

## 1 Introduction

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The study of linguistic landscapes focuses on what Spolsky (2009: 65) calls “public linguistic space,” such as “the city streets and squares, roads and parks, railway and bus stations and stops.” As the journal *Linguistic Landscape* makes clear in its *Aim and Scope*, the emphasis is on languages and how they “surround us everywhere . . . in flashy advertisements and commercials, names of buildings, streets and shops, instructions and warning signs, graffiti and cyber space.” The reference to cyberspace is a recognition that linguistic landscapes are not limited to physical spaces but also include virtual spaces such as websites and chat rooms (though private messaging, much like private oral conversations in physical landscapes, are excluded).

While “linguistic landscape” remains the most commonly used term, other terms are used in order to reflect different research emphases. Gorter (2013: 191) has suggested using “multilingual landscapes” to highlight an interest in multilingualism. And “semiotic landscapes” (Jaworski and Thurlow 2010; Shohamy and Gorter 2008) is usually favored when there is a desire to emphasize the multimodal nature of landscapes, where the interest is on how language interacts with other modalities such as visual images, nonverbal communication, and the infrastructure of the surrounding environment. In this book, we use “semiotic landscape” because, as we argue below, affect is an important aspect of the landscape, and the study of affect requires attention not only to language but to other modalities as well.

Many landscape studies, whether specifically linguistic or more broadly semiotic, are concerned with distributional issues, that is, the relative distributions of particular languages in selected sites (Backhaus 2007; Ben-Rafael, Shohamy, Amara and Trumer-Hecht 2006; Coluzzi 2009; Mendisu, Malinowski and Woldenmichael 2016; Monnier 1989; Muth 2012; Tang 2018). This is a “quantitative-distributive” approach (Gorter 2013: 199). However, as Blommaert (2013: 41) points out, such an approach has its limitations:

Quantitative LLS, as the very first step, will draw attention to the existence and presence of languages in a particular space and can answer questions such as “how many

2 Language, Space, and Cultural Play

languages are used in space X? ” But the argument does not cut very deep, and what we get is a rather superficial, “horizontal,” and distributional image of multilingualism. The fact that these languages are ingredients of multimodal signs, and that these signs occur in non-random ways in public space, is left aside.

To pursue our interest in affect in the semiotic landscape, we adopt a phenomenological orientation that understands the landscape to be ideologically loaded and, moreover, is interested in how this ideological loading may be aimed at regulating the patterns of interactions of those individuals or groups that happen to be located within the landscape, as well as the different possibilities of interpretations of the landscape (or structures of meaning) by different individuals and groups. The landscape is, in other words, a constellation of interpretable signs. There are many other works that also adopt more qualitative analyses (see, among others, Eastman and Stein 1993; Spolsky and Cooper 1991), although these may not necessarily see themselves as adopting a phenomenological orientation.

Our interest in a more phenomenological orientation is in line with other studies that are very much focused on attending to the ways in which ideologies pervade the landscape, such as Stroud and Mpendukana’s (2009) study of the politics of aspiration in South Africa; Pennycook’s (2008, 2010) analysis of the production of graffiti in urban areas or “graffscapes”; and Leeman and Modan’s (2009) discussion of the commodification of language in Washington DC’s Chinatown, to mention just a few.

The recognition of the ideological and sociopolitical content within landscapes is, however, arguably far more well developed in other disciplines such as geography and urban studies. For Marxist geographers such as David Harvey (1989, 2009) and Edward Soja (1989), landscapes were the sites of contestations between different groups in which issues of class, wealth, power, and oppression were inextricably bound. This went far beyond merely asserting that landscapes were occupied by different socioeconomic groups often in tension with each other; landscapes themselves were understood to be written and structured by these relations. This was particularly true of the “postmodern” turn in Marxist geography from the late 1970s onward, with its “phenomenological” emphasis on “the subjectivity, intentionality, and consciousness of knowledgeable human agents engaged not only in making history but also in shaping the political culture of everyday life in modern capitalist society” (Soja 1989: 40–41). The “postmodern” turn in urban studies had a distinctive emphasis on the “city as text” (to use James Duncan’s well-known phrase) and regarded the built environment itself as a system of symbols reflecting a “dominant ideology” and “cultural logic,” a “problem of metaphors and thus of language” (Benjamin 1997: 44; Hutcheon 1988: 35; Jameson 1991: 6).

We will argue in this book that, as part of this phenomenological orientation with its concomitant emphasis on symbols and ideologies, it is also important to attend to digital landscapes (a point made by the journal *Linguistic Landscape* in its reference to “cyber space”; see above). And while it may be natural to understand the digital landscape to refer to cyberspace, or – to retain a connection to the prevailing terminologies of “linguistic landscape” and “semiotic landscape” – the “cyber landscape,” it in fact needs to be seen as being much more than that. With the burgeoning of digital media and technologies around the turn of the twenty-first century, the notion of “landscape” and its phenomenological and interpretative dimensions have been even further complicated. Advanced film effects, especially CGI technology, meant a disruption of any notion of the physical landscape in itself; landscapes in films were modified by technologies, and within the overall narrative of the film, in order to create particular responses on the part of audiences. Yet audiences still responded to these filmic landscapes, and landscape features (trees, mountains, houses, and other natural and human features), as bona fide landscapes with an existence independent of their digital transformations. The most striking evidence of this is the rise of film- and TV-related tourism associated with hit shows like Peter Jackson’s *Lord of the Rings* trilogy and *The Hobbit* films, and HBO’s *Game of Thrones* series. The audience response created through these shows was strong enough to override the knowledge that many landscapes were digitally altered (some quite drastically so), and to give a significant boost to fan tourism to sites in countries like Iceland, Northern Ireland and Croatia (for *Game of Thrones*), and New Zealand (for *The Hobbit* and *Lord of the Rings*). At the same time, the development of purely digital landscapes in spin-offs such as video games based on the *Lord of the Rings* trilogy allowed other fans to interact with the landscapes as purely digital constructs, with no corresponding geophysical location. This phenomenon epitomized by the *Lord of the Rings* may best be described as the creation of a “blended” landscape, both physical and textual, with a digitally altered as well as extra-digital dimension (Goh 2014).

Beyond virtual reality is the increasing use of augmented reality (AR; another form of “blended” landscape), which is perhaps most recently exemplified by the overwhelming popularity of Pokémon Go, “the game that truly brought AR to the public at large” (Anderton 2016). As Anderton (2016) points out, AR is

technology that interacts directly with real world environments and supplements them with new content. Pokémon Go accomplishes this by making millions of people run around outside looking for cute little monsters that they can only see through their phone or tablet.

AR, then, raises interesting questions about how we can approach the landscape analytically, not least because it forces us to confront the issue of whether

4 Language, Space, and Cultural Play

a clear demarcation between physical and digital landscapes is even feasible. Thus, given the rapid developments in digital technology and attempts to encourage their widespread adoption, a study of landscapes has to be prepared to address the interfaces between the physical and the digital. This means that even the notion of semiotic landscape, arguably, does not go quite far enough in capturing the impact of digital technology on the ways in which landscapes are modified and audience responses cultivated. This is because the semiotic landscape is still typically interpreted as being wedded to the idea of a physically demarcated piece of terrain – albeit now one that is acknowledged to be multimodal and saturated with ideologies.

For the moment, however, we simply want to highlight that implicit to varying degrees in all of the studies of ideologies in the landscape that were just mentioned is the undeniable influence played by the role of emotions or, more broadly, affect (we explain the distinction below). Emotions come to the fore perhaps most clearly in Stroud and Mpendukana (2009), when they show how in a particular South African township “sites of luxury” coexist uneasily with “sites of necessity.” But they are also undeniably present in the production of graffiti, whose transgressive nature helps the graffiti artists project “pride” and “rebellion” (Pennycook 2008: 302). And they are also relevant in the commodification of Washington DC’s Chinatown, which, as Leeman and Modan (2009: 340) point out, involves marketing the area as one that promises visitors an experience that is exciting, vibrant, and yet also authentically Chinese. In addition, religious affect has always been a significant factor in pilgrimages to specific religious sites, and it also plays a large role in things like religious heritage preservation and attitudes to the environment (Park 1994). Then there is the group-based affect, a “tribal identification” such as seen in sports fandom or nationalistic causes, that plays a significant role in such sites as Old Trafford stadium and Marylebone Cricket Club and battle sites such as Bannockburn and Gettysburg.

In making the earlier observations, we are certainly not suggesting that linguistics has not given any attention at all to emotions or affect. For example, in a landmark paper, Besnier (1990) observes that

a strict distinction among referential, social, and affective meanings rests on assumptions that are problematic, including ones such as the following: (i) meaning involves “a unidirectional mapping from a predefined reality onto arbitrary linguistic forms”; (ii) cognition and emotion “must be assumed to be dichotomous”; and (iii) “affective meaning is seen as the encoding of the speaker’s emotions, which the interlocutor decodes in verbal messages by giving precedence to intentionality” (1990: 419–420).

Besnier (1990: 421) goes on to argue that affect must be understood as a “multichannel phenomenon” that can be conveyed both linguistically and

by “nonverbal devices” (1990: 427) and that it can be a group affair (1990: 428), and, finally, suggests that affect might be fruitfully studied as a form of semiosis (1990: 428). We find very little in Besnier’s remarks to disagree with, and in Chapter 2 we do in fact develop a semiotic account of affect.

Other, more recent, linguistic approaches to the study of emotions include the collection of papers in Harvey and Shalom (2002), which focus specifically on how language is used to convey romance, desire, and sexuality. That is, the main question driving these papers is how “our desires” can take on “linguistic form,” especially since this involves trying “to understand an experience that overwhelms us and thereby threatens constantly to outmaneuver and outclass our verbal resources, the principal means at our disposal for ordering and making sense of our lives” (Harvey and Shalom 2002: 1). The collection is at bottom highly text driven, being concerned with how “the encoding of desire results in distinct and describable linguistic features and patterns” (Harvey and Shalom 2002: 3). And Schwarz-Friesel (2015), taking a critical cognitive linguistic approach, treats emotion and language as belonging to different mental subsystems. Schwarz-Friesel’s interest lies in the ways that linguistic features can serve to convey emotion and evaluation, and she treats the emotion subsystem as providing the necessary evaluative component to what are otherwise apparently unemotional or un-evaluative ideational meanings. Aside from the fact that Schwarz-Friesel is focused on language and emotion as aspects of cognition rather than as material representations in a landscape, we find her sharp distinction between emotion or evaluation, on the one hand, and ideation, on the other hand, to be problematic (see the comments from Besnier 1990 mentioned earlier; see also the discussion in Reddy 2001: 14–15).

In a recent review, McElhinny (2010) highlights a number of research gaps that might be fruitfully approached from the perspective of language and affect, including the need for more historically sensitive analyses; the rise of terror and hate, and the corresponding importance of conviviality in public speech; and the use of language in affective labor. Some of these themes, such as conviviality in the public arena and affective labor, are clearly relevant to the study of semiotic landscapes. Nevertheless, it still has to be said that the focus in these works tends to be on the emotions or feelings of individuals and/or groups rather than on the ways in which social expectations regarding appropriate emotions or feelings come to be sited in different parts of a landscape.

Where landscape studies in particular are concerned, a more explicit attempt to focus on emotions can be found in the collection of papers edited by Rubdy and Ben Said (2015). However, the papers in this collection deal with a very restricted set of emotions and their triggers, namely “the dynamics of the linguistic landscape as a site of conflict, exclusion, and dissent often arising from mechanisms of language policy, language politics, language hierarchies, and the ethnolinguistic struggles engendered by them” (Rubdy 2015: 1). It is of

course clear that the range of emotions in a landscape goes beyond those of conflict and dissent, with religious fervor, conviviality, and memorializations being just a few that come immediately to mind. And it is equally clear that many of the emotions involved need not be the result of language policy issues even if language does play a role in the communication and management of emotions.

Because emotions are either treated as separate from referential or ideational meanings, or only implicitly recognized in many of the works on landscapes, or given due attention only when they involve conflicts that can be related to matters of language policy, we think it is not inaccurate to state that serious sociolinguistic theorization concerning the general ways in which emotions come to be emplaced in particular landscapes is still in its infancy, notwithstanding works such as by Peck, Williams, and Stroud (forthcoming) and Wee (2016). And we should point out that any attempt at such a theorization is in fact somewhat belated because the “affective turn” in social and critical theory (Clough 2007) took place more than a decade ago. What might be broadly described as the critical study of emotions has resulted in a number of key studies, handbooks, and overviews (Barbalet 1998; Berlant 2011; Brennan 2004; Hochschild 1983; Lewis, Haviland-Jones, and Barrett 2008; Reddy 2001; Rutherford 2016; Scheff 1990; Stets and Turner 2006; Turner and Stets 2005).

What this means is that even though theorizing in sociolinguistics and landscape studies is only just beginning to appreciate the significance of the ideas that constitute the affective turn and to draw upon them, there is also great potential for sociolinguistics and landscape studies to inform these critical studies of emotions. Of course, just because there has been a shift toward greater interest in the study of affect elsewhere does not mean that sociolinguistics, too, has to follow suit. It is the purpose of this introductory chapter, therefore, to make the case as to why the affective dimensions of semiotic landscapes (including the impacts of AR and cyber landscapes) should be of interest to sociolinguistics. It is to this issue that we now turn our discussion.

### **Emotions and Affect: A Matter of Orientation**

Let us now clarify the difference between “emotion” and “affect.” The distinction is not always made, which means that the two terms are sometimes used interchangeably, (see also Hochschild 1979: 551; Smith-Lovin 1995). However, we will now argue that it is affect rather than emotion that is in fact of greater relevance and analytical value in the study of semiotic landscapes.

Whereas emotions refer to the “culturally given labels that we assign to experiences” of individuals or groups, affect is much more general and instead

refers to “any evaluative (positive or negative) orientation toward an object” (Robinson, Smith-Lovin, and Wisecup 2006: 181, 183; see also Jasper 2014: 64; Massumi 1995). Since any such evaluative orientation can also be described using emotion labels, it is useful to think of a cultural label as amenable to being studied as an emotion or as a form of affect. The focus on emotion might be better suited to a social psychological study, whereas the focus on affect would highlight the interaction between environmental factors and the individual. So, one could, for example, study hysteria as an emotion by focusing on an individual’s psychological state. But one could also study hysteria as a form of affect by exploring how the environment might facilitate its spread across a crowd.

Emotions are typically assumed to reside “within” the entity that is feeling the emotion. This entity is often taken to be the individual and, in some cases, the group, where the latter is then conceptualized as a single entity because the individual members are all seen to be sharing the same emotion or to be in the same emotional state. This way of thinking about emotions as being internal to the feeling entity (be it the group or the individual) shifts the focus away from the role that the surrounding environment and the objects that help constitute the environment play in shaping or affecting the emotions of the entity in question. And in the case of a posited group-level emotion, it also raises the question of how it is that the individual members come to share the same emotional state. Here, it is important to recognize that from the perspective of a single individual, the presence of other comembers of the group is undeniably also part of that individual’s environment (Massumi 2002; Sedgwick 2003).

This shift of focus away from the environment is avoided if we think in terms of affect rather than emotions (Brennan 2004). This is because affect involves an orientation toward an object, and this serves in turn to emphasize that affect is fundamentally relational in nature. This relational nature is captured in the fact that we often speak of “being affected” by something and, in psychological studies, a person with “low” or “flat” affect is usually someone who is emotionally detached or unresponsive to her surroundings. The outward orientation of affect is also evident in its etymology from the Latin *afficere*, which in turn contains the root *facere* (“to do” or “to perform”). Indeed, Wissinger (2007: 232; see also Tomkins 1962, 1991) reminds us that affect is “social in that it constitutes a contagious energy, an energy that can be whipped up or dampened in the course of interaction.” Thinking in terms of affect is therefore much more appropriate if we are interested in better understanding semiotic landscapes because the notion of affect is always contextual or environmental.

Thinking in terms of affect also allows us to focus on a variety of phenomena that are not always clearly identifiable via specific emotion labels. For example, there are states or capacities that are not obviously emotions even though they



do have emotional dimensions, such as being alert or being patient. Emotions are typically thought of as relatively short-lived and spontaneous (*I'm feeling happy today; The knock on the door startled me*). They are not usually thought of as cultivatable even though they can be (*I want to be a happier person; I want to be less anxious all the time*), as Frankfurt (1988) points out. In such cases, emotions also blur into other states or capacities that are not usually thought of as emotions (*He is a highly resilient person; John is one of our most vigilant security guards*). Thinking in terms of affect then has the advantage of allowing us to capture the range from prototypical emotions to states and capacities because the analytical focus is on the orientation toward objects in the environment, and such an orientation can encompass a myriad of reactions and responses.

Having discussed the distinction between emotion and affect, we now consider how a focus on the latter bears on and helps to illuminate the study of semiotic landscapes.

### Affect and Semiotic Landscapes

Because affect is relational, an affect-analytic perspective helps to shift the focus from questions about the internal states of individuals or groups toward the structuring of the environment and in particular how that structuring is aimed at regulating or managing the public display or materialization of affect. From a landscape perspective, this is useful as it allows us to confront more sociologically oriented questions like the extent to which certain ideologies might be materially emplaced as part of the semiotic landscape. In other words, the semiotic landscape should not merely be seen as the context in which individuals and groups experience or express emotions, but, importantly, also as contributing to these very experiences *qua* affect. The semiotic landscape has to be acknowledged as structuring the affective affordances and positionings of individuals and groups. Massey (2005) emphasizes that the social and the spatial are mutually constitutive, that is, social structures are emplaced to produce “spatialities” rather than simply being located within pre-given spatial markers.

Affect in the semiotic landscape, then, needs to be appreciated as a kind of spatiality. For example, Wee (2016) shows how the Arlington National Cemetery represents a site where a specific kind of affective regime is cultivated, namely one where honor and respect are to be accorded to the servicemen who died for their country. There are signs on the cemetery grounds that request “Silence and Respect,” as well as visitors’ rules that explain that because the cemetery is “a shrine to the honored dead ... disorderly conduct ... boisterous language,” among others, are prohibited (2016: 111–113). In both these cases, it is not as if the spatial exists prior to and



separate from the social, or vice versa. Rather, the recognition of a site as “Singapore society” or “the Arlington National Cemetery” involves the coconstitutive structuring of the social and spatial.

Hochschild (1979, 1983) observes that emotions are subject to “feeling rules” and “display rules.” The former specifies the kinds of feelings that are considered appropriate in particular situations and the latter how these feelings should be overtly expressed. Socialization into a particular culture means learning the associated feeling rules and display rules, so that individuals then attempt to manage their own emotions in ways that accord with the normative expectations imposed by such rules. Individuals learn the feeling and display rules governing when and how to come across as cheerful, angry, supportive, or welcoming, among others. Particularly in the various service industries that have been studied as a result of Hochschild’s pioneering work, the results are what Hochschild describes as “emotion work,” such as evocation, where the actor tries to bring about “a desired feeling which is initially absent,” and suppression, where the actor tries to remove “an undesired feeling which is initially present” (1979: 561). Successful emotion work then allows the actor to be legitimately described (both by herself and by her interactional others) as possessing the appropriate emotion, that is, by having her internal state be describable by invoking the relevant cultural-specific label. However, semiotic landscapes do not always make use of culture-specific labels to manage the kinds of emotions or behaviors that might be expected or considered appropriate to a particular site. Indeed, inhabitants in a given site may be experiencing a wide range of emotions and the specification of appropriate emotions may not even always be relevant to the remit of how a particular semiotic landscape has been structured. This is to say that not all sites attempt to regulate emotions to the same explicit degree as the Arlington National Cemetery. But all sites, implicitly or otherwise, do have normative expectations regarding appropriate social conduct, where the concomitant emotive dimension oftentimes remains implicit and is therefore better captured in terms of a general evaluative orientation or affect rather than via the invocation of specific labels. For example, “third places” (Oldenburg 1997) such as public libraries and cafes do not explicitly specify what kinds of emotions would be appropriate. But as communally sociable places where individuals from differing backgrounds can be expected to congregate and relax, violent expressions of anger or even excessively loud demonstrations of jubilation are not always welcome. The issue, at least where “third places” are concerned, then, is less a matter of policing any particular emotion by invoking a culture-specific label than one of very broadly regulating positive affect.

Finally, since the concept of affect also captures states and capacities that are not prototypically considered emotions, it is useful in analyzing the activities and goals of urban spaces as these try to accumulate various kinds of symbolic

capital. For example, cities may want to be seen as convivial or business-friendly, and specific environments or neighborhoods may want to present themselves as pedestrian-friendly or dementia-friendly. These are less about specific emotions than about encouraging a positive or supportive orientation toward corporate interests or dementia sufferers and their families. They clearly involve attempts at structuring the semiotic landscape in ways that, hopefully, come to be construed as possessing the relevant symbolic capital. And while emotions are still relevant, these have now to be understood as emplaced so that the desired ambience is brought about. So, instead of speaking about an individual or couple feeling romantic, we need to ask, for instance, how a setting comes to be seen as romantic. This emplacement of affect, of course, brings us right back to the very first point of this section, namely the relational nature of affect.

### The Organization of the Book

Having made the case for why affect needs to be studied as part of our attempts to better understand the ideological structuring of semiotic landscapes, the next question that needs to be addressed is how this can be done in a theoretically coherent way that can lead to insightful analytical payoffs. This is the focus of Chapter 2, *Theorizing Affect in the Semiotic Landscape*, which draws on the concepts of an affective regime (Wee 2016) and an affective economy (Ahmed 2004a, 2004b), among others, to show how these can combine to provide a framework for understanding both the materialization and circulation of affect. The theorization of affect that we proposed is based largely on Peirce's notion of semiotics. The value of this framework is that it integrates the analysis of affect as part of a more general process of semiosis rather than treating it as a unique or distinctive phenomenon. The framework thus serves to provide a concrete theorization of Wissinger's (2007; see above) description of affect as socially "contagious energy." In the absence of concrete theorization, Wissinger's description, despite its aptness, remains a colorful metaphor. But the actual mechanisms by which affect is materialized, circulates, and becomes "whipped up or dampened" need to be more systematically articulated, and Chapter 2 does exactly that.

The utility of the framework is then illustrated over the next six chapters. The chapters are arranged in such a way as to progressively deal with cases where affect becomes more nebulous and implicit, but is nevertheless still relevant to the semiotic landscape. In this regard, Chapter 3, *Kawaii in the Semiotic Landscape*, begins the illustration with what might be considered a relatively transparent attempt at regulating affect: the use of figures that are considered *kawaii*, a Japanese term meaning "cute" or "adorable." An examination of how *kawaii* figures are employed by various municipal authorities in Tokyo brings