1 Introduction

This book examines three questions. The first is descriptive: How have soldiers of Western democracies dealt with unconventional problems in post–Cold War missions? The second question is explanatory: Why do militaries respond differently to rioters, militias, criminals, and insurgents? The third question is about policy impact: How does military behavior impact local populations?

This book compares how the US Army, the British Army, and the German Army operated until 2014, studying three crucial post–Cold War intervention grounds: Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, and Afghanistan. For comparative purposes, the analysis also includes the Italian Carabinieri, a police force with military status. The book traces military behavior from late 1995 (when the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, or NATO, replaced a United Nations mission in Bosnia) to the end of 2014 (when NATO ended its International Security Assistance Force, or ISAF, mission in Afghanistan).

The book shows that US soldiers were good at war fighting but not at crime fighting. British soldiers felt more comfortable operating in the gray area between military combat and community policing, although in Afghanistan, they proved that they were warriors, first and foremost. German soldiers struggled to be robust peace enforcers in the Balkans and to fight insurgents in Afghanistan. The Carabinieri adapted to the contemporary mission environment rather well.

To understand why similar organizations (military land forces from liberal democracies) operating under the same mandates respond differently to the same problems, one must zoom into the organizations "doing" interventions. More precisely, one must study *routines*. The analysis of routines is well established in organization studies.[1] Some students of International Relations (IR) and security studies also examine routines.[2] A routine can be defined as a regular course of action

[1] Becker 2010; Feldman et al. 2016; Howard-Grenville et al. 2016.
[2] McKeown 2001; Foley 2009.

learned by an organization. In new missions, militaries tend to apply existing routines embedded in their organizational histories. Given varying histories, it becomes understandable why the US Army tended to apply conventional warfare templates to missions; why British soldiers patrolled on foot as much as possible; why German soldiers preferred to stay inside their camps; and why the Italians were keen crime fighters.

For local residents, such variation matters. There are numerous examples from post–Cold War missions where foreign soldiers caused "collateral damage" or stood by as people were being attacked. There are also many examples of where foreign soldiers lost life and limb trying to "save strangers."[3] Whether soldiers protect or harm people depends, significantly, on their routines. For minorities facing mobs in the Balkans, it was better to have British soldiers or Carabinieri nearby than US or German soldiers. For civilians in Afghanistan, no place was safe, but living near areas where US forces operated was particularly risky.

This introductory chapter first discusses the gap in research on international intervention and then posits a mechanism linking intervention decisions, military behavior, and local impact. Subsequently, the chapter discusses definitional and methodological issues and presents the plan of the book.

The Research Gap

Much has been written on military intervention, unconventional missions, and the protection of civilians. These issues are discussed in IR and security studies as well as in organization theory, international law, military sociology, and political philosophy. However, the microprocesses of military behavior and the local effects of international action remain underexplored.

Writings on Soldiers and Unconventional Problems

During the Cold War, asymmetric conflict was a niche topic. Since then, many authors have pointed to the blurring boundaries of external and internal security, combatants and noncombatants, state and nonstate actors, war and peace, war and crime, and terrorism and insurgency. In the 1990s, the study of transnational organized crime blossomed in security studies.[4] After 9/11, counterterrorism and counterinsurgency became major research fields.[5]

[3] Wheeler 2000. [4] See Andreas and Price 2001.
[5] Works include Nagl 2005; Cassidy 2008; Long 2016.

As part of the growing interest in unconventional military problems, scholars studied implications for security forces. Students of military change employed terms including innovation, transformation, learning, and adaptation; they examined new doctrine, force structure, and training; and they analyzed military missions and tasks including expeditionary war, peace operations, counterinsurgency, and civil-military cooperation.[6]

The need for flexible military forces is especially visible, and especially pressing, in war-torn countries. After World War II, internal wars became the predominant form of conflict. The end of the Cold War accelerated this process due to a decline in interstate wars.[7] In "new wars," internal security collapses, and a variety of state, para-state, and nonstate actors use violence to further their political, economic, and religious interests.[8] Also, internal wars do not simply end; they peter out with much violence and crime occurring in the "postwar" phase. Coping with organized crime, riots, terrorism, or insurgency requires different planning than interstate war, which had dominated "Western" security policy during the Cold War. Many scholars have detected a convergence of military and police roles.[9] This convergence finds expression in notions such as "cosmopolitan law enforcement," "policing wars," and "war amongst the people."[10]

Yet while there is consensus that military roles have changed, research is rarely comparative. More often, it is wedded to the specificities of particular militaries and sites of intervention, limiting the generalizability of the findings.

Moreover, scholars have paid much more attention to strategy than to the implementation of strategy. On the strategic level, states define their security objectives and decide on matters such as defense budgets and force postures. The operational level concerns the planning and conduct of specific military campaigns so that the strategic objectives set for these campaigns are met. On the level of tactics, soldiers plan and conduct operations in line with operational-level decisions. The closer we get to the tactical level, the scarcer is our knowledge of contemporary missions.[11]

Security studies gets closer to policy implementers than its "parent" discipline of IR. However, there is a focus on military doctrine.[12]

[6] See, for example, Davidson 2010. [7] Mueller 2004: chapter 9. [8] Kaldor 2005.
[9] Easton et al. 2010.
[10] Mueller 2004: chapters 7 and 8; Kaldor 2005: 10–11; Smith 2006a: xiii.
[11] Insightful works include Larsdotter 2008 and Ruffa 2017.
[12] Prominent works include Posen 1984; Cassidy 2004; Long 2016.

Doctrine is not the same as action. Deborah Avant writes that doctrine "falls between the technical details of tactics and the broad outline of grand strategy. Whereas tactics deal with issues about how battles are fought, doctrine encompasses the broader set of issues about how one wages war."[13] Doctrine shapes conduct but does not determine it. For NATO, doctrine "is authoritative but requires judgement in application."[14] Inferring behavior from doctrine does not work for other reasons: soldiers may ignore or tweak doctrine, and new doctrine does not automatically lead to a change in tactics.[15]

Studying how soldiers implement mission is not trivial. After all, what soldiers do in the field – and especially how they use force – impacts the soldiers, their opponents, and bystanders; whether lives are saved or lost depends on the methods soldiers employ. The present study adds insights on military intervention by comparing the same security forces in different multinational operations, revealing *patterns of behavior* over time, in different contexts (postwar and wartime missions), and on the micro level (while also taking into account doctrine and grand strategy).

Writings Offering Explanations of Military Behavior

We lack knowledge not only on what soldiers do on the ground but also on why they do what they do. The literature on military intervention is dominated by policy researchers who aim at practical recommendations instead of theory development. Moreover, three prominent perspectives in IR research – realist, constructivist, and liberal – have limitations when it comes to understanding the forces driving military action (as discussed in more detail in Chapter 3).

From a realist perspective, militaries use methods suitable for solving real-world problems. For example, one might expect counterinsurgents to protect local residents in order to "win hearts and minds." But the assumption of rational action, which is strongly anchored in much of realist thinking, is problematic: rational courses of action are often unclear, and military organizations often employ the same capabilities in different ways.

The second explanation is anchored in constructivist research on norms. A perspective on international and transnational norms suggests a harmonization in the way militaries use force. However, norms such as the immunity of noncombatants are unspecific, allowing militaries a broad range of actions without clearly violating norms. A perspective

[13] Avant 1993: 410. [14] NATO 2001: 77. [15] See Johnston 2000.

on national norms and cultures allows for greater variation. Thus, advanced research on democratic peace reveals variation in the use of force by democracies due to differing ideational foundations.[16] However, this perspective is better suited for studying grand strategy than the microcosm of implementation.

Liberal approaches highlight how domestic political structures influence military policy. Studies on the type of democratic systems, often adopting a principal-agent approach, suggest variation in the use of force.[17] However, acknowledgments that agents have their own interests and are not simply the tools of politicians still underrate the autonomy enjoyed by militaries in contemporary missions. Works on civil-military relations in contemporary missions highlight military autonomy but also mention factors such as technology that give rise to political micromanagement.[18]

Most insights are offered by works focusing on the military as an organization in its own right. Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow demonstrate that understanding the Cuban Missile Crisis required zooming in on the US military.[19] Jeffrey Legro reveals how differences in organizational culture account for variations in compliance with norms of war during World War II.[20] But so far, no study has explained military behavior comparatively, with a focus on contemporary missions, unconventional military tasks, and local effects. Moreover, as argued in Chapter 4, the concept of routines holds advantages over the commonly employed concept of organizational culture.

Writings Analyzing Protection

States and their security forces face numerous protection obligations. A central legal norm, in armed conflict, is the protection of noncombatants, as prescribed by international humanitarian law. Moreover, both in armed conflict and outside this context, security forces have obligations not to violate human rights. These are primarily negative protection obligations ("thou shall not").

In addition, states and their security forces are under pressure to positively protect people ("thou shall"). Cold War UN peacekeeping was governed by the trinity of consent, neutrality, and the use of force in self-defense. These principles proved inadequate for preventing and stopping atrocities after the Cold War as became most evident in Bosnia and Rwanda. Consequently, the UN Security Council mandated peacekeeping missions to protect civilians. There was also a proliferation of

[16] Geis et al. 2013. [17] Avant 1994; Auerswald and Saidemann 2014.
[18] Dandeker 2006. [19] Allison and Zelikow 1999. [20] Legro 1997.

postwar peace-building and state-building missions that were intended to establish functional and legitimate institutions able to protect human rights.[21] In addition, an emergent norm, the Responsibility to Protect (R2P), has gained traction. A further type of protection is humanitarian protection. UN organizations, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) protect civilians in armed conflict through humanitarian relief, visits to detention facilities, or a field presence.

Much scholarly attention has been paid to legal and moral obligations to avoid civilian casualties in armed conflict.[22] Authors also examine obligations to protect people from the violence of third parties, including repressive governments and rebels.[23] Some works examine the impact of missions by the UN and regional organizations on local populations at sites of intervention.[24]

In this context, authors have proposed explanations as to why peacekeepers often fail to protect, with reasons including inadequate mandates, doctrinal deficits, lack of coordination between headquarters and troops, lack of political will to protect, flawed military strategies, and lack of troops.[25] Other discussions revolve around how liberal democracies avoid own casualties;[26] controversial practices such as targeted killings and drone warfare;[27] and the conditions under which states and nonstate armed groups comply with protection norms.[28]

Assessments on the humanitarian effects of military intervention stress that it matters who intervenes.[29] But there is a lack of comparative empirical research on the protection achievements and failures of specific militaries. International organizations do not act coherently as works on national caveats suggest.[30] Hence, one cannot treat the UN, NATO, or European Union (EU) as black boxes. Also, writings on protection examine, predominantly, the protection of civilians in war. But many contemporary interventions take place in postwar countries and involve protection under a paradigm of law enforcement, not war.

The Contribution and Main Arguments of This Book

This book fills empirical gaps by comparing and explaining military responses to crime and insurgency in war-torn countries on the micro

[21] Paris 2004. [22] The classical work in political theory is Walzer 2006.
[23] Wills 2009. [24] On UN missions, see Pouligny 2006; Seybolt 2008; Autesserre 2014.
[25] Holt and Berkman 2006; Seybolt 2008. [26] Shaw 2005; Smith 2008; Watts 2008.
[27] Lubell 2010.
[28] Kalyvas 2006; Hultman 2010; Carey et al. 2013; Jo and Bryant 2013.
[29] See, e.g., Seybolt 2008: 271. [30] Auerswald and Saidemann 2014.

level, and by analyzing local effects. Government agencies enjoy much discretion over policy implementation.[31] Studying military behavior calls for theories and concepts that put militaries center stage. A focus on military routines adds to mid-level theories stressing domestic-level drivers of foreign policy. Mid-level theorizing does not claim to study the entire political process but a specific class of events; leaving space for both generalization and particularism, it builds theory to solve empirical puzzles.

Underlining variation in routines is not to deny that all Western militaries have been struggling in their foreign missions. Post–Cold War missions have demanded high levels of flexibility. Flexibility means that soldiers carry out a variety of tasks, including unconventional ones. For instance, soldiers must arrest suspected war criminals and stop rioters from attacking ethnic minorities.

Achieving such flexibility has been difficult for Western militaries for two reasons. First, all organizations, including militaries, specialize. In developed states of the "global north," divisions of labor between military and police forces have evolved over the centuries.[32] Role specialization was particularly strong during the Cold War. Exceptions notwithstanding, the military focused on the protection of states and societies against external military threats, leaving internal order to the police. Changing roles and routines has been challenging. Asking soldiers to not only be able to fight large-scale war but also insurgents and criminals, and to become diplomats, reconstruction experts, and social workers can lead to "institutionalized schizophrenia."[33] Indeed, many soldiers dislike stabilization and policelike tasks, which involve unclear political objectives, no clear end-date, and high risks of "mission creep."

Casualty aversion is a second factor that has stymied greater flexibility of militaries. For the societies, governments, and militaries of democracies, force protection outweighs the protection of strangers.[34] Militaries that engage rioters and militias, arrest terrorists, and patrol insurgent-infiltrated areas run higher immediate risks of death and injury than soldiers sending in bombs and rockets.

These two problems – specialization and an increase in own risk – have hampered effective intervention by all military forces analyzed here. And yet, military behavior in war-torn countries differs. Consequently, so does the impact of behavior on local populations, with some security forces being better protectors than others.

[31] See Wilson 2000. [32] See Tilly 1975; Giddens 1985. [33] Müller 2012: 280.
[34] Mandel 2004; Shaw 2005.

Figure 1.1 Causal mechanism of military intervention

The argument here is that such variation reflects varying organizational routines. Routines include a cognitive element (problem-solving techniques learned in the course of an organization's history) and a behavioral element (the application of these techniques in new missions). Some militaries are better trained and equipped for unconventional tasks than other militaries and are more disposed to carry out such tasks.

Routines may change, even dramatically, such as after military defeat. But more commonly, routines change only incrementally and partially. The stability and path dependency of routines are due to various reproduction mechanisms, such as military training. While routines are vital for problem solving, they are also a liability for organizations because organizations often apply old solutions to new problems.[35]

The main argument of this book can be presented as a causal mechanism. The decision of a government to send soldiers abroad triggers routine military behavior that impacts local populations (see Figure 1.1).

Terminology

This book employs both the terms "violence" and "force," generally reserving the former to nonstate armed groups and the latter to statutory security forces that, from a Weberian perspective, hold the monopoly on the legitimate use of physical coercion. To be sure, state agents may use force inappropriately, and citizens may regard nonstate armed groups as legitimate.

"Unconventional" problems refer to problems other than conventional combat. This book looks at two types of unconventional problems: crime and insurgency. The term "crime-fighting" comprises law enforcement activities such as the arrest of suspect criminals and riot control. The case studies here focus on violent crime instead of economic crime.

The term "protection" comprises both negative and positive protection obligations. Negative protection is discussed primarily with regard to the norm of noncombatant immunity in war (the Afghanistan case)

[35] Levitt and March 1988; Powell 1991.

Table 1.1 *Protection obligations and protection activities*

Protection obligations		Categories of protection-related tasks
Negative obligations Avoid civilian casualties and human rights violations	*Positive obligations* Proactively protect civilians	Deployment of force (e.g., patrolling) Employment of force (e.g., arresting criminals and fighting insurgents) Security assistance (training of local forces)

although human rights violations such as ill-treatment are also mentioned. Here, the challenge for soldiers is to avoid using too much force. Positive protection requires soldiers to act against third parties preying on vulnerable people, such as when soldiers use force against mobs attacking minorities (the case studies on the Balkans). Here, the challenge is for soldiers to avoid using too little force. The case studies thus do not examine issues commonly associated with positive protection, such as UN peace operations with a Protection of Civilians mandate, R2P, and humanitarian assistance.

The book examines various protection-related tasks. The first type is the *deployment* of force, such as when soldiers patrol to deter attacks against civilians. The second type of task is the *employment* of force, such as when soldiers stop rioters or fight insurgents. The third type of task is *security assistance* to host states. Although not a core issue here, security assistance is considered because local allies of international military forces have an effect on "their" local populations. See Table 1.1 for protection obligations and protection-related activities.

International actors sometimes explicitly frame their activities in the language of protection. At other times, protection is implicit, such as when militaries are to establish a "safe and secure environment." Sending states may, furthermore, talk only about their own security as has been the case with the US "war on terror." But even operations undertaken to shore up domestic security have impact at sites of intervention: such operations may cause "collateral damage" or involve the use of force against predatory third parties.

This book brackets some aspects of international intervention. The collection of intelligence is crucial for protection as it allows soldiers to prevent violence and to distinguish between civilians and combatants. However, the case studies do not discuss intelligence in detail because the focus is on the use of force rather than on preparations for the use of force; the focus is on "kinetic" action, in military terminology.

A word is also warranted on impact assessment. The protection of the local population is hardly the only, and often not even the main, objective of international interventions. Other possible motives include buttressing the credibility of international organizations, preventing renewed war, shoring up domestic security, demonstrating national power, and gaining access to natural resources. Motives vary across missions, but even in missions where the main stated objective is protection, other motives will also be present.

The objective here is not to present a comprehensive assessment of the impact of military behavior on all goals of a given mission. The focus is on the (physical) security of populations because debates on intervention often prioritize the security of intervening forces and intervening states. Moreover, if studying broader mission goals such as the prevention of another war in the Balkans or a reduction of terrorist attacks prepared from Afghanistan, the causal chain between presumed outcomes and military behavior as a presumed cause would be long and would have to include numerous context factors and caveats.

Methodology

Case Selection

To control for organizational characteristics influencing military conduct, I compare the US Army, the British Army, and the German Army, that is, ground forces of Western liberal democracies. The Italian Carabinieri are also included in order to contrast the routines of gendarmeries to those of regular military organizations and to study how foreign forces train host state counterparts.

Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan were chosen because all select security forces played a prominent role there. More generally, these were crucial operations for the "international community," shaping discourses on and practices of intervention. Also, these countries have had a foreign presence for a long time. The case studies cover a period of 18 years, from late 1995 (when NATO began to implement the Dayton peace agreement in Bosnia) to 2014 (when NATO ended its ISAF mission in Afghanistan). To be sure, there is a main difference between cases. In Bosnia and Kosovo, foreign soldiers participated in postwar peace support operations; in Afghanistan, they were involved in war. Nevertheless, as international attention moved from Bosnia to Kosovo to Afghanistan, and as troops (often the same soldiers) moved from one trouble spot to the next, military routines underwent some changes but also showed remarkable continuity. The empirical analysis comprises within-case