Introduction

On December 17, 2014, Barack Obama and Raúl Castro turned a new page of US–Cuban relations. By declaring their intention to normalize diplomatic relations, the two leaders announced the end of half a century of mutual hostility. Amid a flurry of posts, tweets, and broadcasts on the global mass media, Cubans on the street waved the two nations' flags in support of a historic change in bilateral relations. With the lifting of travel restrictions finally in sight, many Americans expressed wishes to visit Cuba, where they could enjoy cigars, mojitos, music, beaches, and a warm climate. The new policies enjoyed solid public support, as indicated in polls taken in both countries after the announcement. Whereas 63 percent of US citizens favored normalization of diplomatic relations with Cuba, 97 percent of Cubans agreed that normalization of relations was good for their country.[1]

Public approval for the new policy did not necessarily deter the opposition campaign. Marco Rubio, a senator from Florida of Cuban descent, blasted Obama's policy shift even prior to its announcement. "My own interest in Cuba has been always furthering democracy and freedom," he declared. "Nothing that the President will announce today is going to further that goal."[2] Former Florida governor Jeb Bush, along with many other hopefuls in the Republican Party for the 2016 presidential election,

[1] Pew Research Poll (online), "Most Support Stronger US Ties with Cuba," January 16, 2015; and *Washington Post* (hereafter *WP*) (online), "Poll shows vast majority of Cubans welcome closer ties with US," April 8, 2015.

[2] Rubio's Statement, http://video.foxnews.com/v/3947931342001/sen-rubio-blasts-white-houses-absurd-cuba-concessions/?playlist_id=211491388000 1#sp=show-clips/daytime (accessed September 1, 2015).

soon joined him. Both Rubio and Bush had deep political roots in Miami, a major stronghold of anti-Castro politics in the United States for the last three decades. For them, normalization of relations would forego the US commitment to "freedom" in Cuba, a neighboring country just ninety miles away.

But unlike in previous decades, such advocacy no longer proved effective. In his 2015 State of Union address, Obama described the previous US policy as outdated. "When what you're doing doesn't work for fifty years," he said, "it's time to try something new."[3] With the backing of US public opinion and the blessing of Latin American governments, Obama moved forward. At the Seventh Summit of the Americas in April, the US President had the first substantial meeting with a Cuban President in more than five decades. In May, he removed Cuba from the State Department's list of state sponsors of terrorism. The Republican-majority Congress ignored his request for the lifting of the embargo on Cuba. Yet in the following summer, the two countries restored diplomatic relations and reopened the embassies in each capital. The two governments agreed to discuss the remaining outstanding matters, such as the embargo and human rights.

The unexpected ease with which the process of restoring diplomatic relations occurred poses a question of why this did not occur much earlier. Obama's White House argued that decades of US isolation of Cuba had failed. Such understanding, however, was hardly new. After the Cuban Revolution of 1959, the US government sponsored counterrevolutionary forces, imposed an embargo, and resorted to subversion, assassination plots, and other hostile measures. As Fidel Castro nonetheless remained in power, allied with the Soviet Union, and contested US foreign policy, the notion of failure had already appeared by the 1970s. The end of the Cold War did not change such an assessment but rather highlighted Washington's unparalleled inflexibility.[4] Although the US government expanded economic relations with China, Vietnam, and other communist countries, it strengthened the embargo on Cuba and forbade most travel to the island. Why did the United States treat Cuba so differently?

[3] Obama's remarks, January 20, 2015, American Presidency Project (hereafter APP).

[4] On US assessments of the embargo's effectiveness, see, for example, Appendix F "US and OAS Sanctions against Cuba (1962–Present)," in CIA Research Paper, "Economic Sanctions: A Historical Analysis," March 1989, in folder "Cuba (General) January–June 1990 [4]," NSC: William Pryce Files, George H. W. Bush Library (hereafter GHWBL). The CIA concluded that the isolation in fact benefited Castro by allowing him to solidify his rule over the island.

Trying to answer such questions, historians, political scientists, sociologists, and migration scholars direct their attention to Miami Cubans. Hundreds of thousands of Cubans moved to the United States, principally South Florida, in opposition to Fidel Castro and his brother, Raúl. Despite comprising less than 1 percent of the US population, scholars claim, these anti-Castro Cuban Americans have wielded a disproportionate amount of political influence on the making of US policy toward Cuba. They created a powerful ethnic lobby in Washington, allied with influential politicians like Rubio and Bush, and formed a solid voting bloc in Florida, a large and important state in US elections.[5] Only recently, perhaps as a result of a generational shift, did Cuban Americans show support for greater ties to their homeland, a goal that Obama pursued in his "historical" move.

In light of these discussions, this study complicates traditional diplomatic historical accounts that mainly focus on the two national capitals. The main sources of the US–Cuban dispute have been ideological rivalries, disparities of power and resources, and fundamental differences in attitude between Washington and Havana. Yet, because Cuban émigrés in Miami intervened in international politics at critical moments, relations between Washington and Havana also intermingled with the political dynamics of the Cuban–American community. This study thus incorporates Miami into the story of foreign affairs and explores the complex intersection between diplomacy and migration. The central argument of this book is that the US government reformulated its Cuban policy in response to Fidel Castro's institutionalization of power, while at the same time trying to build a new relationship with the Cuban–American community as the latter forged a new, politically mobilized constituency within US society.

With its central focus on diplomacy and migration, this research also illuminates how the movement of people contributed to a US–Cuban deadlock. Even before the end of the Cold War, Cuba-to-US migration became increasingly controversial and forced the US government to reassess its priority. Especially after the Mariel Crisis, a massive migration disorder in 1980, migration control became one of the chief national

[5] For Miami Cubans' political influence, Morris Morley and Chris McGillion, *Unfinished Business: America and Cuba after the Cold War, 1989–2001* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2002); Patrick J. Haney and Walt Vanderbush, *The Cuban Embargo: The Domestic Politics of an American Foreign Policy* (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2005); and Susan E. Eckstein, *The Immigrant Divide: How Cuban Americans Changed the US and Their Homeland* (New York: Routledge, 2009).

security issues that required Washington to collaborate with the Cuban government. Yet, whereas migration as an issue encouraged greater Washington–Havana cooperation, migration as a phenomenon already generated a constituency extremely hostile to this diplomatic framework. Washington started to demand that Havana radically transform its domestic politics before normalization of diplomatic relations – more in response to the rise of Miami–Cuban political power than to the decline of Cold War tensions. This study suggests that these contradictory impulses shaped US policy toward Cuba, which in turn influenced Cuban policy toward the United States.

Migration was a far more important factor in international history than previous scholarship acknowledged. Migration control became a high-stakes matter in US national politics, and the issue preoccupied the White House, Congress, and a general public that otherwise paid little attention to the Caribbean island on a daily basis. At the same time, the massive inflow of Cubans also elevated Miami into one of the most important US cities with strong ties to Latin America. This study does not claim that migration defines the composition of the nation, or that it is therefore the single most important determinant in the making of foreign policy.[6] Yet, the demographic change in the nation promotes the gradual yet ongoing transformation of US national interests. Diplomacy may outline the international movement of people, but migration also shapes foreign relations in the long run. Migration and migrant politics influenced foreign policy, even when the broader current of international politics affected the movement of people.

Policymakers, diplomats, and bureaucrats considered foreign policy as their domain, and their shifting geopolitical calculations undeniably shaped the fate of migrants. Yet as indicated in this study, even top officials in a superpower like the United States struggled to deal with border control, resettlement, ethnic lobbying, terrorism, and diverse political activities among migrants in pursuit of transnational agendas and goals. A simultaneous analysis of migration and foreign policy is especially relevant today. With an increasingly dynamical nature of world politics, state-to-state relations resonate not only through diplomacy but also through the increasingly more frequent, lively, and sustained links of people across nation–state boundaries. This study of the meeting spots where diplomacy encounters

[6] See Nathan Glazer and Daniel P. Moynihan, eds., *Ethnicity: Theory and Experience* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1975), 23–24.

migration is an effort to capture such elements of contingency in global affairs.

In delving into Washington's relations with Havana and Miami, this study ties together three major emerging themes of the historical scholarship. First and foremost, any analysis of US–Cuban relations should examine Havana–Washington relations within the international context, especially the global Cold War. The traditional Cold War scholarship was overwhelmingly Eurocentric, paying exclusive attention to the United States and the Soviet Union. Yet, in recent years historians have gone beyond the traditional assumption of the Cold War as a superpower battle, moved the so-called Third World to the center of their scholarship, and highlighted the global dimension of the conflicts that incorporated uncountable smaller powers and non-state actors.[7] In light of such trends, scholars have reexamined and underscored Havana's leading role in the Cold War, especially in Latin America and Africa. Instead of Moscow, Havana emerged as a principal foe of Washington at times.[8]

The Cold War aggravated, broadened, and prolonged US–Cuban conflicts. Yet, caution should be exercised not to reduce the source of US–Cuban conflicts only to differing ideologies and geostrategic interests. Many of the difficulties in US–Cuban relations did not emerge from the Cold War, but predated its outbreak. Although Cuba gained formal independence in 1902, almost all aspects of Cuban lives, ranging from political economy to cultural representation, came under the overwhelming influence of North American hegemony. The US–Cuban relationship was far more strained than it appeared, and the Revolution of 1959 only exacerbated tensions between rising Cuban nationalism and the status quo favored by traditional US policy imperatives. This study affirms that the Cold War did not create, but enlarged, US–Cuban conflicts. Fundamental differences in attitudes between revolutionary and hegemonic states characterized

[7] Robert J. McMahon, ed., *The Cold War in the Third World* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), 3–4.

[8] Piero Gleijeses, *Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959–1976* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2002); Gleijeses, *Visions of Freedom: Havana, Washington, Pretoria, and the Struggle for Southern Africa, 1976–1991* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2013); and Tanya Harmer, *Allende's Chile and the Inter-American Cold War* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2011).

the geopolitical and ideological battles of the two nations facing each other across the Florida Straits.[9]

In addition to Washington–Havana relations, it is necessary to analyze the changing relations between Washington and Miami. Many scholars have referenced Miami's importance in the making of US foreign policy, but few have primarily focused on the complex development of relationships between the US government and Miami Cubans. Most studies rely on media reports and published sources to highlight points in which their interests and worldviews coincided, but obscure their serious disagreements, which frequently appear in unpublished records. The result was narratives based more on what policymakers wanted to believe in Washington than what activists perceived in Miami.[10] In contrast, this study reexamines the nation's foreign policy through the stories of politically active migrants, as well as policymakers. This research assesses more than governmental records and looks beyond "what one clerk said to another," a stereotypical image of the field in the eyes of nondiplomatic historians.[11]

As such, this project seeks to bring migration and ethnic history into the broader narrative of international history. Rather than depicting immigrants' incorporation into US society as a linear, progressive, and inevitable process, the recent migration history scholarship emphasizes the ongoing influence, and mixture, of politics and culture in both the United States and migrants' countries of origin. By following this "transnational" turn in migration history, this study taps into the rich fountain of knowledge on migrants' "foreign relations."[12] Still, unlike most migration historians whose central focus remains on the nation-states' control of human mobility and its impact on the lives of migrants, this study places

[9] Louis A. Pérez, Jr., *Cuba in the American Imagination: Metaphor and the Imperial Ethos* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2008); Louis A. Pérez, Jr., *Cuba: Between Reform and Revolution*, 4th ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011); and Lars Schoultz, *That Infernal Little Cuban Republic: The United States and the Cuban Revolution* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2009).

[10] See, for example, Morley and McGillion, *Unfinished*; Haney and Vanderbush, *Embargo*; and Schoultz, *Infernal*.

[11] Elizabeth Cobbs Hoffman, "Diplomatic History and the Meaning of Life: Toward a Global American History," *Diplomatic History* 21 (Fall 1997): 499–518.

[12] Mae E. Ngai, "Immigration and Ethnic History," in Eric Foner and Lisa McGirr, eds., *American History Now* (Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press, 2011), 358–375. For migration historians' works that address transnationalism, see, for example, Donna R. Gabaccia, *Foreign Relations: American Immigration in Global Perspective* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2012); and Matthew Frye Jacobson, *Special Sorrows: The Diasporic Imagination of Irish, Polish, and Jewish Immigrants in the United States* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995).

more emphasis on the impact of migration and migrant activities on high-level international politics. More than how nation-states manipulated migration and migrant communities as a tool of diplomacy, this work explores how policymakers and leading figures in ethnic communities engaged in discussions, negotiations, and power struggles over nation-states' chief foreign policy goals.[13]

The plentiful literature on Cuba-to-US migration informed this inquiry. Earlier works of historians, sociologists, anthropologists, and political scientists explored why thousands of Cubans came to the United States, how they settled into Miami and elsewhere, and how they developed political and cultural attitudes in the United States.[14] Later works evaluated the consequences of Cuban migration, such as the development of multiracial conflict and collaboration with African-Americans and "Anglos" (non-Hispanic whites), for the Sunshine State.[15] María Cristina García and other historians analyze how diverse Miami–Cuban groups formed distinctive identities, reacted to changing geopolitics, and engaged in numerous noteworthy political activities.[16] This work extends

[13] According to Kristin Hoganson, migration history receives scant attention in the field of diplomatic and international history because scholars fear that the focus on migration would decenter the decision-making from Washington and disaggregate the nation, "the basic unit of international relations history." Hoganson, "Hop off the Bandwagon! It's a Mass Movement, Not a Parade," *Journal of American History* 95 (March 2009): 1089. A few exceptions would include Jason C. Parker, *Brother's Keeper: The United States, Race, and Empire in the British Caribbean, 1937–1962* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008); and Alexander DeConde, *Ethnicity, Race, and American Foreign Policy: A History* (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1992). For works that analyze migration as a tool of diplomacy, see Kelly M. Greenhill, *Weapons of Mass Migration: Forced Displacement, Coercion, and Foreign Policy* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2010); and Meredith Oyen, *The Diplomacy of Migration: Transnational Lives and the Making of US–Chinese Relations in the Cold War* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2015).

[14] Richard R. Fagen, Richard A. Brody, and Thomas J. O'Leary, *Cubans in Exile: Disaffection and the Revolution* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1968); Thomas D. Boswell and James R. Curtis, *The Cuban–American Experience: Culture, Images, and Perspectives* (Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Allanheld, 1983); and Felix Masud-Piloto, *From Welcomed Exiles to Illegal Immigrants: Cuban Migration to the US, 1959–1995* (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 1996).

[15] Alejandro Portes and Alex Stepick, *City on the Edge: The Transformation of Miami* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993); Sheila L. Croucher, *Imagining Miami: Ethnic Politics in a Postmodern World* (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 1997); and Alex Stepick et al., *This Land Is Our Land: Immigrant and Power in Miami* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003).

[16] María Cristina García, *Havana USA: Cuban Exiles and Cuban Americans in South Florida, 1959–1994* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996); María de los Angeles Torres, *In the Land of Mirrors: Cuban Exile Politics in the United States* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1999); Gerald E. Poyo, *Cuban Catholics in the*

this discussion to scrutinize how Miami–Cuban politics figured in Washington's top-level policymaking toward Havana. It explores migrants' active participation in constructing the US's "national" interest and contemplates the transformative impact of migration on international relations.

If Washington's relationship with Miami was complex, so was Havana's relationship with Miami. Traditionally, scholarship on the Cold War in Latin America focused on US interventions and their devastating consequences for the region. The literature has tended to exaggerate the centrality of the United States and to downplay Latin American agency.[17] Yet, newly emerging scholarship focuses more on Latin Americans, reevaluates their experiences of the Cold War "from within," and explores the dynamics of "revolution and counterrevolution" as a central theme of its analysis. Revolutionaries were those who aspired to abolish the legacy of feudalism in favor of collective, egalitarian notions of social democracy. Counterrevolutionaries were those who defended the status quo. As revolutionaries and counterrevolutionaries fought for contrary visions of power and resorted to violence, Latin America's Cold War became far from "cold." Rather than treating Latin America as a passive subject of US interventions, the literature places the region at the center of Cold War history.[18]

It is both appealing and challenging to adopt this revolutionary-versus-counterrevolutionary framework. It is appealing because, as in other revolutions in Latin America, the Cuban Revolution aimed for a radical break with the past and generated counterrevolutionary forces seeking to resist, mitigate, and subvert its impact. Yet, it is also challenging since the

United States, 1960–1980: Exile and Integration (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2007); and Silvia Pedraza, *Political Disaffection in Cuba's Revolution and Exodus* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007). For Cuban Americans elsewhere, see, for example, Yolanda Prieto, *The Cubans of Union City: Immigrants and Exiles in a New Jersey Community* (Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press, 2009).

[17] Max Paul Friedman, "Retiring the Puppets, Bringing Latin America Back In: Recent Scholarship on United States-Latin American Relations," *Diplomatic History* 27 (November 2003): 621–636. Among the most prominent ones are: Peter H. Smith, *Talons of the Eagle: Dynamics of US–Latin American Relations* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000); and Gaddis Smith, *The Last Years of the Monroe Doctrine, 1945–1993* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1994).

[18] See, for example, Gilbert M. Joseph and Daniela Spenser, eds., *In From the Cold: Latin America's New Encounter with the Cold War* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2008); and Greg Grandin and Gilbert M. Joseph, eds., *A Century of Revolution: Insurgent and Counterinsurgent Violence during Latin America's Long Cold War* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2010).

emigration of counterrevolutionaries to the United States extended a Cuban strife both spatially and chronologically.[19] In addition, because Cuban counterrevolution merged into US politics, the study of Cuban counterrevolution demands more than a binary view that typically pits Latin American agency against US hegemony. Whereas historians debate how to strike a right balance between Latin American agency and US hegemony, this work suggests that the two were not necessarily mutually exclusive. The story of Cuban counterrevolutionaries-turned-US citizens highlights both Latin American agency and US hegemony in the increasingly interdependent inter-American society.[20]

To be sure, this Cuban struggle hardly turned bloody except for a few occasions. But it bears emphasizing that both victorious revolutionaries and defeated counterrevolutionaries engaged in "the politics of passion," politics construed as a moral imperative for absolute ends. In this fierce zero-sum battle, opponents were more than adversaries; they were enemies, traitors, evil, and inhuman.[21] When Cuban counterrevolutionaries called themselves "exiles," sought US recognition of "belligerent rights," and spoke of the "liberation" of the homeland, they still operated on this cultural code. Not all opponents of the Cuban government were counterrevolutionaries. Nor were all critiques of counterrevolutionary forces revolutionary in nature. Yet, much of Miami's behavior as a rival power against Havana originated from the revolutionary–counterrevolutionary dynamic that first appeared in the wake of the Cuban Revolution.[22]

[19] Several scholars highlight the Cuban revolutionary–counterrevolutionary dynamic, especially in the first decade since 1959. Jesús Arboleya, *The Cuban Counterrevolution*, trans. Rafael Betancourt (Athens: Ohio University Center for International Studies, 2000); and Jonathan C. Brown, *Cuba's Revolutionary World* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2017). Drawing mainly on Cuban and US sources respectively, their writings depicted the phenomena in strikingly different ways.

[20] For the debate, see Hal Brands, *Latin America's Cold War* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010); and Stephen G. Rabe, *The Killing Zone: The United States Wages Cold War in Latin America* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012). On the theme of interdependence, see Alan McPherson, *Intimate Ties, Bitter Struggles: The United States and Latin America since 1945* (Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2006).

[21] Damián J. Fernández, *Cuba and the Politics of Passion* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2000).

[22] This book uses "revolution" and "counterrevolution" without implying any positive or negative connotations. This is necessary to seek objectivity – however untenable it may be – in this story. "Counterrevolution" does not necessarily mean the restoration of the Batista dictatorship. Most counterrevolutionaries in fact supported the Cuban Revolution up to one point or another. As Fidel Castro became the face of the revolution at home and abroad, however, some of his earlier supporters gradually became disillusioned with his leadership and joined plots to topple the regime. From their perspective, it

Despite years of life in the United States, their leadership identified their role as "The Opposition," a single legitimate alternative to revolutionary Cuba.

Along with Miami's attitudes toward Havana, the story of Cuba-to-US migration requires careful analysis of Havana's policy toward Miami. The topic of the emigration is not as prohibitive as it had been before. An increasing number of Cuban scholars acknowledge that the phenomenon of Cuban migrants influencing international politics – and significantly impacting events on the island – is not new but an outflow of an old tradition. Cuban émigrés in Florida organized the Ten Years War rebellion between 1868–78, as well as the 1895–98 War of Independence. They supported José Martí, prominent exile and father of Cuban independence. Earlier in 1850 and 1851, Narciso López recruited men in the United States, carried the flag of modern Cuba, and led two expeditions to the island. Weapons, ammunitions, and fighters crossed the Florida Straits on all these occasions and later during the 1956–59 Cuban Revolution. In fact, Fidel Castro visited Florida on multiple occasions to fund his revolution. The Cuba–Florida nexus has deep historical roots.

In the aftermath of the revolution, however, Cuba-to-US migration gained special political connotation due to its connections with the Cold War, US foreign policy, and nation-building in Cuba. The Cuban government looked to emigration as "betrayal" of the nation and questioned their claim to being Cuban. In the midst of counterrevolutionary threats and US interventions, emigration was the chief "internal" security issue. In charge of this matter was the Ministry of the Interior, an organ fighting for the security of the revolution. Havana confiscated all the property and rights of those who had indefinitely left the island, prohibited their return except for strictly humanitarian cases, and condemned contact with families or friends in the United States as signs of disloyalty to the socialist nation. Only in the 1970s did Havana begin to review this black-and-white policy.[23] The development was hardly unidirectional or predictable.

was Fidel Castro who betrayed the revolution. Yet, most of these people also supported counterrevolutionaries in other countries, such as the Nicaraguan *contras*, and despised revolutionary forces in Asia, Africa, and Latin America in the name of anticommunism.

[23] For Havana's thinking on migration, see, for example, Jesús Arboleya, *Cuba y los cubanoamericanos: El fenómeno migratorio cubano* (Havana: Fondo Editorial Casa de las Américas, 2013), chap. 4. For Cuban scholars' view on migration, see, for example, Antonio Aja Díaz, *Al cruzar las fronteras* (Havana: Molinos Trade S.A., 2009); José Buajasán Marrawi and José Luis Méndez, *La República de Miami* (Havana: Editorial de Ciencias Sociales, 2003); and Consuelo Martín and Guadalupe Pérez, *Familia, emigración y vida cotidiana en Cuba* (Havana: Editora Política, 1998).