

## DISPOSITIONALISM AND THE METAPHYSICS OF SCIENCE

Dispositionalism is the view that causal powers are among the irreducible properties of nature. It has long been among the core competing positions in the metaphysics of laws, but its potential implications for other key debates within metaphysics and the philosophy of science have remained under-explored. Travis Dumsday fills this major gap in the literature by establishing new connections between dispositionalism and such topics as substance ontology, ontic structural realism, material composition, emergentism, natural-kind essentialism, perdurantism, time travel, and spacetime substantivalism. He also puts forward a novel view concerning the precise relationship between causal powers and the fundamental laws of nature. His rich and accessible study will appeal to readers interested in contemporary analytic metaphysics and philosophy of science.

TRAVIS DUMSDAY is Associate Professor in the Department of Philosophy & Religious Studies at Concordia University of Edmonton. He has published numerous articles and book chapters on topics in philosophy of science, metaphysics, and philosophy of religion.

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## *Contents*

<i>Acknowledgements</i>	<i>page</i>	<i>ix</i>
1 Introduction		i
2 Dispositionalism and the Laws of Nature		9
3 Dispositionalism and Ontic Structural Realism		23
4 Dispositionalism and Material Composition		46
5 Dispositionalism and Substance Ontology		67
6 Dispositionalism and Natural-Kind Essentialism		112
7 Dispositionalism and Spacetime		123
8 Dispositionalism and Essentially Active Objects		153
9 Dispositionalism and Emergentism		173
10 Conclusion		193
<i>Works Cited</i>		199
<i>Index</i>		217

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xi

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