1 *Power and United Nations Peacekeeping*

From the advent of the modern state system in 1648 until recent decades, states fought wars and sued for peace with few intermediaries. Today, however, most wars are fought not between but *within* states, and the United Nations (UN) fields the world's largest uniformed force in conflict zones (United Nations 2018f).[1] Approximately 100,000 uniformed UN troops keep the peace in 14 different hot spots around the world. In other words, rather than states serving as the units in the international system that monopolize the legitimate use of force – as was the case for hundreds of years – the UN is moving into that role.

Unlike national militaries, however, UN peacekeepers do not draw on compellent military force as their main means of power. Although peacekeepers wear uniforms and they are trained by their national governments to be soldiers, once they don the blue helmet, they swear to function by a set of rules that almost always precludes the use of military compellence. Peacekeepers are "soldiers for peace" (United Nations 1988). As a result, the concept of peacekeeping is profoundly confusing for observers, practitioners, and the "peacekept" alike.

This book presents an attempt to cut through the confusion. I devise a typology – a classification scheme – of how peacekeepers wield power. According to Robert Dahl's classic definition of power, "A has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something that B would not otherwise do" (1957). I ask, how do peacekeepers convince the peacekept – warring parties, governments, and civilians – to behave as they otherwise would not?

I argue that peacekeepers exercise power in three basic forms: coercion, inducement, and persuasion; I devote a chapter to each concept. *Coercion* is about limiting choice. In this study, it is wielded by uniformed troops. Importantly, however, compellence – the use of

[1] The United States has more troops stationed abroad, but as of mid-2018, the majority of them are not on battlefields.

offensive, kinetic force to coerce an actor into action – is only one dimension. Military and peacekeeping forces may also deter, defend, surveil, and arrest (Art 1980; Foucault 1977; Schelling 1966). National militaries and regional organizations may (and must) compel, but not the UN. *Inducement* refers to the carrots of aid and employment in a variety of different forms, the restriction of markets, as well as the construction of institutions to regulate behavior. Coercion and inducement are both material in nature, rendering it easier for a researcher to detect and trace lines of causality. *Persuasion* is the slipperiest of the types because it lies purely in the realm of ideas. From Sun Tzu's ancient bid to learn the "minds" of opponents (1971) to Joseph Nye's concept of soft power and the "attraction to shared values" (2004, 7), using ideas to change behavior is a crucial, if still under-studied, form of power. When exercised consistently and without hypocrisy, persuasion tends to prove the deepest and longest-lasting means of changing behavior, whether in peacekeeping or in other domains (Carr 1946).

Peacekeepers exert intentional power in these three basic forms, and, for the most part, they are successful. There are many ways to measure success and failure in peacekeeping, as I explain later. Although by most assessments peacekeeping is effective, peacekeepers do not consistently achieve the results they seek. Peacekeepers sometimes exercise unintentional forms of power, which result in a variety of often self-defeating and unintended consequences, although not all unintended consequences are negative.

In this chapter, I introduce the origins of the concept of UN peacekeeping. I then assess the current state of peacekeeping, showing that, for all the problems reported in the media as well as in many qualitative scholarly studies, peacekeepers generally have positive effects. I then turn to the current literature about how peacekeeping works, delineating the two primary alternative arguments regarding basic causal pathways in peacekeeping. I also survey the scholarly literature about power in general and specify how it intersects with power in peacekeeping in particular. I conclude by explaining my methodological approach and the logic of the chapters.

This study is theoretical and scholarly in nature, but it has important policy implications. The main purpose is to clarify how the UN exercises power in order to achieve peace. I fulfill this goal by diving deeply

into three cases of UN peacekeeping, each of which exemplifies the use of a different form of power: *persuasion* through mediation, and information and outreach campaigns in Namibia; financial *inducement* in southern Lebanon, where the UN is the largest employer; and *coercion* in the Central African Republic, where UN peacekeepers innovated in the application of the power of arrest, alongside the compellent use of force exercised by French (and American) special forces. These examples together paint a picture of the essential ways in which peacekeepers differ from military forces. For policy purposes, I show that peacekeeping has been, and may continue to be, a surprisingly effective form of intervention, especially when peacekeepers adhere to their original conceptualization, which calls for the careful application of all forms of power short of military compellence.

The Origins of Peacekeeping

From its inception in 1948, the inventors of peacekeeping sought to form a multinational, pacifying mechanism to step back from war fighting. The idea of peacekeeping arose after the devastation of World War II and was profoundly influenced by the decolonization movement, Gandhi's principles of nonviolent resistance, and the civil rights movement in the United States. Dr. Ralph Bunche, an active player in the American civil rights and universal human rights movements, and the head of the UN's decolonization office, came up with the basic concept of peacekeeping while mediating the first successful armistice deal between Israel and its neighbors (Urquhart 1998). In the course of pursuing new forms of power for establishing peace, Bunche explained,

> The United Nations exists not merely to preserve the peace but also to make change – even radical change – possible without violent upheaval. The United Nations has no vested interest in the status quo. It seeks a more secure world, a better world, a world of progress for all peoples … The United Nations is our one great hope for a peaceful and free world. (Bunche 1950)

During the 1948 armistice negotiations, Bunche introduced the idea of using impartial soldiers from multiple third parties to keep the peace after violent conflict as a means of bringing about a nonviolent,

mediated resolution.[2] Several years later, following the efforts of former UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold, Canadian Prime Minister Lester Pearson, and Bunche, this phenomenon assumed the label of "peacekeeping." Hammarskjold proclaimed, "Peacekeepers are the front line of a moral force which extends 'round the world'" (BBC 1995).[3] The creators envisioned peacekeeping along a police-like "constabulary model," which "deemphasizes the application of violence in order to attain viable political compromises" (Moskos 1976, 2–3). Under such a model, the peacekeeper would "favor persuasion over punishment, compromise over capitulation, and perseverance over conquest" (Moskos 1976, 132). The originators of peacekeeping forwarded these novel ideas and, in a classical constructivist causal sequence (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; Keck and Sikkink 1998), convinced the other powerful member states of the United Nations to institutionalize the unusual proposition of using soldiers for peace.

Three doctrinal rules anchored this new instrument of peacekeeping: (1) impartiality, (2) consent of the warring parties, and (3) the use of force only in self-defense. Impartiality was meant to shield peacekeepers from the vagaries of great power political and ideological conflicts and to enable them to avoid the expression of favoring any particular side in a dispute (Boulden 2015; Paddon Rhoads 2016). By not taking sides, peacekeepers would deploy with the consent of the belligerents after the parties had reached an agreement that specifically requested UN assistance. The UN's forces were to be comprised of troops from any *but* the great powers, and preferably not from former colonial states, in order to uphold the principles of impartiality and consent (Cunliffe 2013). Finally, although peacekeepers would carry light weapons for self-defense, they were meant to keep the peace without resorting to violence.

These principles of impartiality, consent, and the limited use of force are precisely what distinguish peacekeeping from other forms of military intervention. They remained in place during the Cold War, even as the United States and the USSR ceased to be able to agree on most issues confronting the United Nations. Hostile bipolarity meant that, despite the ignition of numerous conflicts worldwide, the United

[2] For negotiating the first armistice deal in the Middle East, Bunche won the Nobel Peace Prize in 1950.
[3] Hammarskjold was referring to the 1956 mission in Suez.

Nations did not field a single new mission between 1978 and 1988 (Fortna and Howard 2008). However, the rise of Mikhail Gorbachev in the Soviet Union and end of the Cold War changed everything.

With the end of international ideological deadlock in 1992, the great powers gathered in the UN Security Council at the level of heads of state for the first time in history and decided to halt horrific conflicts around the globe by mediating the end of civil wars and deploying UN peacekeepers to help implement the agreements. The Council requested input from the UN Secretariat. Then-Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali advanced the United Nations' efforts to establish peace by drafting *An Agenda for Peace,* which lays out the concepts and aspirations of post-Cold War peacekeeping and related activities (peace enforcement, peacebuilding, preventive diplomacy, etc.). In the introduction, Boutros-Ghali outlined the UN's plan for a "United Nations capable of maintaining international peace and security, of securing justice and human rights, and of promoting, in the words of the Charter, 'social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom'" (Boutros-Ghali 1992, para 3). Peacekeeping was reborn.

Although wars differ and change over time, we can classify them into two broad types – inter- and intrastate war.[4] Scholars have classified peacekeeping operations in a variety of ways, but we might collapse these categories into two basic types of operations that match the two essential types of war. For the interstate wars, "traditional" peacekeeping missions monitor troop demobilization and ceasefires along borders. Since the wars are between states, there is less need for externally supported state building upon the war's conclusion. Civil wars, however, are much more complex and difficult to conclude because the basic question is not how to separate but *merge* warring parties. Intra-state peacekeeping mandates mirror this complexity. Peacekeepers are charged not only with observing ceasefires and troop demobilization but also with human rights monitoring, protecting and delivering humanitarian aid, retraining troops, reforming military and police forces, protecting civilians, reforming legal systems, assisting in economic reconstruction, and sometimes administering the entire state until a new government can take over. In other words, after civil wars,

[4] These types contain within them several subtypes (e.g., wars of political inclusion, secession, or conquest) and may bleed into one another (e.g., externally waged counterinsurgency).

peacekeepers are often mandated by the UN Security Council not only to monitor ceasefires but also to help reform the essential institutions of the state so that all parties may be included in the political process. The idea is not to allow one side to win but to restore order by enabling politics to usurp violence.

Peacekeeping differs significantly from other forms of military intervention, but it is sometimes confused with internationally sponsored counterinsurgency (Friis 2010). While both concern the use of external military forces to protect a given population, counterinsurgency operations seek to establish order by defeating the insurgents. This crucial goal directly contradicts the basic purpose of peacekeeping in civil wars, which aims to bring about peace and reconciliation between warring parties. Counterinsurgency negates the peacekeeping principles of impartiality, consent, and the limited use of force.[5]

Although national governments are often the central actors in countering their own insurgent rebellions, for internationally sponsored counterinsurgency, such as the missions in Afghanistan and Iraq, external forces – American and allied forces in these cases – intervene to help the government. Counterinsurgency efforts have proven effective when they employ *compellence* as their essential form of power (Hazelton 2017). But recently, they also have tried to do much more. The Former Commanding General in Afghanistan, and former US Ambassador to Afghanistan, Karl Eikenberry, describes a village where Marines were "building a school, establishing a health clinic, creating a local government center, training and reforming the police force, helping the people with grievance resolution, actively supporting gender rights … improving agricultural productivity and more" (Eikenberry 2013, 61). These are all classic multidimensional peacekeeping tasks. However, as Eikenberry lamented, "The typical 21-year-old marine is hard-pressed to win the heart and mind of his mother-in-law; can he really be expected to do the same with an ethnocentric Pashtun tribal leader?" (2013, 64). Unlike counterinsurgency, peacekeeping works

[5] Counterinsurgency is also much more expensive than peacekeeping. The annual peacekeeping budget for 14 peacekeeping missions in 2018–2019 stands at nearly $6.7 billion for about 100,000 troops (United Nations 2018c). In contrast, for the Afghanistan mission alone, "At the height of the surge, Washington had about 100,000 troops in theater, costing about $100 billion annually" (Eikenberry 2013, 64). Peacekeeping is more than 10 times less expensive than counterinsurgency (see also General Accounting Office 2018).

according to a hearts and minds logic precisely because of its founding principles of consent, impartiality, and the limited use of force. The individual peacekeeper does not have to woo anyone on his/her own, because the entire mission – multinational troops wearing blue hats, driving in white vehicles – is designed to signal consensual relations. Counterinsurgency, on the other hand, works according to a military-based, compellent logic. In recent years, there have been moves to merge the tools of counterinsurgency and peacekeeping, without much success for either form of intervention. I explore this phenomenon further in the concluding chapter.

Assessing Peacekeeping Outcomes

Studies of international interventions and peace operations have employed a wide variety of methods for measuring success and failure – the endeavor of measurement is notoriously difficult (Caplan 2019). In 2010, Paul Diehl and Daniel Druckman published a 234-page book entitled *Evaluating Peace Operations*, elaborating the myriad ways in which scholars can, and might better, assess success and failure. The overall picture of peacekeeping is difficult to evaluate in part because we must decide at what point in the history of the operation we make the assessment. Do we wait until the mission has concluded, or do we attempt to gauge progress while the operations are in motion? I explore both ways of measuring here.

If we wait until the operations close, the UN's record is remarkably successful. Since the end of the Cold War, the UN has concluded 18 mandates in internal conflicts. Of those, two-thirds were successful at mandate implementation. UN peacekeepers fulfilled most components of their mandates in, and then departed from, Namibia, Cambodia, Mozambique, El Salvador, Guatemala, Eastern Slavonia (in Croatia), Timor Leste, Burundi, Sierra Leone, Côte d'Ivoire, and Liberia (see Table 1.1). Although these countries are not all model democracies today (Fortna and Huang 2012), none has returned to the full-scale war experienced before peacekeepers deployed.[6]

[6] The standard definition of civil war comes from the Correlates of War dataset, where civil war entails sustained combat, involving organized armed forces, resulting in a minimum of 1,000 battle-related fatalities within a 12-month period (Small and Singer 1982, 205–206).

Table 1.1 *Completed Multidimensional UN Peacekeeping Operations*

Number	Country and Multidimensional[a] Mission	Year PKO Began	Year PKO Ended
SUCCESSFUL			
1	Namibia UNTAG	1989	1990
2	Cambodia (mixed success) UNTAC	1992	1993
3	Mozambique ONUMOZ	1992	1994
4	El Salvador ONUSAL	1991	1995
5	Guatemala MINUGUA	1997	1997
6	E. Slavonia/Croatia UNTAES	1996	1998
7	Timor Leste UNTAET	1999	2002
8	Sierra Leone UNAMSIL	1999	2005
9	Burundi (mixed success) ONUB	2004	2006
10	Timor Leste UNMIT	2006	2012
11	Côte d'Ivoire UNOCI	2004	2017
12	Liberia UNMIL	2003	2018
UNSUCCESSFUL			
1	Congo ONUC	1960	1964
2	Somalia UNOSOM II	1993	1995
3	Angola UNAVEM II	1991	1995
4	Rwanda UNAMIR	1993	1996
5	Bosnia (Srebrenica) UNPROFOR	1992	1995
6	Haiti MINUSTAH	2004	2017

[a] In order to count here as "multidimensional," the mission had to have at minimum military, police, civilian, human rights, and elections divisions. Many other missions have started and ended, but they were not as multidimensional (or difficult).

Alongside the remarkable and under-studied cases of success, we have the vivid and devastating examples of failed UN multidimensional operations in the Congo in the 1960s, and after the Cold War in Somalia, Rwanda, Angola, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Haiti. These are all countries where the UN mission downsized or departed before fulfilling its peacekeeping mandate. In both Rwanda and Srebrenica, the UN adhered to the three peacekeeping principles, which meant that genocide could occur while UN peacekeepers merely observed. No capable militaries – a single state, a coalition of the willing, or a regional force – acted in time to halt the slaughter. Because

UN blue helmets were present, however, they took the blame (Dallaire with Beardsley 2005). In all of the most recent, successful missions, UN peacekeepers were often aided by actual ad hoc military forces. In other words, we had violent and nonviolent external interveners working together, each exercising their most effective tools of power. I will return to this insight in Chapter 4, on coercion, and in Chapter 5, the book's conclusion.

There is no single, universally accepted way to measure peacekeeping effectiveness. Many scholars contend that mandate implementation is a fair standard by which to evaluate UN missions (Bellamy and Williams 2005; Howard 2008; Ratner 1995). Given the individual components or benchmarks in a mandate, researchers may assess how many of the tasks the UN fulfilled by the time of its departure (Diehl and Druckman 2018). I have used this measure in previous work, I use it here in Table 1.1, and I appreciate it. In recent years, however, mandates have become more homogenous, longer, and less implementable (Guterres 2018; Howard and Dayal 2018). Members of the UN Secretariat like to refer to the newer directives as "Christmas Tree" mandates, whereby many players in the UN system receive the "present" (task) they would like. Most notably the current, "big five" missions in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DR Congo), Darfur, South Sudan, Malí, and the Central African Republic – each with more than 14,000 personnel deployed – have very long and involved mandates.[7] The end point of these missions, as well as the longstanding traditional operations, is very unclear. Table 1.2 lists the ongoing traditional and multidimensional missions and the year they began.

Scholars using quantitative methods have devised a wide variety of measures to evaluate both concluded and ongoing peacekeeping missions. Although earlier work suggests that peacekeepers inhibit conflict resolution (Greig and Diehl 2005), most studies find that, all else equal, the effects of peacekeepers are largely positive. UN peacekeepers tend

[7] The "big five" are considered to be the most difficult of the current UN missions. They are housed in DR Congo (with 22,000 personnel), the Central African Republic (14,000), Mali (14,500), and South Sudan (17,000). The UNAMID Mission in Dafur also has more than 14,000 personnel; it is co-run by the African Union and the United Nations.

Table 1.2 ***Current UN Peacekeeping Operations: Traditional and Multidimensional***

Number	Multidimensional Peacekeeping Acronym	Country or Region of Operation	Year Operation Began
TRADITIONAL			
1	UNTSO	Middle East (Lebanon, Israel, Egypt, Syria)	1948
2	UNMOGIP	Kashmir, India/ Pakistan	1949
3	UNFICYP	Cyprus, Greece/ Turkey	1964
4	UNDOF	Golan Heights, Syria/Israel	1974
5	MINURSO	Morocco/Western Sahara	1991
6	UNISFA	Abyei, South Sudan/Sudan	2011
MULTIDIMENSIONAL AND OTHER[a]			
1	UNIFIL	Lebanon	1978/2006
2	UNMIK	Kosovo	1999
3	MONUC/ MONUSCO	DR Congo	1999/2010
4	UNAMID	Darfur	2007
5	UNMISS	South Sudan	2011
6	MINUSMA	Malí	2013
7	MINUSCA	Central African Republic	2014
8	MINUJUSTH	Haiti	2017

[a] UNIFIL began as a traditional, cease-fire observational mission between Israel and Lebanon (confusingly, during the Lebanese civil war). But the mandate became multidimensional after the 2006 Israeli invasion (also, confusingly, during an inter-state crisis). In DR Congo, in 2010, MONUC transitioned into MONUSCO, but the mandate did not change significantly.