Introduction: Empire, Race and Global Justice

Duncan Bell

Abject poverty. Yawning inequality, political, economic, and social. Human rights and their systematic abuse. Nationality, sovereignty, citizenship. The identification of historical injustices and their possible rectification. Migration flows and border politics. The legitimation, conduct, and cessation of war. Terrorism, terror, territory. Democracy beyond and between states. All of these topics and more are addressed in contemporary debates over global justice. They have motivated activism, spawning social movements, political protest, and legal campaigns. They are debated across a range of academic disciplines and discourses: sociologists, International Relations (IR) scholars, geographers, anthropologists, economists, and historians have contributed important work on the subject. In political theory, global justice has been a core topic at least since the end of the Cold War, its meaning, scope, and policy implications contested by groups of egalitarian cosmopolitans, libertarians, liberal nationalists, and statists, among others.[1] The importance of the subject shows no sign of waning.

Despite the welcome attention paid to the topic, the debates on global justice among political theorists – at least in the so-called 'Anglo-American' (or 'analytical') tradition – are marked by some notable silences and omissions. This book addresses two of the most significant. First, there has been little detailed discussion of how the history of imperialism has shaped current patterns of global injustice, and the ethical and political consequences that follow from this troubling legacy. There is even less reflection on the thorny question of whether, and to what extent, that very history undermines or distorts the liberal theoretical frameworks typically employed to argue about global justice. The dominant approaches to the subject invoke ideas about justice,

[1] For useful surveys of the scholarly terrain, see Chris Brown and Robyn Eckersley (eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of International Political Theory* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), especially sections 3, 5, 6, and 7; Darrell Moellendorf and Heather Widdows (eds.), *The Routledge Handbook of Global Ethics* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2015).

liberty, democracy, and rights, while ignoring the ways in which the theories frameworks utilised as well as the institutions identified as possible agents of justice, were shaped by centuries of Western expansion and exploitation.

A second gap concerns the role of race. A growing body of scholarship has indicted the field of political theory for failing to pay sufficient attention to ideologies and practices of racial discrimination, domination, and white supremacism, past and present.[2] While imperialism and racism are not necessarily connected – imperialism antedates the development of modern conceptions of race by centuries, and many critics of empire held racist views – they have typically been fused together, especially during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Modern European empires were often justified through claims about racial inferiority and superiority, and white supremacism played a fundamental role in legitimating and structuring imperial formations. Racialized visions and practices, rooted in that history, continue to inflect global politics in myriad ways.

Empire, Race, and Global Justice engages these issues by bringing together an interdisciplinary group of scholars, working in departments of political science, philosophy, and law. Although they adopt different perspectives, and draw contrasting conclusions, all ask how empire and/or race figure (or should figure) in the way political theorists approach questions of global justice. The chapters explore the following types of question: Why have debates over global justice tended to downplay or ignore imperial history? What are the consequences of this gap for the construction of persuasive theoretical accounts of global order? Is global justice necessarily a racialized discourse? Are liberal accounts of global justice – and especially egalitarian cosmopolitanism – the latest iteration of liberal imperialism, or an effective antidote to it? Does work on the ethics of war reproduce or undermine traditional colonial accounts of legitimate political violence? How does settler colonialism challenge the conceptual assumptions of global justice scholarship? Should international law be seen as part of the solution, or part of the problem, in addressing global injustices? What resources do other traditions of political thought, and the practices of social movements, offer for theorising

[2] For valuable surveys of the literature, see Tommie Shelby, 'Race' in David Estlund (ed.), *The Oxford Handbook of Political Philosophy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 336–53; Charles W. Mills, 'Critical Philosophy of Race' in Herman Cappelen, Tamar Szabó Gendler, and John Hawthorne (eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Philosophical Methodology* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016), 709–32; Robert Bernasconi, 'Critical Philosophy of Race' in Sebastian Luft and Soren Overgaard (eds.), *The Routledge Companion to Phenomenology* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2012), 551–62; Naomi Zack (ed.), *The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Race* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016).

global justice? In addressing such questions, the following chapters seek to open up debate on the legacies of empire and racism.

The Burdens of History

In 1800 European states controlled 35 per cent of the landmass of the planet; by 1914 the figure had reached an extraordinary 84 per cent.[3] Empire was widely seen as a legitimate, even necessary, form of political order, capable of underwriting state power and prestige, maintaining geopolitical stability, and 'civilizing' purportedly backward peoples. The modern architecture of global governance – including international law and numerous international organisations – was forged in this imperial world system.[4] It was only with the process of decolonisation in the decades following the Second World War that empire ceased to be widely regarded as a justifiable political form. That process, often violent, left its imprint on the emergent world of states. Racist ideologies were developed, deployed, and reproduced in imperial contexts, often serving to justify the occupation and exploitation of distant lands. As with the territorial and institutional legacies of decolonisation, so the world-shaping power of racial ideologies outlasted the dissolution of the age of formal empire.

Historians of political thought have spent the last three decades excavating the multifarious ways in which the tradition of Western political thinking was interwoven with imperial legitimation.[5] The fraught relationship between liberalism and empire stands at the centre of this body of

[3] Paul Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers* (New York: Random House, 1978), 148–9. For some macro-historical studies of empire in world history, see Dominic Lieven, *Empire: The Russian Empire and Its Rivals* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2002); Christopher Bayly, *The Birth of the Modern World* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2004); Jane Burbank and Frederick Cooper, *Empires in World History: Power and the Politics of Difference* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010); Krishan Kumar, *Visions of Empire: How Five Imperial Regimes Shaped the World* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2017).

[4] See, among others, Susan Pedersen, *The Guardians: The League of Nations and the Crisis of Empire* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015); Adom Getachew, *Worldmaking after Empire: The Rise and Fall of Self-Determination* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2018).

[5] Examples include: David Armitage, *The Ideological Origins of the British Empire* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000); Andrew Fitzmaurice, *Sovereignty, Property and Empire, 1500–2000* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013); Sankar Muthu (ed.), *Empire and Modern Political Thought* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012); Jennifer Pitts, *A Turn to Empire: The Rise of Imperial Liberalism in Britain and France* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005); Duncan Bell, *The Idea of Greater Britain: Empire and the Future of World Order, 1860–1900* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007); Onur Ulas Ince, *Colonial Capitalism and the Dilemmas of Liberalism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018); Anthony Pagden, *Lords*

work.[6] Scholars disagree over whether the connection is *rejectionist*, *necessary*, or *contingent*. The *rejection thesis* posits that liberalism and imperialism are mutually exclusive, that authentic liberals cannot be imperialists. Few political theorists today adopt this position explicitly. The *necessity thesis* asserts that imperialism is an integral feature of liberal political thought; that to be a proper liberal is to be committed to the legitimacy of (liberal) empire. This is a common line of argument among critics of liberalism, though they often diverge over the particular features of liberalism that are held responsible, and just how far they want to push the claim. In one of the most influential accounts, Uday Singh Mehta argues that liberalism and imperialism have been tightly braided together since the ideology emerged in the early modern era. Liberalism, he suggests, contains an 'urge' to eliminate difference and remake the world in its own image. In a discussion of British thinkers in the nineteenth century, centred on John Stuart Mill, he proclaimed: '[i]n the empire . . . liberalism had found the concrete place of its dreams'.[7] But not all advocates of the necessity thesis are critics of liberalism. Alan Ryan, for example, argues that liberal imperialism is the doctrine that 'a state with the capacity to force liberal political institutions and social aspirations upon nonliberal states and societies is justified in so doing', and he maintains that 'liberalism *is* intrinsically imperialist'. It is necessary to 'understand the attractions of liberal imperialism and not flinch', he continues, before cautioning against 'succumbing to that attraction', chiefly on the pragmatic grounds that imperialism usually doesn't work in practice.[8]

of All the World: Ideologies of Empire in Spain, Britain, and France, c.1500–1800 (London: Yale University Press, 1995); Karuna Mantena, *Alibis of Empire: Henry Maine and the Ends of Liberal Imperialism* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010); Burke Hendrix and Deborah Baumgold (eds.), *Colonial Exchanges: Political Theory and the Agency of the Colonized* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2017).

[6] I explore these debates, and offer my own argument about the relationship, in Duncan Bell, *Reordering the World: Essays on Liberalism and Empire* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2016), ch. 2. Prominent contributors to this debate include Richard Tuck, James Tully, Sankar Muthu, Jennifer Pitts, Karuna Mantena, Jeanne Morefield, Barbara Arneil, and Uday Singh Mehta. See also Jennifer Pitts, 'Political Theory of Empire and Imperialism', *Annual Review of Political Science*, 13 (2010), 211–35.

[7] Mehta, *Liberalism and Empire: A Study in Nineteenth-Century British Liberal Thought* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999), 37. 'Urges can of course be resisted, and liberals offer ample evidence of this ability, which is why I do not claim that liberalism must be imperialistic, only that the urge is internal to it' (20). See also Domenico Losurdo, *Liberalism: A Counter-History*, trans. Gregory Elliott (London: Verso, 2011).

[8] Ryan, 'Liberal Imperialism' [2004] in Ryan, *The Making of Modern Liberalism* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2012), 107, 122. Italics in original. For a conceptual discussion of liberal imperialism, see also Jedediah Purdy, 'Liberal Empire: Assessing the Arguments', *Ethics & International Affairs*, 17/2 (2003), 35–47.

On such a view, only practical constraints qualify the universalising imperative.

The *contingency thesis* posits that liberal normative commitments do not necessarily entail support for empire. Instead, the imperialism of liberal writers can be explained either through reference to superseded historical conditions or by disaggregating discrete strands of liberalism, some of which are more susceptible to imperial temptation than others. Thus Jennifer Pitts indicts the 'imperial liberalism' of John Stuart Mill and his followers, while insisting that other forms of liberal thought, including those advanced by Jeremy Bentham and Adam Smith, contained ample resources for imperial critique.[9] The relevance of these historical arguments for the global justice debates is obvious. Depending on the view one adopts of the history and scope of liberalism, it is possible to argue either that liberal accounts of global justice are but the latest iteration of an enduring tradition of liberal imperialism, or, alternatively, that while some forms of liberal argument for global justice are (potentially) imperialist, other anti-imperial forms can be fostered and developed. It is also possible to bite the bullet, as Michael Ignatieff has done, and acknowledge the imperial dimensions of contemporary liberal arguments about global order while endorsing them as the best avaliable response to contemporary conditions. 'Nobody likes empires', he argued in *Empire Lite*, 'but there are some problems for which there are only imperial solutions'.[10] In this tragic register, empire is posited as the least worst option for responsible policy makers to adopt.

Identifying imperialism and its legacies, though, is not always a straightforward matter. This is because empire and imperialism come in different forms, and moreover, there is considerable dispute about how best to define them. There are also a range of thorny empirical problems concerning causality, of how to identify the relationship between past and present. Scholarly accounts of empire come in narrow and broad varieties.[11] On a narrow view, empire connotes

[9] Pitts, *A Turn to Empire*.

[10] Ignatieff, *Empire Lite: Nation-Building in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan* (London: Penguin, 2003), 11. Niall Ferguson offers a more celebratory account of liberal imperialism. For a powerful attack on their arguments, see Jeanne Morefield, *Empires without Imperialism: Anglo-American Decline and the Politics of Deflection* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014). In a different theoretical idiom, John Finnis has suggested that natural law arguments provide a compelling justification for British colonial occupation in Australia and Africa. Finnis, 'Natural Law and the Re-making of Boundaries' in Allen Buchanan and Margaret Moore (eds.), *States, Nations, and Borders: The Ethics of Making Boundaries* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 171–8.

[11] Duncan Bell, 'Ideologies of Empire' in Michael Freeden, Marc Stears and Lyman Tower Sargent (eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Political Ideologies* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 562–83; James Tully, 'Lineages of Contemporary

the direct and comprehensive rule of one polity over another, 'a relationship ... in which one state controls the effective political sovereignty of another political society'.[12] The British occupation of India in the second half of the nineteenth century is a paradigmatic example. Broad definitions characterise an empire as a polity that exerts decisive or overwhelming power in a system of unequal political relations, thus encompassing diverse forms of control and influence. Much contemporary discussion of American empire adopts this broader usage.[13] Some IR scholars prefer 'hegemony' to 'empire', although the difference is often hard to specify with any precision. The concept of imperialism is also utilised in various ways. On a narrow account, imperialism is a strategy or policy that aims to consolidate or expand an empire. According to broader definitions it a strategy or policy – or even an attitude or disposition – that seeks to create, maintain, or intensify relations of inequality between political communities. There is also a debate over the connection between *formal* and *informal* empire/imperialism. Some insist that 'empire' and 'imperialism' should only designate direct intervention in, or sovereign control over, a territorial space; others invoke them, and imperialism in particular, to cover a plethora of formal and informal modes of influence, coercion, and control. Under conditions of informal imperialism, James Tully explains, imperial states 'induce local rulers to keep their resources, labour, and markets open to free trade dominated by western corporations and global markets'.[14] Thus during the nineteenth century Britain integrated much of Latin America into its sphere of influence through 'free trade imperialism'. During the second half of the twentieth century, Tully contends, informal empire emerged as the preferred mode of domination by the leading powers, chiefly the United States. He argues that it is the predominant contemporary manifestation of liberal civilising imperialism, though it has been called a variety of (ideologically mystifying) names: modernisation, development, neoliberal globalisation. These constitute 'the continuation of

Imperialism' in Duncan Kelly (ed.), *Lineages of Empire: The Historical Roots of British Imperial Thought* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009); Frederick Cooper, *Colonialism in Question: Theory, Knowledge, History* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005).

[12] Michael Doyle, *Empires* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1986), 45.

[13] For relevant discussion, see Paul MacDonald, 'Those who Forget Historiography Are Doomed to Repeat It: Empire, Imperialism, and Contemporary Debates about American Power', *Review of International Studies*, 35/1 (2009), 45–67; Miriam Prys and Stefan Robel, 'Hegemony, not Empire', *Journal of International Relations and Development*, 14/2 (2011), 247–79; Michael Cox, 'Empire, Imperialism and the Bush Doctrine', *Review of International Studies*, 30/4 (2003), 585–605.

[14] Tully, 'Lineages of Contemporary Imperialism', 13.

Western imperialism by informal means and through institutions of global governance'.[15] 'Humanitarian intervention' is often criticised in similar terms. Such claims are rejected by many (though not all) liberals, who maintain that current practices differ in vital respects from historical instances of imperialism, not least in the motivations driving them.

Settler colonialism constitutes a distinctive form of imperial domination. Settler colonies seek to establish new and permanent political communities, usually on land dispossessed from indigenous peoples. As Patrick Wolfe has argued, it is an 'inclusive, land-centred project that coordinates a comprehensive range of agencies, from the metropolitan centre to the frontier encampment, with a view to eliminating Indigenous societies'.[16] The paradigmatic modern example is the British settlement of North America, Australia, and New Zealand. These countries are, of course, the intellectual and institutional centres of 'Anglo-American' political theory – a fact that, as Robert Nichols explores in his chapter, is no coincidence.[17] The implications of settler colonialism for debates on global justice are profoundly complex, encompassing questions about both the styles of political theorising prevalent in settler states and the constitution of their dominant political ideologies. For many scholars of settler colonialism, the socio-political development and ideological armature of Anglo-American liberal democracy has been conditioned by the history of settler colonialism. Elsewhere, I have argued (contra Uday Singh Mehta) that it was in the settler colonies, rather than India and Africa, that nineteenth-century liberal thinkers found the concrete place of their dreams.[18] Other scholars argue that the political identities of settler states are indelibly shaped by their violent histories of conquest, dispossession, and violence. 'American democracy', as Joan Cocks puts it, 'did not simply emerge on the ground from which Indians

[15] Tully, *Public Philosophy in a New Key, Vol II: Imperialism and Civic Freedom* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 7. For a parallel critique (though with a different conclusion), see Thomas McCarthy, *Race, Empire and the Idea of Human Development* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009). I discuss Tully's account of empire in Duncan Bell, 'To Act Otherwise: Agonistic Republicanism and Global Citizenship' in David Owen (ed.), *On Global Citizenship: James Tully in Dialogue* (London: Bloomsbury, 2014), 181–205.

[16] Wolfe, 'Settler Colonialism and the Elimination of the Native', *Journal of Genocide Research*, 8/4 (2006), 393. Elimination need not include mass killing, but it often did. On settler violence, see Dirk Moses (ed.), *Genocide and Settler Society* (Oxford: Berghan, 2004).

[17] See also Carole Pateman, 'The Settler Contract' in Carole Pateman and Charles W. Mills, *Contract and Domination* (Cambridge: Polity, 2007), 35–78. For a pioneering discussion of domestic colonization, in Europe and North America, see Barbara Arneil, *Domestic Colonialism: The Turn Inward to Colony* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017).

[18] Bell, *Reordering the World*.

and their life world was being cleared but owed its very existence as radical democracy to that clearance'.[19] Aziz Rana argues that American conceptions of freedom are derived from settler ideology. 'Settler freedom', he maintains, fuses 'ethnic nationalism, Protestant theology and republicanism to combine freedom as self-rule with a commitment to territorial empire'.[20] Mahmood Mamdani, meanwhile, suggests that '[t]he uncritical embrace of the settler experience explains the blind spot in the American imagination: an inability to coexist with difference, indeed a preoccupation with civilizing natives'.[21] Facing up to this situation is not only a matter of belatedly recognising an obligation to address past injustice, important as that is, but admitting that the current political order is founded on, and continues to be shaped by, colonialism. If settler ideologies permeate the political tradition(s) of the leading 'liberal democratic' states, what does this mean for our understanding of liberal theory in general, and global justice in particular?

Political theorists and historians of political thought have paid less attention to race. Yet explicit or implicit visions of racial hierarchy have animated, and helped to structure, ideologies of rule from the early modern era to the present.[22] The prevailing historical view is that race/racism is largely an invention of Western modernity, emerging simultaneously (and not coincidentally) with the Spanish conquest of the Americas, though some scholars seek to trace its proto-forms deep into the bedrock of European history.[23] The racial order was transcontinental in reach from the beginning, and subsequent centuries of imperialism both spread and consolidated it. By the nineteenth century it was a pervasive feature of the Western political imaginary. Critical philosophers of race have demonstrated that the canon of Western philosophy is

[19] Cocks, *On Sovereignty and Other Political Delusions* (London: Bloomsbury, 2015), 64.
[20] Rana, *The Two Faces of American Freedom* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010), 12.
[21] Mamdani, 'Settler Colonialism', *Critical Inquiry*, 41 (2015), 598–9. See also Kevin Bruyneel, 'The American Liberal Colonial Tradition', *Settler Colonial Studies*, 3 (2013), 311–21.
[22] In the literature on postcolonial international law and IR, the centrality of race to questions of global order and justice has long been a vital theme. Examples would include: Siba N'Zatioula Grovougi, *Sovereigns, Quasi Sovereigns, and Africans: Race and Self-Determination in International Law* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996); Roxanne Doty, *Imperial Encounters: The Politics of Representation in North-South Relations* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996). Thanks to Randall Persuad for discussion of this point.
[23] See especially George Fredrickson, *Racism: A Short History* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002). See also Francisco Bethencourt, *Racisms: From the Crusades to the Twentieth Century* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2013). On the debate about chronology, see Miriam Eliav-Feldon, Benjamin Isaac, and Joseph Ziegler (eds.), *The Origins of Racism in the West* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009).

marked by persistent claims of racial superiority, where large parts of the world, and the peoples who lived there, were considered to be inferior to white Europeans in various ways.[24] Many suggest that philosophical scholarship (largely unwittingly) continues to perform this function. The modern social sciences have also acted as an important site for the incubation and dissemination of such ideas. Recent scholarship on the disciplinary histories of political science, IR, and sociology, for example, shows that from their emergence in the late nineteenth century they were preoccupied with the legitimation of white supremacism and (often) imperialism.[25] As Robert Vitalis has argued, until deep into the twentieth century IR was often regarded as a synonym for 'inter-racial relations'.[26] Du Bois uttered a commonplace in *The Souls of Black Folk* when he predicted that 'the problem of the twentieth century is the problem of the color-line'.[27] Half a century later, in *The Wretched of the Earth*, Frantz Fanon reiterated the point: 'It is evident that what parcels out the world is to begin with the fact of belonging to or not belonging to a given race.'[28] Racialized conceptions of politics and society continue to play a fundamental role in Western societies, shaping ideas, institutions, and public policies.

Despite its importance, race is largely absent from discussions of global justice in political theory. For Charles Mills, this means that theoretical

[24] See, for example, Zack (ed.), *The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Race*, Sec. I & V; Justin E. H. Smith, *Nature, Human Nature, and Human Difference: Race in Early Modern Philosophy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2015); Robert Bernasconi, 'The Philosophy of Race in the Nineteenth Century' in Dean Moyar (ed.), *Routledge Companion to Nineteenth Century Philosophy* (London: Routledge, 2010), 498–521; Charles Mills, 'Decolonizing Western Political Philosophy', *New Political Science*, 37/1 (2015), 1–24. See also Dipesh Chakrabarty, *Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000).

[25] Robert Vitalis, *White World Order, Black Power Politics: The Birth of American International Relations* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2015); Jessica Blatt, *Race and the Making of American Political Science* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2015); John Hobson, *The Eurocentric Conception of World Politics: Western International Theory, 1760–2010* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010); Vineet Thakur, Alexander David, and Peter Vale, 'Imperial Missions, "Scientific" Method: An Alternative Account of the Origins of IR', *Millennium*, 46/1 (2017), 3–23; George Steinmetz (ed.), *Sociology and Empire: The Imperial Entanglements of a Discipline* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2013).

[26] Vitalis, *White World Order, Black Power Politics.*

[27] Du Bois, *The Souls of Black Folk*, 2nd ed. (Chicago: McLurg, 1903), vii. This idea has been picked up in recent scholarship: Marilyn Lake and Henry Reynolds, *Drawing the Global Colour Line: White Men's Countries and the International Challenge of Racial Equality* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008); Alexander Anievas, Nivi Manchanda, and Robbie Shilliam (eds.), *Race and Racism in International Relations: Confronting the Global Color Line* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2015).

[28] Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth*, trans. Constance Farrington ([1961] New York: Grove Press, 1968), 40.

debates ignore or misunderstand some of the principal sources and sites of injustice.[29] 'Racial ideologies', he contends, 'circulate globally, assumptions of nonwhite inferiority and the legitimacy of white rule are taken for granted, a shared colonial history of pacts, treaties, international jurisprudence, and a racial-religious self-conception of being the bearers and preservers of civilization provide common norms and reference points.'[30] These assumptions have long been deeply ingrained in patterns of thought and behaviour. Several contributors to this volume suggests that the failure to address questions of race and empire is in part methodological – 'Anglo-American' political theorists have missed much of importance because of the way they approach the subject. For Mills, 'ideal theorizing' in a Rawlsian vein bears some of the blame.[31] It is no accident, he argues, that mainstream liberal political philosophy has routinely ignored or downplayed questions of racial domination, for this is a predictable result of generating theories divorced from, and even blind to, the historical processes and practices – imperialism, slavery, racism – that have helped structure the contemporary world. It is a feature not a bug. Political theory, then, often fails to adequately grasp the character of the injustices it purports to address. Such a worry animates many of the following chapters. A number of authors argue for the importance of recovering, and integrating into theoretical analysis, the views of those in the Global South usually presented as the passive 'recipients' of global justice. This highlights the promise of ethnographic work in political theory.[32] More generally, the following chapters emphasize the need for political theorists to engage more with social scientists and historians.[33]

[29] Mills, 'Race and Global Justice'.

[30] Mills, 'Race and Global Justice', Chapter 4 in this volume. For a relevant critique of human rights discourse, see Makua Mutua, *Human Rights: A Political and Cultural Critique* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013).

[31] See especially Mills, 'Ideal Theory as Ideology' in Mills, *Black Rights/White Wrongs: The Critique of Racial Liberalism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), ch. 5. For other relevant criticisms of ideal theorization, see Elizabeth Anderson, *The Imperative of Integration* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010); Sarah Fine, 'Immigration and Discrimination' in Fine and Lea Ypi (eds.), *Migration and Political Theory: The Ethics of Movement and Membership* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 125–50.

[32] *For a discussion of ethnography and political theory, see Lisa Herzog and Bernardo Zacka, 'Fieldwork in Political Theory: Five Argument for an Ethnographic Sensibility', British Journal of Political Science (2017, online first).*

[33] Michael Goodhart, *Injustice: Political Theory for the Real World* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018). For an exploration of the ideas and practices of global justice movements in the Global South, focusing on the World Social Forum, see Manfred Stenger, James Goodman, and Erin K. Wilson, *Justice Globalism: Ideology, Crises, Policy* (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2013). See also Shari Stone-Mediatore, 'Global Ethics, Epistemic Colonialism, and Paths to More Democratic Knowledge',