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978-1-108-42249-9 — The Interaction Between Competition Law and Corporate Governance
Florence Thépot
Index
More Information

Index

Adams, Stanley, 188–9
ADM. *See* Archer Daniels Midland (ADM)
Adverse selection, 20
Aer Lingus, 96–7, 120
Agency costs
  in agency theory, 28
  collusive behaviour and, 136, 142
Agency theory
  overview, 27
  agency costs
    overview, 28
    collusive behaviour and, 136, 142
  agents
    overview, 27, 136
    in cartels, 160–162
    corporate compliance programmes versus sanctions targeting, 217–18
    leniency policy and, 185–6 (*See also* Leniency policy)
    sanctions targeting (*See* Sanctions)
  bonding, 28, 136
  cartels, agency relationships in
    alignment of interests, 162–3
    delegation of authority, 160–1
    examples, 160–2
    outside boundaries of firm, 162
    principal versus agent, 160–1
  collusive behaviour as agency problem (*See* Collusive behaviour)
  commercial agency agreements (*See* Commercial agency agreements)
  corporate governance and, 28
  monitoring, 28, 136
  moral hazard in, 136, 138–9
  principals
    overview, 27, 136
    in cartels, 160
    corporate compliance programmes versus sanctions targeting, 216–17
    leniency policy and, 183–4
    sanctions targeting (*See* Sanctions)
  relevance of, 28–9
  residual loss, 28, 136
  residual rights of control and, 27
  specificity to Anglo-American system, 12
Agents
  overview, 27, 136
  in cartels, 160–162
  corporate compliance programmes versus sanctions targeting, 217–18
  leniency policy and, 185–6
    agency relationships, destabilisation of, 185
    prosecution of firm and, 185
    tension between firm and individuals and, 185
  sanctions targeting (*See* Sanctions)
Aguzzoni, L., 140
Air Cargo, 228
Akzo Nobel, 184
Alchian, A.A., 24–5
Alexander, C.R., 141
Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 192
Allocation of fines, 9
Allocative efficiency, 4, 19
ALMO, 103–4
Almunia, Joaquin, 198, 200
Anti-corruption regulations
  in Bulgaria, 215
  competition law versus, 209–11, 215, 237
  in EU, 209, 215
  in France, 210
  in Hungary, 215
  in Italy, 210, 215
  in Netherlands, 210
  in UK, 209–10

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CAMBRIDGE
Cambridge University Press
978-1-108-42249-9 — The Interaction Between Competition Law and Corporate Governance
Florence Thépot
Index
More Information

in Ukraine, 215
in US, 209
Antitrust law. *See* Competition law
Apple Computers, 114
Archer Daniels Midland (ADM), 11, 147–8, 161–2, 175, 185–6, 190–1, 201–2
Arlen, J., 216
Aschaffenburger Versorgungs GmbH (AVG), 121–2
Asymmetry of information, 38
Australia, corporate compliance programmes in, 208, 235–6
Austria
minority shareholdings in, 124–5
sanctions targeting agents in, 172
Axel-Springer Verlag (ASV), 121
Azar, J., 91

Bagley, C.E., 223
Baker, W.E., 161
BASF, 184
Bayer Corp., 72
Becker, G.S., 167
Belgium, sanctions targeting agents in, 172
Berle, A.A., 27
'Black box' concept
overview, 10
cartels, enforcement purposes, 11
competition law, firm as in, 240–1
corporate compliance programmes and
overview, 211, 241
in EU, 200–2
firm as, 240–1
incentive versus ability in, 243–4
liability attribution and, 241
moving boundaries between firm and market and, 10–11
sanctions and, 241
Blumberg, P., 58, 247
Boards of directors
executive directors, 145–6
internal monitoring by, 144–6
one-tier boards, 145–6
supervisory directors, 145–6
two-tier boards, 145–6
Bonuses, 149
Bounty programmes. *See also specific country*
overview, 158–9, 180, 186, 195
design of, 188–9
effectiveness of, 189
examples of, 186–8
leniency policy versus, 188
normative justification for, 189
Brandeis, Louis, 113
Brasser, Wayne, 175
British Airways, 191
British-American Tobacco, 100–1
British Sky Broadcasting Group (BSkyB), 118–19
British Sugar, 201
British Telecom, 102
Brussels I Recast, 75
Bryant, P.G., 137
Buccirossi, P., 151
Buch-Hansen, H., 94
Bulgaria, anti-corruption regulations in, 215
Burt, R.S., 94

Cadbury Report, 2, 169
Canada, corporate compliance programmes in, 208
Cartels
agency relationships in
alignment of interests, 162–3
delegation of authority, 160–1
examples, 160–2
outside boundaries of firm, 162
principal versus agent, 160–1
bounty programmes (*See* Bounty programmes)
'cartel damages prevention', 224–5
collusive behaviour (*See* Collusive behaviour)
corporate compliance programmes (*See* Corporate compliance programmes)
corporate governance, cartel enforcement and, 244–6
derivative actions (*See* Derivative actions)
detection of, 137–40, 197 (*See also* Leniency policy)
deterrence of (*See* Sanctions)
imprisonment, 158, 171
individual behaviour, 238, 245
leniency policy (*See* Leniency policy)
management-based regulation, 238–9, 244–6
recidivism, 153–6
sanctions (*See* Sanctions)
self-regulation, 238–9, 244–6
CCIE, 98–9
Cheney, E.R., 161
Cherry, T.L., 170
Chief executive officers (CEOs), 145
Chloroprene rubber cartel, 85
Christie's, 161, 231
Clayton Act (US)
derivative actions under, 193
exemptions to persons under, 39–40
interlocking directorates under, 7, 12, 95–6, 112–14, 116
joint ventures under, 79
minority shareholdings under, 95–6

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CAMBRIDGE

Cambridge University Press
978-1-108-42249-9 — The Interaction Between Competition Law and Corporate Governance
Florence Thépot
Index
More Information

Clayton Act (US) (cont.)
partial acquisitions under, 95–6
structural links between competitors under, 95–6, 108–10
Coase, R.H., 20, 22, 36, 38, 67
Coglianese, C., 196–7, 238
Cohen, M.A., 141
Collective dominance, 106–7
under Article 102 TFEU, 106–7
structural links and, 85
Collusive behaviour
overview, 133
as agency problem
overview, 136
agency costs, 136, 140–2
cartel detection and, 137–40
collusive behaviour as manifestation of, 137
collusive behaviour as source of problem, 142–3
corporate crime, characteristic of, 140–2
investigations, effect of, 140
long-term outlook, 137–40
reputational effects, 139–40
shareholders versus managers, 137–40
bounty programmes (*See* Bounty programmes)
corporate compliance programmes and (*See also* Corporate compliance programmes)
overview, 211–14
anti-corruption regulations versus, 215
economic benefits of, 214
'heart of business', 213–14
senior executives, involvement of, 212–13
corporate governance and
overview, 135–6, 144, 157
cartel participation by top management, 146–8
competition, impact on, 153–6
internal monitoring, 146–8 (*See also* Internal monitoring)
remuneration, 150–2 (*See also* Remuneration)
corruption compared, 211–14
derivative actions (*See* Derivative actions)
deterrence of (*See* Sanctions)
as individual behaviour, 238, 245
leniency policy (*See* Leniency policy)
management-based regulation of, 238–9, 244–6
in Netherlands, 140, 167
sanctions (*See* Sanctions)
self-regulation of, 238–9, 244–6
Combe, E., 137
Commercial agency agreements
overview, 65–6
alternative approach to, 70–1
Article 101 TFEU under, 66–7, 69, 75
assessment of, 67–8
case law, 69–70
corporate law and, 74
Guidelines on Vertical Restraints and, 68–9, 70, 73
legal versus economic aspect, 65
liability attribution, 73–5
corporate compliance policies, effect of, 74
corporate governance and, 74
incentive versus ability, 74–5
strict liability, 74
substantive reach of law, 66–7
in US, 71–2
Common Ownership. (*See* Structural Links)
Company, defined, 4, 12
Competition law
anti-corruption regulations versus, 209–11, 215, 237
under Article 101/102 TFEU, 33
'black box', firm as, 240–1
corporate law versus, 126, 128–9
exemptions in, 40
as external dimension of firm, 3
firm, concept of
overview, 31–2, 33–4, 46, 130–1, 241
liability attribution and, 243–4
moving boundaries between firm and market and, 16, 242–3
property rights approach and, 242
substantive reach of law and, 16, 242–3
Green Paper on Merger Review, 116
interaction with corporate governance (*See* Interaction between competition law and corporate governance)
national approaches, 117
need for paradigm shift in, 116–17
parent–subsidiary relationships and, 246–8
single entity doctrine and
overview, 33–4, 43
in EU, 43
implications of, 43–6
structural links between competitors and, 249
targeted transparency in, 116–17
undertakings and, 33, 40–1, 240
White Paper: 'Towards More Effective EU Merger Control', 116–17
Complex corporate structures, 9, 212, 220–1, 226–7, 243
Compliance programs. *See* Corporate compliance programmes
Concerted practice, 104
Connor, J.M., 153
Consignment agreements. *See* Commercial agency agreements

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CAMBRIDGE

Cambridge University Press
978-1-108-42249-9 — The Interaction Between Competition Law and Corporate Governance
Florence Thépot
Index
More Information

Control
lasting change in control, 27, 94, 97
liability attribution in parent–subsidiary relationships, control versus legal obligations, 61–2
under Merger Control Regulation, 96–9
residual rights of control
agency theory and, 27
in joint ventures, 81
in property rights approach, 25–6
Coordination, 19–20
Copperweld, 41
Corporate compliance programmes
overview, 17, 133–4, 237
advantages of, 196–8
in Australia, 208
'black box' concept and
overview, 211, 241
in EU, 200–2
in Canada, 208
certification and, 235–7
collusive behaviour and
overview, 211–14
anti-corruption regulations versus, 209–11, 215, 237
economic benefits of, 214
'heart of business', 213–14
senior executives, involvement of, 212–13
commercial agency agreements, effect on, 74
comparison of regulatory approaches, 199–200
competition authorities, role of, 198, 227, 237
defined, 196
in EU
overview, 200–2
'black box' concept and, 200–2
comparison of Member States, 204
verifiability of programmes, 232
in France, 207–8, 232
in Italy, 198, 206
key foundations of effective programmes
overview, 228
business risk, 231–2
clear communication, 229
compliance ambassador, 229–30
cultural of compliance set from top, 228–9
economic risk, 231–2
risk mitigation, 230–1
in Korea, 208
in Netherlands, 206–7
parent–subsidiary relationships, effect on, 62
pragmatic and incentive-based approach
overview, 220–1
business risk, 231–2
'cartel damages prevention', 224–5
certification and, 235–7
clear communication, 229
competitive advantage, organisation as source of, 222–3
compliance ambassador, 229–30
corruption and, 225
cultural of compliance set from top, 228–9
customers and, 226
economic risk, 231–2
external dimension, 224–7
incentives for, 227–34, 237
interviews regarding, 220–1
investigations, receiving credit during, 234–5
investors and, 224
joint ventures and, 226
risk management and, 221–2
risk mitigation, 230–1
screenings, 223
'serious games', 223
standards in, 235–7
strategic uses of, 221–7
suppliers and, 224
third parties and, 224–7, 234
verifiability of, 232–4
reluctance to provide incentives, 198
sanctions versus, 196–7, 238, 244–5
standards in, 235–7
theoretical basis of, 196–8
traditional enforcement instruments versus
overview, 215–16
agents, sanctions targeting, 217–18
compliance programmes as one tool in enforcement toolbox, 219–20
corporate liability, 216–17
individual liability, 217–18
leniency policy, 218–19
principals, sanctions targeting, 216–17
in UK, 198, 204–6, 232
in US
overview, 199–200, 202
in federal courts, 202–3
regulatory agencies and, 203–4
reluctance to provide incentives, 198
verifiability of programmes, 233
verifiability of, 232–4
voluntary implementation, promotion of, 239
Corporate governance
agency theory and, 28
boards of directors
executive directors, 145–6
internal monitoring by, 144–6
one-tier boards, 145–6
supervisory directors, 145–6
two-tier boards, 145–6

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CAMBRIDGE

Cambridge University Press
978-1-108-42249-9 — The Interaction Between Competition Law and Corporate Governance
Florence Thépot
Index
More Information

Corporate governance (cont.)
cartel enforcement and, 244–6
collusive behaviour and
overview, 135–6, 144, 157
cartel participation by top management, 146–8
competition, impact on, 153–6
internal monitoring, 146–8 (*See also* Internal monitoring)
remuneration, 150–2 (*See also* Remuneration)
competition, impact on
overview, 152
collusive behaviour and, 153–6
in market-oriented systems, 152
in network-oriented systems, 153
corporate law versus, 1, 44, 79
defined, 1–2
in Germany, 122–4
interaction with competition law (*See* Interaction between competition law and corporate governance)
interlocking directorates, effect on, 93
as internal dimension of firm, 1–3
internal monitoring
overview, 144
collusive behaviour and, 146–8
by directors, 144–6
management-based regulation, 238–9, 244–6
mechanisms of, 144
national differences in, 128
obligations imposed by law, 144
remuneration
overview, 148–50
bonuses, 149
collusive behaviour and, 150–2
linking pay and performance, 149
problems with, 149–50
share plans, 149
stock options, 149
self-regulation, 238–9, 244–6
shareholders, reaction of, 189–90
structural links between competitors and
overview, 126, 249
fiduciary duties and, 126–8
limited reach of, 126–8
in UK, 119–20
use of term, 1, 44, 79
Corporate law
commercial agency agreements and, 74
company defined, 4
competition law versus, 126, 128–9
corporate governance versus, 1, 44, 79
in Germany, 122–4
horizontal relations, single entity doctrine in, 129
interlocking directorates and, 125
joint ventures and, 85
liability attribution and, 74
commercial agency agreements, 74
parent–subsidiary relationships, 56
parent–subsidiary relationships and, 56
single entity doctrine and, 48
structural links between competitors and, 117, 249
trusts and, 5–7
in UK, 119–20, 177
Corporate liability. *See* Sanctions
Corporate rights, 88
Corruption. *See* Anti-corruption regulations
Crawford, R.G., 24
Criminal sanctions. *See* Sanctions
Croatia, sanctions targeting agents in, 172
Cyprus, sanctions targeting agents in, 171
Czech Republic, sanctions targeting agents in, 171

Dahlman, C.J., 20
Daimler Chrysler, 68
Dairy Farmers of America (DFA), 109–10
Decisive influence
liability attribution, 51–6
structural links between competitors, effect on, 97, 98
in UK, 117–18
Demsetz, H., 24
Denmark
bounty programmes in, 187
Competition Act, 171
sanctions targeting agents in, 171
Derivative actions
under Clayton Act, 193
defined, 191–2
in EU, 192
promotion of, 245
purpose of, 191–2
standing, 192
in UK, 193–4
in US, 192–3
Detection of cartels, 137–40, 197. *See also* Bounty programmes; Leniency policy
Deterrence of cartels. *See* Sanctions
Deutsche Bahn, 224–5
Digital Equipment Corp., 102
Director and officer (D&O) insurance, 175–7, 194
Directors. *See* Boards of directors
Dittmar, L., 223

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CAMBRIDGE

Cambridge University Press
978-1-108-42249-9 — The Interaction Between Competition Law and Corporate Governance
Florence Thépot
Index
More Information

Eckard, E.W., 137
Economic integration, 6
Eemland, 106
Efficiency, 4, 19
Electrical equipment cartel, 162
Elhauge, E., 106, 107
Empire building, 142
Enron, 147, 150
Enterprise liability in parent–subsidiary relationships, 56, 57–8, 246–7
Entity liability in parent–subsidiary relationships, 56–7, 246–7
Estonia
  Competition Act, 171
  sanctions targeting agents in, 171
European Commission
  bounty programmes, 186–7
  corporate compliance programmes and, 198, 200–2
  Green Paper on Merger Review, 116
  White Paper: 'Towards More Effective EU Merger Control', 116–17
European Council
  anti-corruption regulations and, 209
  Regulation 1/2003, 63, 64, 77, 163, 247
European Union
  anti-corruption regulations in, 209, 215
  corporate compliance programmes in
    overview, 200–2
    'black box' concept and, 200–2
    comparison of Member States, 204
    verifiability of programmes, 232
  Damages Directive, 139, 181
  derivative actions in, 192
  economic integration in, 6
  Guidelines on Vertical Restraints, 68–9, 70, 73
  Horizontal Cooperation Guidelines, 80
  interlocking directorates in, 114
  joint ventures, property rights framework, 84–5
  jurisdiction of, 12
  leniency policy in, 180–1, 184
  Merger Control Regulation (*See* Merger Control Regulation (EU))
  parent–subsidiary relationships in (*See* Parent–subsidiary relationships)
  Protocol 22 of European Economic Area, 34
  TFEU (*See* Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU))
  Treaty on European Union (TEU), 34
Excessive pricing, 107
Executive compensation. *See* Remuneration
Executive directors, 145–6
External dimension of firm, competition law as, 3
Faulkner, R.R., 161
Fiduciary duties
  corporate governance and, 126–8
  in France, 127
  interlocking directorates and, 249
  to minority shareholders, 126
Financial holdings, liability attribution in, 53–5, 63
Financialisation, 4, 32, 61, 79, 88
Financial links
  anticompetitive effects of, 88–90
  impact on behaviour, 90–1
  interlocking directorates versus, 92
  theories of harm, 88–90
Financial rights, 88
Financial risk, 36–9
Fines, allocation of, 9
Finland, sanctions targeting agents in, 172
Firms
  adverse selection and, 20
  'black box', firm as in competition law, 240–1
  competition law concept of
    overview, 31–2, 33–4, 46, 130–1, 241
    liability attribution and, 243–4
    moving boundaries between firm and market and, 16, 242–3
    property rights approach and, 242
    substantive reach of law and, 16, 242–3
  concepts of, 3–4
  coordination and, 19–20
  external dimension of, 3
  internal dimension of, 1–3
    renewed interest in, 7–9
  legal boundaries of, 16, 31, 46, 51, 85
  moral hazard and, 20
  motivation and, 19–20
  'nexus of contract' approach, 24–5
  organisation, importance of, 18–21
  price mechanism and, 19–20
  production function of, 19
  property rights approach, 25–6, 37–8
  sociological groups in, 1–2
  'theory of the firm'
    overview, 13, 15–16, 18, 21
    'nexus of contract' approach, 24–5
    property rights approach, 25–6, 37–8
    relevance of, 26–7
    transaction cost approach (*See* Transaction cost approach)
  transaction cost approach (*See* Transaction cost approach)
Fisher, G.A., 161
Flav-O-Rich, 109
Formica Belgium, 67

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CAMBRIDGE
Cambridge University Press
978-1-108-42249-9 — The Interaction Between Competition Law and Corporate Governance
Florence Thépot
Index
More Information

France
anti-corruption regulations in, 210
Asset Management Association, 127
Autorité de la Concurrence (Competition Authority), 226–7, 228, 232
cartel recidivism in, 153–6
Commercial Code, 125
corporate compliance programmes in, 207–8, 232
fiduciary duties in, 127
interlocking directorates in, 86–7, 91–2, 114–15, 125
'Macron Law', 125
as network-oriented system, 153
sanctions targeting agents in, 171, 173
sociétés anonymes, 56
Fraud, 140–1
Free cash flow, 136, 142
Furubotn, E.G., 20

Galloway, J., 178
General Electric, 162
Geradin, D., 211
Germany
Act against Restraints of Competition (GWB), 120–1
bounty programmes in, 187
Bundeskartellamt (Competition Authority), 120–2, 173–4
cartel recidivism in, 153–6
corporate governance in, 122–4
corporate law in, 122–4
Gesellschaft mit beschränkter Haftung (GmbH), 123
interlocking directorates in, 86–7, 91–2, 114–15
leniency policy in, 182
minority shareholdings in, 56, 120–4, 249
as network-oriented system, 153
Public Auditors' Institute, 236
sanctions targeting agents in, 172, 173–4
Gillette, 106
González, T.A., 93–4, 148, 191
Google, 114
Götz, G., 228, 229
Governance. *See* Corporate governance
Graphites electrode cartel, 191
'Great merger movement', 5–6
Greece, sanctions targeting agents in, 171–2, 173
GTE, 98–9

Hammond, S.D., 185
Hart, H.L.A., 16, 31, 46, 51, 85, 241
Hart, O.D., 25
Hayek, F., 19
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, 112
Herold, D., 150, 228, 229
Hoffmann-La Roche, 188–9
Horizontal relations, single entity doctrine in
overview, 16, 32, 78–9, 129
corporate law and, 129
financial links
anticompetitive effects of, 88–90
impact on behaviour, 90–1
interlocking directorates versus, 92
theories of harm, 88–90
interlocking directorates (*See* Interlocking directorates)
joint ventures (*See* Joint ventures)
structural links between competitors (*See* Structural links between competitors)
Hungary
anti-corruption regulations in, 215
bounty programmes in, 187
sanctions targeting agents in, 172

ICC. *See* International Chamber of Commerce (ICC)
Indemnification, 141, 175–7
Individual sanctions. *See* Sanctions
Innovation competition, 89
Interaction between competition law and corporate governance
overview, 1, 5, 250
interlocking directorates and, 127–9
minority shareholdings and, 126
moving boundaries between firm and market and, 10–11, 242–3
in structural links between competitors, 128–9
Interlocking directorates
anticompetitive effects of, 86–7, 91–3
under Article 101/102 TFEU, 94–5
under Clayton Act, 7, 12, 95–6, 112–14, 116
corporate governance, effect of, 93
corporate law and, 125
efficiencies and, 93
empirical studies, 93–4
in EU, 114
fiduciary duties and, 249
financial links versus, 92
in France, 86–7, 91–2, 114–15, 125
in Germany, 86–7, 91–2, 114–15
interaction between competition law and corporate governance and, 127–9
in Italy, 86–7, 114–15, 125–6, 248–9
national features of, 114–15
in Netherlands, 125
regulatory approaches, 125–6
under Sherman Act, 114

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CAMBRIDGE
Cambridge University Press
978-1-108-42249-9 — The Interaction Between Competition Law and Corporate Governance
Florence Thépot
Index
More Information

theories of harm, 91–3
in UK, 114–15
unilateral incentives to compete, effect on, 92–3
in US, 86–7, 112–13, 114–15, 116, 248–9
Internal dimension of firm
corporate governance as, 1–3
renewed interest in, 7–9
Internal monitoring
overview, 144
collusive behaviour and, 146–8
by directors, 144–6
International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), 222, 225, 226, 228
International Standards Organisation (ISO), 235–6
Intracorporate conspiracy doctrine
under Sherman Act, 6–7, 41
single entity doctrine versus, 41–3
Investment companies, liability attribution in, 55, 63
Ireland, sanctions targeting agents in, 171, 173
Italy
Amministrazione Autonoma des Monopoli di Stato (AAMS), 36
anti-corruption regulations in, 210, 215
corporate compliance programmes in, 198, 206
interlocking directorates in, 86–7, 114–15, 125–6, 248–9
Italian Association of Auditors (Assirevi), 206
sanctions targeting agents in, 172
ITV, 118–19

Japan, lifetime employment in, 138
Jensen, M.C., 24, 28, 136, 142
Joint ventures
overview, 79–80
under Article 101 TFEU, 79–80, 84–5
under Clayton Act, 79
corporate law and, 85
less than complete ownership, 80–1
under Merger Control Regulation (*See* Merger Control Regulation (EU))
property rights framework
overview, 80–2
in EU, 84–5
in US, 82–3
under Sherman Act, 79, 80, 83
unity of interests, 81

Klein, B., 24
Koehler, Robert, 191
Korea
bounty programmes in, 187
Cartel Informant Reward Programme, 187
corporate compliance programmes in, 208

Langus, G., 140
LaPorta, R., 155
Lasting change in control, 27, 94, 97
Latvia, sanctions targeting agents in, 171
Lawrence, P.R., 148, 151, 162–3
Lazer, D., 196–7, 238
Legal, R., 137
Legal personality, 56–7
Leniency policy. *See also specific country*
overview, 17, 133, 158–60, 180, 195
agents and, 185–6
agency relationships, destabilisation of, 185
prosecution of firm and, 185
tension between firm and individuals and, 185
bounty programmes versus, 188
corporate compliance programmes versus, 218–19
defined, 180–1
effectiveness of, 182–3
in EU, 180–1, 184
'leniency religion', 186
principals and, 183–4
recidivism, 186
sanctions, interaction with, 182
Leslie, C., 161
Levenstein, M.C., 137
Levinson, Arthur, 114
Liability attribution
overview, 43–4
'black box' concept and, 241
in commercial agency agreements, 73–5
corporate compliance policies, effect of, 74
corporate governance and, 74
incentive versus ability, 74–5
strict liability, 74
competition law concept of firm and, 243–4
corporate law and, 74
commercial agency agreements, 74
parent–subsidiary relationships, 56
deterrence in parent–subsidiary relationships and
overview, 56
case-by-case analysis, 63
case law, 60–3
control versus legal obligations, 61–2
corporate compliance policies, effect of, 62
in decisional practice, 60–3
financial holdings, 63
financial supervision, effect of, 61
framework for, 59–65
incentive versus ability, 59–63
investment companies, 63
investments, effect of, 61
negligence-based defence, 64–5
rebuttal of presumption, 60–3

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CAMBRIDGE

Cambridge University Press
978-1-108-42249-9 — The Interaction Between Competition Law and Corporate Governance
Florence Thépot
Index
More Information

Liability attribution (cont.)
theoretical foundation, 59–60
parent–subsidiary relationships (*See* Parent–subsidiary relationships)
Limited liability, 56–7
'Loose' combinations, 5
Lopez-de-Silanez, F., 155
Lufthansa, 151–2, 219, 229, 230
Lysine cartel, 161–2, 185–6, 190–1

Mainova AG, 121–2
Malta
leniency policy in, 180
sanctions targeting agents in, 172
Market-oriented systems, 152
Mars, 207
McCahery, J., 90
MCI, 102
Means, C.C., 27
Meckling, W.H., 24, 28, 136, 142
Mercedes-Benz, 68
Merger Control Regulation (EU)
control, concept of, 96–9
joint ventures under, 79–80
minority shareholdings under, 86, 99–100, 248
structural links between competitors under control, focus on, 96–9
in decisional practice, 97–8
decisive influence, effect of, 97, 98
minority shareholdings, 98–9
pre-existing non-controlling participations, 99–100
Methodology of study, 13–14
Michelin, 223
Minority shareholdings
overview, 87–8
under Article 101/102 TFEU
overview, 94–5
Article 101, 102–3
Article 102, 94–5, 106–7
in Austria, 124–5
under Clayton Act, 95–6
conflicts of interest, 87
corporate governance and, 189–90
EU law versus US law, 115–16
fiduciary duties to, 126
in Germany, 56, 120–4, 249
interaction between competition law and corporate governance and, 126
under Merger Control Regulation, 86, 99–100, 248
in UK, 117–19
Monitoring. *See* Internal monitoring
Monnier, C., 137
Moral hazard
in agency theory, 136, 138–9
firms and, 20
undertakings and, 37
Morgan Stanley, 209, 213
Motivation, 19–20
Motta, M., 140
Mullin, W.P., 141
Multinational firms, 247–8
Murphy, J.E., 222, 228

National Basketball Association (NBA), 82
National Football League Properties (NFLP), 83
Negligence-based defence in parent–subsidiary relationships, 64–5
Nestlé, 207
Netherlands
anti-corruption regulations in, 210
collusive behaviour in, 140, 167
Competition Authority (ACM/NMa), 206–7
corporate compliance programmes in, 206–7
interlocking directorates in, 125
leniency policy in, 182
sanctions targeting agents in, 172
Network-oriented systems, 153
New institutional economics, 21
New Zealand, corporate compliance programmes in, 235–6
'Nexus of contract' approach, 24–5
Nikpay, A., 135

O'Brien, D.P., 124
Olivetti SpA, 102
One-tier boards, 145–6
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), 1–2, 169, 210, 222
Originality of study, 14–15
Orts, E.W., 16, 31, 46, 51, 85, 241

Paha, J., 150, 228, 229
Pakistan
bounty programmes in, 187
Competition Commission, 187
Parent–subsidiary relationships
overview, 65
competition law and, 246–8
corporate law and, 56
deterrence in
under Article 101/102 TFEU, 59, 64
case-by-case analysis, 63
case law, 60–3
control versus legal obligations, 61–2
corporate compliance policies, effect of, 62
in decisional practice, 60–3

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CAMBRIDGE

Cambridge University Press
978-1-108-42249-9 — The Interaction Between Competition Law and Corporate Governance
Florence Thépot
Index
More Information

financial holdings, 63
financial supervision, effect of, 61
framework for, 59–65
incentive versus ability, 59–63
investment companies, 63
investments, effect of, 61
liability attribution and, 56
negligence-based defence, 64–5
as policy objective, 59
rebuttal of presumption, 60–3
theoretical foundation, 59–60
enterprise liability, 56, 57–8, 246–7
entity liability, 56–7, 246–7
incentive versus ability, 247
liability attribution
overview, 50–1
corporate governance and, 56
decisive influence, 51–6
financial holdings, 53–5, 63
investment companies, 55, 63
procedural fairness and, 56
rebuttal of presumption, 51–6
strict liability, 53
undertakings and, 51–2
wholly-owned subsidiaries, 51–6
multinational firms and, 247–8
property rights approach and, 246
substantive reach of law
under Article 101/102 TFEU, 49–50
in EU, 49–50
under Sherman Act, 48–9
in US, 48–9
Parker Pen, 43
Patel, M.S., 91
Pennings, J.M., 94
Persons
overview, 10–11, 31
Clayton Act, exemptions under, 39–40
legal personality, 56–7
scope of competition law and, 33
under Sherman Act, 33, 34, 39–40
Philip Morris, 100–1
Philip Morris doctrine, 100–2
'Piercing of corporate veil'
enterprise liability and, 57–8
entity liability and, 57
use of term, 57
Pittsburgh Corning Europe, 67
Poland
bounty programmes in, 187
sanctions targeting agents in, 172
Portugal
Competition Act, 172
sanctions targeting agents in, 172
Price mechanism, 19–20
Principals
overview, 27, 136
in cartels, 160
corporate compliance programmes versus sanctions targeting, 216–17
leniency policy and, 183–4
sanctions targeting (*See* Sanctions)
Private enforcement, single entity doctrine and, 75–6
Procedural fairness, liability attribution and, 56
Production function of firm, 19
Property rights approach
competition law concept of firm and, 242
joint ventures and
overview, 80–2
in EU, 84–5
in US, 82–3
parent–subsidiary relationships and, 246
'theory of the firm' and, 25–6, 37–8

Regal Tube Corp., 41
Remuneration
overview, 148–50
bonuses, 149
collusive behaviour and, 150–2
linking pay and performance, 149
problems with, 149–50
share plans, 149
stock options, 149
Residual income rights, 71
Residual rights of control
agency theory and, 27
in joint ventures, 81
in property rights approach, 25–6
Reuter-Holding GmbH, 103
Richter, R., 20
Risk aversion, 27
Risk management, corporate compliance programmes and, 221–2
R.J. Reynolds, 100–1
Romania
bounty programmes in, 187
sanctions targeting agents in, 171, 173
Rothmans International, 100–1
Rule of reason, 115
Ryanair, 96–7, 118, 120

Safeway, 193–4
Safran, 210
Salop, S.C., 124
Sanctions. *See also specific country*
overview, 17, 133, 158–60, 163–4, 195
agents, targeting (*See also specific country*)

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CAMBRIDGE

Cambridge University Press
978-1-108-42249-9 — The Interaction Between Competition Law and Corporate Governance
Florence Thépot
Index
More Information

Sanctions (cont.)
overview, 170
corporate compliance programmes versus, 217–18
criminal sanctions, 158, 171–4
director and officer (D&O) insurance and, 175–7
effectiveness of, 175–7
examples, 171–4
imprisonment, 158, 171
indemnification and, 175–7
internal factors, 175
organisational factors, 175–7
promotion of, 245
theoretical basis of, 174–5
'black box' concept and, 241
corporate compliance programmes versus, 196–7, 238, 244–5
leniency policy, interaction with, 182
principals, targeting
overview, 164
ability to internalise, 168–9
corporate compliance programmes versus, 216–17
effectiveness of, 168–70
identification approach, 165–6
incentive versus ability, 168–70
insufficiency of, 166
necessity of, 164–6
normative justification for, 164–6
'perverse' effects of, 169–70
reputational effects, 167–8
in UK, 165–6
under-deterrence, 166–8
vicarious liability, 166
under Sherman Act, 12
targeting both principals and agents, 179–80
on undertakings, 164
Sautner, Z., 90
Schmid, M., 93–4, 148
Schmidt, Eric, 114
Scope of study, 12
SGL, 191
Shareholders
collusive behaviour, shareholders versus managers, 137–40
corporate governance, reaction to, 189–90
Share plans, 149
Sherman Act (US)
external dimension of firm and, 3
imprisonment under, 158, 171
interlocking directorates under, 114
intracorporate conspiracy doctrine under, 6–7, 41
joint ventures under, 79, 80, 83
'loose' combinations and, 5
parent–subsidiary relationships, 48–9
persons under, 33, 34, 39–40
sanctions under, 12
single entity doctrine under, 46
structural links between competitors under, 108
trusts and, 5–6
undertakings under, 31
Shleifer, A., 155
Siemens, 212–13
Simon, H., 22, 67
Singapore, bounty programmes in, 187
Single entity doctrine
overview, 10–11, 31, 41, 46
under Article 101 TFEU, 43, 46
in commercial agency agreements (*See* Commercial agency agreements)
competition law concept of firm and
overview, 32, 33–4
in EU, 43
implications of, 43–6
corporate law and, 48
in financial links
anticompetitive effects of, 88–90
impact on behaviour, 90–1
interlocking directorates versus, 92
theories of harm, 88–90
in horizontal relations (*See* Horizontal relations, single entity doctrine in)
in interlocking directorates (*See* Interlocking directorates)
intracorporate conspiracy doctrine versus, 41–3
in joint ventures (*See* Joint ventures)
liability attribution, 43–4 (*See also* Liability attribution)
in parent–subsidiary relationships (*See* Parent–subsidiary relationships)
private enforcement and, 75–7
under Sherman Act, 46
in structural links between competitors (*See* Structural links between competitors)
substantive reach of law, 43–4 (*See also* Substantive reach of law, single entity doctrine and)
undertakings, critical to distinguishing of, 240
in vertical relations (*See* Vertical relations, single entity doctrine in)
Slovak Republic
bounty programmes in, 187
sanctions targeting agents in, 171
Slovenia, sanctions targeting agents in, 171
Smith, A., 19
Snyder, Brent, 203

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CAMBRIDGE

Cambridge University Press
978-1-108-42249-9 — The Interaction Between Competition Law and Corporate Governance
Florence Thépot
Index
More Information

Snyder, C.M., 141
Social insurance, 36–7
Sonnenfeld, J., 148, 151, 162–3
Sotheby's, 161, 231
Sources for study, 13
Southern Belle, 109–10
Spagnolo, G., 151
Spain, sanctions targeting agents in, 172
Standard Oil, 5
Starks, L., 90
Static efficiency, 4, 19
Stephan, A., 135, 139, 173
Stilke, 121
Stock options, 149
Strict liability
  commercial agency agreements, 74
  wholly-owned subsidiaries, 53
Structural links between competitors
  overview, 85–8, 115–16
  under Article 101 TFEU
    overview, 94–5, 100, 107–8
    condition of existence of agreement or undertaking, 103
    existence of agreement, 104–6
    existence of undertaking, 103–4
    minority shareholdings and, 102–3
    Philip Morris doctrine, 100–2
  under Article 102 TFEU, 106–7
    overview, 94–5, 107–8
    collective dominance and, 106–7
    excessive pricing and, 107
    minority shareholdings and, 106
  under Clayton Act, 95–6, 108–10
  collective dominance and, 85, 106–7
  competition law and, 249
  corporate governance and
    overview, 126, 249
    fiduciary duties and, 126–8
    limited reach of, 126–8
  corporate law and, 117, 249
  enforcement gap, 87
  EU law versus US law, 115–16
  financial links
    anticompetitive effects of, 88–90
    impact on behaviour, 90–1
    interlocking directorates versus, 92
    theories of harm, 88–90
  interaction between competition law and corporate governance in, 128–9
  interlocking directorates (*See* Interlocking directorates)
  under Merger Control Regulation
    control, focus on, 96–9
    in decisional practice, 97–8
    decisive influence, effect of, 97, 98
    minority shareholdings, 98–9
    pre-existing non-controlling participations, 99–100
  minority shareholdings (*See* Minority shareholdings)
  partial acquisitions
    overview, 108–11
    filing exemption, 111–12
    'solely for investment purposes', 111
    substantive exemption, 111
  under Sherman Act, 108
  substantive reach of law, 94–6
  undertakings and
    condition of existence of agreement or undertaking, 103
    existence of undertaking, 103–4
Subsidiaries. *See* Parent–subsidiary relationships
Substantive reach of law, single entity doctrine and
  overview, 43–4
  in commercial agency agreements, 66–7
  competition law concept of firm and, 242–3
  in parent–subsidiary relationships
    under Article 101/102 TFEU, 49–50
    in EU, 49–50
    under Sherman Act, 48–9
    in US, 48–9
  in structural links between competitors (*See* Structural links between competitors)
Supervisory directors, 145–6
Suslow, V.Y., 137
Susquehanna Alliance, 82
Sweden, sanctions targeting agents in, 172

Targeted transparency, 116–17
Temple Lang, J., 62
TEU (Treaty on European Union), 34
TFEU. *See* Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU)
'Theory of the firm'
  overview, 13, 15–16, 18, 21
  'nexus of contract' approach, 24–5
  property rights approach, 25–6, 37–8
  relevance of, 26–7
  transaction cost approach (*See* Transaction cost approach)
Thépot, F., 150–1
Thépot, J., 150–1
ThyssenKrupp AG, 190, 236
Transaction cost approach
  overview, 20–1
  marginal costs, 21
  nature of relation, firm characterised by, 22
  undertakings and, 36

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CAMBRIDGE

Cambridge University Press
978-1-108-42249-9 — The Interaction Between Competition Law and Corporate Governance
Florence Thépot
Index
More Information

Transaction cost approach (cont.)
unit of analysis, transaction as, 23–4
Treaty on European Union (TEU), 34
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU)
Article 101
commercial agency agreements under, 66–7, 69, 75
deterrence under, 59
Guidelines on Vertical Restraints and, 68–9
joint ventures under, 79–80, 84–5
jurisdiction under, 12
minority shareholdings under, 102–3
parent–subsidiary relationships and, 49–50
single entity doctrine under, 43, 46
Article 102
minority shareholdings under, 94–5, 106–7
undertakings under, 31
collective dominance under, 106–7
commercial agency agreements under, 66–7, 69, 75
competition law and, 33
deterrence under, 59, 64
external dimension of firm and, 3
interlocking directorates under, 94–5
joint ventures under, 79–80, 84–5
minority shareholdings under
overview, 94–5
Article 101, 102–3
Article 102, 94–5, 106–7
parent–subsidiary relationships and, 49–50
single entity doctrine under, 43, 46
structural links between competitors, substantive reach of law (*See* Structural links between competitors)
substantive reach of law
in commercial agency agreements, 66–7
in parent–subsidiary relationships, 49–50
undertakings under
Article 102, 31
defined, 34
Trusts, 5–6
Two-tier boards, 145–6

Ukraine, anti-corruption regulations in, 215
Uncertainty reduction, 93
Undertakings
overview, 7, 10–11, 31
under Article 102 TFEU, 31
asymmetry of information and, 38
competition law and, 33, 40–1, 240
defined, 34
economic activity, based on
overview, 35–6
activity offering goods or services to market, 36
asymmetry of information and, 38
financial risk and, 36–9
in functional definition, 34–5
moral hazard and, 37
non-economic activity versus, 38
property rights approach and, 37–8
functional definition of, 34–5
moral hazard and, 37
parent–subsidiary relationships, liability attribution, 51–2
property rights approach and, 37–8
sanctions on, 164
single entity doctrine critical to distinguishing of, 240
structural links between competitors and
condition of existence of agreement or undertaking, 103
existence of undertaking, 103–4
under TEU, 34
transaction cost approach and, 36
Union Oil Co., 72
United Kingdom
anti-corruption regulations in, 209–10
bounty programmes in, 187
Bribery Act 2010, 209–10
'cartel offence', 172–4, 178, 214, 219
cartel recidivism in, 153–6
Companies Act 2006, 119, 176
Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986 (CDDA), 177
Competition Act 1998, 193–4
Competition and Markets Authority (CMA), 8–9, 118, 158, 182, 187, 204, 205, 222, 228, 232
Competition Commission (CC), 118–19, 120
corporate compliance programmes in, 198, 204–6, 232
corporate governance in, 119–20
corporate law in, 119–20, 177
derivative actions in, 193–4
Enterprise Act 2002, 117, 177
interlocking directorates in, 114–15
leniency policy in, 182
limited companies, 56
as market-oriented system, 152, 153
material influence in, 117–18
mergers in, 117–18
minority shareholdings in, 117–19
Office of Fair Trading (OFT), 119, 178, 193, 204–6
sanctions in
agents, targeting, 171, 172–3

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CAMBRIDGE

Cambridge University Press
978-1-108-42249-9 — The Interaction Between Competition Law and Corporate Governance
Florence Thépot
Index
More Information

Competition Disqualification Orders (CDOs), 177–8
principals, targeting, 165–6
single entity doctrine, private enforcement and, 75–6
United States
anti-corruption regulations in, 209
Antitrust Division, 203–4, 212
Antitrust Guidelines for Collaborations Among Competitors (DOJ/FTC), 79, 108–9
Antitrust Modernization Commission, 40
bounty programmes in, 187–8
cartel recidivism in, 153–6
Clayton Act (*See* Clayton Act (US))
commercial agency agreements in, 71–2
corporate compliance programmes in
overview, 199–200, 202
in federal courts, 202–3
regulatory agencies and, 203–4
reluctance to provide incentives, 198
verifiability of programmes, 233
criminal sanctions in, 171
Delaware, derivative actions in, 192–3
derivative actions in, 192–3
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), 159, 161–2, 185–6
Federal Trade Commission (FTC), 79, 86, 108–9, 111–12, 114, 203
Federal Trade Commission Act, 114
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA), 213
Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act, 248
Hart-Scott-Rodino Act, 108
Horizontal Merger Guidelines (DOJ/FTC), 108–9, 119
interlocking directorates in, 86–7, 112–13, 114–15, 116, 248–9
intracorporate conspiracy doctrine in, 6–7
joint ventures, property rights framework, 82–3
Justice Department (DOJ), 79, 108–10, 111, 114, 198, 202, 203–4, 212, 235
leniency policy in, 180–1, 182
as market-oriented system, 152, 153
parent–subsidiary relationships, 48–9
sanctions targeting agents in, 171
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 223
Sentencing Guidelines, 202–3, 204, 209, 213
Sherman Act (*See* Sherman Act (US))
structural links between competitors, substantive reach of law (*See* Structural links between competitors)
trusts in, 5–6

Vertical relations, single entity doctrine in
overview, 16, 32, 47–8, 77
commercial agency agreements (*See* Commercial agency agreements)
Guidelines on Vertical Restraints and, 68–9, 70, 73
parent–subsidiary relationships (*See* Parent–subsidiary relationships)
private enforcement and, 75–7
Vertical restraints, 3
Vestager, M., 8, 86
Vicarious liability, 166
Viho Europe BV, 43
Vishny, R.W., 155
Voting rights, 88

Wagner, S., 223
Whistleblower programmes. *See* Bounty programmes
Whitacre, Mark, 159, 161–2, 185–6, 189
Williamson, O., 23–4, 36
Wils, W.P.J., 167, 196, 211
Wilson, Woodrow, 113

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