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Introduction

As countries emerge from violent conflict they face difficult challenges about how to nurture a space where speech and media are able to contribute to a new future while balancing a difficult legacy. In some cases, media are part of ambitious reconciliation projects; in other war-to-peace transitions, reconciliation processes, if they occur at all, will be much further in the future. This is a book about the role of media in some of Africa's most complex state- and nation-building projects.¹ It comes at a turbulent moment in global politics as waves of populist protest gain traction and concerns continue to grow about fake news, social media echo chambers and the increasing role of both traditional and new media in waging wars or influencing elections. As kleptocratic and autocratic forms of government take root throughout

¹ The difference between nation-building and state-building is often muddled, particularly in post-war situations, where both processes often occur. There is a diverse literature on 'failed states' (Fukuyama, 2004a, 2004b; Rotberg, 2002, 2004), 'fragile states' (Osaghae, 2007; Zoellick, 2008), 'crisis states' (Putzel & Di John, 2012) or 'hybrid political orders' (Boege, Brown & Clements, 2009; Lund, 2006; Meagher, 2012), among other classifications, in Africa that addresses the state- and nation-building debates. Both nation- and state-building are central to the political projects and the role of the media in Ethiopia and Uganda but exactly what is meant by this is not always clear. Generally accepted definitions are offered by the authors of *State-Building, Nation-Building and Constitutional Politics in Post-Conflict Situations: Conceptual Clarifications and an Appraisal of Different Approaches*, when they note 'State-building means the establishment, re-establishment, and strengthening of a public structure in a given territory capable of delivering public goods. Essential to state-building is the creation of sovereign capacities of which the fundamental one is the successful and generally undisputed claim to a "monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force"' (Von Bogdandy et al. 2005). In contrast, 'Nation-building is the most common form of a process of collective identity formation with a view to legitimizing public power within a given territory. This is an essentially indigenous process which often not only projects a meaningful future but also draws on existing traditions, institutions and customs, redefining them as national characteristics in order to support the nation's claim to sovereignty and uniqueness. A successful nation-building process produces a cultural projection of the nation containing a certain set of assumptions, values and beliefs which can function as the legitimizing foundation of a state structure.' (Von Bogdandy et al., 2005).

the world, there are increasing restrictions on freedom of expression and a growing confidence in dismissing the old international order that (at times) has emphasised values and human rights in exchange for *realpolitik*. But by moving away from some of the assumptions or judgements about the role of the media in autocratic states, or judgements about the ways in which a country may fall short of classical freedom of expression standards, this book unpacks the paradoxes of media and politics to understand them on their own terms, and according to their own logic in specific contexts. In short, to borrow a question that has been used by other comparative media scholars, to ‘understand why the media is the way it is’ (Hallin & Mancini, 2004a; Siebert, Peterson & Schramm, 1956). This allows for diagnosing important factors that have led to the diverse media environments that we currently see across the continent.

Home to some of the world’s most ambitious experiments in communication and media, Africa is an important and too often neglected theatre for exploring these difficult questions. With the mobile phone market growing at a pace exceeding Asia,² the continent is becoming more connected than ever, and media are having a transformative impact on all aspects of political, social and economic life. For many, this has instilled a great confidence in the potential for progressive strides forward. The United Nations Agenda for Sustainable Development, outlining the goals that all countries should adopt for addressing global poverty and peace, has made universal internet connectivity a goal for all by 2020. This has become a rallying point for leaders in industry, global philanthropists and international activists to connect the unconnected.

This book stands cautiously back from the more optimistic projections and future hopes for technology and instead critically examines the foundations and ideas that have grounded the contemporary media systems in Ethiopia and Uganda today. Without dismissing the potential for new communication technologies to enhance the lives of individuals, the focus here is on how governments have used communications for political projects and to shape media systems for state- and nation-building, and how this has been challenged. New technologies are not simply added to society as an appendage to an existing order but, like an invasive species, the introduction of a technology often sees it spread with varying repercussions for the existing system. This is particularly the case in countries such as Ethiopia and Uganda that exhibit autocratic tendencies in their governance. Ruled by guerrilla movements that fought fierce wars before coming to power, the longstanding ruling parties in Uganda and Ethiopia have publicly proclaimed their desire to provide stability and unity, but these noble ambitions have too often morphed into centralism and control. Studying their shared, and divergent, histories provides insight into how autocracies have navigated the challenges and opportunities posed by media and communications in an increasingly information-rich environment. But, while

² www.gsma.com/mobileeconomy/sub-saharan-africa-2017/.

sharing similar histories, Uganda and Ethiopia have also developed two very different media systems. Uganda's is comparatively open, while Ethiopia's is far more restrictive, and by asking why this has been the case it is possible to offer new conclusions about how the systems have developed, and also offer more general insights on the role of media in state- and nation-building projects.

AFRICA'S NEW LEADERS?

Ethiopia and Uganda are ripe for comparative analysis. Their ruling parties share a legacy of coming to power after successful guerrilla wars led by charismatic leaders. In Uganda, President Yoweri Museveni and the National Resistance Movement (NRM) remain in power having taken office in 1986. In Ethiopia, Meles Zenawi and the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) took power in 1991 and Meles would likely still be Ethiopia's head-of-state today if not for his untimely death in 2013. But his party also remains in power and is strongly devoted to his legacy and ideas. This longevity of rule can partly be attributed to the NRM and EPRDF's ability to institute ambitious political projects steeped in the language of democracy and accountability but which have also helped consolidate their power. In Ethiopia this process of change has been referred to as Revolutionary Democracy, while in Uganda it is known as the Movement System. These approaches, which were honed, developed, articulated and practised during the guerrilla struggles, informed the political transitions that the parties oversaw in the 1990s. But as wartime memories and legacies began to recede, the NRM and EPRDF each began to take up the business of long-term governance, redefining and rearticulating what Revolutionary Democracy and the Movement System means. While continuing to embrace elements of Marxist-Leninism that were so important to the EPRDF leadership's early political education, Meles Zenawi offered a vision for Ethiopia's future as a developmental democratic state harmonious with the post-Cold War world order, and there has been increasing discussion in Kampala about the practice of democratic centralism. But these are more efforts at rebranding core ideas than offering new alternatives.

Revolutionary Democracy and the Movement System share much in common. They each emphasise the importance of the leadership of one party and a strong leadership figure to promote national unity, stability and development. As Vladimir Lenin described, democratic centralism involves the 'freedom of discussion, unity of action', which refers to the space given to party members to debate policy but with the expectation that all members will ultimately follow party decisions. With a heavy emphasis on strong, stable leadership, Revolutionary Democracy and the Movement System both promote a centralisation of power that is justified in enabling the state to best direct the development effort. In Ethiopia and Uganda, this approach draws inspiration not just from the Marxist-Leninist tradition but also from the historical examples of South East Asian countries that have enjoyed enviable levels

of economic growth since the Second World War. Each advocating for the role of the state and strong leadership, Meles and Museveni have been examples for other leaders in the continent seeking to break with the crippling orthodoxy of austerity. Paul Kagame of Rwanda, for example, has credited Meles with having ‘the intellectual ability to formulate and argue the case for a developmental democratic state . . . and the boldness to push it through’, urging other Africans to ‘practice variations of the concept based on local conditions’, and they may ‘get equally good results’ (Kagame, 2015). Certainly, Ethiopia’s and Uganda’s economic growth rates demand attention. Ethiopia has had some of the highest rates of economic growth on the continent at 10.5 per cent (compared with Uganda at 4.5 per cent) average over the last five years (until 2016).³ And by delivering high growth rates, proponents of Revolutionary Democracy and the Movement System have been able to deflect criticism that the EPRDF and NRM have restricted political freedoms. It is argued that Revolutionary Democracy and the Movement System promises instead a richer and more meaningful democracy based on empowerment.

However, while Ethiopia and Uganda are tied together by their notable similarities and overall state-building trajectories, there are differences. Here, the media stands as both a mirror that can be held up to study these differences and a motor of the historical change driving divergent paths. Initially, both Meles and Museveni made promoting media freedoms a central part of their governments’ new political agendas and citizens and journalists enjoyed unprecedented access to diverse media outlets. From this starting point the situation has evolved differently. From the most established print outlets to the smallest online initiatives, since 2005 the media in Ethiopia has been subjected to extensive controls and surveillance by the ruling EPRDF. Websites are routinely blocked and at the time of writing more than a dozen journalists and bloggers are currently in jail. The country remains one of only two on the continent (the other being Eritrea) that retains a state monopoly of the telecommunications system. The result has been the creation of a highly restrictive media environment where few private media outlets are able to operate.

In contrast, there are significantly fewer reports of government monitoring and surveillance of online spaces in Uganda, although the NRM has closed social media during recent election and campaigning periods. While journalists do report government harassment and there have been cases of imprisonment, the types of restrictions and intense interventions seen in Ethiopia are not present. With over 100 stations and dozens of private newspapers and satellite stations, the country is well connected and comparatively information rich. Ugandans themselves look favourably upon their media. From information collected between 2011 and 2013, Afrobarometer found that 83 per cent of Ugandans considered their media as being ‘effective’ in serving as a ‘watchdog role over government’, a percentage higher than both Ghana and South Africa (Mitullah & Kamau, 2013: 6). The country also ranks

³ www.worldbank.org/en/country/ethiopia and www.worldbank.org/en/country/uganda.

relatively highly for sub-Saharan Africa in Freedom House's Press Freedom Index. No country in sub-Saharan Africa is assessed as 'free' but Uganda is categorised as 'partly free', above average for the region. Ethiopia, in contrast, is categorised as 'not free' and falls third from the bottom, just ahead of Equatorial Guinea and Eritrea (Freedom House, 2017).

The similarities shared between Uganda's and Ethiopia's political systems and the differences that separate their media systems get to the heart of the puzzle raised in this book. While both countries have held elections since coming to power, these are deeply flawed and serve to distract from the political reality that Ethiopia and Uganda can be described as autocratic states.

The spaces for political freedoms that the EPRDF and NRM initially encouraged took place at a specific global moment and were seen as part of a new trend in leadership and development on the continent. With the end of the Cold War and the liberal triumphalism that followed, Meles and Museveni were hailed as 'agents of change' who would bring peace to ethnically diverse and war-ravaged populations and contribute to a broader African Renaissance. Together with Kagame, Thabo Mbeki of South Africa, Joachim Chissano of Mozambique, Isaias Afewerki of Eritrea and Jerry Rawlings of Ghana they were seen as principled and committed leaders dedicated to improving the lives of their people through measures appropriate for their particular contexts (Ottaway, 1999). President Bill Clinton and Secretary of State Madeline Albright helped popularise the notion of a new generation of African leaders in the late 1990s, and while neither publicly listed the leaders who were part of this group, Albright visited Ethiopia and Uganda in 1997 and Clinton followed with a visit to Kampala in 1998, in which he praised both Meles and Museveni. Academics, journalists and commentators from within and beyond the continent endorsed the notion of new leaders.

There were, of course, dissenting voices and critiques of the new leader narrative, and it did not take long for international disenchantment with these leaders to become evident. This change in sentiment can be clearly discerned in the pages of *Foreign Affairs*. In 1998, an article entitled 'Africa's New Bloc' argued that the Eastern African leaders, Meles, Museveni, Kagame and Afewerki, are 'coalescing into a new political and military bloc' and they 'share the goal of ending the cronyism and instability' (Connell & Smyth, 1998). In 2000, the publication carried an article entitled 'Ending Africa's Wars' that argued that these leaders had clay feet and suggested that they might not be the purveyors of peace as expected, particularly since 'currently all four "partners" are at war' (Stremlau, 2000: 124). And in 2007, 'Blowing the Horn' contended that the Greater Horn, including Uganda, is 'the hottest conflict zone in the world' and suggested that these leaders have not been held to account by Western states, which 'are like barking dogs with no bite' (Prendergast & Thomas-Jensen, 2007: 71).

The EPRDF and NRM may have brought some measure of peace to populations beleaguered by the extraordinary cruelty of the Derg and Idi Amin regimes that they

succeeded but they have not brought an end to violent conflicts, both internally and with their neighbours. Violence has been used as a tool by both parties to consolidate power. In Uganda, a major war in the North with the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) has raged with no resolution for over twenty years, a conflict the NRM has steadily accrued political and financial benefit from. On the international front, Uganda has also been involved in a controversial war in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and previously in Rwanda. Ethiopia has also been involved in violent conflicts. Since the EPRDF came to power there have been a number of ongoing secessionist and liberation movements fighting the central government. Ethiopia recently intervened militarily in Somalia and its troops continue to occupy Mogadishu and surrounding areas in the South. Partly as a result of this intervention, the internal Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF), operating in the area bordering Somalia, has gained momentum and ONLF fighters and government troops are currently engaged in combat. Ethiopia and Eritrea also fought the bloodiest conventional war of the late twentieth century over the tiny border town of Badme. The findings of the United Nations Border Commission awarding Badme to Eritrea have yet to be implemented and the countries remain on a war footing.

Ethiopia and Uganda are now routinely included in categories ranging from 'authoritarian' (Hagmann & Reyntjens, 2016; Lyons, 2016), 'semi-authoritarian' (Khisa, 2016) to 'developmental authoritarians' (Matfess, 2015) or 'illiberal state builders' (Fisher & Anderson, 2015). These varying characterisations share several commonalities, including a recognition that while the EPRDF and NRM both desire and work for integration in the global economy and engagement with donor countries, they are also driven by a securitisation agenda. They both leverage the military to retain political power and solve problems, a typical recourse for governments emerging from guerrilla struggles or protracted conflicts. The lack of democratic practice is tolerated, perhaps even encouraged, by their international allies as part of a broader process of 'securitisation of development', which is characterised by a relationship with Western patrons built on enthusiastic support for the military and promoting security and stability above all else (Fisher & Anderson, 2015). While the securitisation of development framework has typically been built around the aid recipient's relationship with Western patrons such as the United States, United Kingdom or France, there is also increasing camaraderie and support from countries such as China for such an approach. Ethiopia, in particular, has benefited from extensive Chinese investment in sectors from transport to telecommunications. The Chinese government recently invested \$3.4 billion (USD) in a new 460-mile-long railway from Addis Ababa to the port in Djibouti, and the Chinese telecommunications company, ZTE, signed a loan agreement of \$1.5 billion (USD) with the Ethiopian Telecommunication Corporation in 2006, the largest such agreement on the continent (Gagliardone, 2016b: 1). There are also unique party to party ties between the Communist Party of China and the EPRDF, which are reported to be the most extensive and close on the continent (Yun, 2016).

Now established regional players, the Ethiopian and Ugandan ruling parties have been in power for nearly a generation and their record of governance offers opportunities for new insights into the nation-building process. So what went wrong? What allowed Uganda's media environment to grow into a comparatively rich and varied landscape and for Ethiopia's to become desiccated by state repression? As the autocratic tendency cuts across both parties, it is not the simple holding on to power for power's sake that can explain these two paths but, as this book argues, a far more complex constellation of factors that must be unpacked.

*Leadership and the Transition from War to Governance:
Towards a Comparative Approach*

Comparative studies of media systems tend to focus on comparing equivalent policies and laws and schematically establishing the economic and political environment for journalists. Such criteria help enable quick comparisons, and ranking tables (such as those produced by Freedom House) may be useful for civil rights advocacy groups but often overlook the role of leaders and ideas that ground and shape institutions. The legacy of guerrilla insurgencies is an important factor here. While much of the literature on guerrilla governance focuses on the ways in which guerrilla movements govern the communities they control, this book instead focuses on how the insurgent parties headed by Museveni and Meles adapted to the task of transition and how they subsequently set out to order themselves and society when in power. Thus, the governance and politics of the communities as well as the parties is of importance.

This approach endeavours to view Ethiopia and Uganda on their own terms rather than how they compare with idealised models that bear an uncanny resemblance to the experiences of the West. Responding to calls to 'dewesternize media studies' (Curran & Myung-Jin, 2000), however, does not mean to suggest that these two countries have been hermetically sealed from outside influence. From examples of understanding the role of Mao's teachings on the development of the EPRDF and NRM to the role of US military aid, this book focuses on the strong international influences involved in the creation of the two countries' media systems today. The ambition for this book has instead been to carefully listen to the many conversations at play in the debates on media governance in these two countries that can be Afrocentric or Eurocentric, idealistic or technocratic, local or international and so on.

Where Museveni and Meles tower over the two histories of this book, a focus on leadership is almost unavoidable here. Without unduly indulging the great man theory of history, leaders matter and particularly in times of transition from war when institutions are weakened, as has occurred recently in both Uganda and Ethiopia. Leaders can help build resilience, ameliorate tensions and enhance social cohesion by building support for a vision. They can also, inadvertently or not, act as

a stress factor, weakening state legitimacy and undermining social harmony. Identifying how leaders carry forward and symbolise the ideas they are seeking to advance is crucial to understanding politics. One of the more interesting aspects about leadership in the region is the rise of populism, and Meles and Museveni have not been immune from its charms, both adopting populist strategies to mobilise identity groups, particularly among the poor. Such trends have also been seen in South Africa under the African National Congress's (ANC) Jacob Zuma, in Michael Sata's Patriotic Front in Zambia and Raila Odinga's unsuccessful bid for the presidency of Kenya (Carbone, 2008). These cases evidence the fact that leadership often has a central (and often overlooked) role in putting forward the ideas that shape state institutions and are intertwined with the political interests being advanced. Understanding the personal experiences and stories of the leaders, and how the histories of their countries have merged and meshed with their ideas helps to illuminate how their ideas motivate their actions. By reaching back to the revolutionary struggles of the ruling parties, this book is based upon a simple premise: to understand the present we must understand the past. It is too often assumed that new technologies will bring with them new modalities of interaction and new ways of being, but old ideas and institutions are never so easily replaced.

A comparative case study approach allows for systematic analysis. By using small sets of theoretically interesting variables, and by using process tracing to identify causal relationships and trends, it is possible to offer insight into the factors that have contributed to certain trends and outcomes. This methodology has been prominent among political scientists and the methods here draw upon a long lineage that includes, among others, Émile Durkheim (1973), Max Weber (1949), Theda Skocpol (1984) and Arend Lijphart (1975). More recently, scholars such as David Collier and John Gerring have been reinvigorating this approach with applications of case study research emphasising process tracing, exemplified by research projects such as the African Power and Politics Programme at the UK's Overseas Development Institute (Booth & Cammack, 2013; Kelsall, 2013). This project, which will be referred to later, has explored the ways in which 'working with the grain', or building development policies on local government structures cognisant of the ways societies actually work (rather than how they ought to), have achieved much welcomed results. This present book endeavours to share this bottom-up approach and the desire to move beyond the two extremes of multivariate statistical analysis and intensive studies of single case studies. These two poles tend to dominate contemporary research on media and governance with larger studies (often powerfully foregrounding the colonial legacy⁴) attempting to forge causal relations between the media and development (Golding, 1974; Islam, 2002; Weaver, Buddenbaum & Fair, 1985), the media and democracy (Curran, 2011; Gunther & Mughan, 2000; McChesney, 2015) and the media and accountability (Bertot, Jaeger & Grimes, 2010;

⁴ See for example, Eribo & Jong-Ebot, 1997; Hachten, 1971 and Wilcox, 1975.

Besley & Prat, 2006; Nogara, 2009; Norris, 2009). At the other end of the spectrum there is a growing body of excellent and detailed ethnographic work on, for example, how newsrooms operate (Hasty, 2005; Skjerdal, 2008) and on community call-in radio programmes (Brisset-Foucault, 2016; Fraser, 2016; Gagliardone, 2016a; Stremlau, Fantini & Gagliardone, 2015). By forging a middle way that involves a systematic approach to small-N comparative studies, it is easier to detect and identify the nuance and context of particular situations as well as draw out causal relationships.

These ‘middle way’ studies tend to work best if they have, at their core, a few key variables. Ideas, institutions and interests – three concepts that have been used variously by political scientists, sociologists and economists – have proven particularly useful for this study (Blyth, 2002; Hall, 1997; Hay, 2004; Keohane & Martin, 1995). There is no absolute consensus on their definitions, and their use and meaning vary significantly across studies to explain everything from policy change around trade liberalisation (Irwin & Kroszner, 1999) to political change and policies around the American Civil Rights Movement (Lieberman, 2002). But the fact that these three categories have been returned to again and again is testament to their efficacy in both exploring and explaining complex phenomena. In *Ideas and Institutions: Developmentalism in Brazil and Argentina*, Kathryn Sikkink, for example, focused on ideas and institutions to explain why under two seemingly similar governments there have been very different developmental outcomes. Sikkink shows how the governments of Juscelino Kubitschek and Arturo Frondizi both assessed the challenges they faced in similar ways and pursued very similar policies but the results varied significantly. Leadership, Sikkink argued, was the key difference, as was the degree of political opposition and the institutional structures, in leading to the different outcomes (Sikkink, 2012). As with the best works in political economy, her analysis was attuned to the fact that ideas and interests can never be easily disaggregated into discrete spheres, and she carefully analysed the complex interplay that exists between them. This too has been a consideration in this book and explains the emphasis in these pages on competition, and analysis of the spaces and presentation of alternative ideas and political interests.

Ideas are the boundaries of possible action and are the cognitive frames that undergird the language, discourse and symbols that give them form. They inform politics and power relations and, in a way, they become laws and policies providing the scope and priorities of what must be done. And laws and policies are created in such a way to reinforce certain ideas, elevating some and marginalising others. They also reflect the life histories of the leaders or parties that drive forward the ideas, reflecting both domestic and international experiences and influences. In some cases, when a political project is strongly ideologically grounded, the importance of ideas trumps the development of institutions and, in some cases, economic interests. Stalin’s ruinous policy of collectivization stands as one profoundly sad example of this dynamic.

In this book, understanding the milieu of ideas surrounding the media and the EPRDF and NRM in Ethiopia and Uganda, respectively, has been accomplished

through an extensive examination of materials, including party propaganda, media texts from the struggle, writings by party ideologues (including sympathetic journalists and academics) and interviews with those most actively involved in advancing these ideas in the respective political systems. There is often an incorrect assumption that because it is difficult to access guerrilla insurgencies, it is too challenging to study them and understand their calculations. But as the arresting imagery of bearded guerrillas from the twentieth century alludes to, campaigns are often fought as much in the pages of the press and popular opinion as in the field, leaving a rich source base behind.

Across the continent, guerrilla groups invariably had sophisticated media and propaganda strategies. Umkhonto we Sizwe, the armed wing of the ANC in South Africa, ran Radio Freedom from the 1970s to the 1990s, which is credited as being the oldest nationalist radio. Broadcasting from neighbouring countries, Radio Freedom was instrumental in rallying South Africans and informing them of the struggle. Elsewhere in southern Africa, the South West Africa People's Organizations of Namibia (SWAPO) launched the Voice of Namibia and the Zimbabwe African People's Union's (ZAPU) broadcast through the Voice of the Revolution. Radio stations were particularly attractive given guerrilla movements' difficulties with controlling territory and the often illiterate populations they hoped to reach, but radio endeavours complemented with newsletters, newspapers and other communications initiatives, such as mobile theatre groups, all in an effort to convince war-weary populations to join the struggle. In Ethiopia, the Tigrayan People's Liberation Front (the body from which the EPRDF was ultimately formed and which fought a long war against the Derg) had a portable radio station, Voice of the Rebellion, as well as printing presses that were hidden in caves in northern Ethiopia. In Uganda, the NRM published *Resistance News* from neighbouring Kenya and practised a unique mobilisation approach of establishing Resistance Councils in villages as part of their comprehensive communications strategy. The extant material that relates to these media all offer unique clues to the ideas and ideology and regional and international influences that have shaped current communications policies and political communication.

Institutions offer the home and platform for the perpetuation and implementation of political ideas and values. Institutions, whether formal or informal, provide humanly devised constraints – rules, frameworks, structures – that shape interactions (North, 1990). When, why and how institutions change are central questions. Wars and economic depressions are often crucial turning points that alter structures (Blyth, 1997), and much has been said about institutional learning, or the ways in which institutional habits and traditions endure in times of significant turmoil and revolutionary change. Institutional learning has been fruitfully explored in understandings of the media in Eastern Europe during the process of democratization following the fall of the Berlin Wall. In these countries, many authors have documented a continued intolerance towards dissent that marked the period of

Communist rule and that has made more difficult the full realisation of democratic institutions.⁵ Cases such as these upset the teleological assumptions that states exist on a linear path that will ultimately take them to a Western-style democracy.

The echoes with Uganda and Ethiopia are clear, where the experiences the EPRDF and NRM gained during the struggles had a profound influence on their efforts to shape the respective media systems but where their capacity to enact change was limited by existing structures. This returns us to leadership and reminds us that there has been remarkable continuity between governance during the struggles and the establishment of national governments. Upon seizing power, many of the media reforms enacted by the EPRDF and NRM were instituted by the same individuals who had been the most active in the insurgencies. In Ethiopia, for example, Amare Aregawi, the head of the TPLF radio operation, later shaped the state-controlled Ethiopian Television and the Ethiopian News Agency, before leaving to launch one of the first private papers, *The Reporter*. In Uganda, Museveni himself was active, penning pieces for Uganda's *Resistance News*. Similar career trajectories can be witnessed elsewhere on the continent. Zwelakhe Sisulu, son of the well-known liberation leader Walter Sisulu, and a leading journalist for ANC publications during the struggle, was appointed as the first head of the South African Broadcast Corporation (SABC) after the inauguration of democracy in 1994. In the case of Somaliland, the insurgency radio, Radio Halgan, almost directly transitioned to be the new government broadcaster, Radio Hargeisa, with the head of Radio Halgan serving as the first director.

Returning to a point already made, despite often fierce efforts to defend their autonomy and prerogatives, institutions do not exist in isolation and their development is closely intertwined with evolutions of ideologies. In countries such as Uganda and Ethiopia, years of insecurity and violence have had a clear impact on how journalists and the government perceive themselves and each other. Concepts that can seem perfectly innocuous such as press watchdogs, press oversight and media independence can take on different meanings and interpretations that contrast markedly with their use by Western advocacy groups and media organisations. For many journalists who had been involved with the guerrilla insurgencies, their new positions as journalists after the end of formal hostilities merely led them to think of themselves as continuing the conflict through other means. Journalism often came to be regarded as an opportunity to implement the ideological and political vision for which they had often fought for decades.

That the two histories under investigation here have a recurring cast of characters, however, does not mean that the *interests* of those in and out of power have always remained constant. While this book largely focuses on the perspectives of the NRM and EPRDF, the countries they preside over have been fractured by political

⁵ See for example, Beumers, Hutchings & Rulyova, 2009; Milton, 2001 and Price, Rozumilowicz & Verhulst, 2002.

disagreement and discontent. Both the NRM and EPRDF face many and varying opposition groups and interests, including the LRA in Northern Uganda and the ONLF in Ethiopia. Even members of their own parties have grown disenchanted and crossed over to become prominent voices of the opposition. The competition over the prevailing political and institutional framework as most frequently apparent through electoral competition has been bitterly fought over, and interests in the context of this book have been used to explore the ways in which political parties' leaders have attempted to exercise power and advance their goals and objectives. A focus on interests also helps elucidate the type and nature of the opposition and how the opposition has also been crafted or developed by the ruling parties. How the opposition has been handled by the ruling parties, the nature of the arguments that have occurred between them and the spaces for elite negotiation of power are all part of understanding the role of competing interests in furthering particular outcomes.

This book also considers the tools or institutions available for different groups to advance their agenda. In some cases, the individual or organisation may believe that there is little conventional opportunity for influencing political outcomes, and recourse to violence or insurgency is the only option (as is the case for guerrilla insurgencies). But in other instances, groups may attempt to use the law, media or civic education programmes to attempt to advance their agenda through softer methods. Material interests, or the distribution of resources, are also an important component of understanding how parties or authorities allocate or shape the flows of resources across social, ethnic or political groups. In this respect, interests are less ideological and more based on strategies of alternative political objectives and groups. In the context of Ethiopia and Uganda, the interests of the ruling party can be seen not only through electoral competition but also through the narratives and perceptions that the opposition, or critical media, have of the party.

The detailed analysis and empirical heart of this book is divided into two parts, with Chapters 3, 4 and 5 devoted to the case of Ethiopia and Chapters 6, 7 and 8 focussed on Uganda. In order to provide the necessary context and further establish the nature of the similarities and differences between Uganda and Ethiopia, this is preceded by a more general overview to follow in Chapter 2. While recognising the role of the bifurcated state that Mahmood Mamdani explores in *Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism*, Chapter 2 looks back to the history of print and media culture and argues that accounts of contemporary media systems often overemphasise the role of the colonial legacy. This focus, the chapter argues, has led us to neglect more recent political developments and local agency in exploring why the media systems have developed in the way that they have.

Chapters 3, 4 and 5 delve into the case of Ethiopia, following the framework of ideas, institutions and interests. The first chapter within this series focuses on the role of ideology during the guerrilla insurgency and the formation of the theories

of Revolutionary Democracy and the democratic developmental state that have marked the EPRDF's rule. The chapter begins by focusing on the origins of these theories during the Student Movement, 1960–1974, when Tigreyans sought to rectify the injustices seen within their communities and how these ideas were further shaped and refined during the armed struggle against the Derg. The chapter then proceeds to understand how the principles and priorities developed by the TPLF during the period of opposition prior to 1991 came to be applied by the EPRDF to the task of governance and in particular in the development of the constitution. This chapter helps to explain the enduring influence of Revolutionary Democracy and the democratic developmental state on the EPRDF's character, as well as the international appeal the EPRDF's governance model has held for other countries on the continent. The next chapter, Chapter 4, considers the way the EPRDF approached developing institutions after coming to power. It examines the efforts to restructure the state according to the tenets of Revolutionary Democracy, including the process of consolidating single-party rule while attempting to retain some degree of legitimacy by permitting a degree of electoral competition. How the EPRDF approached the institutional and ideological legacy that it inherited from the Derg, including human resources, has proved to be a major determinant on the shape of contemporary institutions and broader issues of reconciliation. By purging the old order and failing to address historical grievances and effectively reform state media institutions, the ERPDF set in motion processes of resentment and distrust that have helped contribute to the highly polarised media landscape that exists today. The last of the Ethiopian chapters, Chapter 5, considers how some of the most influential elements of the private media have reflected these competing ideas and interests of the nation-state and studies the efforts on the part of the government to effectively reign such opposition in. While initially tolerating dissent, the EPRDF has increasingly calculated that restricting the media (and criticism more generally) is more in its interests to maintain rule than allowing it.

Chapters 6, 7 and 8 turn to Uganda's political and media system. Similarly structured to the Ethiopian chapters, Chapter 6 examines the roots of the NRM's ideology and the development of the NRM's justification for single-party rule, an approach widely known as the Movement System. The chapter focuses on the development of propaganda during the struggle and how the experience with persuasion and political mobilisation provided the lessons for institutionalising the Resistance Councils when coming to power: small units of political representation. The constitution-making process and the values and political ideas embedded within it are also considered. Chapter 7 considers the development of media institutions under single-party rule or what the proponents of the Movement System would rather call no-party rule, and the extent to which efforts of reconciliation were incorporated into this process. This marks a difference with the EPRDF's approach to addressing the legacies of the previous regime and is explored in detail through the case of *The New Vision Corporation*. *The New Vision*, which includes the

publication of the newspaper, *The New Vision*, is the government's unique experiment with creating what is essentially a party-led, but semi-independent, initiative that has set much of the tone and character of the media system as a whole. Chapter 8 considers the way in which the government has sought to shape an opposition media and co-opt critical voices as a way of consolidating power. In the context of non-competitive electoral contests, this chapter probes what it means to have critical media in the context of the NRM's single-party rule and how interests beyond those of the ruling party might be reflected within the media system.

The concluding chapter, Chapter 9, draws out some comparative explanations as to why the media has developed differently in Ethiopia and Uganda. While providing grounding on the influence of ideology, the reform (or non-reform) of institutions and the exercise of interests, the chapter engages with broader questions about the role of the media in contributing to the development of a nation of citizens and the place of the media in nation- and state-building. It also considers the intersection between the media and broader practices of reconciliation, which often involves building historical consensus and envisioning a shared future of the country.

Finally, it is important to note that throughout this book the focus is on a few key publications. This facilitates narrating the story of the media more clearly and allows for greater depth and deeper understanding. In Ethiopia, there is extensive discussion of the government media, including *The Ethiopian Herald* and *Addis Zeman*, and the broader politics of transformation within the Ethiopian News Agency and Ethiopian Broadcasting Corporation. On the other end of the political spectrum, some of the pioneering private papers and critical media, such as *Tobiya* (and later *Lisane Hezeb*), are analysed along with more middle ground or private papers that showed greater sympathy towards the ERPDF's agenda, including *The Reporter* and *Fortune*. In Uganda, where the media is less polarised, much of the focus is on the government paper, *The New Vision*, and its popular private counterpart, *The Monitor* (and its predecessor the *Weekly Topic*). Print media are a focus for several reasons; they serve as a historical record and it is easiest to access archives (radio archives are often non-existent) and they also have tended to be the most vibrant and independent, setting the agenda for news reporting on radio. This is not to undermine or neglect the importance of the many outlets that are not discussed. It is simply not possible to exhaustively cover every publication, radio station and social media outlet across two countries and several decades of history. But by focusing on a few selected and most important media houses, an in-depth analysis aware of wider developments has, hopefully, been achieved, bringing the characters and challenges to the fore.