



## *Power in Peacekeeping*

United Nations peacekeeping has proven remarkably effective at reducing the death and destruction of civil wars. But how peacekeepers achieve their ends remains under-explored. This book presents a typological theory of how peacekeepers exercise power. If power is the ability of A to get B to behave differently, peacekeepers convince the peacekept to stop fighting in three basic ways: they *persuade* verbally; *induce* financially; and *coerce* through deterrence, surveillance and arrest, but not the offensive use of force. Based on more than two decades of study; interviews with peacekeepers; unpublished records on Namibia; and ethnographic observation of peacekeepers in Lebanon, DR Congo, and the Central African Republic, this book explains how peacekeepers achieve their goals and differentiates peacekeeping from its less effective cousin, counterinsurgency. It recommends a new international division of labor, whereby actual military forces hone their effective use of compellence, while UN peacekeepers build on their strengths of persuasion, inducement, and coercion short of offensive force.

LISE MORJÉ HOWARD is an associate professor in the Department of Government at Georgetown University. Her work on peacekeeping, civil war termination, and US foreign policy has appeared in such journals as *International Organization*, *International Security*, *International Studies Quarterly*, and *Foreign Affairs*. Her book, *UN Peacekeeping in Civil Wars* (Cambridge University Press, 2008), won the Best Book Award from the Friends of the Academic Council on the UN System.

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LISE MORJÉ HOWARD  
*Georgetown University, Washington DC*



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## *Preface and Acknowledgments*

On patrol with the Congo-Brazzaville battalion in the Central African Republic, I asked the captain how he protects civilians. He replied, “well, there is no state here. No hospital or ambulance services. We prevent people from dying by delivering first aid, and bringing them to the hospital if they get injured in fighting. That is how we keep civilians alive.” I then inquired, “what do you do when you confront rebels?” He answered simply, “we talk to them.”

Civil warfare is on the rise not only in the Central Africa Republic, but across the globe, and the only effective “third party” technique that humans have devised to put an end to these bloody, destructive conflicts is peacekeeping. Today, there are more peacekeepers deployed in conflict zones than any other type of troop. Peacekeepers cost 10 times less than sending American or NATO forces. At the same time, the record of UN peacekeeping is truly remarkable. Peacekeepers have saved millions of lives. Unlike most other types of foreign intervention, two-thirds of all complex, completed UN peacekeeping operations succeeded (and not because they were sent to the “easy” conflicts).

United Nations peacekeeping is effective and relatively inexpensive, yet peacekeepers are facing an array of challenges. Blue helmets, of late, are dying in large numbers. Media hardly ever report the positive stories about peacekeeping, favoring instead sensationalized accounts of sexual abuse. Most of the qualitative scholarship on peacekeeping zeroes in on dysfunction. And the current American administration has made it a point of pride to cut UN peacekeeping budgets.

Most of these challenges fall well beyond anything one lone professor could expect to analyze or confront, but there is one area in which I can make a contribution. The scholarly literature on peacekeeping has been better at documenting empirical trends than at theorizing *how* peacekeepers keep the peace. Probably because peacekeepers wear uniforms and are trained as soldiers, many observers think these troops wield military force as part of their regular practice. Peacekeepers,

however, by their very makeup, do not have the capacity, resolve, nor do they often employ, compellent force to accomplish their goals. Instead, they wield a variety of other types of power that, I contend, fall into three basic categories: verbal persuasion, financial and institutional inducement, and coercion short of offensive military force. This book provides a theoretical anchoring of the ways in which peacekeepers exercise power. By better understanding how peacekeepers cause peace, and how peacekeeping differs from other, less successful forms of military intervention, it might be possible to build on peacekeeping's strengths.

Conducting the research for this book was not simple. I wanted to interview peacekeepers, and witness them while on active duty, in several conflict zones: southern Lebanon, which is home to the oldest, interstate peacekeeping operation; Democratic Republic of the Congo, which houses the largest and arguably most complex of the current multidimensional missions; and finally, the Central African Republic, with the youngest and most innovative of the current, complex missions. I reasoned that these cases – which are at once unique but also representative of others – would help me to demonstrate different causal pathways to effectiveness (or its absence) in peacekeeping.

As I was trying to figure out how to conduct this research, a documentary filmmaking friend of mine, Pierre-Olivier François, was planning to compose a film about peacekeeping. He had been commissioned by Arté, a French-German public television company – working also with the production company Alegria – to create a one-hour film about peacekeeping for the 70th anniversary of the United Nations, in the fall of 2015.

Pierre-Olivier and his colleagues agreed to incorporate me into their filmmaking team. In exchange, I helped them with background information, interview questions, structuring the case studies, thinking through the overall narrative, and translating the final product from French into English. Journalists may gain permission to be “embedded” with peacekeeping battalions, observing them in their work, in a way that scholars generally cannot. Because of this distinctive form of access, I was able to witness peacekeepers in their daily practices and routines while enjoying transportation and protection by UN troops in unstable security contexts (and without having to seek employment directly with the UN, which could have compromised my objectivity).

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Thus, I both watched peacekeepers at work, as a form of ethnographic research, and also conducted more traditional, semi-structured interviews with approximately 100 key figures in peacekeeping in Lebanon, Democratic Republic of the Congo (DR Congo) and the Central African Republic, as well as in Washington, New York, Jerusalem, Brussels, and Paris. I had previously conducted field research in Namibia for another scholarly project; I draw on some of those materials for this manuscript as well. I asked questions about the utility of force, and how peacekeepers keep the peace. What I constantly heard was something along the lines of the following: “we have the mandate to use force, and that is fine, but we don’t use it. We protect civilians in other ways.”

Peacekeepers exercise power in three basic ways. They persuade, induce, and coerce. I match each ideal type with one key case that demonstrates the ways in which the type of power has worked: persuasion in Namibia, inducement in Lebanon, coercion in the Central African Republic. Central Africa offers both a positive case of coercion, for a time, and then a negative example of all three types. I dropped my study of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (I plan to publish this research separately). Weeding through cause and effect in Congo is difficult because failure is overdetermined. In other words, it has multiple sources, many of which have little to do with the peacekeeping mission. In my original research design, the Force Intervention Brigade (FIB) in DR Congo provided an example of the UN’s effective use of force. But that one instance of the UN’s use of physical compellence remains the only well-documented example of such action. I can sum it up in a few sentences rather than in a drawn-out case study: in March of 2013, a unique, three-nation brigade of troops wearing blue helmets, in coordination with the *Forces armées de la république démocratique du Congo*, defeated a Rwandan-sponsored, small, hierarchically organized armed group – the M-23 – after it had taken control of the eastern town of Goma. The FIB helped to remove the M-23, but since that time it has not had success in facing the growing number of armed groups in DR Congo – some 140 by most recent counts. The FIB had one success many years ago, but the results since then suggest that this example is not generalizable.

According to Dahl’s classic definition of power – when A has the ability to get B to do something s/he would not otherwise do – in order to assess whether an act of power achieved its intended behavior

change, the researcher must understand very well the positive cases, when B did what A wanted. In the negative cases, it is hard to trace causal pathways because, for example in peacekeeping, the negative state is the status quo. Moreover, if fighting continues, or the number of armed groups increases as in the case of DR Congo, then peacekeeping, along with many other things, is not working well. In order to see power at work in peacekeeping, the researcher must choose cases where B has changed behavior (ceased the perpetration of violence), and then s/he must link the behavior change to what A tried to do. Some scholars might condemn this strategy for selecting on the dependent variable, but for the purposes of this study, it makes sense. All of the cases are instances when the UN's mechanisms of power generally worked (contrasted with in-case variation, when things fell apart in the Central African Republic). In other words, this book is about theory-building and small-n testing. The next step is to figure out how to assess my propositions more broadly. I welcome suggestions on this front.

But before then, there are many people to thank for getting me this far. I have studied peacekeeping since the early 1990s, when I worked at the UN in New York, before beginning my PhD at the University of California, Berkeley. At Berkeley, I had the distinct pleasure of taking a course co-taught by my mentor, the late Ernst B. Haas, and Sir Brian Urquhart, the former UN Under-Secretary-General who helped to create the UN's Department of Peacekeeping Operations. I am forever grateful to have had the opportunity to study with two giants – one in academia and the other in the UN system. Since that course, I have observed changes in peacekeeping both from a distance – while teaching undergraduate, masters, and doctoral courses in peacekeeping and related topics at Georgetown University – and more closely, by conducting interview-oriented fieldwork every few years for a variety of scholarly projects. I owe a huge debt of gratitude to my students for their probing questions and to those in the UN system for answering my questions.

During my fieldwork for this book, I would like to thank many friends and colleagues who answered my unceasing queries, and helped me to navigate my way through many obstacles. At UN headquarters, and in other locations, thank you so much, Dorian Lacombe and Hervé Ladsous. In Lebanon, huge thanks to Gheith Al-Amine, Loubna El Amine, Nada Awar Jarar, Kevin McDonald, Daniel Neep, Leila

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In recognizing the tremendous privilege accrued by circumstance of birth, which enables the ability to live and work in places at peace, I am very grateful to have benefited from audience feedback from various public presentations of earlier versions of this work. I presented parts of this book at the annual conferences of the Academic Council on the UN System (ACUNS), the American Political Science Association (APSA), the International Studies Association (ISA), and the International Security Studies Section of ISA and APSA, as well as during invited talks at Connecticut College, Georgetown University, a Folke Bernadotte Academy workshop in California, the US Military Academy at West Point, the UN University in Helsinki, Vesalius College in Brussels, and Yale University.

In the summer of 2017, I held a book incubator workshop at Georgetown with Michael Barnett of George Washington University, Andrew Bennett of Georgetown University, Susanna Campbell of American University, Paul F. Diehl of the University of Texas-Dallas, and Dr. Renata Dwan, Chief of Policy and Best Practices Service, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, United Nations. Each participant brought to the table different strengths in theory, methods, and real-world experience. This manuscript is infinitely better for their

<sup>1</sup> Bienvenu Bitta was forced to seek refuge in neighboring Cameroon in 2016 due to the fighting. He has not yet been able to return home.

input, and I cannot thank them enough for reading (re-reading), and commenting. I would also like to thank the anonymous manuscript reviewers for Cambridge University Press, Tobias Ginsberg, Elizabeth Kelly, Vinithan Sethumadhavan, and my editor, John Haslam.

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*Acronyms*

A4P	Action for Peacekeeping
CAR	Central African Republic
CIMIC	Civil-Military Cooperation
CIVPOL	Civilian Police
DDR	Demobilization, Disarmament, and Reintegration
DDRR	Disarmament, Demobilization, Reintegration and Repatriation
DPKO	Department of Peacekeeping Operations
DR Congo	Democratic Republic of the Congo
DSRSG	Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary General
DTA	Democratic Turnhalle Alliance
ECOMOG	Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group
FACA	Forces Armées Centrafricaines
FIB	Force Intervention Brigade
FPRC	Front Populaire pour la Renaissance de la Centrafrique
HDI	Human Development Index
HIPPO	High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations
IDF	Israeli Defense Forces
ICRC	International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement
INTERFET	International Force East Timor
LAF	Lebanese Armed Forces
MICOPAX	Peace Consolidation Mission in the Central African Republic
MINUGUA	United Nations Verification Mission in Guatemala
MINUSCA	United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic
MINUSTAH	United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti
MISCA	International Support Mission to the Central African Republic



*List of Acronyms*

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NAMSO	Namibian Student Organization
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
ONUB	United Nations Operation in Burundi
ONUC	United Nations Operation in Cambodia
ONUMOZ	United Nations Operation in Mozambique
ONUSAL	United Nations Operations in El Salvador
OSRSG	Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary General
PLAN	People's Liberation Army of Namibia
PLO	Palestinian Liberation Army
QIP	Quick Impact Project
SADF	South African Defense Forces
SEA	Sexual Exploitation and Abuse
SLA	South Lebanese Army
SRSG	Special Representative of the Secretary General
SWABC	South West African Broadcasting Corporation
SWAPO	South West African People's Organization
SWATF	South West African Territorial Force
UCDP	Uppsala Conflict Data Programme
UN	United Nations
UNAMIR	United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda
UNAMSIL	United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone
UNAVEM II	United Nations Angola Verification Mission II
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNEF	United Nations Emergency Force
UNHCR	United Nations High Commission for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNIFIL	United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon
UNMIL	United Nations Mission in Liberia
UNMISS	United Nations Mission in South Sudan
UNMIT	United Nations Mission in Timor-Leste
UNOCI	United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire
UNOSOM II	United Nations Operation in Somalia II
UNPOL	United Nations Police
UNPROFOR	United Nations Protection Force
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
UNTAC	United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia
UNTAES	United Nations Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium

xviii	<i>List of Acronyms</i>
UNTAET	United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor
UNTAG	United Nations Transition Assistance Group (Namibia)
UNTSO	United Nations Truce Supervision Organization
WFP	World Food Program