

Reasoning of State

Scholars and citizens tend to assume that rationality guides the decision making of our leaders. Brian Rathbun suggests, however, that if we understand rationality to be a cognitive style premised on a commitment to objectivity and active deliberation, rational leaders are, in fact, the exception – not the norm. Using a unique combination of methods, including laboratory bargaining experiments, archival-based case studies, quantitative textual analysis, and high-level interviews, Rathbun questions some of our basic assumptions about rationality and leadership, with profound implications for the field of international relations. Case studies of Bismarck and Richelieu show that the rationality of realists makes them rare. An examination of Churchill and Reagan, romantics in international politics who sought to overcome obstacles in their path through force of will and personal agency, show what less rationality looks like in foreign policy making.

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Realists, Romantics and Rationality in International Relations

Brian C. Rathbun

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> For my parents, Josette and Chris Not always entirely rational, but perhaps that is why I love them.





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Acknowledgments

Like every other academic in the world, I am sometimes asked at a dinner party, on a bus, or in the gym, by those not in this peculiar line of work, what I research. "What are you working on now?" they often inquire. The past few years I have told them about a book I am writing on rationality, and how we should not assume that foreign policy decision makers are rational. "Don't we already know that?" (Some book editors have said the same.)

We should. But perhaps more than in any field other than economics, political scientists and international relations scholars have been taken with the rational actor model. We could chalk this up to tractability and simplicity. It provides a useful starting point. But as people like myself question this "assumption," it becomes clear that is a deeply rooted conviction of not a few. As they admit the implausibility of rationality assumption and claim to use it only as an analytical convenience, they simultaneously resist conclusions resting on other, more substantiated bases of human decision making consistent with the evidence. Even those who don't believe in universal rationality have often been reluctant to offer nonrational alternatives, choosing instead to broaden the scope of what encompasses rational behavior, such as appropriate behavior in a particular context given a set of norms. This is likely a result of a desire not to depart too far from the international relations mainstream as well as a reflection of the difficulty of understanding just how to explain nonrational behavior. Surely we are not in the psychiatry business.

So I am just going to say it: human beings are not always very rational, even the most highly educated among us (and those considerably less so) to whom we entrust our foreign policy. See, that wasn't so bad.

But that is not even the central argument of this book. My claim is that human beings systematically vary in their rationality, even if highly rational decision makers are relatively rare given the cognitive demands and effort required by active deliberation and maintaining objectivity (which is how I define rational thinking). Just as it wrong to always assume pure rationality, so it is folly to assume that everyone is always

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irrational. While it is certainly true that rationality is a function of situation and that every individual displays both tendencies every day, I focus in this book on stable individual-level differences. It is best to think of more rational or less rational individuals rather than irrational or rational ones, and to judge this based not on the outcomes of their decisions and the substance of their beliefs but on the process by which they form their judgments. Nonrational individuals display more intuitive, even impulsive thinking styles with fewer concerns about seeing things as they are.

This is not a book just about leaders, as some have tried to make it. Too often those who study the psychology of decision making are dismissed as "merely" doing foreign policy analysis. Even though the case studies are of four key figures in history, the conclusions are meant to matter for international relations Theory with a capital "T." The fact that our most rational foreign policy makers (in this book, Bismarck and Richelieu) are realists, and realists are rare, tells us a lot about how to approach the universality of realism as a theory of foreign policy. It is more exception than rule.

Rationality is best judged in relative terms, which necessitates that we understand at least one type of nonrational leader. Here I seized on romantics, fulfilling a longstanding wish I have had to integrate insights from the humanities with those of the social sciences. The humanities tell us a lot about being human, and taking our humanity seriously is at the heart of the psychological approach to explaining decision making. Doing so allows us to understand how Churchill and Reagan tick, figures who seem larger than life and ill explained by existing theoretical frameworks. That's because they were not very rational.

This book is itself a mixture of romantic and rationalistic scholarship. It is rationalistic in the sense that it seeks to carefully consider concepts and demonstrate their causal role in human decision making. It is romantic in trying to make a bold argument that recasts our understanding of rationality even if it has little chance of succeeding. In other words, I hope it combines the best of two increasingly separate types of international relations theorizing: the more traditional approach focused on taking big swings and initiating grand debates, and the more modern positivistic turn toward making tangible progress on tractable research questions with a careful focus on research design. The former laments the narrowing of our research aims and claims and the increasing technicality of our research methods – the lack of romance, as it were, in our scholarship. The latter complains of the pointlessness of grand theory ill suited and uninterested in testing its hypotheses in a rigorous way since no one is going to change their mind anyway. Both are right.



Acknowledgments

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Now for the delicate task of thanking co-authors. Two of the chapters in this book are the result of close partnerships. Joshua Kertzer and I together designed and implemented the bargaining experiment, previously published in *International Organization*, that forms the basis of Chapter 4. This was the first step in testing the hunch that formed this book, and there was no one else who could help me carry this out. Gold, Jerry! Gold! Therese Anders was my research assistant for a year and a half, the best I have ever had. She helped me construct and analyze a data set comprising Churchill's speeches and comparing them with those of government speakers, which is at the heart of Chapter 9. I thank both of them for teaching an old dog new tricks.

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I dedicate this book to my parents, to whom I owe the particular left-and right-brain combination (rational and nonrational, perhaps) that enabled me to put this all together. My mom received her bachelor's degree only in her forties, earning a degree in theology and going on to a successful career in, of all things, finance. I remember my mom with papers splayed across the bed when she was taking a class on art history, and I kept the textbook, which I have been carrying around for years. I cite it in this book in my review of romanticism. My dad is a numbers guy, an accountant who derives his greatest pleasure from singing in choirs. In loving and deep partnership with my wife, Nina, I am trying to encourage the same broad understanding and love of the world in my sons, Luc and Max, as they become fine young men who appreciate both science and the arts. Combining the two makes for better scholarship and better people.

