

AGAINST KNOWLEDGE CLOSURE

Knowledge closure is the claim that, if an agent *S* knows *P*, recognizes that *P* implies *Q*, and believes *Q* because it is implied by *P*, then *S* knows *Q*. Closure is a pivotal epistemological principle that is widely endorsed by contemporary epistemologists. *Against Knowledge Closure* is the first booklength treatment of the issue and the most sustained argument for closure failure to date. Unlike most prior arguments for closure failure, Marc Alspecter-Kelly's critique of closure does not presuppose any particular epistemological theory; his argument is, instead, intuitively compelling and applicable to a wide variety of epistemological views. His discussion ranges over much of the epistemological landscape, including skepticism, warrant, transmission and transmission failure, fallibilism, sensitivity, safety, evidentialism, reliabilism, contextualism, entitlement, circularity and bootstrapping, justification, and justification closure. As a result, the volume will be of interest to any epistemologist or student of epistemology and related subjects.

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