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According to the received view in epistemology, inferential knowledge from non-knowledge is impossible – that is, in order for a subject to know the conclusion of their inference, they must know the essential premises from which that conclusion is drawn. In this book, Federico Luzzi critically examines this view, arguing that it is less plausible than intuition suggests and that it can be abandoned without substantial cost. In a discussion that ranges across inference, testimony and memory he analyses the full range of challenges to the view, connecting them to epistemological cases that support those challenges. He then proposes a defeater-based framework which allows the phenomenon of knowledge from non-knowledge across these three epistemic areas to be better understood. His book will be of interest to a wide range of readers in epistemology.

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Inference, Testimony and Memory

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Preface

According to a widely accepted view in epistemology, competently deducing a conclusion from a known premise yields knowledge of that conclusion. The principle of Knowledge Closure that expresses this view is a firm and common tenet of a wide variety of epistemological theories. Fred Dretske's arguments (1969, 1970, 1971) that relations such as 'is evidence for' and 'is conclusive reason for' are not closed under competent deduction first cast doubt on what used to be a comfortable assumption. To cite his famous example, casual medium-distance observation of a striped equine in a zoo pen marked 'Zebra' provides strong, perhaps even conclusive, evidence for the proposition *the animal in the pen is a zebra*; yet it fails to provide strong or conclusive evidence for the entailed proposition *the animal is not a mule cleverly disguised by zoo authorities to look like a zebra.* Obtaining strong or conclusive evidence for the latter proposition requires more meticulous investigation (close-up inspection, DNA testing, etc.) which the subject might not have undertaken. It is not unnatural to think on the basis of this case that it is possible for a subject to know *the animal in the pen is a zebra*, but not know *the animal is not a mule cleverly disguised to look like a zebra*, despite recognizing that the former proposition entails the latter. Over the past five decades, a minority of epistemologists have been persuaded to abandon Knowledge Closure on the basis of this kind of case, which has forced the majority of epistemologists to think hard how to best reconcile this kind of case with their commitment to Knowledge Closure. The underlying question to this important debate has been: is knowing the premise of one's inference always *sufficient* for acquiring knowledge of the conclusion by competent deduction alone?

Much less attention, however, has been given to the flip side question: is knowing the premise of one's inference always *necessary* for acquiring knowledge of the conclusion by competent deduction alone? The principle of Knowledge Counter-Closure, according to which inferential knowledge of the conclusion is only to be had if one knows the premise, is *prima facie*

very plausible, so much so that it has made its way unchallenged into epistemology textbooks and is assumed without argument by several philosophers. Yet surprisingly, this principle is also subject to what appear to be flat-out counterexamples. Ted Warfield (2005) was the first to draw significant attention to cases of alleged deductive knowledge from a false premise, and he sparked several critical responses seeking to explain away the challenge to Knowledge Counter-Closure. Peter Murphy (2013, 2015) subsequently proposed two further kinds of cases: inferential knowledge from a premise that the subject does not believe and inferential knowledge from a premise that the subject believes with insufficient justification. I have argued that challenge cases involving a specific kind of Gettiered premise, from which a subject gains deductive knowledge of their conclusion, gives pause for thought to various theories wishing to accommodate Knowledge Counter-Closure (Luzzi 2010, 2012a, 2012b). Importantly, these criticisms of Knowledge Counter-Closure have proceeded independently of one another. One of the elements of novelty of this book consists in its examination *in concert* of different types of counterexamples to Knowledge Counter-Closure; thus the breadth of the phenomenon of knowledge from non-knowledge is recognized and given due consideration.

The primary aim of this book, then, is to bring to the fore critical discussion of Knowledge Counter-Closure, thereby going some way towards redressing the imbalance between the question of sufficiency and the question of necessity. The ambitious aim is to convince the reader that Knowledge Counter-Closure should be abandoned, but I will be happy enough if the reader is led to submit any merely pre-theoretical endorsement of this principle to critical scrutiny, even if ultimately they decide that espousing this principle is worthwhile, despite the costs I outline for this position. After an introduction of the standard view that endorses Knowledge Counter-Closure (Chapter 1), I lay out the landscape of the debate on cases of knowledge from falsehood (Chapter 2) and on knowledge from justified, true yet unknown (i.e., Gettiered) belief (Chapter 3). In particular, in Chapter 2 some difficulties for those who deny the possibility of knowledge from a false premise are described, and responses to recent criticisms levelled to Warfield's original cases are provided. In Chapter 3, I examine how justified, true yet unknown belief in a premise may give rise to deductive knowledge from non-knowledge for mainstream epistemological views and for two departures from traditional epistemology: epistemic contextualism and interest-relative invariantism. A further important result of Chapter 3 is that one's stance on knowledge from Gettiered belief has implications for one's stance on certain cases of

knowledge from falsehood. This validates the importance of a more holistic approach that investigates the different kinds of knowledge from non-knowledge in concert.

In Chapter 4, a picture of an epistemological view that denies Knowledge Counter-Closure, and which thereby admits the possibility of some forms of inferential knowledge from non-knowledge, is clarified. This helps pave the way for a rejection of this principle. In particular, it is argued that rejecting Knowledge Counter-Closure carries no bad consequence. The difference between epistemically suspicious cases of 'easy knowledge' (Cohen 2002, 2005) and 'transmission failure' (Wright 1985, 2000, 2002, 2003, 2004a, 2004b, 2014) on the one hand, and legitimate cases of knowledge from non-knowledge, on the other hand, is made clear. I argue for two further theses: Knowledge Counter-Closure can be replaced by principles that perform all the work we expect from that principle but are not vulnerable to the challenge cases afflicting it, and not all proposed forms of knowledge from non-knowledge in the literature are genuine. A broadening of lens brings us to consider the possibility of knowledge from non-knowledge for multi-premise inference.

Two more substantial broadenings of focus occur in Chapters 5 and 6. In Chapter 5, we examine the roughly parallel debate on knowledge from non-knowledge in the epistemology of testimony. In this relatively more mature debate, the orthodox view that testimonial knowledge of p requires that the speaker know p was first attacked by Jennifer Lackey (1999, 2008), who proposed several putative cases of testimonial knowledge from non-knowledge. After presenting the current state of play, a first comparison is made between inferential and testimonial knowledge from non-knowledge, which appeals to an explanatory defeater-based framework. While I am sympathetic to Lackey's view that testimonial knowledge from non-knowledge is possible, I claim that she underestimates the number of types of testimonial knowledge from non-knowledge. In particular, I argue *contra* Lackey that testimonial knowledge from unsafe belief is possible. Additionally, I buttress support for the existence of testimonial knowledge from non-knowledge by pointing out some serious problems for the most well-articulated defence of the orthodox view, put forward by Elizabeth Fricker (2006a).

Chapter 6 examines the debate on knowledge from non-knowledge in the epistemology of memory, where the orthodox view, according to which knowing p via memory requires one to have known p at a prior time, was attacked by Lackey (2005, 2008) and explicitly defended by Thomas Señor (2007). Again, while I am sympathetic to Lackey's

conclusion that we should admit mnemonic forms of knowledge from non-knowledge into our epistemology, I disagree over which kinds of case clinch this conclusion. I conclude my discussion in Chapter 7 with a comparison among the varieties of knowledge from non-knowledge for the three sources of inference, testimony and memory, and some explanatory remarks are offered. If I am correct, then the common distinction between preservative and generative sources of knowledge – according to which testimony, memory and inference are purely preservative while, for example, perception and introspection are generative – is less compelling than many take it to be.

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