Introduction

Authoritarian Successor Parties Worldwide

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A surprising feature of democracy in many countries is that large numbers of people, after gaining the right to choose their leaders through free and fair elections, vote for political parties with deep roots in dictatorship. Since the third wave of democratization, *authoritarian successor parties* (ASPs) have become prominent actors in Africa, Asia, Europe, and Latin America (Loxton 2015). In many countries, former authoritarian ruling parties (e.g., Hungarian Socialist Party, MSzP; Taiwan's Kuomintang, KMT; Mexico's Institutional Revolutionary Party, PRI; African Party for the Independence of Cape Verde, PAICV) and parties founded by high-level authoritarian incumbents shortly before or shortly after a transition to democracy (e.g., Spain's People's Party, PP; Bolivia's Nationalist Democratic Action, ADN; Ghana's National Democratic Congress, NDC; Tunisia's Nidaa Tounes) have been voted back into office. Many of them grew out of regimes responsible for large-scale human rights abuses. Nevertheless, there was life after dictatorship: authoritarian successor parties remained major political actors and were frequently voted back into office.

In this introductory chapter, I provide an overview of the concept of authoritarian successor parties and develop an original framework for analyzing them as a worldwide phenomenon. To this end, I present a new set of terms, definitions, and operationalizations – in short, a common language – to facilitate a new research agenda on this topic and present a number of questions to serve as the basis for this agenda. The chapter is structured as follows. In the first section, I offer a minimalist definition that can travel across regions and thus allow for broad comparative analysis. In the second section, I present new data showing that authoritarian successor parties are one of the most common features of democratization worldwide: they have been prominent actors in nearly three-quarters of all third-wave democracies, and they have been voted back into office in over one-half of all third-wave democracies. In the third section, I ask why they are so widespread and argue that much of this is due to *authoritarian inheritance*: they may inherit valuable resources from authoritarian regimes that, paradoxically, help them to thrive under democracy. In the fourth

section, I consider the flip side of the ledger – *authoritarian baggage*, or the liabilities of an authoritarian past – and examine the various strategies that parties can employ to offload this baggage. In the fifth section, I ask why some authoritarian successor parties are more successful than others and outline a number of hypotheses to explain variation in their electoral performance and longevity. Finally, I examine the effects of authoritarian successor parties on democracy and argue that these are *double-edged*. While they can be harmful in a number of ways, they can also have surprisingly salutary effects.

DEFINING AUTHORITARIAN SUCCESSOR PARTIES

Authoritarian successor parties are *parties that emerge from authoritarian regimes, but that operate after a transition to democracy* (Loxton 2015).[1] There are two parts to this definition. First, these are parties that operate *after* a transition to democracy. This means that ruling parties of existing authoritarian regimes are excluded, even if the regime in question holds somewhat competitive elections, as in "competitive authoritarian" (Levitsky and Way 2010) or "electoral authoritarian" (Schedler 2013) regimes. To be sure, many authoritarian successor parties begin their lives as authoritarian ruling parties. However, after democratization, they become – if they survive – authoritarian successor parties. To illustrate, Mexico's PRI was an authoritarian *ruling* party until the country's transition to democracy in 2000; thereafter, it became an authoritarian *successor* party. An important implication of this part of the definition is that to win votes, party leaders cannot rely on the "menu of manipulation" (Schedler 2002) used by electoral authoritarian regimes, such as coercion, fraud, or the massive abuse of state resources. Authoritarian successor parties can, and often do, win large numbers of votes. To be considered authoritarian successor parties, however, they must do so while broadly abiding by the democratic rules of the game.[2]

[1] For an earlier use of the term "authoritarian successor party," see K. Roberts (2012). Scholars have used various labels for such parties. In the context of the postcommunist world, they have used terms such as "ex-communist parties" (Ishiyama 1997), "communist successor parties" (Bozóki and Ishiyama 2002; Ishiyama 1999a, 1999b), "post-communist parties" (Kitschelt et al. 1999), and simply "successor parties" (Grzymala-Busse 2002). In other contexts, they have used terms such as "continuist parties" (Haggard and Kaufman 1995), "old regime parties" (Tucker 2006), "formerly hegemonic parties" (Langston 2006a), "former dominant parties" (Friedman and Wong 2008), "ex-authoritarian parties" (Jhee 2008), "formerly authoritarian parties" (Slater and Wong 2013), and "authoritarian legacy parties" (Kitschelt and Kselman 2013).

[2] In practice, it can sometimes be difficult to determine with absolute certainty whether this condition has been met, given borderline cases of democracy and the existence in some countries of what Way (2015) calls "pluralism by default," in which there is oscillation between unstable democracy and competitive authoritarianism. In Appendix I.1 and Appendix I.2, I rely on Geddes, Wright, and Frantz's (2014a) widely used Autocratic Regimes Data Set to score regimes. Other chapters in this volume (e.g., LeBas, and Kitschelt and Singer) use alternative operationalizations.

Second, these are parties that emerge from authoritarian regimes. This can happen in one of two ways, corresponding to two distinct subtypes of authoritarian successor party. The first are *former authoritarian ruling parties*. Many authoritarian regimes in the twentieth century – both civilian and military – used "official" parties as instruments of rule.[3] In some regimes, this involved a formal "one-party" arrangement, in which all parties but the ruling party were legally proscribed; in others, it occurred through a "hegemonic party" system, in which opposition parties existed and theoretically could contest for power, but in which competition was severely constrained.[4] Following transitions to democracy, former authoritarian ruling parties often continued to exist (though they sometimes changed their names), thus becoming authoritarian successor parties. Examples include Hungary's MSzP, Social Democracy of the Republic of Poland (SdRP)/Democratic Left Alliance (SLD), Taiwan's KMT, South Korea's Democratic Justice Party (DJP)/Saenuri, Indonesia's Golkar, Mexico's PRI, Brazil's Social Democratic Party (PDS)/Progressive Party (PP), and many others. (See Appendix I.2 for a complete list of prominent authoritarian successor parties since the third wave.)

The second subtype is *reactive authoritarian successor parties*. As the name suggests, these are parties formed in *reaction* to a transition to democracy. They are new parties created by high-level authoritarian incumbents in anticipation of an imminent transition or by former incumbents shortly after a transition. By high-level incumbents, I mean figures such as heads of state, ministers, and key members of the security apparatus.[5] While such parties have received less scholarly attention than former authoritarian ruling parties, they are widespread. Examples include Spain's PP, founded in 1976 (as the People's Alliance, AP) by former ministers of the Franco regime such as Manuel Fraga; Bolivia's ADN, formed in 1979 by former military dictator Hugo Banzer; the Independent Democratic Union (UDI) in Chile, founded in 1983 by hard-line *Pinochetistas* during a regime crisis that they feared would result in democratization; Ghana's NDC, created in 1992 by dictator Jerry John

[3] There is a large literature on the role of parties in authoritarian regimes. See, for example, Brownlee (2007a); Gandhi (2008); Geddes (1999); Levitsky and Way (2012); and Smith (2005).

[4] On the distinction between "hegemonic" and "one-party" arrangements, see Sartori (1976).

[5] In dictatorships that last for long periods of time, much of the population is often implicated in the regime in some way. Even Lech Walesa, one of the heroes of Poland's pro-democracy movement and its first democratic president after the fall of communism, is alleged to have served as an informant for the communist regime in the 1970s. (See Joanna Berendt, "Lech Walesa Faces New Accusations of Communist Collaboration," *The New York Times*, February 18, 2016.) In order to prevent the concept from being stretched to the point of meaningless, the definition therefore excludes parties founded by individuals who held low-level positions in the former authoritarian regime.

Rawlings after being forced to initiate a transition to multiparty elections (and eventually full democracy); and Nidaa Tounes, founded in 2012 by figures such as Beji Caid Essebsi, who held numerous ministerial portfolios in Tunisia's authoritarian regime before it was toppled in the "Arab Spring."

I add three notes about this definition. First, it is located relatively high on Sartori's (1970) "ladder of abstraction." As Sartori noted, this is appropriate for concepts designed to travel across regions, and thus for the purposes of this book. One of the major goals of the book is to launch a conversation about authoritarian successor parties as a worldwide phenomenon. To be sure, this is not the first study of such parties. A substantial body of work exists on authoritarian successor parties in the postcommunist world,[6] and smaller but still significant bodies of work also exist on Latin America,[7] East and Southeast Asia,[8] Sub-Saharan Africa,[9] and other regions.[10] To date, however, most of these works have had a regional focus, with only a handful of

[6] On postcommunist Europe, see Bozóki (1997); Bozóki and Ishiyama (2002); Dauderstädt (2005); Evans and Whitefield (1995); Grzymala-Busse (2002, 2006, 2007); Higley, Kullberg, and Pakulski (1996); Ishiyama (1995, 1997, 1998, 1999a, 1999b, 1999c, 2000, 2001a, 2006); Ishiyama and Bozóki (2001); Ishiyama and Shafqat (2000); Kitschelt et al. (1999); Kuzio (2008); Lewis (2001); Mahr and Nagle (1995); Orenstein (1998); Rizova (2008); Tucker (2006); and Waller (1995). See also Ágh (1995); Clark and Praneviciute (2008); Doerschler and Banaszak (2007); Grzymala-Busse (1998); Gwiazda (2008); Haughton (2004); Haughton and Rybar (2008); Hough and Koß (2009); Kimmo (2008); Kirchick (2012); Komar and Živković (2016); Kopeček (2013); Kopeček and Pseja (2008); March (2006); Olsen (2007); Patton (1998, 2011); Phillips (1994); Pop-Eleches (1999, 2008); Racz (1993); Rizova (2012); Rybar and Deegan-Krause (2008); Spirova (2008); Stojarová and Emerson (2010); Thompson (1996); Vuković (2015); Ziblatt (1998a); Zimmer and Haran (2008); and Zubek (1994, 1995).

[7] On Latin America, see K. Roberts (2006, 2016) and Loxton (2014a, 2014b, 2016). See also Abente-Brun (2009); Ackerman (2012); Adrogué (1993); Aibar (2005); Azpuru (2003); Cantanhêde (2001); Copeland (2007); Crenzel (1999); Deming (2013); Flores-Macías (2013); Garrard-Burnett (2010); Harding (2001); Holland (2013); Jetté, Foronda, and López (1997); Joignant and Navia (2003); Klein (2004); Koivumaeki (2010, 2014); Kyle (2016); Langston (2006a, 2017); Levitsky and Zavaleta (2016); Luna (2010, 2014); Martí i Puig (2010, 2013); McCann (2015); Meléndez (2014); Olmeda and Armesto (2013); Ortega Hegg (2007); Peñaranda Bojanic (2004); Pérez (1992); Pollack (1999); Power (2000); Ribeiro (2014); Serra (2013); Sivak (2001); Sosa Villagarcia (2016); Thaler (2017); Turner (2014); and Urrutia (2011a, 2011b).

[8] On East and Southeast Asia, see Hicken and Kuhonta (2011, 2015) and Slater and Wong (2013). See also Cheng (2006); Copper (2013); Kim (2014); Muyard (2008); Park (2010); Suh (2015); and Tomsa (2008, 2012).

[9] On Sub-Saharan Africa, see Ishiyama and Quinn (2006) and Riedl (2014). See also Creevey, Ngomo, and Vengroff (2005); Ibrahim and Souley (1998); Marcus (2001); Marcus and Ratsimbaharison (2005); Meyns (2002); and Whitfield (2009); and chapters in Diamond and Plattner (2010), Doorenspleet and Nijzink (2013, 2014), and Villalón and VonDoepp (2005).

[10] On Southern Europe, see Balfour (2005), Hopkin (1999), López Nieto (1998), and Montero (1987). On South Asia, see Hossain (2004). On the Middle East and North Africa, see Masoud (2011, 2013), Romdhani (2014), and Zederman (2016). On "old regime conservative parties" in late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Europe, see Ziblatt (2017).

exceptions.[11] An unfortunate by-product of this is that these works have not always been well known to scholars of different regional interests. This has impeded the accumulation of knowledge and, more fundamentally, resulted in an inadequate appreciation of just how common authoritarian successor parties are. Given the diverse regions covered by the chapters in this volume, and the volume's goal of encouraging cross-regional dialogue, I have therefore opted for a broad definition that can travel across space. Scholars focusing on particular countries or regions may wish to move down the ladder of abstraction and adopt a more detailed definition.[12]

Second, this definition focuses on the *origins* of authoritarian successor parties, and is intentionally agnostic about other important issues, such as how the party positions itself toward the legacy of the former authoritarian regime or the extent to which it draws upon that regime's organizational infrastructure. As the chapters in this volume show, authoritarian successor parties vary considerably on these dimensions. Some embrace the past; others run from it. Some deploy large authoritarian-era organizations to engage in clientelism; others win votes primarily on the basis of ideational factors. For this reason, I treat these as "variable properties" rather than "defining properties."[13] Finally, the concept of authoritarian successor parties is used here to refer to parties that emerge from modern authoritarian regimes in the second and third waves of democratization (that is, from 1945 onward).[14] As Ziblatt's chapter shows, however, an important analogue can be seen in the "old regime conservative parties" of first-wave Europe, which are conceptual cousins of modern-day authoritarian successor parties.

[11] See Haggard and Kaufman (1995); Jhee (2008); Loxton (2015); Shafquat (1999); and some chapters in Friedman and Wong (2008).

[12] In her work on East Central Europe, for example, Grzymala-Busse (2002: 14) uses a more detailed definition: "*[S]uccessor parties* are defined as the formal descendants of the communist parties – that is, the main political parties that arose from the ruling communist parties in 1989 and that explicitly claim their successor status." Such a move down the ladder of abstraction has the benefit of greater specificity, or what Sartori (1970) called "intension." However, this comes at the cost of inclusiveness, or what Sartori called "extension." Thus, Grzymala-Busse's (2002) definition includes more information about the parties in which she is interested, but excludes those that did not emerge from communist regimes (and therefore most authoritarian successor parties in Africa, Asia, and Latin America), as well as parties that downplay their authoritarian origins.

[13] According to Gibson (1996: 8), "[defining properties] define the concept; they provide the basis for excluding specific cases from the pool of cases being compared. Variable properties are characteristics associated with the concept, but their absence from a specific case does not provide grounds for removing it from the pool of cases being compared."

[14] On the first, second, and third waves of democratization, see Huntington (1991).

A WORLDWIDE PHENOMENON

How prevalent are authoritarian successor parties? How common is it for them to return to power under democracy? To answer these questions, I put together a list of all countries that democratized during the third wave. Drawing on Geddes, Wright, and Frantz's (2014a) Autocratic Regimes Data Set, I included all countries that they scored as having democratized between 1974 and 2010 (see Appendix I.1 for full list).[15] In order to avoid biasing my sample toward consolidated democracies,[16] I included cases where the new democracy later broke down (and in some cases democratized again). The only cases not included were those where the new democracy broke down so quickly that it was not possible to hold even a single free and fair election after the year of the transition (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Mauritania, Russia, Sudan, and Zambia).[17] Excluding such cases was essential, since a core part of the definition of authoritarian successor parties is that they contest elections under democracy. In total, I counted sixty-five countries that had experienced at least one transition to democracy.

I then examined each of these countries to see if a prominent authoritarian successor party emerged (see Appendix I.1 for the list and Appendix I.2 for details). By "prominent," I meant simply winning 10 percent or more in a single national election after the transition to democracy. A party could be scored as an authoritarian successor party *either* by having served as the ruling party of an authoritarian regime *or* if it was formed by high-level authoritarian incumbents in anticipation of a transition to democracy or by former incumbents shortly after a transition (see Appendix I.1 for detailed coding rules). I made a number of conservative coding decisions. First, I excluded parties that had long histories predating authoritarian rule and later became official parties of authoritarian regimes, but that held that position for less than ten years (e.g., National Party in

[15] Some of the chapters in this volume use different operationalizations than the one used here (e.g., LeBas, and Kitschelt and Singer). However, as discussed below, using alternative operationalizations of democracy does not affect the main finding of this section about the prevalence and frequent return to power of authoritarian successor parties.

[16] Looking only at democracies that consolidated would have made it impossible to examine one of the possible effects of authoritarian successor parties discussed later in the chapter: that their return to power may trigger an authoritarian regression.

[17] Burundi could arguably be excluded on these grounds, as well. Although its 2005 elections were considered free and fair by observers, its 2010 elections were marred by violence, fraud allegations, and an opposition boycott. (See Human Rights Watch, "Burundi: Violence, Rights Violations Mar Elections," July 1, 2010, www.hrw.org/news/2010/07/01/burundi-violence-rights-violations-mar-elections.) Following the severely flawed follow-up elections in 2015, Freedom House changed its classification of Burundi from "Partly Free" to "Not Free" (https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2015/burundi). Nevertheless, in order to avoid ad hoc coding, I include Burundi in my list of third-wave democracies, since Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2014a) score it as a democracy from 2006 onward.

Honduras), on the assumption that their pre-authoritarian pasts were likely to have been the main determinants of their identities and resources. Second, I excluded parties created by former high-level authoritarian incumbents more than one election cycle after the transition to democracy (e.g., Slovakia's Direction-Social Democracy, Smer-SD), on the assumption that their leaders were likely to have developed political identities independent of the former authoritarian regime in the intervening years. Finally, I excluded parties founded by authoritarian incumbents who went into opposition before the transition to democracy (e.g., Mexico's Party of the Democratic Revolution, PRD), on the assumption that their role as champions of democratization was likely to have absolved them of their links to the authoritarian regime in the eyes of voters.[18] While including these three types of parties would have expanded my list considerably, I excluded them in order to avoid conceptual stretching. In total, I counted forty-seven countries that had produced at least one prominent authoritarian successor party.

Finally, I looked at each party to see if it had been democratically voted back into office (see Appendix I.1 for the list and Appendix I.2 for details). For this, I set a high bar: *winning the presidency or prime minister's office in an election after the transition year*. Once again, I made a number of conservative coding decisions. First, I excluded cases where the party had contested democratic elections for a time, and then, after a democratic breakdown, returned to power through nondemocratic means (Burundi, Central African Republic), given the definitional requirement that authoritarian successor parties contest free and fair elections. Second, I excluded one case where the party held the presidency for a single term after the transition, but did not hold it in any subsequent election (Brazil), since it never won power in a direct election or in an election after the transition year.[19] Finally, I excluded two cases where the party held cabinet positions in coalition governments after the transition but never held the top job directly (Indonesia, Slovakia), since in countries with multiparty systems, it may be possible to serve as a junior partner in a governing coalition with only minimal electoral support. Again, while including such cases would have expanded my list, I excluded them in order to avoid stretching the concept. In total, I counted thirty-five countries in which an authoritarian successor party had returned to power democratically.

[18] One borderline case that I include is Brazil's Liberal Front Party (PFL)/Democrats (DEM). The PFL/DEM emerged from a breakaway faction of the military regime's official PDS in the lead-up to the 1985 founding election. I score it as an authoritarian successor party for two reasons. First, it was not formally created until after the transition to democracy. Second, under democracy, it became the primary destination for former authoritarian incumbents and held such pro-military positions that, even though the PDS was the former official ruling party, the PFL/DEM was "the true heir" of the regime (Power 2000: 80; also Power, Chapter 7, this volume).

[19] For details, see Power (Chapter 7, this volume).



FIGURE I.1 Authoritarian successor parties in third-wave democracies, 1974–2010

In sum, of the sixty-five countries that democratized during the third wave, *forty-seven of them (72 percent) produced prominent authoritarian successor parties, and in a whopping thirty-five countries (54 percent), voters returned these parties to power in democratic elections.*[20]

Notable authoritarian successor parties also emerged in Germany, Cape Verde, São Tomé and Príncipe, Guyana, Suriname, and Tunisia, but were excluded from my count because of small population size;[21] because the party formed after 2010; or, in the case of Germany, because of complications arising from national reunification.[22] In Cape Verde, Suriname, Tunisia, and Guyana, the party was voted back into office. (See table "Other Notable Authoritarian Successor Parties" in Appendix I.2 for details.)

[20] This broad finding is robust to changes in the operationalization of democracy. If we use Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland's (2010) Democracy and Dictatorship dataset, we find that seventy-two countries democratized from 1974 to 2008; in fifty-one (71 percent) of these countries, prominent authoritarian successor parties emerged, and in thirty-nine (54 percent), an authoritarian successor party was elected back into office. If we use Freedom House data, we find that forty-four countries made the transition from "Not Free" to "Free" from 1974 to 2015; in thirty (68 percent) of these countries, prominent authoritarian successor parties emerged, and in twenty-three (52 percent), an authoritarian successor party was elected back into office. Data available from the author upon request.

[21] Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2014a) include in their dataset only countries that had at least 1 million inhabitants as of 2009.

[22] In March 1990, the German Democratic Republic (GDR), or East Germany, held democratic elections, thus ending over four decades of communist rule. Less than a year later, it was absorbed into the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), or West Germany. Because West Germany had democratized decades earlier during the second wave, and because its population was approximately four times that of East Germany at the time of national reunification, I do not count Germany as a third-wave democracy and thus do not include it in my overall count. However, post-1990 Germany *did* have a prominent authoritarian successor party in the form of the Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS)/The Left, which I discuss in the table "Other Notable Authoritarian Successor Parties" in Appendix I.2.

In short, authoritarian successor parties are one of the most common features of the democratization experience – a fact that, to date, has largely been overlooked. They have been prominent actors in nearly *three-quarters* of third-wave democracies, and they have been voted back into office in over *one-half* of third-wave democracies. For better or worse, authoritarian successor parties are a normal part of democracy: it is normal for them to exist, and it is normal for them to return to power.

AUTHORITARIAN INHERITANCE

The widespread existence of authoritarian successor parties – and their frequent success at the ballot box – is puzzling. If the Workers' Party in North Korea or the Communist Party of Cuba "wins" 100 percent of the vote in an uncontested election, this outcome can be dismissed as the product of totalitarian repression. Similarly, if the ruling party of a competitive authoritarian regime, such as Robert Mugabe's Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) or Malaysia's United Malays National Organisation (UMNO), ekes out an electoral victory, this can be explained by the unevenness of the playing field. However, if a party with roots in dictatorship performs well or is even voted back into office *under free and fair conditions*, that is harder to explain. Yet that is what happens in *most* new democracies. Instead of saying "good riddance" after the fall of dictatorships, voters frequently use their newly acquired democratic rights to vote for parties rooted in regimes that previously ruled them in an undemocratic – and sometimes brutal – manner.

Scholars who have attempted to make sense of this puzzle have found that authoritarian successor parties often succeed under democracy because they inherit valuable resources from the previous authoritarian regime. One of the earliest expressions of this argument can be found in Grzymala-Busse's (2002) seminal study of communist successor parties in East Central Europe. Many of these parties, she argued, benefited from "usable pasts" ("the historical record of party accomplishments to which the elites can point, and the public perceptions of this record") and "portable skills" ("the expertise and administrative experiences gained in the previous regime") (Grzymala-Busse 2002: 5). Particularly in countries such as Poland and Hungary, where authoritarian ruling parties carried out some reforms and engaged with the opposition during the communist period, they entered democracy with reputations for pragmatism and managerial competence, and their cadres possessed many of the skills necessary to thrive in the rough-and-tumble of democratic politics.[23]

[23] In his discussion of the "red return," or the return to power of communist successor parties under democracy, Huntington (1996: 8) offers a similar reflection: "[P]erhaps all that the red return signifies is that people who have the political talent to rise to the top in communist systems also have the political talent to rise to the top in democratic systems."

In my own work on authoritarian successor parties of the right in Latin America (Loxton 2014a, 2014b, 2016), and on authoritarian successor parties more broadly (Loxton 2015), I expanded on such findings by developing the concept of *authoritarian inheritance*. Authoritarian inheritance refers to the various resources that authoritarian successor parties may inherit from authoritarian regimes – resources that, paradoxically, can help them to survive, and even thrive, under democracy. Potential forms of authoritarian inheritance go beyond usable pasts and portable skills, and may include (1) a party brand, (2) territorial organization, (3) clientelistic networks, (4) source of party finance, and (5) source of party cohesion.

First, authoritarian successor parties may inherit a *party brand*. "Party brand" is a term used by scholars to denote the ideational component of parties.[24] According to Lupu's (2014, 2016) influential formulation, a party's brand is the image of it that voters develop by observing its behavior over time. Parties with strong brands come to stand for something in the eyes of voters. To the extent that they feel a sense of "comparative fit" between a party's brand and their own views, they become loyal partisans who consistently turn out to vote for it at election time. Brand-building is crucial to party-building. Yet it is not easy to develop a well-known and attractive brand, especially in the face of competition from older parties with already established brands and new parties trying to stake out their own position in the party system.

Authoritarian successor parties may be spared the difficulties of brand-building by simply inheriting a brand from the former dictatorship. While the idea of a popular brand derived from an authoritarian regime may seem counterintuitive, it is undeniable that such regimes sometimes enjoy considerable popular support.[25] In Chile, when citizens were given the opportunity in 1988 to vote in a relatively free and fair plebiscite on whether to extend General Augusto Pinochet's rule for an additional eight years, 44 percent voted in favor. In Mexico, at the time of the transition to democracy in 2000, 38 percent of the population identified as *priístas*, or supporters of the authoritarian ruling party – more than the two main opposition parties combined (Medina Vidal et al. 2010: 68). And in South Korea, surveys have repeatedly shown that its most popular former political leader is Park Chung-hee, the country's military dictator from 1961 to 1979, with 55 percent of those surveyed expressing a favorable opinion of him in 2006 (Suh 2015: 15).

In some cases, popular support for authoritarian regimes is based on "position issues," or the regime's position on the left–right ideological spectrum. Perhaps more common, though, is for such regimes to generate

[24] Parts of this section draw on Levitsky, Loxton, and Van Dyck (2016).

[25] In recent years, a significant literature has emerged on this phenomenon of "popular autocrats" (Dimitrov 2009). See, for example, Chang, Chu, and Welsh (2013); Rose and Mishler (2002); Rose, Mishler, and Munro (2006, 2011); Shin and Wells (2005); and Treisman (2011). For more, see Conclusion (Loxton, this volume).