

Index

- action
 fluid, 132–137, 140, 145, 147–148, 150;
 See also agency, practical; critical
 comparison; moral perception; *phronēsis*
 (practical intelligence); reason, practical
 intentional structure of, 20
 norm-governed, 16, 18–19
 unity of, 17; *See also* moral evaluation, action
 as object of; flourishing, as normative
 balance; right action
- action-guidingness. *See* excellence; flourishing, as
 living excellently; moral evaluation, action
 as object of; moral exemplars; virtue
 ethics, right action; virtues
- aesthetic judgment. *See* Kant, Immanuel
- agency, 3, 31, 35, 40, 43, 46, 78, 133, 145, 158,
 174–175
 and autonomy, 40, 45, 122, 127, 132
 and deliberation, 44, 132
 and habituation, 130
 intentional structure of, 16, 18
 and intentionality, 16, 116
 limited nature of, 172
 and moral luck, 12
 norm-responsive, 9, 146, 148
 and patience, 156–157, 160, 164
 phenomenology of, 15, 33, 66, 77, 79, 125,
 133–150, 167, 173; *See also* attunement;
 Heidegger, Martin
 practical, 15, 40, 77, 134, 136
 temporal, 12, 14–15, 18–19, 21, 31, 41, 46,
 156, 161, 173; *See also* finitude, as
 temporal dispersal
- altruism, 30, 65, 220
- Annas, Julia, 12, 30, 92, 110, 122, 131, 136–137
- anxiety
 existential, 147, 204
 and foreclosure of possibilities, 155
- arête* (virtue), 71, 74. *See also* Socrates; virtues
- Aristotle, 98, 113, 155, 175
 on agency, 92
 on confidence, 213–216
 on courage, 10, 202, 205, 207, 213–214, 216,
 218
 on deliberation, 132
 on the emotions, 119
 on *ergon* (function), 26–27, 33
 on *eudaimonia*, 77–79; *See also* *eudaimonia*
 on fear, 213–217
 on friendship, 42, 143
 on the good, 130
 on the good life, 31
 on habituation, 118–121, 129
 on honour, 218
 on hope, 214
 on justice, 79, 100
 on *mimesis*, 114, 125
 Nicomachean Ethics, 41–42, 79, 83, 87,
 89–93, 118–120, 130–131, 139
 on the noble, 33, 42, 121, 130, 139, 218–219
 on *phronēsis* (practical intelligence), 89–93,
 107, 122, 131, 150
 on pleasure, 121
 on practical reason, 33, 223
 on rashness, 213–216
 on self-love, 41–43
 on the soul, 33, 130, 223
 on temperance, 69
- arrogance, 194–195
- attunement, 35–36, 70, 201. *See also* agency,
 phenomenology of; Heidegger, Martin
- Augenblick* (moment of vision), 211–212
- authenticity, 212
 and courage, 212; *See also* courage
- autonomy, 40, 45, 121–122, 127, 132, 158.
See also agency; Korsgaard, Christine
- bad faith. *See also* arrogance; perfectionism
 in self-understanding, 1, 7, 193–199
 in virtue ethics, 1, 8, 66, 196–199
- being in the world, 7–8, 33, 36–38, 50, 64–65, 74,
 76, 78–79, 85, 108–110, 113, 115, 118,

- 142, 150, 163, 221–222, 226; *See also* flourishing, as normative responsiveness
 as care, 36, 45, 78, 93, 97, 223–224; *See also* Heidegger, Martin
 Bentham, Jeremy, 24
 Bommarito, Nicholas, 159, 161–165, 168–169
 Bratman, Michael, 19, 46, 134
 Buddhism, 161, 165, 176
- care. *See* being in the world, as care
 ethics of, 55
 Chang, Ruth, 94–98
 character, 12–14, 18, 73; *See also* excellence; flourishing; virtues
 dispositionalist account of, 16, 18
 and habituation, 14, 143, 162, 173
 as modes of responsiveness, 16
 charity, virtue of, 28
 community, 3, 8, 56, 58–59, 61, 64, 84, 94–95, 98, 100, 103, 114, 128, 144, 148, 150, 158–160, 170, 174, 176, 220, 222–223. *See also* flourishing, third-personal dimension of; Kant, Immanuel; normative claim(s), third-personal
 confidence, 213–216
 consciousness, 6
 consequentialism, 116
 courage, 10, 17, 22, 86–87, 89, 96, 147, 202–222; *See also* virtues
 as choosing one's better self, 10, 214, 218–220, 222
 and confidence, 213–218
 and fear, 213–218
 as masculine virtue, 209
 and normative balance, 213, 215, 217, 221
 as problem-solving stance, 70, 203, 205–207, 209–210, 212–213, 219, 221, 226
 and self-control, 216
 Crisp, Roger, 27
 critical comparison, 9, 24, 35, 49, 94–98, 107–109, 113, 136–150, 226. *See also* flourishing, as normative responsiveness; moral perception; reason, practical; normative claim(s), competing; virtues, as problem-solving stances
 critical distance, 132–133, 136–150. *See also* critical comparison; deliberation; habituation; moral exemplars; moral perception; normative responsiveness
 Crowell, Steven, 6, 52, 133, 146
- Darwall, Stephen, 50–56, 187
 death, 147, 167, 186
 existential, 147, 203–209, 212, 218, 222
 physical, 202, 205, 218, 222
- for the sake of the noble, 222
 deliberation, 24, 90, 125–128, 131–132, 136–145, 148, 150, 213, 224, 226; *See also* critical comparison; habituation; moral exemplars; moral perception; normative responsiveness
 and courage, 221
 as distinguishing human feature, 132
 and moral perception, 10, 131, 136–144
 deontic constraints, 5, 82, 99–101. *See also* rights, concept of
 deontology, 65, 116
 Kantian, 4
 as third-personal stance, 4
 dispositionism. *See* character
 Driver, Julia, 178–180, 182–183, 196, 210
- egoism, motivational, 75–77, 79, 220–222
 embodiment, as defining human feature, 72
 emotions, 91–92, 112, 119, 127, 129–130
 endurance, 216
 Enlightenment, the, 62
ergon (function), 35
eudaimonia, 22, 27, 29–30, 75–79, 105, 109. *See also* excellence; flourishing
 excellence. *See also* flourishing
 of character, 68, 80, 88, 92, 112, 119, 128, 131, 143, 148, 199–200, 202, 208, 212, 219, 225
 as habituation, 15, 92, 143, 216
 second-personal modes of, 221
 third-personal modes of, 188
 excellent life. *See* Aristotle; flourishing; moral evaluation, life as object of
 existentialism. *See* phenomenology, existential
- fear, 213–217
 finitude
 as defining human feature, 72, 106, 176
 and patience, 152, 155, 175
 as temporal dispersal, 10, 12, 15, 152, 156, 167, 171, 173, 175; *See also* time, phenomenology of
 temporal scarcity, 10, 69–70, 152–158, 171–173, 175, 204
 finitude, radical. *See* death, existential
 flourishing, 165; *See also* critical comparison; excellence; moral perception; *phronēsis* (practical intelligence); reason, practical; virtues
 Aristotelian account of, 26
 challenges to, 69–70, 72–73, 80, 88, 91, 151–152, 156
 first-personal dimension of, 1–2, 4, 8, 23, 28–29, 40–50, 76, 98, 109–128, 158

- hybrid views, 24, 28
 impossibility of, 98, 101–106, 130
 as incomplete project, 70, 108, 125, 142
 as living excellently, 1, 4–5, 14, 22, 30, 35,
 38–39, 43, 63, 70, 88, 223–226
 and moral exemplars, *See also* moral exemplars
 as normative balance, 3–5, 8–9, 20, 33,
 35–39, 41, 45, 64–65, 69, 71, 73, 76, 79,
 81–82, 98, 101, 119, 148, 160, 224–225
 as normative responsiveness, 1, 3, 14, 18, 35–36,
 38, 41, 46, 51, 56, 63–64, 68–70, 72, 76,
 78–79, 87–88, 98, 109, 150, 200, 213,
 220, 224
 objectivist accounts of, 8, 25–31, 37, 65
 naturalism, 26, 29, 34–35, 72
 phenomenology of, 19, 35, 82, 123, 129, 133,
 212
 second-personal dimension of, 2, 4, 50–56, 76
 as self-world fit, 1, 9, 32–33, 35–37, 39,
 47–48, 68, 72, 76, 78, 148, 223
 subjectivist accounts of, 7–8, 23–25, 28,
 30–31, 35, 37, 224
 hedonism, 23–24
 third-personal dimension of, 1–2, 4, 8, 31, 42,
 56–65, 76, 105, 128, 144
 world-embedded, 32–33, 36, 50, 58, 63, 72,
 224
 fluid action. *See* action, fluid
 Foot, Philippa, 26, 83
 forgiveness, 172
 fortitude, 207–208
 freedom, 50, 147, 195–198. *See also* bad faith, in
 self-understanding
 friendship, 95, 118. *See also* Aristotle; self-
 becoming; virtues

 generosity, 84, 86, 158
 good, the, 17, 23, 26, 35, 170
 Aristotle on, 130
 good life, the, 30, 140, 142, 226; *See also*
 excellence; flourishing; virtues
 Aristotelian, 31
 goods, 77–78, 95, 151
 knowledge, 77–78
 pleasure, 77–78
 plurality of. *See* Aristotle; normative claim(s),
 plurality of

 habituation, 9, 108–109, 118–125, 129–130,
 149–150; *See also* critical comparison;
 critical distance; deliberation; moral
 perception; normative responsiveness
 Aristotle on, 118–122, 129
 moral exemplars and, 118–125, 129
 self-becoming and, 109, 118–125, 129

 Haybron, Daniel, 30
 hedonism. *See* flourishing, subjectivist
 accounts of
 Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, 62
 Heidegger, Martin, 7, 20, 131, 139, 146–147,
 204, 210–213; *See also* agency,
 phenomenology of; attunement
 on death, 203, 205
 on lived time, 15
 Herder, Johann Gottfried, 43
 honesty, 49, 86, 88–89, 112
 honour, Aristotle on, 218
 Hurka, Thomas, 75–78
 Hursthouse, Rosalind, 28, 127, 131
 on V-rules, 111–114
 Husserl, Edmund, 6–7, 57–61, 78
 on objectivity, 57–58
 on perspectival incompleteness, 59
 on scientific understanding, 57–59
 on solipsism, 57–58

 identity, 10, 22; *See also* self, the
 existential awareness of, 212, 221–222
 grounding, 205–208, 210, 213, 216
 peripheral, 210
 and self-becoming, 42–43, 50
 and self-creation, 43–50
 and stable traits, 13
 imagination, role in self-becoming, 125, 191
 impatience, 152, 167, 174–176
 and anxiety, 155, 173
 as foreclosure of possibilities, 154, 173
 as moralism, 171
 and perfectionism, 171
 as self-privileging, 155
 as temporal orientation, 154, 171
 incommensurability, 9
 incommensurable normative claims, 6, 9, 65, 93–98
 individuality. *See* flourishing, first-personal
 dimension of
 injustice, 83
 integrity, 100
 intentionality, 6–7, 15–16
 intersubjectivity. *See* flourishing, third-personal
 dimension of

 justice, 4, 9, 22, 31, 55, 62, 73–87, 89, 92;
 See also deontic constraints; rights,
 concept of; virtues
 as global virtue, 4, 9–10, 74, 79–84, 91,
 100–102, 226
 institutional, 74, 79
 second-personal dimension of, 82–83
 self-directed, 83–85, 98–100
 as specific virtue, 10, 74, 79–80, 83, 98–99, 226

- Kant, Immanuel, 44, 132
 on moral exemplars, 116, 122
 on moral judgement, 122
 on *sensus communis*, 60–64
- Kierkegaard, Søren, 67, 146, 161, 167–168, 176, 211
- Korsgaard, Christine, 13, 19, 27, 34, 40–41, 43, 132–134, 149
- Lévinas, Emmanuel, 51–56, 131, 221
 on asymmetry, 51, 53
 on the face-to-face, 52–55
 on freedom, 52, 54
- love
 Aristotle, on self-, 41–43
 mimetic, and moral exemplars, 114–118, 129, 138, 141
- McDowell, John, 130–131
- metaphysics, 176
- Mill, John Stuart, 24. *See also* flourishing; subjectivist accounts of
- mimesis* (imitation), 108–109, 123, 141. *See also* moral exemplars, and mimetic love
- Aristotle on, 114, 125
- modesty, 10, 22, 181; *See also* virtues
- and arrogance, 181–182, 184, 186, 189–190, 193–196, 199
- egalitarian view, 185–197
- false, 179, 184, 186, 198
- as feminine virtue, 181
- first-personal dimension of, 182–184, 190
- as ignorance of self-worth, 179
- as normative balance, 178, 187, 189–190, 192, 196, 199–201
- phenomenology of, 180, 182, 186, 193
- as problem-solving stance, 70, 178, 185, 201, 226
- second-personal dimension of, 180–184, 187, 192, 200
- and self-abnegation, 182, 190, 197
- and self-deprecation, 179
- third-personal dimension of, 10, 183, 185, 187, 190
- moral evaluation. *See* critical comparison; deliberation; flourishing; habituation; moral perception; normative claim(s); normative responsiveness
- action as object of, 4, 12–14, 16–17, 19–20, 81, 111; *See also* Sher, George
- character as object of, 12–13, 16, 18–19, 21
- life as object of, 1, 8–9, 12–13, 17, 19–21, 76, 81, 112, 115–117, 139, 143
- phenomenology of, 131
- moral exemplars, 9, 45, 82, 108–118, 121–125, 141, 143; *See also* flourishing; normative responsiveness
- bad, 9, 129, 132, 145
- and critical distance, 10, 136–150
- and deliberation, 125–128, 136–144
- and habituation, 118–125, 129
- and mimetic love, 114–118, 129, 138, 141–142
- and narrativity, 145
- and normative balance, 170
- and perspectival balancing, 5
- moral luck, 12, 80, 101, 104, 106, 215. *See also* agency and moral luck; flourishing; virtue ethics
- moral perception, 10, 130–131, 134–136, 151, 217. *See also* critical comparison; deliberation; flourishing, as normative responsiveness; habituation; moral exemplars; *phronēsis* (practical intelligence); reason, practical; virtues
- moral theory, 63
- mortality. *See* finitude, temporal scarcity
- narcissism, 220. *See also* egoism, motivational
- narrativity
 patience and, 169
 and the self, 45
 self-becoming and, 118, 143
- naturalism, 1, 26, 29, 34–35, 72. *See also* flourishing, objectivist accounts of; virtue ethics
- Nietzsche, Friedrich, 47, 49, 67, 207, 222
 on self-becoming, 47–48
 on self-overcoming, 211
 on virtue, 219
- noble, the, 205, 210, 217, 222. *See also* Aristotle
- normative balance. *See* normative claim(s), balance of
- normative claim(s), 2–8, 29
 balance of, 3, 65, 73, 76, 93, 109, 156, 170, 187, 191, 216, 223, 225
 competing, 3–5, 20, 64–66, 73, 79–82, 93, 103, 196, 221, 223, 225
 first-personal, 2–3, 35, 37, 40–47, 50, 82, 100, 104, 223–224
 incommensurable, 6, 9, 65, 93–98
 irreducible, 2–4, 64–65, 70, 93, 149, 159, 223–225
 plurality of, 3, 5, 8–9, 37–38, 64–66, 68, 72, 76, 85, 92, 94, 101–102, 148–149, 151, 196, 199, 201, 219, 223, 225–226
 second-personal, 2–3, 37, 50–56, 66, 94, 100, 122, 220, 222–224
 third-personal, 2–3, 37, 56–64, 78, 100–101, 138–139, 141, 190, 220, 223–224
 world-embedded, 224
- normative demand. *See* normative claim(s)

- normative perspective. *See* perspective, normative
- normative responsiveness, 134–136. *See also* critical comparison; critical distance; deliberation; flourishing, as normative responsiveness; habituation; moral exemplars; moral perception; *phronēsis* (practical intelligence); reason, practical; virtues
- normativity. *See* normative claim(s)
- Nozick, Robert, 23
- objectivity, 57, 60, 63
 Husserl on, 57–58
- patience, 86, 96, 152, 177; *See also* virtues
 as character trait, 160
 contrasted with complacency, 155
 contrasted with endurance, 153, 157
 and entitlement, 175–177
 first-personal dimension of, 156, 159
 and narrativity, 169
 and normative balance, 155, 160, 170, 177
 as orientation to world, 172
 as problem-solving stance, 10, 70, 152, 175, 226
 second-personal dimension of, 10, 153, 155–157, 159, 164
 and self-abnegation, 159
 as self-restraint, 153, 155–158, 160–161, 164, 166, 172–175
 as temporal orientation, 154–155, 158, 160–162, 164–169, 171, 174–175
 third-personal dimension of, 156, 158
 as tolerance, 156–160
- perception, 57–60, 78, 117, 130–132, 134–137, 141, 217. *See also* moral perception
- perfectionism, 103
 and impatience, 171
- perseverance, 207
- perspective, normative. *See* normative claim(s), first-personal; normative claim(s), plurality of; normative claim(s), second-personal; normative claim(s), third-personal
- phenomenology, existential, 1–2, 5, 7
 first-personal, 6
 and metaphysics, 169
 as method, 2, 6–8, 38, 65–67, 169
 second-personal, 6
 third-personal, 6
- phronēsis* (practical intelligence), 4, 9, 71, 89–93, 107, 131, 146, 150–151, 159, 211;
 See also Aristotle; critical comparison; flourishing, as normative balance; flourishing, as normative responsiveness; reason, practical; virtues, as problem-solving stances
- Plato
 on the Forms, 110
 on justice, 74, 91
 Republic, 74, 83
- pleasure, 8, 23, 31–32, 38, 42, 61, 69, 78, 109, 120–121, 124, 213–214, 225.
 See also Aristotle, on pleasure; goods, pleasure
 aesthetic, 62
- rashness, 214–215. *See also* Aristotle, on courage
- Rawls, John, 74
- reason, practical, 8, 33–37, 45, 65, 96–97, 122, 132, 134, 223–224; *See also* critical comparison; flourishing, as normative responsiveness; moral perception; normative claim(s), competing *phronēsis* (practical intelligence); virtues, as problem-solving stances
 and deliberation, 8, 35–36
 and normative plurality, 8
- relativism, 68, 72–73, 144–145. *See also* flourishing, challenges to; virtues, as problem-solving stances
- responsibility, 50, 147, 192–195, 198–199, 201, 212, 220, 224
 as ‘resoluteness’, 212; *See also* Heidegger, Martin
- right action, 77, 82, 107
 agent-centered, 9, 112
 consequentialism, 12
 deontology, 12
 and self-control, 13
 Utilitarianism, 5
 world-embedded, 1–2, 64
- rights, concept of, 55, 62, 95, 99–101. *See also* deontic constraints; justice
- role models. *See* moral exemplars
- Romanticism, 43–46, 48–49, 62
- Rudd, Anthony, 167–169
- Russell, David, 16, 90, 119, 121, 128
- Sartre, Jean-Paul, 81
- Scheler, Max, 115–116
- Schueler, G. F., 179–180, 182, 197
- science, 33, 63–64. *See also* Husserl, Edmund, on scientific understanding
- Seinkönnen* (ability-to-be), 139, 146. *See also* flourishing, as normative responsiveness; identity; virtues, as problem-solving stances; virtues, skill model of

- self, the, 32–33, 43–44, 46, 52, 65, 70, 133, 169;
See also character; excellence; flourishing
 metaphysical conception of, 165–166, 169
 and narrativity, 45
 normatively governed, 133
 and temporality, 14–15, 18–19, 21–22, 31, 38,
 41, 45–46, 72, 119, 152, 155–156, 158,
 160–161, 163–169, 171, 173–175, 177
 world-embedded, 32–33, 36–37
 self-abnegation, 83
 self-becoming, 1–3, 19, 32, 40–44, 46–48, 50,
 64, 78, 97, 143, 157, 159, 161, 174, 187,
 190, 197, 214, 219–220, 222–224, 226;
See also flourishing; moral evaluation, life
 as object of
 and critical distance, 9, 49, 114, 147; *See also*
 Nietzsche, Friedrich
 and deliberation, 63, 125–128
 and friendship, 118
 and habituation, 109, 118–125, 129
 as incomplete project, 2, 10, 108, 125, 144,
 151, 156, 164–165, 167–170, 173–174,
 177, 191, 199, 219
 and moral exemplars, 47, 97, 107, 109–118,
 121–129, 136
 and narrativity, 118, 143
 and perspectival incompleteness, 170
 phenomenology of, 116
 role of the imagination in, 125, 191
 as self-control, 45, 47
 as self-creation, 44, 46–49, 129, 134–151;
See also Nietzsche, Friedrich
 as self-overcoming, 220
 self-creation. *See* identity, as self-creation;
 Nietzsche, Friedrich; self-becoming, as
 self-creation; style
 self-love, Aristotle on, 41–43
 self-overcoming. *See* Nietzsche, Friedrich; self-
 becoming, as self-overcoming
sensus communis. *See* Kant, Immanuel
 Sher, George, 13–21
 skill. *See* *Seinkönnen*; virtues, as problem-solving
 stances; virtues, skill model of
 Slote, Michael, 81
 Socrates, 73, 91
Apology, 73
 on *arête*. *See* virtues
 on wisdom, 91
 soul, the, 8, 33–34, 75, 79, 115, 130–131, 223
 Aristotle on, 33, 130, 223
 Sreenivasan, Gopal, 86–88, 90, 99–101. *See also*
 deontic constraints; justice; rights,
 concept of
 Stoicism, 73
 style, 47–50. *See also* Nietzsche, Friedrich; self-
 becoming, as self-creation
 subject/object dichotomy, 7, 9, 32, 38, 64,
 77–78, 224
 Sumner, Wayne, 24
 temperance, 86
 temporality, as defining human feature, 72.
See also time
 time
 phenomenology of, 15, 155, 165
 relation to transcendence, 168
 Utilitarianism. 24, 65. *See also* Bentham, Jeremy;
 flourishing, subjectivist accounts of;
 hedonism; Mill, John Stuart
 as first-, second-, third-personal stances, 4–5
 virtue ethics
 agent-centered, 2, 9, 14, 17, 21, 25, 112
 circularity objection, 108–113, 117–118
 contrasted with Utilitarianism and deontology,
 4, 12–13, 70–71, 107
 and dispositionalist account of character, 14
 and existential phenomenology, 1–2, 5, 8
 as practical project, 13, 15, 20–21, 65–66, 225
 naturalistic accounts of, 1, 34; *See also*
 flourishing, objectivist accounts of,
 naturalism
 neo-Aristotelian, 8
 right action, 4, 12, 14, 17, 19, 112
 virtues. *See* character; excellence; flourishing, as
 normative responsiveness; virtue ethics
 constitutive of flourishing, 22, 68, 71, 168, 200
 enumeration problem, 10, 68–69
 as modes of excellence, 22, 28, 68, 71, 225
 as problem-solving stances, 4, 9–10, 19–20,
 68–73, 79, 87–88, 90, 92, 101–102,
 178, 225; *See also* critical comparison;
 flourishing, as normative responsiveness;
 moral perception; normative claim(s),
 competing; reason, practical
 skill model of, 4, 19–20, 35, 70–71, 80,
 89–91, 118, 131, 136, 144, 211,
 226
 unity of, 9, 73, 86–89
 well-being. *See* flourishing
 Williams, Bernard, 29, 215
 wisdom, practical. *See* Aristotle; *phronēsis*
 (practical intelligence)
 world, 32–33
 Zagzebski, Linda, 113–114