INTRODUCTION: THE CH'ING DYNASTY, THE CH'ING EMPIRE, AND THE GREAT CH'ING INTEGRATED DOMAIN

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The ninth volume of The Cambridge history of China series has the title The Ch'ing dynasty to 1800. As in all other volumes of The Cambridge history of China, the term “dynasty” is used in four main senses. It is used most often in a temporal sense as a way of indicating a period of time, from the inaugural declaration to the end of a succession of rulers who, after the founder, mostly inherited their position as ruler. Such a line of rulers is by definition a dynasty. In many instances in The Cambridge history of China series, references to a family dynasty include not just rulers, but also their relatives by birth and marriage. “The dynasty” is also used in an extended sense to refer to the government apparatus that the dynastic family employs to try to maintain itself in power and attract or compel obedience. In this third sense, “the dynasty” can refer to the court, the state, and the government institutions, including the military, without specifying which is meant. “The dynasty” in this institutional sense can be imputed with agency as the subject of active verbs: “the dynasty did this or that,” or “the dynasty conquered here or there.” Because a dynasty – that is, the line of one family of rulers and its government – could, and did, fail, to be replaced by one or more other dynasties, each dynasty assigned itself a name.1 The names of the dynasties in The Cambridge history of China series were not the name of a family, as in the histories of some other places, but a name associated with the family’s place of origin, or, from the thirteenth century on, a name indicative of some chosen symbolic value by which it meant to be known.

Each dynasty had a spatial or geographical dimension; that is, the area or territories the dynasty ruled, or claimed to rule. In The Cambridge history of China volumes, the name of the dynasty is also used to indicate that territorial extent. This fourth sense of the term “dynasty” appears as a name on a map, where it functions as the name of a country. The subtitle of each volume through Volume 11, except Volume 6, has the name of the dynasty or dynasties

1 In contrast, the continuing line of emperors in Japan to the present day do not have a dynastic name.
being considered. (The subtitle of Volume 6 is *Alien regimes and border states, 907–1368*, which might imply that they were not dynasties, but in the chapters the Liao, Chin and Yuan regimes are referred to as dynasties.) As a convention, then, the dynastic name is used as shorthand for a period of time, a ruling family, a government, and the territorial extent under the rule of that government.

The territorial extent of the major dynasties considered in the first eleven volumes of *The Cambridge history of China* is generally referred to as an empire, modified by the name of the dynasty that ostensibly ruled it. In other words, “empire” is used to refer to the territory under the control of a dynastic ruler, who is routinely labeled an emperor. The cluster of terms – “empire,” “emperor,” and “imperial government” – are conventional and pervasive in the first eleven volumes of *The Cambridge history of China*.

What is conveyed by the term “empire” in these volumes? The word in English and French is derived from a Roman word for “commanding” (*imperare*), which gave rise to words for the one who had supreme command (*imperator*), and then for the territory controlled by him and his designates; that is, an empire (*imperium*). In other historical contexts, the word “empire” has usually been reserved for command over more than a few important territorial units, and is generally taken to be greater in extent than what is ruled by a king. There is a built-in presumption of military conquest or subordination of more territories under the control of one ruler. If there is a counterpart word in earlier Chinese texts for “empire,” it is usually taken to be *t’ien-hsia*, literally “all under Heaven,” where Heaven (*T’ien*) was understood to be a superior ancestral deity who is “up there” in the sky (*t’ien*). The term “all under Heaven” was used a thousand years before the Roman *imperium* to convey the idea of an extensive territory of subordinated units in principle under the formal control of one man. “All under Heaven” was used from the beginning of the Chou dynasty (*1045–256 BCE*) as a way of indicating what was under the nominal command of the Chou king, who was ritually referred to as the earthly counterpart and even descendant of Heaven (*t’ien tzu*). In other words, the early rhetorical claim was that the king should command all the people in all the areas that acknowledge Heaven (*t’ien*) as a deity; it was not a universal claim to rule all peoples everywhere. This claim remained as rhetoric, not description, as Chou dynasty kings never achieved that degree of direct control. In 221 BCE the king of Ch’in, who inherited a kingdom (*kuo*), completed the conquest of the six major rival kingdoms in what we now call north and central China. Still a king, he asked for and acquired a new, superior title, *huang-ti*, to mark

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his bringing together all under Heaven (ping t'ien-hsia). The new title, by
convention, and in analogy to Rome a couple of centuries later, is rendered
into English as “august emperor,” and is usually just “emperor” in The Cambridge
history of China volumes. (To avoid the reference to Rome, some authors
prefer to translate the title as “august thearch,” although that term does not
have comparable implications in English.) An emperor/huang-ti, by his own or
his ancestors’ military conquests, commanded an “empire.” This is where The Cambridge
history of China series of volumes begins, with the founding of an
effective empire in 221 BCE by the newly named first Ch’in emperor. (There
had been dynasties of kings before, but 221 marks the beginning of dynasties of
emperors.) The volumes published so far, up to Volume 10, are primarily
concerned with a succession of imperial dynasties headed by emperors, with
Volume 7 ending with the last claimants who would be rulers of the Ming
empire in the seventeenth century.

Although “empire” is used as a conventional term in Volumes 1 through
9 published in The Cambridge history of China series, it is not a well-defined
concept. In historical literature more generally, “empire” is a problematic,
contested term. History books are filled with empires: not only Roman,
but Greek, Persian, Byzantine, Holy Roman, Ottoman, Spanish, Portuguese,
French, Russian, British, Japanese, and many more that themselves embraced
the word “empire” or something like it as self-descriptive or have been ascribed
that status by others, usually historians. Even among this small selection, the
empires do not have much in common other than commanding more than
a few significant territories and peoples beyond where they started or were
based. There is no consensus on the taxonomy of “empire,” or on the criteria
under which the label is to be applied or withheld. In recent times, the term
“empire” generally has been used in a pejorative sense, an accusation against
ambitious, multi-territorial exertions of power in conflict with the ideal of the
nation-state. In these uses applied to more recent times, “empire” is generally


5 The secondary literature is enormous on the comparative study of empires. A place to begin is the brief consideration of what they call “universal empire through time and across cultures” in Peter Fibiger Bang and Dariusz Kolodziejezyk, “Elephant of India: Universal empire through time and across cultures,” in Universal empire: A comparative approach to imperial culture and representation in Eurasian history, ed. Peter Fibiger Bang and Dariusz Kolodziejezyk (Cambridge, 2012), pp. 8–14 and 27–8. In addition to “universal empire” (understood in the singular, perhaps as an ideal type), another term that is invoked is “tributary empire.” See Peter Fibiger Bang and C.A. Bayly, Tributary empires in global history (New York, 2011). The discussions in both volumes selectively reference the Han, T’ang, Yuan, Ming, and Ch’ing empires, all of which partially fit the various criteria used to describe “empire.”
a negative term, usually with implications of being bad, of being exploitative of others, a mode of governance used in the past that need be renounced. Although some commentators have tried to point to more positive characteristics of some empires as systems of multinational control, when the area the Ch‘ing leaders controlled is treated as still another iteration of “empire” the negative implications of the term do not go away.

Part One of Volume 9, which has the subtitle The Ch‘ing empire to 1800, includes assessments of the four individuals who reigned as the Ch‘ing emperor /huang-ti/ khan from 1644 to 1795. “Empire” is routinely used to characterize the territories that came under the Ch‘ing government’s control. Whether we think of empire with the negative implications that the term has acquired in historiography from the twentieth century on, or as a conventional translation of the long-standing, positive Chinese term t‘ien-hsia, all under Heaven, there are three problematic aspects to be noticed when we consider the historical developments antecedent to the Ch‘ing dynasty’s “empire.”

The first problematic aspect is that there was no settled boundary, not even the Pacific shore, for the territorial limits of the succession of empires treated in The Cambridge history of China volumes. They cannot be regarded together as constituting a single empire under a succession of different dynastic names, even though by convention they are all referred to as “China” in the titles of the volumes. The boundaries of the areas controlled under the Han dynasties of the two Liu families (see Volume 1), under the T‘ang dynasty of the Li family (see Volume 3), under the Sung of the Chao family (see Volume 5), and under the Ming dynasty of the Chu family (see Volume 7) had significant differences in every direction. The capitals of these five dynastic families were in different places. The origins and backgrounds of the five families were radically different. On the other hand, each of these five empires ruled populations of roughly fifty million persons or more. (By late Ming the population of the empire was in the range of two hundred million.) They each adopted the rhetorical claims entailed by using the title huang-ti (emperor) and t‘ien-hsia (all under Heaven, or empire). They each contributed to the evolving technology of governance using imperial institutions. Together these five (some would say four) dynastic families, the two Liu, the Li, the Chao, and the Chu, from 200 BCE to 1650 or so provided the titular rulers for 1,200 of the 1,850 years. If more restrictive criteria for assessing the degree

6 In a 1717 edict the K‘ang-hsi emperor declared that in the 1,960 years since the first year of the founding Ch‘in emperor (counting from when he first became king of Ch‘in), there had been 211 people who had been named emperor (huang-ti) and had recognized reign periods for tracking historical events. See Jonathan D. Spence, Emperor of China: Self-portrait of K‘ang-hsi (New York, 1974), p. 145.
of actual, effective imperial command over major parts of the empire exercised by the reigning emperors and their surrogates are applied, then the percentage of years of the collective rule of these five dynasties would be reduced from two-thirds to less than half the total years from 200 BCE to 1650. In either case, there has not been one continuous empire as a geographical or political entity.

The second problematic aspect of the use of the term “empire” in the volumes of The Cambridge History of China prior to the establishment of the Ch‘ing dynasty is represented in the discussion of the founding of the Yu¨an dynasty. Khubilai (1215–94), a grandson of the great conqueror known as Chinggis (d. 1227), maneuvered to become the fifth great khan, or khaqan, in 1260, and he only proclaimed the Great Yu¨an dynasty to begin in 1272, with himself as huang-ti (emperor). Khubilai and his successors as khaqan commanded more inner Asian territory than any previous dynasty considered in The Cambridge History of China volumes. Their command of the former Chin and Sung territories was as august emperors (huang-ti), with titles, reign names, rituals, and calendars much like the emperors of previous long-lasting dynasties. This dual, blended, or blurred practice combining khan and emperor was not unprecedented, and later it was attractive to some Ming emperors and their advisers, who had designs on recovering control of territories to the north and west. So the second problematic aspect of deploying the label “empire” to characterize or describe the Yu¨an dynasty’s territory is that to do so is to treat Yu¨an as one more iteration of a succession of empires without asking whether it was something categorically different from what had gone before. We might ask whether the label “empire” has become too elastic, and therefore vague, when it is applied to dynasties from the thirteenth century on in the volumes of The Cambridge History of China.

When “empire” is used as the conventional translation for t‘ien-hsia (all under Heaven), it obscures the later development of an added meaning for that Chinese word and some of its associated words. In part because of the succession of dynasties that included takeovers by outsiders, by the seventeenth century some historically minded writers sought to use t‘ien-hsia not in a territorial sense, as in “empire,” but instead to refer to something more enduring. They argued that t‘ien-hsia did not change just because there was a change of dynastic family and the extent of the territory it ruled. In their arguments t‘ien-hsia was a term that conveyed something like civilization, or civilized values and

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practices. Left unsaid was that it was “our” civilization, the civilization of the writers making the claim. This interpretation added an ambiguity to what the term t’ien-hsia meant. In the mid-eighteenth century, early in his reign, the emperor is recorded as declaring, “I am master of all under Heaven” (chen wei t’ien-hsia chu). The context does not limit his meaning of t’ien-hsia to the territory he ruled, as in empire, or to a large, diverse set of subjugated peoples, whom he controlled as emperor and khan, or to a non-dynastic tradition of civilization and civilized values. The reader now cannot determine whether the emperor or his audience had such distinctions in mind, but “empire” seems to be an inadequate word to cover his grandiose claim.

As a descriptive term derived from Roman history for an extensive, conquered territory that is also used as a standard term for rendering t’ien-hsia (all under Heaven), “empire” is so pervasive in The Cambridge history of China volumes, including this one, that it cannot be abandoned. But considering an alternative might enhance understanding of what “empire” means in the specific context of Volume 9. Under the Great Yüan, the Great Ming, and the Great Ch’ing regimes, as they called themselves, the governments ordered massive compilations that assembled geographical information about all the areas under their purview. All three compilations went under the rubric of gazetteer (chih, as the genre is usually translated when it refers to materials about territorial units such as a county, a prefecture, a province, or a region). Instead of using “all under Heaven” as the term to indicate the inclusive territory covered in the three massive compilations, the successive sets of editors in their titles used the term “integrated domain” (i-t’ung). In his preface to the Ta Ch’ing i-t’ung chih (Gazetteer of the Great Ch’ing integrated domain), dated the first month of 1744, the Ch’ien-lung emperor explained that his grandfather had ordered a compilation to celebrate the great integrated domain (ta i-t’ung), but the work was not finished when he died. His father renewed the commitment. Now, ten years later, the emperor wrote, more than 350 draft chapters had been prepared, covering eighteen provinces (sheng) with more than 1,600 prefectures, sub-prefectures, and counties; fifty-seven outer territories (wai fan) and attached states (shu kuo); and beyond them the thirty-one places that had sent representatives bringing tribute. This was an integrated domain that

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8 “Cheng shih,” in Ku Yen-wu, Jih chih lu ci chih: Wai ch’i chung, comp. Huang Ju-ch’eng (1834; Shanghai, 1985), 13, p. 5b. Also see the discussions on Chung-kuo in chapters 4 and 6.
9 See chapter 14 below, note 33.
10 Preface dated the first month of 1744 by the Ch’ien-lung emperor, in Ta Ch’ing i-t’ung chih: San-pai wu-shih-liu ch‘uian, 1744 preface date, printed 1764. East Asian Library, Princeton University, Princeton. The date of the submission of the printed version is at the end of the book in a note by the compilers.
was layered out from the imperial center. Notice was taken of effectively independent places with which it had contacts, including the Chosŏn dynasty’s Korea and Japan of the Tokugawa shoguns to the east, an unstable Annan to the south, and countries such as Holland in the far west on the Western Ocean.11

The term i-t’ung as “integrated domain” had a long history. According to an account produced a century later (with supposed quotations from participants’ speech), at the moment of the transformation of the king of Ch’in in 221 BCE into the first emperor (huang-ti), his chief adviser, Li Ssu, argued successfully against any allocation of territory to subordinates on an irrevocable, inheritable basis. In the course of his argument, Li Ssu used the conventional inclusive term, t’ien-hsia (all under Heaven), which had been commonly used during the no-longer-existing Chou dynasty. He meant the term more in the sense of the people now under the ruler’s command, not as the territory. As a premise of his argument he used “within the seas” (hai nei) in the sense of everywhere that counted, with a geopolitical connotation. He also used what was probably a newer term, i-t’ung (“integrated domain”): “Now everywhere within the seas has submitted to His Highness’s holy integrated domain.”12 The important distinction, made explicit by Li Ssu, was that previously all under Heaven had been divided up into autonomous, inheritable political units controlled bySuccessions of dynastic lords and tribal leaders nominally under a Chou king. He urged that the new “integrated domain” should be administered by appointed officials on a revocable, salaried basis, not by a hereditary elite. Acknowledging that the newly entitled huang-ti (august emperor) had brought together all under Heaven (ping t’ien-hsia), Li Ssu proposed a further distinction. “Everywhere within the seas there are now administrative units [that are not inheritable or militarily autonomous] and the rules come from the integrated domain [and are not determined locally]; this has never been the case since high antiquity.”13 This early articulation of an unprecedented ideal of an integrated domain under a Ch’in ruler whose dynastic successors could continue indefinitely was not realized. The first emperor died in 210, and Li Ssu was dead in 208 BCE.

Was the ideal of an integrated domain without delegation or toleration of inherited control over militarily autonomous regions ever approximated? A partial answer, limited to Volume 9, is that as the three Ch’ing rulers could continue indefinitely was not realized. The first emperor died in 210, and Li Ssu was dead in 208 BCE.

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11 Information about Chosŏn Korea is in chapter 353, information about Annan in chapter 354, information about Japan in chapter 356, information about Western Ocean countries that had direct relations with the Ch’ing court in chapter 355. These countries are discussed in chapters in this volume, in this order.

12 Ssu-ma, Shih chi 6, p. 239. 13 Ssu-ma, Shih chi 6, p. 236.
by the mid-eighteenth century doubled their territory far beyond the initial conquests of the seventeenth century, what they conquered was not left as nominally or loosely controlled autonomous regions. They weakened existing claims of inherited territorial privilege by subordinated leaders, and they blocked new claims by Manchus, Mongols, and others in their domain. On the other hand, from the beginning the Ch'ing rulers did not impose a uniform administrative system. The eighteen provinces, sometimes called the inner areas (nei ti) and formed out of what mostly had been directly controlled Ming territory, were each administered by Ch'ing governors appointed by the emperor under a changing set of criteria (see chapter 1 below). Pairs of provinces and their governors were usually overseen by a proximate governor-general. Provincial government also was supervised routinely from the capital on a divided functional basis by the six ministries inherited from the Ming system, and through the second half of the eighteenth century on a strategic basis by the Grand Council (Ch'in-chi ch'u), a mid-Ch'ing innovation. Following Ming practice, the Ch'ing government continued to divide each province into a hierarchy of prefectures (fu), sub-prefectures (chou) and counties (hsien).

The island of Taiwan is an example of a territory with a significant non-Han population that had not been under Ming control but was incorporated into the Ch'ing provincial hierarchy after its conquest in 1683 (see chapter 2). Although there were special circumstances, especially related to large-scale immigration, Taiwan illustrates the complexity of integrating new territory into the prefecture–county hierarchy that had been reconfirmed as areas formerly controlled by the Ming government were taken over by Ch'ing forces in the seventeenth century.

The Manchu emperors successively subordinated more non-Ming territories in Mongolia, Tibet, and Sinkiang, but without bringing them into the province–prefecture–county hierarchy. Some were placed first under the newly developed banner system, and all came under the mainly civil administration of a board that ultimately was known as the Li-fan yuan (sometimes called the "board for governing outer territories"), charged with overseeing outer territories (wai fan) (see chapter 3). The question of a unified administrative system could always be raised, if only rhetorically. In an interview in 1715 the K'ang-hsi emperor asked an official who had lived for a year in Mongol territory if Mongols could be governed by the ways of Han people (Han jen chih tao), meaning a provincial system. The answer, of course, was that it was not possible. Although they were administered separately, and differently, from

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14 See chapters 3–5 of The Cambridge history of China, Volume 9, Part 1, and chapters 2 and 3 of this volume.

the inner areas, the outer territories were functionally also incorporated into an integrated domain by the middle of the eighteenth century. In this respect, the Ch’ing system was moving close to satisfying Li Ssu’s main criterion of not allowing territorial, militarized lords to remain in place or to develop.

The three eighteenth-century Ch’ing rulers did allow hereditary elites. There was a privileged dynastic family, known as the Aisin Gioro clan, which included the pool of sons from which emperors were selected, but from which direct powers and also peripheral members were stripped away.16 Of more military and political consequence was the conquest elite.17 (Elite is used here in a simple, vague sense of a relatively small, discernible group that wields disproportionate power over other elements of society, and has protected status and access to wealth.) Conquest elites were descendants of bannermen, especially leaders, who served successfully during the years of the conquests of eastern Mongols and the Ming empire. These descendants inherited notable ranks in the Manchu, Mongol, and Han-ch’u banners, and their elite status gave them advantaged possibilities of appointment to leadership roles in the Ch’ing government.18

A separate, larger elite, the core of which was men recruited on the basis of a civil service examination system largely taken over from the Ming dynasty, staffed the bulk of the regular official posts in the civil bureaucracy in the capital and in the provincial administrative hierarchies down to the county level.19 Their status was not normally inheritable, although sons of important men had a comparative advantage, and the Ch’ing system began to allow the purchase of eligibility for appointment to office. This elite consisted of serving and retired officials, and it was augmented by holders of higher examination degrees who had not been appointed to office. Officials and higher-degree holders were themselves a superior subset of the larger pool of men known as literati (shih) since the eleventh century. Literati in Ch’ing times can be identified by their ability to compose examination-level prose essays and poetry. They constituted more loosely defined, overlapping groups variously called the examination elite, the educated elite, the learned elite,

18 See the discussion in Crossley, “The conquest elite of the Ch’ing empire” pp. 310–59. With some hesitation, Mark C. Elliott decided to speak of all the groups in the banners as “Manchus.” Mark C. Elliott, The Manchu way: The eight banners and ethnic identity in late imperial China (Stanford, 2001), pp. 14–15. In his sense, banner elite, conquest elite, and Manchu elite all would refer to more or less the same constructed group.
the scholar elite, and sometimes the intellectual elite. The autonomy of this elite group, involved in a culture of books that stretched back at least to the eleventh century, was gradually co-opted and constrained in the eighteenth century (see chapter 14).

Another term, “local elites,” refers to more diffuse groups that could include officials at home, literati, men of some wealth, and others active in local affairs (see chapter 15). Although the term “merchant elite” is not used in Volume 9, through the eighteenth century there was a noticeable increase in men who owned significant wealth derived principally from regional and overseas trade in salt, tea, and other processed commodities, separate from rents from real estate.

These several differently constituted but not wholly distinct elites – even the members of the imperial family and the conquest elite that had inherited status – all were effectively managed or intimidated by the three administrative emperors through the eighteenth century. The emperors pursued policies and practices that created the conditions under which the different elites, especially the successful leaders in each group, perceived an interest in working with the emperor in a modulated political competition for advantage over other elite groups. Under the simple criterion of an integrated domain that did not condone autonomous control of territory by individuals who had inheritable power, the emperors in the eighteenth century administrated an integrated domain. In this volume it is called the Ch'ing dynasty and the Ch'ing empire, but it represented a new order that was categorically different from the “old” empires.

Given that all under Heaven (t'ien-hsia) has sometimes been taken to imply a claim about “universal empire,” did Ch'ing emperors in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries recognize or accept limits on the extent of their control? The Ch'ing government tolerated different practices in handling its relations with neighboring areas that it did not take to be constituent parts of the directly administered areas under the six ministries or the Li-fan yüan.

The government in Korea under the Chosŏn dynasty of kings maintained its independent administration, although it was coerced into accepting the status of tributary state to the Ch'ing government from 1637 on (see chapter 4). The Ch'ing government dominated but did not directly control the Chosŏn monarchy, and generally did not take notice of the Korean elites’ continuing ideological resistance to any implications of Manchu superiority. By having

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