

Introduction

The Work of Parting

Sacrifice is a work of parting. This is a book about that work. More specifically, it is a book about how Augustine saw and practiced the work of parting. It considers what his vision and life can teach about contemporary economics. But it also moves beyond Augustine and his thought to sketch the logic of an economy of sacrifice. That economy is where we live. Life is inherently sacrificial. It is conditioned, throughout, by the work of parting. So our economic transactions are always sacrificial (even when we do not see them that way). Our task is to understand what our sacrifices have to teach us about ourselves and our corporate life – and then to realign our economic culture to better acknowledge that reality now. This book takes on that task.

All economic exchanges involve parting with things that we value. The easiest way to understand these partings is as sacrificial losses, which we accept for the sake of a greater good. But parting with something need not be simply the same as losing it. Thus, sacrificial exchange is not just a means for making loss pay. Augustine, the late antique North African philosopher, theologian, and saint, reminds us of how much is at stake – for our understanding of economic life today – in the difference between giving up what is ours and relinquishing what we share. Instead of seeing sacrifice as a loss accepted for a greater gain, Augustine invites us to see sacrifice as an offering made for the sake of the common good.

When we lose something, we part with what is *ours*. Sacrifice, then, might be a renunciation; or, if the loss is forced, a deprivation. But, in either case, we lose what originally belonged to us. The sacrifice was ours

to make. We have a moral claim on such losses.¹ Sometimes, we expect to be compensated in kind (and then some) for what we give up. At other times, we expect someone else we care about to benefit from our loss. In the second case, we benefit indirectly because we compassionately identify our interests with theirs. But, either way, sacrifice is a *quid pro quo*. As such, it is the opening move in business exchange. It operates according to the logic: “I will make a sacrifice, you will make a sacrifice, and we will both (ostensibly) be better off in the end because of what we get out of the deal.”² But such arrangements depend on something prior: a claim to *own* that with which we are parting.

In contrast, parting without loss is an *offering*. We part with what had never been our own. And we do so by acknowledging a common good that precedes all our conditional property claims. By challenging us to convert our partings from losses into offerings, Augustine unsettles the easy assumption of ownership that underwrites the idea of sacrifice as renunciation or deprivation. For him, sacrifice becomes the work of making an offering of our lives. We do so by turning the things we buy and sell, trade and borrow, into media of openhearted dialogue, which connect us to one another.

Originally, sacrifice meant *sacrum facere* – the work of making things sacred. Augustine shows how the economy of sacrifice makes humans sacred through the work of parting. The things we buy and sell, lend and borrow, give and take – things like money, contracts, goods, or services – are capable of making us sacred by teaching us how to live together with constant openheartedness. We offer something to one another through our economic exchanges. What we offer is not the rights to ownership. It is life, represented through the things that enable and enrich it. And life – our life in the body – is a life of parting. A life of division. Bits and pieces. Some now and some later, and nothing all together here and now.

¹ For one sophisticated account of sacrifice that defines it in terms of dispossession and asymmetry between the sacrifice and its cause, cf. Peter Jonkers, “Justifying Sacrifice,” *Neue Zeitschrift für Systematische Theologie und Religionsphilosophie* 50, no. 3–4 (December 1, 2008), 293.

² In the words of Georg Simmel: “It is above all the exchange of economic values that involves the notion of sacrifice. ... [E]conomic exchange – whether it is of objects of labour or labour power invested in objects – always signifies the sacrifice of an otherwise useful good, however much eudaemonistic gain is involved,” Georg Simmel, *The Philosophy of Money*, trans. Tom Bottomore and David Frisby (London, New York: Routledge Classics, 2011), 86–7.

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But, precisely in and through that life of parting, Augustine sensed the possibility of acknowledging the unparted goodness that gives life to all parting things. For him, that goodness takes on a life in the body and makes it an openhearted offering for all. Humans make that offering within a community that represents the economy of sacrifice. This community turns the transactions of daily life into gestures of openhearted attention, recognition, and devotion.

Sacrifice organizes the logic of exchange and, thereby, the logic of economy. The term *economy of sacrifice* alludes to this structure. But the phrase also suggests something more – and something more enigmatic. Sacrifice orders economy by pointing beyond its own conditions: that is to say, beyond the terms set by its economy. Ultimately, sacrifice releases the relationships that it structures into an offering that it does not structure. And that offering is love: an openhearted acknowledgment of self and others that can be expressed, here and now, in each transaction. Put differently: the term “economy of sacrifice” says two distinct things. First, it names the *economy* to which sacrifice belongs – the context in which it plays an inevitable role. It highlights the fact that any economy depends on exchange relationships. And those exchange relationships inevitably require the work of parting, which is sacrifice. Second, the term “economy of sacrifice” names the *sacrifice* that reveals the economy in which it plays a role for what it really is: namely, an exercise in openhearted detachment from the media with which we part for the sake of the common good that we share with our exchange partners.³

³ These two uses of the term loosely correlate with what Dennis Keenan, the post-structuralist theorist, names “economic” and “aneconomic” sacrifice, *Question of Sacrifice* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2005), 2. However, for Keenan, aneconomic sacrifice is impossible because one only ever gives up something in the context of *some* exchange, no matter how sublimated the terms are: one might make a sacrifice for “a supreme moment of transcendent truth” – yet such a moment is still one term within the sacrificial exchange made to achieve it, *ibid.*, 1. Yet, for Keenan, though aneconomic sacrifice is impossible, it is also (paradoxically) necessary because sacrifice can only be what it is – a “holocaust,” or something burnt whole – aneconomically: one can only truly sacrifice if one expects no reciprocity, looks for no reward, gives something that is utterly consumed in the giving, *ibid.*, 1–2. Given this impossible necessity, the aneconomic moment of sacrifice is always quivering above the economy that it virtually enables. Keenan says that the aneconomic moment gets “inevitably sublated” into the economic (now at a higher level of self-awareness), while this economic moment of sacrifice, in turn, gets inevitably sublated through its “sacrifice” to aneconomic self-transcendence, *ibid.*, 2. This process is apparently interminable: an “eternal return of the same” that is “without reserve” and “inevitably impossible,”

Sacrifice is conversational: a rational dialogue between partners. Thus, seeing our place in the economy of sacrifice means recognizing exchange as a conversation that affords mutual illumination. It means buying and selling as a dialogue in which we give others the authority to teach us about ourselves and vice versa. It means allowing others to help us get the things we want in exchange for helping them get the things they want – while recognizing that such exercises teach us about ourselves by giving us a voice.⁴ Such transactions show us our standing. They reveal how our desires bring us into relationship with one another. Because our needs and desires are different, so are we. Even pedestrian transactions bring home to us our existential singularity. Each of us is alone. That is why we ask each other for help in meeting our needs. Yet, each request also shows us something else: our desire for different things simultaneously links us together. We part, not just to gain – but so that others may also part and gain from us. We ask for help so that we may

ibid., 2–3. There is no end to such sacrificial striving, which Keenan calls the “sacrifice of sacrifice,” cf. *ibid.*, 1–3, 8–9. Yet, Keenan enjoins dwelling at this place of strife, this point at which the aneconomic dimension of sacrifice is always slipping back toward the economy to which it belongs and from which it arises: “*Ours is the moment in history, if only for a moment, that calls for dwelling with this aporia of sacrifice rather than stilling this strange oscillation between the aneconomics and the economical (by sublating the aneconomics into the economical),*” *ibid.*, 3 (emphasis original). Keenan challenges us to make our peace now within this endless interplay: making sacrifice always within an economy, yet always beyond it. There is something real about this fraught dialectic – but also, perhaps, something misleading. Sacrifice, when made as an offering, is always a gesture of repose. Peace. And, most of all, love. Keenan situates sacrifice in the unstable (unlivable?) force field between possibility and its opposite. Or, one could say, between sacrifice as an economic claim to possession and its aneconomic claim to dispossession. But, on my reading, sacrifice is neither: it is *detachment*. Sacrifice affords us a peaceable *paideia* into what has always been true of our economy: namely, that the terms we exchange have never been ours to possess or dispossess. Yet, the truth in the dialectical turmoil of Keenan’s view stems from the inevitable illusion of possession from which an education in sacrificial detachment begins and through which it passes. Think of this as the *felix culpa* of the Augustinian economy of sacrifice. The inevitability of imagining that we possess the things that pass through our hands and hearts is not absolute (as Keenan’s view implies). But, given our experience of fallen attachment and memory – through which we find it inconceivable to fully reimagine a time before the fall, a time where detachment was our native state – this illusion has become inevitable *for us*. And this is where we begin. And this is where we have always begun.

⁴ For an account of business exchange as a conversation that deepens self-understanding and clarifies self-expression through the instruction we offer, in it, to one another, cf. Joshua S. Nunziato and Ronald Paul Hill, “Perfectionism and the Place of the Interior Life in Business: Toward an Ethics of Personal Growth,” *Business Ethics Quarterly* 29, no. 2 (April 2019): 241–68.

provide others what they need by providing them the chance to meet our needs. We offer what we have in order to offer others the chance to offer what they have. True sacrifice expresses itself through the ongoing circuit of exchange – not just through a snatch of monologue. The economy of sacrifice teaches us that we are alone together. This need not mean that our desire for connection perversely isolates us from one another. (Though it certainly can.) Rather, it means (if we will acknowledge it) that we are acknowledged in our singularity through the economy that shows us how to love. Sacrifice, Augustine suggests, is not renunciation or deprivation in the face of a greater good. Rather, it is what we make of life itself when we offer the things of life to others in the service of our common good.

However, sacrifices are not gifts. And the economy of sacrifice is not a gift economy. That Augustinian idea cuts against conventional ways of thinking about sacrifice and sacred offering. In an article of great concision and clarity, Raymond Firth outlines the representative view (which Augustine’s undermines). For Firth, an offering is a particular type of gift, distinguished from other gifts by a difference in status between the one who makes the offering and the one who receives it. (The one who makes an offering is always lower than the one who receives it.)⁵ Sacrifices, in turn, are said to be the subset of offerings that represent a *costly* loss to the one making them.⁶ Firth elaborates: “[S]acrifice is ultimately a personal act, a giving of the self or a part of the self. The self is represented or symbolized by various types of material object. Such a material object must have social significance or value, or the implication will be that the self is trivial or worthless. Part of the theory of sacrifice then is the giving of a valued object involving some immediate personal loss.”⁷ In this view, a sacrifice is a particular kind

⁵ Raymond Firth, “Offering and Sacrifice: Problems of Organization,” *The Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland* 93, no. 1 (1963): 12.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 12–13.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 22. David Weddle provides a variation on the same theme: “[T]he closest we come to a common meaning of *sacrifice* is that of *giving up natural and human goods for spiritual benefits*. In this most inclusive sense, sacrifice is the cost of religion,” *Sacrifice in Judaism, Christianity, and Islam* (New York: New York University Press, 2017), xi. Weddle elaborates, “Religious sacrifice is a costly act of self-giving, in denial of natural inclinations, that is offered in suspense, under conditions that threaten failure, for the purpose of establishing a relation with transcendent reality,” *ibid.*, 22. The Augustinian account of sacrifice I offer here challenges Weddle’s definition nearly point-by-point: sacrifice is an offering of what had never been one’s own. Therefore, it is not a gift or a

of offering; and both sacrifices and offerings are particular kinds of gifts. In contrast, my rendering of Augustine sees sacrifice differently: a sacrifice is only made in the spirit of a gift when the people making it do not fully understand what they are doing – and need to learn the deeper significance of their action. An offering to God is never a gift.⁸ A *gift* implies a prior ownership of the thing given. When we make a gift, we place a claim upon the thing we give: we register our attachment to what we are leaving behind. But, for Augustine, the work of parting teaches us how to make sacrifices as offerings, which acknowledge that what we offer is not – and never was – ours to give up.⁹ From that perspective, Firth conflates the *means* by which acknowledgment is communicated with the communication itself.¹⁰ The real offering is the expression of acknowledgment – not the gift taken to be the means for articulating it. And the offering of acknowledgment can be made (and, ultimately, is always made) without giving up anything that was ever our own.

Perhaps the richest and most sophisticated recent account of sacrifice comes from John Milbank.¹¹ His approach sees sacrifice as gift and

loss or a cost. Sacrifice transforms natural inclinations but does not deny them. Sacrifice is made without suspended expectations because it achieves – in the very offering – everything it seeks: true sacrifice is made without hope of ulterior return. And, finally, sacrifice acknowledges (but does not establish) relationship with a divine reality that always dwells (as Augustine puts it in *The Confessions* (*conf.*) III.vi (11)) more closely to me than I dwell to myself: which is to say, sacrifice recognizes a transcendence more immanent than immanent creatures are to themselves. (All subsequent references to *The Confessions* are abbreviated in text as *conf.* All subsequent Latin references to *conf.* are taken from Augustine and James J. O'Donnell, *Confessions: Introduction and Text*, vol. 1 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012). Sometimes, the English translation of *conf.* given in the text is Augustine, *Confessions* (Confessiones), trans. Henry Chadwick (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998); sometimes it is Augustine, *Confessions*, trans. Albert Outler (London: SCM Press, 1955). I have indicated which translation I use in-text. Where I have departed from either translation to provide my own rendering of Augustine's Latin, I have also noted as much. For the sake of orthographic consistency, I follow the convention of rendering all Latin words containing a consonant *u* form using a *u*.)

⁸ I use the term “offering” to conceptually translate what I think Augustine means by true sacrifices [*vera sacrificia*], when these are circumspectly made.

⁹ In this respect, my reading of Augustine differs from that Eugene Schlesinger, who defines Augustinian sacrifice as “the unreserved gift of self to God,” cf. “The Sacrificial Ecclesiology of *City of God* 10,” *Augustinian Studies* 47, no. 2 (2016): 145.

¹⁰ To his credit, however, Firth does acknowledge – at the close of his article – development in sacrificial thinking toward a “moral act” which he identifies as “a conception at a different level from sacrifice as a material loss,” Firth, “Offering and Sacrifice,” 23.

¹¹ John Milbank, “The Midwinter Sacrifice,” in *Blackwell Companion to Postmodern Theology*, ed. Graham Ward (Oxford: Blackwell, 2001), 107–30.

transforms the economy of sacrifice into an endlessly open gift exchange: “Joyfully estranged from ourselves, we should sometimes find in this loss our gain, and always know that this would finally be so.”¹² The vision of sacrifice presented in the present book is close to Milbank’s. Yet he and I diverge on a central point: I do not see sacrifice as a gift. Rather, sacrifice is an offering that transcends the gift economy of gains and losses and embodies the art of openhearted detachment.¹³ By detachment, I do not mean indifference or apathy – though the term has been used that way to critique economic culture.¹⁴ Instead, I mean a spiritual serenity that sees and loves without grasping or clinging. This means caring

- ¹² Ibid., 121. For his more fully articulated account of gift, in conversation with Marion, Heidegger, and Derrida, cf. Milbank, John, “Can a Gift Be Given?” in *Rethinking Metaphysics*, ed. L.G. Jones and S.E. Fowl (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995).
- ¹³ Rowan Williams sees Augustine as pioneering the insight that changing interpretations of loss are essential to the journey into mature self-understanding, Rowan Williams, “Time and Self-Awareness in the *Confessions*,” in *On Augustine* (London, Oxford, New York: Bloomsbury Continuum, 2016), 5–6. I, perhaps, go beyond Williams in claiming that Augustine would have us ultimately *convert* loss, altogether, into parting. This conversion does not release us from the task of mourning, but it changes the affective texture of grief.
- ¹⁴ William Cavanaugh has used the term *detachment* to refer to the “constant dissatisfaction” of a late capitalist consumer culture driven to commodify (nearly?) everything, William T. Cavanaugh, *Being Consumed: Economics and Christian Desire* (Grand Rapids, Cambridge: Eerdmans, 2008), p. 35. Later in the same chapter, Cavanaugh will offer another definition of detachment, which provides a counterpoint to the first: “In the Christian tradition, detachment from material goods means using them as a means to a greater end, and the greater end is greater attachment to God and to our fellow human beings,” *ibid.*, 52. This second definition of detachment is much closer to what I mean by the word. Nevertheless, even means/end thinking is not quite what I have in mind when I describe the role of exchange media in the economy of sacrifice. To frame material goods solely in terms of their usefulness for getting something else still betrays an attachment to the things being used as tools or instruments. And the intensity of our attachment to the means will vary in direct proportion to the importance of the goal they help us reach. To the extent that “material things” afford the means to an *ultimate* end, our attachment to them in their role *as means* should be very intense. To focus distracted desires in our economic culture, it may be necessary to go further than practicing detachment from material things that we use to *get* to God and others. Perhaps, we will need to detach ourselves from the entire assumption of ownership that organizes our affective relationships to material things – and do so as an offering that links us (in different ways) to the divine and to one another. A further complicating issue is that a particular kind of detachment from other people may be crucial for *expressing* openhearted attachment to them. We need more than simply greater attachment to one another. (In what follows, I will eventually describe this detachment from others as an acknowledgment of our singularity, or solitude, in community.)

about something without allowing it to simply swamp one's attention or affection. Consider, for example, so-called soccer neutrals: fans who enjoy "the beautiful game" without investing themselves in the outcome of any particular match or the fortunes of any specific team. Their lack of affiliation makes it easier to recognize in them – and perhaps also easier for them to cultivate in themselves – a sense of detached delight. No team has an exclusive claim to their affections. Conversely, they do not claim any team as their own. They are free to simply enjoy. So, too, does sacrifice teach us to see economic life differently: not as an arena for celebrating wins and grieving losses, but as a place for learning detachment from both wins and losses in the interest of releasing ownership as an offering of delight.¹⁵

In general, Milbank is rethinking "self-sacrifice" as a paradigm of ethical action: an ideal he finds variously celebrated by Jacques Derrida, Jean-Luc Marion, Emmanuel Levinas, and other post-Kantian thinkers.¹⁶ What these philosophers ostensibly push to the breaking point is an ideal of ethical self-possession achieved through mortal self-dispossession. Milbank rejects such an ethics¹⁷ – and rightly so. The Christian offering makes no claim to own what it sacrifices: "[H]ere we give up 'absurdly' to God in order to confess our inherent nothingness and to receive life in the only possible genuine mode of life, as created anew. Here we hold onto nothing, here we possess nothing securely."¹⁸ This is a beautiful

¹⁵ In some ways, my portrait of sacrifice as an offering reflects the Stoic ideal of parting without loss. This ideal is beautifully summarized by Epictetus: "Never say about anything, 'I have lost it,' but instead, 'I have given it back.' Did your child die? It was given back. Did your wife die? She was given back. 'My land was taken.' So this too was given back," Epictetus, *The Handbook*, trans. Nicholas P. White (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1983), 11. However, there are several important differences between my Augustinian account of sacrifice and the Stoic discipline of returning the objects of one's love to their source. First, Epictetus' image still draws on the idea of *gift* to describe sacrifice; mine does not. Second, the Stoics relinquish any claim to ownership over externals – but assert a very strong claim to ownership over inner life. For Augustine, one's inner life is also offered up as ultimately not one's own. Third, my Augustinian image of sacrifice sees the offering as a gesture of openhearted love. The Stoics, on the other hand, counsel a serenity detached from the ardor of gratitude.

¹⁶ "This complex of ideas, or characterization of the ethical as gift-exchange, feast, marriage, and resurrection, I am seeking to set in deliberate opposition to a recent consensus which would try to understand the ethical as *primarily* self-sacrifice for the other, without any necessary 'return' issuing from the other back to oneself," Milbank, "Midwinter Sacrifice," 122.

¹⁷ For the peroration of his thesis, cf. *ibid.*, 126.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 128.

image of the resurrected self. But is the vision *itself* held in openhanded hope? While Milbank criticizes the image of sacrifice as an unconditional gift and counter-proposes the image of sacrifice as an eschatological gift exchange, Milbank and those he criticizes both assume that sacrifice is a *gift*. I question that assumption.¹⁹ Perhaps Milbank's attempt to move beyond the logic of ownership (and, ultimately, of attachment to self) by liquidating exchange into an image of radical gift economy fails to provide the full release it seeks. It thereby seems to reintroduce a falsely sacrificial self-image through the equation of sacrifice and gift.

Milbank will postulate: “[S]acrifice is only ethical when it is also resurrection.”²⁰ However, there is, perhaps, a subtle – yet misleading – understanding of hope that shapes Milbank's portrait of gift-exchange. To insist that we offer ourselves – even to the point of death – in prayerful hope that Christ will remember us beyond our own ability to remember ourselves is not the same as assuming or presuming that Christ will do so. Milbank strikes the wrong chord when he ventures (albeit tentatively) to talk about resurrection as “automatic.”²¹ So, too, when he notes: “[I]t is when we are giving, letting ourselves go, sometimes with unavoidable sacrificial pain, that we are always receiving back as ever different a true, abundant life (this is the gospel).”²² There is something poignant about such a line – but also something that rings false. When we die, we let go of even our ability to receive back life. And this release need not be a token of despair or resignation: it can be an acknowledgment that

¹⁹ Though I do not deny that the language of *gift* can sometimes describe true sacrifice – and that Augustine himself sometimes has recourse to such language – I regard the image as provisional and approximate. *Gift* is neither the best nor most illuminating word for characterizing the offering of life to God. Although he himself is still inclined to use the language of “gift,” Joseph Clair's work on *oikeiōsis* implicitly suggests the provisionality of that language by showing how Augustine uses the logic of ownership (e.g., appealing to images like “treasure in heaven”) as a pedagogical device to challenge his auditors to move beyond the logic of proprietorship (whether of earthly or heavenly goods) to take detached delight in the divine good, cf. Joseph Clair, *Discerning the Good in the Letters & Sermons of Augustine* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 124–6, 162–6.

²⁰ Milbank, “Midwinter Sacrifice,” 122.

²¹ *Ibid.*, 123. Milbank refers to the “automatic, self-raising dimension of Jesus' resurrection,” *ibid.* But, theologically speaking, would it not be better to say that Christ raises himself only by the Triune power of God? Perhaps our flesh is raised in him by that power in hope. And maybe it would be better to say that Christ raises himself with respect to his divine power so that, with respect to his human nature, humans might be raised in him.

²² *Ibid.*

the promise of such a reception lies hidden in God, beyond the purview of our offering. If we claim for ourselves, already in this life, a share in the resurrection (Milbank says that we “participate” in the resurrection now²³), we risk reserving, in our imaginations, an image of ourselves that cannot be offered in death – and, therefore, an image that cannot be raised.

Perhaps Easter *somehow* (a word that crops up several times in Milbank’s essay) radiates through Good Friday. But can it do so in a mode discernible to us mortals now? If we imagine our lives as being instantaneously, continually re-created – if we think that the “absolute eternal coincidence of gift and exchange in the same moment which is ceaselessly perpetuated”²⁴ is *our own moment* – can we really envision the offering made in mortal life now? Perhaps, instead, what resurrection communicates in each instant of our lives is precisely its hiddenness in our own deaths – as these are hidden in Christ and as Christ is hidden in God. Only by acknowledging as much do we recognize our lives as redeemed through sacrifice. We cannot see beyond death to integrate resurrection “regifting” into the self-image we offer up now.²⁵

It is crucial to let go of the temptation to repossess – in our hopeful imaginations – the fragments of lives that we could only hope to be redeemed beyond all horizon of our recall. I worry that Milbank risks trading faithful, loving hope for a claim to vision.²⁶ And *claiming* resurrection life – instead of hoping for it simply in the work of parting – leaves us hazarding another version of the presumptuous self-apprehension that Milbank criticizes in others. When it comes to hope, I take my bearings from T. S. Eliot: “I said to my soul, be still, and wait without hope / For hope would be hope for the wrong thing; wait without / love / For love

²³ Ibid., 117.

²⁴ Ibid., 120.

²⁵ This is not to dismiss the potential value of eschatological images of redemption. But it is to say that such images ultimately get offered up in death, too. They don’t secure any post-mortem continuity with our present self-understanding.

²⁶ Rowan Williams has cannily observed: “There is indeed a *requies* promised to the people of God, the ‘presence’ of heaven and the vision of God’s face; but by definition this cannot now be talked about except in the mythological language of future hope (as if it were a future state like other future states, like what I shall feel tomorrow). It is the presence of God as our own end, our death, the end of time for us, and in some sense the end of desire in *fruitio*; not, therefore, for possession now in the language of belief, or any other language,” Rowan Williams, “The Nature of Christian Formation,” in *On Augustine* (London, Oxford, New York: Bloomsbury Continuum, 2016), 55–6. I wonder whether Milbank exchanges the mythological futurity of hope for a metaphysics of faith’s *fruitio* now.