

Checking Presidential Power

A central concern about the robustness of democratic rule in new democracies is the concentration of power in the executive branch and the potential this creates for abuse. This concern is felt particularly with regard to the concentration of legislative power. *Checking Presidential Power* explains the levels of reliance on executive decrees in a comparative perspective. Building on the idea of institutional commitment, which affects the enforcement of decision-making rules, this book describes the degree to which countries rely on executive decree authority as more reliance may lead to unbalanced presidential systems and will ultimately affect democratic quality. Breaking new ground by both theorizing and empirically analyzing decree authority from a comparative perspective, this book examines policymaking in separation of powers systems. It explains the choice between decrees and statutes, and why legislators are sometimes profoundly engaged in the legislative process and yet other times entirely withdrawn from it.

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Checking Presidential Power

Executive Decrees and the Legislative Process in New Democracies

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For Gael

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Abbreviations

CDA	Constitutional Decree Authority
DNU	Decretos de Necesidad y Urgencia (Decrees of Necessity and Urgency, Argentina)
EC ₃₂	Emenda Constitucional 32 (Constitutional Amendment, Brazil)
HCDN	Honorable Cámara de Diputados de la Nación (Chamber of Deputies, Argentina)
ICI	Institutional Commitment Index
MPV	Medidas Provisórias (Provisional Measures/Decrees, Brazil)
SC	Supreme Court
STF	Supremo Tribunal Federal (Supreme Court, Brazil)