-circuit map, and outlines my methodology. The second uncovers the constellation of repertoires across France, Germany and the United Kingdom, including the idiosyncratic universals held by Mitterrand, Chirac, Kohl, Schröder, Major and Blair. The third chapter considers the case of Bosnia, the fourth Kosovo, the fifth Afghanistan and the sixth Iraq. In order to ensure the comparability of my findings across these crises, I structure all empirical chapters on the successes and failures of crisis co-management in exactly the same fashion, first comparing the perimeter circuits of the French, German and British leaders, then the resonance circuits, and, finally, the structuration circuits. The conclusion summarises my findings, discusses their implications, and draws up an agenda for further research.