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Introduction

GLOBAL POVERTY AND INEQUALITY: HOW DEEPLY SHOULD WE BE CONCERNED?

The World Bank's Poverty Data for 2015 (the most recent date reported) estimates that over 700 million persons in the world live in extreme poverty, the majority of them women, who earn about half as much as men. Earlier data for 2010 showed that 100 million lacked access to safe water; 2,600 million lacked access to basic sanitation, 1000 million lacked access to adequate housing, 2000 million lacked access to essential drugs, 774 million couldn't read or write; 218 million children were forced to work for their subsistence, and 72 million elementary school age children attended no school. As of 2015, 35.2 percent of people inhabiting sub-Saharan Africa live in severe poverty, surviving on an income of less than $1.90 per day in purchasing power calibrated to what people inhabiting the United States can purchase.[1] Similar statistics

[1] According to how the World Bank (WB) calculates purchasing power parities (PPPs), the cutoff point for extreme poverty is $392/year indexed to 1993 purchasing power in the US and $785.76 for severe poverty. Adjusted to inflation, equivalent purchasing power cutoffs for 2007 would be $564 and $1,128 for a US citizen. By adopting these benchmarks for defining extreme and severe poverty the World Bank sets the bar low for gauging progress in eliminating poverty. In fact the International Poverty Line (IPL) chosen by the WB is the mean of the poverty line as determined by government bureaucrats in the world's fifteen poorest countries (nine of which have very small populations and thirteen of which are located in sub-Saharan Africa) who have political incentives to deflate the number of poor living in their country by adopting low domestic poverty lines. Moreover, the World Bank's current method for determining the cutoffs for extreme and severe poverty misrepresents the actual purchasing power of the poor in a number of respects. For instance, $1.90 – the recently adopted cutoff for extreme poverty that replaced the older threshold

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for other regions are equally grim: 13.5 percent in South Asia; 4.1 percent in East Asia and the Pacific; 5.6 percent in Latin America and the Caribbean.[2] The good news is that those living in extreme poverty fell to 9.6 per cent of the global population, the lowest percentage ever recorded, down from the 2012 statistic of 12.8 per cent (902 million). Despite this progress, fueled in large part by rapid economic growth in India and steady growth in China (now diminishing) and by "investments in people's education, health, and social safety nets," World Bank President Jim Yong Kim noted that the goal of eliminating extreme poverty by 2030 will be difficult to achieve in a world racked by civil conflict and economic crises, including falling prices in natural resources (a chief export of developing countries). Most disturbing of all is the rapidly growing population of poor people in sub-Saharan Africa, which has traded places with Asia as the epicenter of a scourge of global poverty that in its less extreme but still severe manifestations still afflicts three billion of the world's inhabitants.[3]

Thomas Pogge (2008: 2) estimates that 18 million of the world's poorest die prematurely from poverty-related causes every year, one-third of all deaths, and from 2000 to 2014, more than the deaths caused by all the wars and genocides of the twentieth century combined. The daily toll from poverty-related deaths is 50,000, with 29,000 of them being children under the age of five. These data represent conservative estimates based only on family income. A richer understanding of poverty based on the United Nations Human Development Index inspired by Harvard economist Amartya Sen tracks the lower lifespan and quality of life – in terms of educational attainment, health, and living standards – of

of $1.25 – is supposed to cover nonnutritional as well as nutritional expenses, which may cost 50 percent more in developing countries. Also the purchasing power of the poor using their own country's currency is about ¼ of what it would be using dollars on global markets. Therefore, a more accurate accounting of the annual purchasing power (or consumption) of those living in extreme and severe poverty in 2007 with respect to global exchange markets would be $140 and $280, respectively. In fact, the average yearly consumption of those living in severe poverty in 2007 (2,533 million) would be $165, or about $.45/day. According to Thomas Pogge (2010: 67), a more adequate IPL for extreme poverty would by twice the WB's cutoff, which would suggest that many more people are living in extreme poverty than the WB indicates.

[2] Recent WB statics were unavailable for the Middle East and North Africa because of civil strife; 2010 statistics showed that 12 percent of the population in those regions lived in extreme poverty.

[3] In 1990 half of the global poor lived in Asia while only 15 percent lived in Africa; by 2015 those percentages were almost exactly reversed.

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those at the bottom. But this index is insensitive to differences in gender, age, and social class.[4]

The World Bank calculations and the Human Development Reports show that the percentage of people living in poverty is declining. However, that statistic obscures the fact that improvements in China account for almost the entire decline.[5] A 2014 report, "The State of Food

[4] The Human Development Index (HDI) developed by Sen, Paul Streeten, Mahbub ul Haq, and others builds on the International Labour Organization's 1976 declaration that development should aim at satisfying the *basic needs* of everyone in the shortest time possible. As such it bypasses individual household and per capita income and consumption because these don't reflect the fact that different levels of income are required for people with different needs and different endowments to achieve basic or equal development of overall *capability* (see Chapter 2 n18 below). HDI takes the average of three indices (life expectancy, education, and gross domestic product (GDP)) scaled from 0–1 within countries. The Gender Development Index (GDI) uses the same components but penalizes for gender deviations by taking the harmonic mean of male and female scores. Thus, (supposing parity among male and female populations) if both men and women have an equal educational attainment of 0.6, the GDI is just 0.6. But if men have an educational achievement of 0.9 and women have an educational achievement of 0.4, the GDI is 4/9, or 0.45 (Pogge 2010: 86). By focusing on countrywide rankings, GDI and HDI take a step backward from the WB poverty headcount measure, which focuses on the impoverishment of individual human beings as these are aggregated. Furthermore, they obscure distributional inequalities within a country, so that great gains in HDI and GDI among the most affluent groups can easily make it seem that progress is being made, even though regression has occurred among the vast majority of poor, as is especially obvious in the case of income and life expectancy. Finally, GDI and HDI measure gross domestic product, or a country's output, the proceeds from which may be largely owned by affluent foreigners, rather than gross national product (GNP), which measures the domestic and foreign income of citizens (e.g., Angola recorded a huge increase in GPD between 2001 and 2007 even though most of its increase in domestic oil product went to foreigners and corrupt government elites). Improvements in GDI can be achieved by doubling 10,000 privileged women's incomes to $200,000 each rather than doubling to $2000 the incomes of 1 million female domestics (88). And because GDI, like HDI, summarizes all three indices, it obscures whether women's gains in one area offset losses in the other two. Pogge recommends that instead of just aggregating factors and dividing by population (as WB indices for income and consumption, HDI and GDI do) we need to begin with individuating factors of difference: age, gender, and social status. We need to know whether increases in literacy go to landlords or the landless, whether improved medical care benefits the young or the old, men or women, etc. We can then assess the relative deprivation of women, say, as the mean difference across population fractiles (divided by age, household income, situation, etc.).

[5] Poverty researchers at the World Bank (Chen and Ravallion 2008: 34ff) noted that the decline in extreme poverty (below $1.25/day) from 1981 to 2005 was greatest in China (627 million), East Asia outside of China (123 million), India (35 million), South Asia (12 million), and the Middle East (1 million). These declines were offset by increases elsewhere in sub-Saharan Africa (182 million) and a worldwide increase in people living in severe poverty (below $2.00/day) worldwide, despite a decline in this category in China (499 million).

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Insecurity in the World," released by three UN agencies, the Food and Agriculture Organization, International Fund for Agricultural Development, and World Food Program, shows that the number of chronically undernourished people declined by 100 million over the past decade, but qualifies this statistic by observing that only 25 developing nations, including Brazil and Malawi, have succeeded in meeting the UN goal of halving the number of hungry people, and that some countries, such as Haiti, saw their hungry population increase (in Haiti's case, from 4.4 million in 1990–1992 to 5.3 million in 2012–2014). Altogether 1 in 9 persons inhabiting the planet (805 million) remain chronically undernourished.

The pledge by 186 nations who attended the 1996 World Food Summit in Rome, organized by the UN Food and Agricultural Organization, to reduce by *only* one half the number of hungry people by 2015, was furthered watered down in the UN's first Millennium Development Goal (MDG1), which promised not to halve the *number*, but only the *percentage*, of this demographic.[6] Given rapid population growth in the poorest nations, by 2015, the MDG1 will have been met if it succeeds in reducing the total number of hungry people by just 16.9 percent, from 1,089.6 million in 2000 to 905.2 in 2015. If the current 2015 WB estimate of 702 million for those living in extreme poverty is accurate, success has indeed been achieved. But success means that 158 million *more* people are starving than was aimed at in the original 1996 goal of 543.9 million.

Failure to significantly reduce global poverty appears especially glaring in light of China's rapid progress in reducing its poverty and the more than ample technical capacities that almost exclusively benefit the global

[6] The eight MDG goals were: 1. Eradicate poverty and hunger; 2. Achieve universal primary education; 3. Promote gender equality and empower women; 4. Reduce child mortality; 5. improve maternal health; 6. Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria, and other diseases; 7. Ensure environmental sustainability; and 8. Develop a global partnership for development. As Ian Goldin notes (Goldin 2016: 86–87) the MDG program was historically unprecedented in its alignment of donors' and recipients' aims and instruments, which included agreement on the definition and measurement of twenty-one targets and sixty intermediate indicators. The uneven success of the MDG program and its reflection of a top-down technocratic approach spearheaded by the UN and the OECD led to the 2015 adoption of the UN 2030 Agenda with its seventeen sustainable development goals (SDGs) under the auspices of a much broader set of civil society stakeholders. These goals build upon the MDGs by incorporating a broader spectrum of issues, including global climate change (goal 13); loss of biodiversity and environmental degradation (Goal 15), resource conservation (Goal14), sustainable growth (in agriculture [Goal 2], industry [Goal 9], urbanization [Goal 11], energy [Goal 7], and overall production and consumption [Goal 12]), and inequality within and among countries (Goal 10). The SDGs also expand the range of actors beyond markets and states to include businesses, cities, and private donors.

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wealthy.[7] In 2005 the income ratio between the top and bottom decile was 273:1; the corresponding wealth ratio was 2730:1. The top 1 percent possessed 40 percent of global wealth; the top 10 percent possessed 85 percent. Today, average per capita consumption in high-income countries is thirty times greater than that in low-income countries (120 times greater when differentials in currency exchange rates are factored in), with the poorest 40 percent of the world's population accounting for just 1.7 percent of all household consumption in comparison to the top 15 percent, who account for 81 percent. As Pogge (2008, 10) notes, shifting just 1/70th of the consumption expenditure from the latter group to the former would provide the approximately $300 billion the former needs to escape severe poverty (calibrated at a $2 IPL). However, World Bank data show just the opposite trend: a growing disparity between high-income and low-income earners, with per capita real income in high-income OECD countries rising by 56 percent from 1984–2004 in comparison to the paltry 9.6 percent increase in income enjoyed by the bottom 10 percent during this period. Indeed, according to a frequently cited study by Branko Milanović (2002: 51–92), real income for the poorest 5 percent declined by 20 percent from 1988–1993, and then declined by another 23 percent from 1993–1998, while global wealth increased by 5.2 percent and 4.8 percent respectively. In sum, despite the impressive growth rates of many developing countries in comparison to the sluggish growth rates of most developed economies, today developmental inequality between and within developing nations is far greater than it is between and within developed nations, with the rate of relative inequality (or lack of social inclusion) – a key indicator of development – being higher in

[7] Using tax-based evidence from the United States, Britain, and France (extending back, respectively, to 1913, 1909, and the late eighteenth century), Thomas Piketty (2014) has convincingly tracked the growth in income inequality in a handful of representative affluent countries as well. He provocatively argues that the income differential between the top 1 percent and all other earners has returned to the level that existed during the Gilded Age (with the 1 percent receiving 20 percent of all income), before the era of progressive taxation had cut the top 1 percent's share in half (to around 10 percent by 1950). Driving this new age of "patrimonial capitalism" – in an era of slower economic growth and stagnating real wages (equivalent to 1970 levels) caused by declining technological innovation and population growth in the working-age population – are tax reductions on capital earnings, corporate taxes, and inheritance taxes. Paul Krugman (2014) notes additional factors not stressed in Piketty's analysis that contribute to this growing inequality: excessive CEO compensation and financial deregulation that rewards successful hedge fund managers, with only the latter laying legitimate claim to having "earned" their incomes through demonstrable market-based returns on investment.

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middle-income countries (MICs) such as China, Indonesia, India, Nigeria, and Pakistan than in *lower*-income countries (LICs).[8]

Official Development Assistance

Probably most people would agree that living in a world where one-third of the world's population lives in severe or extreme poverty, in both absolute and relative terms, and lack the means to escape from poverty on their own, suffices to generate a duty to assist them on the part of high-income countries (HICs).[9] This duty is partly fulfilled in the form of global Official Development Assistance (ODA).[10] As defined by the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), ODA provides loans and grants from governments specifically targeting the welfare and development of the

[8] Simon Kuznets hypothesized that inequality tracks phases of development: the transition to industrialization increases inequality markedly, which gradually tapers off and then decreases as levels of education rise and birth rates decline. The hypothesis appears most applicable to the industrial phase of development, but is contradicted by growing inequality in postindustrial nations like the US and G-10 countries (see note 7). While absolute poverty has been reduced from 43 per cent of the world's population to between 10 and 15 percent, relative poverty within developing countries, defined as the percentage of those who fall below a level of income requisite for achieving a minimum threshold of social inclusion as measured by a rising mean of national per capita income, has not (Alonso 2016: 110–13).

[9] Peter Singer (1972) famously compared the duty to rescue a child drowning in close proximity to the duty to rescue a starving child living abroad. From Singer's strictly utilitarian perspective, the two are comparable: the death of one person is equivalent to the death of another, regardless of social connection or distance. Indeed, in response to a revision in Singer's drowning child example proposed by Paul Gomberg (2002: 45), in which the benefactor's rescue efforts require muddying boots that she plans to donate for famine relief to the benefit of saving many more lives, Singer agreed that the benefactor should forgo rescuing the drowning child. From a conventional moral perspective this is wrong. The duty of immediate emergency rescue of someone close at hand that does not place the benefactor at serious risk of harm reflects a powerful impulse – gorillas in captivity have protected small children that have fallen into their compounds – and moreover one that in human society has a rational basis in coordinating mutual aid efficiently without further calculation and, most importantly, without callous display of disrespect. Ultimately, as Richard Miller (2010: 25–26) notes, the expectation that others would rescue us in similar circumstances, instead of "looking straight through us," "makes us much less alone, much more at home in our social world." For Hegelians like Axel Honneth (see below), this kind of mutual recognition, or social affirmation, is the very essence of freedom.

[10] Of the approximately $300 billion in annual US charitable aid not included in ODA estimates, only about 10 billion goes to international aid, with a fraction targeting basic needs.

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neediest countries. Approximately $149 billion was spent on ODA in 2013, a 69 percent increase since 2000 and a 350 percent increase since 1960, partly attributable to the expansion of DAC members from 8 to 28 (plus the EU).[11] In comparison to ODA delivered during the Cold War, which was largely used to prop up corrupt client regimes and therefore inefficiently managed, ODA today is more effective in targeting the neediest people (although much aid still flows to strategically vital countries, such as Afghanistan, Iraq, Columbia, and Egypt). ODA today is also better coordinated (although improvement is needed in this area as well).

To gauge whether this money satisfies the duty to assist we need to bear in mind that the OECD itself has determined that at least $320 billion a year will be required to help developing countries pay for mitigating and adapting to global climate change in addition to $130 billion in development aid. Altogether, it is estimated that implementing the SDGs will cost $2.5 trillion per year – more than twice the private and public investment in today's developing world (Goldin 2016: 111). The Global Recession of 2008–2012 has raised fears of another global financial crisis, so that ODA – which has now been surpassed by foreign direct investment ($650 billion), remittances ($350 billion) and other private funds ($320 billion) – will likely decline as donors reduce ODA in grappling with tight domestic budgets (Alonso 2016: 106–09).[12] And its future, relative to a plethora of new and innovative partnerships, such as the Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation (GPEDC), is highly uncertain, especially insofar as these partnerships are more effective in coordinating multiple efforts of regional and cross-regional sustainable development. As it stands, ODA comprises a very small percentage of Gross National Product (GNP). In 2005, the Millennium Project estimated that its goal for poverty reduction would require all high-income countries to donate .7 percent of their GNP, whereas the current level hovers around .2 percent. The biggest donor of ODA, and the wealthiest country in the world, the United States (at $31.5 billion), gave just.19

[11] One must not neglect the $23 billion in "south-to-south" donations provided by non-DAC members, chiefly Saudi Arabia ($5.6 billion). United Arab Emirates ($5.4 billion), Turkey ($3.3 billion), and China ($3 billion) (Alonso 2016: 124–25).

[12] Whereas developmental assistance targets economic redistribution, climate change development targets the creation and maintenance of international public goods (IPGs), such as reduced carbon emissions. Here again, MICs, which contribute 54 percent of CO_2 emissions, are especially important actors in promoting sustainable development in other developing countries since they constitute thirteen of the fifteen countries that the 2012 World Risk Report has determined are at the highest level of risk for suffering catastrophic effects of climate change (Alonso, 128).

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percent of its GNP to ODA while Norway (at $5.6 billion) gave 1.07 percent. The United States currently ranks 20th in percentage of ODA it donates relative to GNP. To place these figures in perspective, the United States spends $496.5 billion for military defense, more than 16 times the amount it spends on ODA.

To be sure, capital flight has been a significant problem in China, India, Latin America, and Africa (the latter alone has lost upwards of $1 trillion in revenue since 1970 due to corrupt accounting practices in misstating the costs of imports and exports) (Goldin 2016: 98). It is estimated that reforming tax codes could more than compensate for shortfalls in needed ODA. Closing tax havens, which account for $32 trillion – one third of the world's wealth – could free up $189 billion alone (it is sobering to think what a "soak the rich" tax levied on the eight wealthiest persons on the planet might accomplish in this regard; their combined assets, totaling over $420 billion, exceed the $409 billion held by the world's poorest 3.6 billion).[13] Instead, governments are doing little to address this loss in revenue, with the recent trend favoring more regressive tax policies that benefit the rich and exacerbate domestic and global inequality. Alternatively, further gains in "aid" could be accomplished by forgiving the huge debts owed to lending institutions in the developed world that governments of developing countries are obligated to service or by reducing licensing fees that poor countries have to pay to transnational corporations in order to access value-added goods and services (during the peak of the debt crisis in the mid-1990s, for every $1 that was given in aid, $9 was taken back through debt repayments) (Goldin 2016: 96).[14]

[13] Oxfam Website, "An Economy for the 99 Percent" (January 16, 2017). The Panama Papers disclosure in April 2016 refocused public attention on the moral downside of tax havens. Tax havens – which are mainly wealthy nations like Switzerland, Hong Kong, the United States (especially Delaware and Nevada), and Britain (if one counts semi-independent former colonies like Bermuda, Cayman Islands, and Jersey) – shield the financial holdings of corrupt leaders from public scrutiny and deprive even wealthy countries of tax revenues and investment capital needed for creating jobs. Cutting corporate taxes at home to dissuade shell companies merely shifts more of the domestic tax burden to the workforce (Shaxson 2011).

[14] The debt crisis of the 1970s highlights the compensatory duties owed by developed countries to the developing world; the crisis was triggered by the United States drastically raising its interest rates to manage its own "stagnation" crisis, with the initially low-interest loans held by developing countries to help them "take off" on a course of rapid industrialization – aggressively promoted by foreign banks flush with excess petro-dollars from skyrocketing oil prices – subsequently being readjusted upward at higher unsustainable rates. It took almost twenty years of threatened and real loan defaults by developing countries before international institutions began to respond to this financial crisis. The

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The amount of ODA that actually targets meeting "basic social services" is only a fraction – about 14 percent – of total ODA (in 2005, $7.63 billion out of $106.8 billion, with about one-fifth of the total amount going to Iraq).[15] Despite a recent shift toward targeting LICs instead of MICs,[16] little ODA trickles down to meeting basic needs. Part of the explanation for this is politics.

For example, until 2014 the US contribution to its Food For Peace Program (administered by USAID) – a relic of Cold War diplomacy whose funding has declined with the growing geopolitical insignificance of developing countries – had also served to rid American farmers of their agricultural surpluses. At the urging of Oxfam America, CARE, and the UN, the Obama administration determined that it could feed 4 million more people at a savings of $500 million if it could use $1.4 billion earmarked for the program to buy food vouchers for the needy to purchase food grown locally

world's thirty-eight heavily indebted poor countries (HIPCs) now have access to the HIPC initiative (in place since 1996 and continued under the G8's 2006 Multilateral Debt Reduction Initiative [MDRI]) whereby the IMF and WB provide concessionary low interest loans for debt servicing (in 2005 the IMF also instituted a $3.3 billion debt relief measure for nineteen of the world's poorest countries, while the WB wrote off the larger debts owed to it by seventeen other HIPCs). When it was first introduced, the HIPC initiative was heavily criticized for requiring an excessive debt to exports (or debt to revenues) ratio of about 200–250 percent (280 percent based on debt/revenue calculations) for potential recipients of relief and for imposing structural adjustment conditions on qualifying governments. Over the next ten years the initiative was modified to allow for a lower debt to export ratio of 150 percent, and operate under a less austere Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF) administration that replaced the enhanced structural adjustment facility (ESAF) regime. As noted above, thirty-nine countries have also received full or partial cancellation of debts owed to foreign governments and the IMF/WB. The two-thirds reduction in total debt owed by HIPCs still falls short of the Jubilee 2000 demands. Many of the eighteen countries (such as Zambia) that benefitted from cancelled loans were able to invest their savings in health, education, and other public services. Despite this progress, many poor countries did not qualify for debt relief or cancellation. As of 2012, the WB determined that developing countries owed $4 trillion in foreign debt (40 percent held by the BRICS group), with the poorest countries having to pay $34 million *per diem* to service loan repayments. As Goldin wryly observes (Goldin 2016: 99–100) "[i]n an irony of history, the advanced economies that preached macroeconomic orthodoxy failed to heed their own advice . . . [and today have] levels of debt approximately similar to that of many of the developing countries during the 1970s and 1980s." To this he adds that the terrible lessons regarding failed structural adjustment policies learned in the 1970s–1990s have been forgotten with regard to Greece and other indebted countries.

[15] www.oecd.org/dataoecd/52/18/37790990.pdf

[16] From 2000 to 2011, MICs saw their share of ODA decline from 62.1 percent to 47.2 percent, LICs saw their share increase from 37.9 percent to 52.8 percent. ODA is still the largest source of international funding for LICs and represents 70 percent of foreign finance in least developed countries (LDCs) (Alonso 2016: 105–06).

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in poor countries, thereby bypassing costs associated with transporting 1.44 million tons of basic foodstuffs and other bulk commodities across the Atlantic.[17] Most important, the new policy would stop driving local farmers out of business by "dumping" underpriced US agricultural goods in local markets. Opposition from the American Farm Bureau Federation, maritime associations, and other lobbying groups, who argued that vouchers invited corruption and would result in the loss of American jobs – this despite the fact that commodities shipped under the Food For Peace program account for less than two-thirds of 1 percent of US agricultural production and less than .5 percent of US agricultural exports – resulted in the passage of a diluted reform that sets aside only 20 percent of the money earmarked for food relief to be spent on vouchers serving 3.4 million fewer starving people than what had been projected under the original proposal (Abbot 2013).

Not only does 80 percent of the older form of "tied aid" continue to support policies that worsen poverty in poor countries, but also some of it – despite what critics of the Obama reform claim – is still used to prop up corrupt, authoritarian regimes who are more than capable of providing the basic necessities for their poorest citizens, but who prefer to squander their wealth on military expenditures and bloated government salaries. For example, South Sudan, the recipient of $600 million in US aid annually and the beneficiary of US state-building efforts since its independence from Sudan in 2005, is a country of stark contradictions, home to some of the world's worst poverty, health, and education problems as well as some of its richest oil deposits. Although its postindependence oil revenue has increased sharply, more than half of it has gone to paying for defense costs and bloated governmental salaries. Locked in an ethnic civil war with Nuer rebel leader and former Vice President Reik Machar that has left 10,000 dead and 800,000 displaced, the undemocratic government of Salva Kiir in Juba recently borrowed millions of dollars to pay its soldiers, after it shut down oil production over a dispute with Sudan over transit fees. As I write, over 100,000 people are suffering from human-made famine in north central South Sudan, with another 4.5 million facing acute food shortages. Although the US was instrumental in South Sudan's struggle for independence, US lawmakers now decry US developmental assistance as a crutch enabling the South Sudanese government to continue ignoring the needs of the poor while further entrenching its military rule (Dixon 2014).

[17] In 2013 Sudan, Ethiopia, Kenya, and Pakistan were among the major recipients targeted for emergency famine relief.

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