

Introduction

On May 17, 1958, motorists on the Yamaguchi–Hiroshima highway were stopped along the roadside to allow an unusual procession to pass. The road was dominated by a caravan of dignitaries dressed up as high samurai officials, traveling in palanquins carried by pole bearers in loin-cloths and accompanied by an eclectic mix of sword-carrying samurai, motorized police, and Boy Scouts. The procession wound its way from Hagi to take part in celebrations for the Hiroshima Recovery Exposition and the reconstruction of Hiroshima Castle out of steel-reinforced concrete.¹ Having entered the exhibition site, the contrast between this reenactment of an Edo-period (ca. 1603–1868) tribute mission and its contemporary setting became even more pronounced. The caravan paraded past a Soviet satellite exhibit and an American Atoms for Peace pavilion that included a display on the atomic bombing of Hiroshima, complete with a mummified horse displaying keloid scars from the blast.

The Hiroshima Recovery Exposition celebrated Hiroshima's rise from the ashes and presented a bold vision of the new Japan: modern, slick, technologically advanced, with space-age displays, shiny electric consumer products, and model bullet trains. The reconstruction of the bombed-out castle and the revival of ancient pageantry may seem incongruous in this modernist moment, but Hiroshima – like dozens of other cities across Japan – rebuilt its castle in order to reach toward both the future and the pre-imperial past to recapture a sense of collective identity lost amidst the physical and moral ruins of defeat. There was no place in this narrative for the castle's role in Japan's recent imperial past. The castle was converted to an Imperial Japanese Army garrison in 1873, and hosted the Meiji emperor and the Imperial General Headquarters in Japan's first major modern war against China in 1894–1895. The army presence in and around Hiroshima Castle steadily increased throughout the following decades, dominating urban life and

¹ Hiroshima bunka zaidan Hiroshima-jō, eds. *Hiroshima-jō no 50 nen*. Hiroshima: Hiroshima-shi shiminkyoku bunka supōtsu bu bunkazai tantō, 2008. p. 37.

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earning Hiroshima a designation as a “military city.” By 1945, Hiroshima Castle held the 2nd General Army, responsible for the defense of all of western Japan, contributing to the city’s fate as the target for the first atomic bombing.

The marriage of reinforced concrete and premodern aesthetics in post-war castle reconstructions erased their imperial history, and brought together different worlds separated by a gulf of empire, war, and devastation. Official brochures proudly displayed modern elevators and air conditioning alongside advertisements by the many companies who donated to castle reconstructions. The great pride castle builders took in the modernity of their reconstructions has largely disappeared in the twenty-first century. Indeed, although castles are among the best-known symbols of Japan, the unabashed modernity of the dozens of twentieth-century reconstructions is jarring to many Japanese and foreign tourists. The interiors of most postwar castles are marked by institutional lightning and décor more befitting a government office than a supposed historical reconstruction. Websites with information on castles in Japan often include comments lamenting the scarcity of “authentic” castles. A range of publications and websites is dedicated to “dodgy castle keeps” (*ayashii tenshu*), reveling in the ahistorical and even fantastic character of many reconstructions. Reflecting this sentiment, a wave of new castle reconstructions beginning in the 1990s has dispensed with concrete and opted instead for “authenticity,” using traditional building methods and materials. Many more projects are currently under way. In Nagoya, in March 2017, the City Council approved the contribution of public funds as part of a projected total of 50 billion yen (roughly US\$450 million) to rebuild the concrete keep of Nagoya Castle out of wood by 2022. The keep was closed in May 2018 and demolition work is under way at the time of writing.

From the medieval period to the present day, castles everywhere have fulfilled functional and symbolic roles. Functional roles include their use as fortifications, residences, and tourist destinations, while they have been used to symbolize authority, identity, tradition, and modernity. From the nineteenth century onward, castles underwent transformations that accompanied broader changes in historical perceptions, and this book seeks to establish the centrality of castles to Japan’s modern history. Castles, we argue, have been tools for crafting identities, and the transformations of modern Japan are clearly reflected in the changing meanings and uses of castles. The existence and characteristics of castles have been key factors in Japan’s historical development. Whether celebrating tradition or the latest technology, or redefining regional or national identity, Japan’s castles are first and foremost citadels of modernity.

This role was especially significant in the context of the militarization and demilitarization of Japanese society either side of 1945. We seek to demonstrate that castles were central to the unique process of military mobilization that began in the late nineteenth century and ultimately became comprehensive in the 1930s. Although several castles saw combat in the 1870s and had real military importance up to the Second World War, their main function was as symbols of power and authority. After being the centers of Japan's major "castle towns" for almost three centuries, in the Meiji period (1868–1912), many castles became garrisons for the modern imperial army. Many others were repurposed as parks, reconfigured to host schools and administrative buildings, or simply left to decay. The absence of a nationwide policy regarding castles made them potent sites in struggles over interpretations of history and identity. At the same time, castles were physical spaces that brought together civilians and the military, leading to an identification between the two through their idealized martial history.

Throughout the twentieth century and beyond, castles have served as symbolic venues for both national and local authorities to assert their own particular view of the past. In the early 1900s, nostalgia for a rapidly vanishing past led civil society groups and municipalities to call for the preservation and restoration of castles. In the 1950s, when many Japanese sought to forget their immediate imperial history and to connect with the more peaceful Edo period, castles were some of the most important sites for the "invention" of the past. In contrast, castles served a similar purpose for those who desired to invoke medieval warriors in order to reconstruct a martial masculinity that had been rendered unacceptable by defeat and occupation. While the meanings and uses of castles have evolved over time, in this study, we examine the history of castles *as castles* in modern Japan. The awareness that a space was originally a castle, rather than just a park, sports field, army base, or municipal building, is important, and we treat castles as they were seen by contemporaries. This study also benefits from the approaches and insights that comprise what has become known as the "spatial turn" in historical research, which has only recently entered the study of Japan's urban history.² This study accordingly takes into account the scale and physical location of castles, as these were decisive factors for the impact castles had on both their occupants and greater society.

² Schmidtpott, Katja. "Indifferent Communities: Neighbourhood Associations, Class and Community Consciousness in Pre-War Tokyo," in Christoph Brumann and Evelyn Schulz, eds. *Urban Spaces in Japan: Cultural and Social Perspectives*. Abingdon: Routledge, 2012. pp. 125–147, at p. 126.

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The tension between local and national interests and identities is a second core theme explored in this book, and castles have been an important stage for these debates. From the Meiji period to war with China in the 1930s, castles were highly contested spaces between national and regional actors, as well as between different groups within these camps. Castles and the historical figures with whom they were associated became focal points for regional identity, but were simultaneously capable of being integrated into the national whole. Castles were seen as uniquely Japanese structures, with local castles remaining safely patriotic while being distinguished by local characters and characteristics. In the postwar decades, with appeals to nationalism deemed suspect, castles were vital tools for “recapturing” local identities that could distance Japan’s regions from the discredited imperial state.³ At the same time, many postwar reconstructions grew out of earlier projects that had been postponed due to the war, while others involved castles destroyed by Allied bombing. The postwar repackaging of prewar castle projects, in light of issues of local and national identity, provides insight on the complexities of trans-war continuity and change.

Recent scholarship has examined Japan’s civil society and its relationship with the modern state, and this interaction is the third main focus of this book.⁴ Conflicts over castle reconstruction and preservation present a unique opportunity to examine the changing character and role of civil society in modern Japan. Beginning in the Meiji period, civil society groups, consisting mostly of elites close to the former Tokugawa shogunate, petitioned and collected money to preserve their former castles and/or to turn them into public parks – a new concept imported from the West. Civil society groups working with municipalities drove the vast majority of castle preservation works and reconstructions in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. In the imperial period, these projects demonstrated the vibrancy of a civil society that was willing and able to challenge the military and government. Building and maintaining castles is both

³ Laura Hein has observed a related dynamic for local arts in the 1950s. See Hein, Laura. “The Art of Bourgeois Culture in Kamakura,” in Christopher Gerteis and Timothy S. George, eds. *Japan since 1945: From Postwar to Post-Bubble*. London: Bloomsbury, 2013. pp. 10–26.

⁴ For example: Sprotte, Maik Hendrik. *Zivilgesellschaft als staatliche Veranstaltung? Eine Spurensuche im Japan vor 1945 (Formenwandel der Bürgergesellschaft – Arbeitspapiere des Internationalen Graduiertenkollegs Halle-Tōkyō*, No. 12). Halle: Martin-Luther-Universität Halle-Wittenberg, 2012; Sprotte, Maik Hendrik and Tino Schölz, eds. *Der mobilisierte Bürger? Aspekte einer zivilgesellschaftlichen Partizipation im Japan der Kriegszeit (1931–1945) (Formenwandel der Bürgergesellschaft – Arbeitspapiere des Internationalen Graduiertenkollegs Halle-Tōkyō*, No. 6). Halle: Martin-Luther-Universität Halle-Wittenberg, 2010.

expensive and of great symbolic importance, and government action concerning castles often met with strong public opposition. Grassroots and popular castle initiatives demonstrate the strength of Japanese civil society groups on issues that, for them, were related primarily to local pride and community improvement, without direct financial benefits to the majority of individuals involved. Examining these developments in depth complicates the traditional state-centered view of Japan's modern history.

This is not to discount the importance of the state for castles from the Meiji period to the present, and castles had multiple meanings and uses even for the state. A fourth important theme in this work is the power relationships between state actors at various levels, and how conflicts over castles revealed the limits of their relative authority. This included the former ruling families (*daimyō*), who were relocated to Tokyo after the Restoration, but often retained considerable influence in their ancestral lands. For those castles that were transferred to the Army Ministry in the Meiji period, the military was the determining factor in their modern history, and also defined their postwar fates as they were decommissioned, taken over by US forces, or given over to use by universities, schools, and other public bodies.

Castles have also been sites for observing the complex relationship between the state and religion, especially Shinto, in modern Japan. The religious aspects of castles are the fifth key theme in this book. Castles were frequently selected as the location for shrines that were established throughout the country under the headship of Yasukuni Shrine to celebrate imperial Japan's growing number of war dead. After 1945, these shrines complicated the transfer of castles to civilian authority, as the presence of religious structures on public land conflicted with the official separation of church and state. The fate of these shrines in the postwar period illustrates the difficulties presented by the legacy of prewar and wartime religious policy. The relationship between the state and religion went beyond imperial "State Shinto," however. Conflicts over castle space were also reflected in the history of other religions, including the New Religion Ōmotokyō, which purchased Kameyama Castle in 1919 to relocate its sacred center following government repression. In a postwar case, Buddhist groups obtained American backing to "reclaim" the Kanazawa Castle site where their temple had stood almost four centuries before. Their conflict over the castle site with the secular Kanazawa University also reveals the limits of the occupation's ability to impose its will.

A sixth set of significant themes explored in this book includes changing notions of authenticity, and their relationship to concepts of reconstruction,

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restoration, and recreation.⁵ The evolution of these ideas is evident in Japan's most recent castle reconstruction projects, which use wood and traditional building methods and are considered more appropriate than concrete reconstructions by the vast majority of visitors. Japan has had extensive interactions with international debates on heritage and authenticity. In the case of castles, Japan was influenced by Western-dominated discourses regarding built heritage, but also took its own course. In addition, global discourses on heritage and authenticity have been informed and shaped by concerted Japanese efforts to introduce “non-Western” approaches. This was reflected in the influential 1994 Nara Conference on Authenticity, which had a significant impact on the work of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), and the adoption of Japanese ideas regarding heritage and authenticity has led to a far greater variety of sites and practices being recognized as historically significant.

The seventh key theme is that reconstructed pasts and castles were not uniquely Japanese phenomena. Castle preservation and reconstruction drew on a wide array of developments in Europe and beyond, where other societies faced similar crises of identity in confronting modernity. Japanese attitudes and actions reflected those in other societies at important historical junctures, and this study places Japan's castles into a global comparative framework. For example, the nationwide fascination with castles in the 1950s and 1960s also came to reflect Japan's rehabilitation and reintegration into the international order in a similar approach to architecture seen in Germany and other countries at the time. As some of Japan's most famous national and regional symbols, castles have been valuable barometers of continuity and change from the Edo period to the twenty-first century, and this study demonstrates that while Japan's historical development as a whole took a unique course, it was driven by ideas and motivations that had distinct parallels in other societies.

Considering Castles and *Tenshu*

The “castle-building booms” of the twentieth century reflected the widespread view that no Japanese cityscape is complete without a gleaming white (or, less commonly, black) keep, or *tenshu*, set atop its castle. The *tenshu* often represents the castle – and the city – as a whole, and many modern *tenshu* have been built on castle sites that did not originally

⁵ In this context, the related Japanese terms *fukkō* (復興), *fukugen* (復元), and *fukugen* (復原) are not always clearly differentiated, being used synonymously by some commentators while others use them to distinguish between reconstruction, restoration, and recreation.

have such a structure. Accordingly, in the modern era, castles without a *tenshu* were popularly perceived as less significant, as empty pedestals. This dynamic contributed to the second half of the twentieth century seeing the greatest flurry of *tenshu* construction in more than three centuries, bringing the total up to well over 100 in the year 2000 from roughly twenty in 1900.⁶ In the twenty-first century, financial woes, building regulations, and changing views of authenticity have complicated castle construction and slowed its pace, but dozens of municipalities throughout Japan have high-profile plans to build or rebuild their *tenshu* as soon as possible.

The form and function of Japan's castles have changed considerably over the centuries, as has the very understanding of what is considered to be a "castle." In most cases, "artificial" modern structures, such as newer *tenshu*, are but one part of the larger castle, which may also have original moats, stone walls, earthworks, gates, bridges, and other features. In practical terms, these latter structures were more essential to castles' capabilities as military fortifications, and many castles did not originally have *tenshu*. The wooden *tenshu* constructed in Japan from the late sixteenth century onward were vulnerable to attacks, fires, earthquakes, and decay, and very few survived to the present intact; only twelve *tenshu* in Japan today are more than 100 years old. The massive stone walls and earthworks proved more durable, and provided a base for a wide variety of structures and facilities from the late nineteenth century onward. Nonetheless, even defenses as impressive as the moat and walls of Kumamoto Castle were considered wanting by residents and visitors after its *tenshu* burned down in 1877, and civil society groups vocally pushed for its reconstruction from the 1920s onward.

Similarly, the largest castle in Japan, Edo Castle, is often overlooked in discussions of Japanese castles due to its lack of a *tenshu* since the last one burned down in 1657. In 1888, two decades after the Meiji emperor moved to Edo (renamed Tokyo), the former Edo Castle was officially renamed the "Imperial Castle" (*kyūjō*), emphasizing the designation of "castle" as the locus of authority. This decree was later officially rescinded on July 1, 1948, and the emperor's castle was renamed "Imperial Palace" (*kōkyō*), thereby stripping it of its martial and authoritarian connotations, and signifying the end of almost eighty years of imperial rule.⁷ Even today, the Imperial Palace retains many of its moats, walls, and gates, and its past

⁶ Numbers of *tenshu* are always approximate, as the distinction between *tenshu* and larger watchtowers and turrets (*yagura*) is not universally agreed. An article in the *Asahi shinbun* on May 14, 1935, reflected this uncertainty. "There are now 17 or 18 existing castles across the country, most of which have already been designated national treasures."

⁷ Dajōshō insatsukyoku, ed. *Kanpō*, July 1, 1948. p. 2.

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status as a castle is readily apparent. The Imperial Palace forms the core around which modern Tokyo arose, and reflects the defining role of castles in the design of Japanese cities. Many of the city's place names refer to existing and former gates, moats, and bridges, but in spite of these clear hallmarks, the absence of a *tenshu* greatly aided postwar efforts to downplay the Imperial Palace's origins as a castle. More recently, in an attempt to recover this earlier heritage, civil society groups led by the Rebuild Edo Castle Tenshu Society (founded 2004) have run a high-profile public campaign to reconstruct the *tenshu*.⁸

Unlike walls, ramparts, bridges, and other castle components, *tenshu* fulfilled little or no practical military function throughout their history. Theirs was essentially a symbolic role, projecting authority, power, and wealth to those being ruled. As a result, many premodern castles never had *tenshu*, or they were often left unrepaired after suffering fires or other severe damage. Most Edo-period castles were built in an age that did not see warfare for 250 years, and the construction of effective defenses by regional *daimyō* was severely restricted by the Tokugawa shogunate. By the mid-nineteenth century, advances in military technology had rendered not just *tenshu*, but castles as a whole essentially obsolete. The elegant and picturesque *tenshu* were “grim and efficient only in their stone foundations.”⁹ The fascination with *tenshu* was only heightened by the impermanence of their wooden construction, as only a ruler with real authority could afford such a fragile extravagance. This was further reinforced by popular views regarding the use of *tenshu* in wartime, when warriors supposedly preferred to charge forth from their castles rather than defend their fortifications.¹⁰ In hopeless cases, they would set fire to their own *tenshu* and commit suicide or perish in the flames. The portrayal of early military tactics was heavily influenced by the cultural nationalism and militarism of the imperial period, and used for the “spiritual education” of Japanese soldiers and civilians in the 1930s and 1940s.

As highly prominent symbolic structures, *tenshu* are uniquely suited as vehicles for the study of Japan's modern history from the late Edo period to the present day. While their significance changed over time, their fundamental role as symbols remained unchanged. Their symbolic meaning evolved along with politics and society, allowing us to study major and minor developments through the medium of castles, and *tenshu* in particular. This can be seen, to name just a few examples, in the *tenshu* of Aizu-

⁸ Edo-jō tenshu o saiken suru kai (<http://npo-edojo.org/>) (Accessed February 4, 2019).

⁹ Paine, Robert Treat and Alexander Soper. *The Art and Architecture of Japan*. Baltimore, MD: Penguin, 1955. p. 265.

¹⁰ Hirai, Kiyoshi. *Feudal Architecture of Japan*. New York, NY: Weatherhill, 1973. p. 15.



Figure 0.1 Osaka Castle in 2018. Photo by the authors

Wakamatsu Castle as a symbol of the dying Tokugawa polity in 1868, the reconstruction of the Osaka Castle *tenshu* as a symbol of peace and modernity in 1931 (Figure 0.1), Hiroshima Castle as a symbol of postwar rebirth and recovery in 1958, and the Ōzu Castle *tenshu* as a symbol of the strength of civil society in twenty-first-century Japan. At the same time, symbolism was always contested, and often fiercely so. The postwar castle boom, especially, gave rise to extensive criticisms on aesthetic, financial, moral, and emotional grounds. On a local level, few subjects have excited as much passion in Japan's communities as the fate of their castles, and almost every rebuilt *tenshu* faced controversy from the time it was first suggested.

Modern Castles on the Margins

Premodern castles have been the subject of considerable archaeological, architectural, and historical research, but scholarship on their modern history was very limited before the twenty-first century, and continues to be largely the domain of a handful of Japanese scholars. One early work

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was Moriyama Eiichi's groundbreaking 1989 collection of documents and data concerning castles around the time of the Meiji Restoration, which continues to be the definitive source on this period.¹¹ More recently, Ichisaka Tarō has taken a more analytical approach, exploring whether castles in the 1860s and 1870s were symbols of power or also served a practical military purpose.¹² The past decade has seen a proliferation of works on modern castles, reflecting a growing awareness of the importance of castles for researchers working on many different aspects of modern Japanese history.

In comparison with the growing literature on the Meiji history of castles, the history of castles during and after the Showa period (1926–1989) is still largely unexamined. Although the great *tenshu* at Osaka, Nagoya, and elsewhere rapidly became the symbols of their cities and were constructed using the most modern building technologies, they scarcely feature in books on modern Japanese architecture. Studies of premodern castles also tend to ignore the modern reconstructions, although they often use photos of their exteriors. Straddling both modernity and tradition, castle reconstructions have traditionally been neglected by scholars of related fields, and the first limited studies of modern castles only began to appear at the end of the twentieth century. These tend to be case studies focusing on issues such as town planning, urbanization, and tourism, rather than on the castles themselves. Hashitera Tomoko, for example, discusses the use of Osaka Castle as part of her broader work on the development of parks in the Meiji period.¹³ Fukumoto Takeshi and Fujikawa Masaki approach the subject from the perspective of urban planning, criticizing the lack of consideration for the town in modern castle constructions in Ibaraki Prefecture.¹⁴ Studies of Japanese architectural conservation practice and legislation tend to look at shrine and temple architecture, although castles have also found their way into this literature.¹⁵

The past two decades have seen several brief studies on aspects of modern castle reconstructions. Architectural historian Nonaka Katsutoshi, whose

¹¹ Moriyama Eiichi. *Meiji ishin: haijō ichiran*. Tokyo: Shinjinbutsu Ōraisha, 1989.

¹² Ichisaka Tarō. *Bakumatsu ishin no shiro: ken'i no shōchō ka, jissen no yōki ka*. Tokyo: Chūkō Shinsho, 2014.

¹³ Hashitera Tomoko. "Kaienji no Ōsaka-jō kōen to Taishō ki no keikaku an ni tsuite: kindai no Ōsaka-jō shi no riyō ni kan suru kenkyū," *Nihon kenchiku gakkai Kinki shibu kenkyū hōkoku shū*, 2002. pp. 1029–1032.

¹⁴ Fukumoto Takeshi and Fujikawa Masaki. "Kyū jōkamachi no keikan kōzō ni chakumoku shita machidzukuri no kentō: Ibaragi kennai no kinsei jōkamachi o jirei toshite," *Nihon kenchiku gakkai taikai gakujiutsu kōen kōgai shū*, September 2001. pp. 871–872.

¹⁵ Aoyanagi Masanori, Miyagami Shigetaka, Ishii Susumu, Hanyū Shūji, and Fujii Keisuke. "Gendai no 'fukugen' kenchiku o kangaeru," *Kenchiku zasshi* 108:1346 (August 1993), pp. 40–46.