Introduction

This book is motivated by a desire to make sense of Nietzsche's much maligned metaphysics of the will to power. Since Heidegger and perhaps because of him, it has become unpopular to interpret Nietzsche as a metaphysician. To interpret him thus carries connotations of philosophical failure, in particular, of having perpetuated rather than overcome the history of Western thought and the nihilistic logic that, according to Heidegger, informs this history. Nietzsche's conception of Being as will to power is, for Heidegger, an anthropomorphic treatment of the issue that ultimately does away with the question of Being by reducing it to value. In so doing, rather than overcoming the metaphysics of the West and its nihilistic forgetfulness of the question of Being, Nietzsche, he argues, represents its culmination. Abstracting from the particularities and aims of Heidegger's interpretation of Nietzsche, his claim that Nietzsche anthropomorphizes metaphysics is an objection that has stuck and has served to seriously discredit the will to power as a metaphysical thesis.

Although the book is not about Heidegger or his interpretation of Nietzsche, it nevertheless shares some things in common with Heidegger. First, Nietzsche is interpreted metaphysically, and the will to power is taken as central to his metaphysics. Second, Nietzsche's proposal of the metaphysics of the will to power is explored in the context of his critical engagement with central figures in the history of Western philosophy. Third, the connection between the metaphysics of the will to power and his account of value is examined.[1] However, unlike Heidegger, I do not take Nietzsche's

[1] According to Heidegger, the 'Will to Power is the "principle of a new valuation", and vice versa: the principle of the new valuation to be grounded is the will to power.' Heidegger, *Nietzsche*, Volume 3, trans. Joan Stambaugh, David F. Krell and Frank A. Capuzzi (New York: HarperCollins, 1991), p. 15. Although Eugene Fink agrees with Heidegger that the will to power ontology is an anthropomorphic projection of our values, unlike Heidegger, he denies that Being is reducible to the will to power. Rather, he appeals to the notion of cosmic play as a non-anthropomorphic artistic vision into reality that is beyond all value and which gives birth to the Apollonian illusions of the will to power. However, Fink's interpretation, it seems to me, commits Nietzsche to the possibility of extra-perspectival

metaphysics to be a complete failure and instead focus on its potential viability as a response to nihilism and as a metaphysical thesis more generally. Although I do not aim to offer a defence of Nietzsche on the issues of metaphysics and value *per se*, I nevertheless aim to interpret and reconstruct his arguments charitably in order to make the most sense of them. In particular, I try to make sense of the will to power as a thesis about the character of the world and the human being's place in it that avoids the reduction of either one to the other. I execute this argument, specifically, by examining how the will to power thesis provides him with the necessary conceptual and metaphysical resources to address the problem of nihilism as he rather than Heidegger understood the problem.

Nihilism, according to Nietzsche, entails the willing of nothingness (GM, III, 28). It has its roots in the appeal to and ultimate demise of the traditional Platonic and Judeo-Christian view that our highest values are grounded and realizable in a metaphysical world beyond the empirical one that we bodily inhabit. Platonism and Judeo-Christianity are nihilistic in the sense that they will nothingness by appealing to a metaphysical support for our highest values that does not actually exist. The nihilism of this view comes into focus when the will to truth that informs the appeal to a metaphysical basis to our values in the first place reveals that this metaphysical basis is in fact an empty notion (WP, 5 KSA 12: 5 [71]). It is when this revelation comes to pass, when the will to truth becomes conscious of itself (GM, III, 27) and reveals that our highest values are without metaphysical foundation and our highest values devaluate themselves as a result (WP, 2 KSA 12: 9 [35]), that nihilism becomes a particularly acute evaluative and existential crisis. The crisis is acute because these devaluated values form the basis of Western European culture. Nihilism, then, for Nietzsche, incorporates many questions, including questions of a metaphysical, existential, psychological and cultural nature. But the first question is of primary importance and grounds all of the others. This is because nihilism emerges in the context of a metaphysical realist presupposition about the status of our values, that they are objective and hence meaningful by virtue

knowledge and hence to the very dogmatism and unconstrained speculation that, I will argue throughout, he cautions us against (Eugene Fink, *Nietzsche's Philosophy*, trans. Goetz Richter (London: Continuum, 2003), pp. 170–172). Gilles Deleuze's interpretation of Nietzsche also aligns value with the will to power. Although I have a lot of sympathy with this claim, my interpretation offers a more robustly metaphysical interpretation of the will to power as an account, on Nietzsche's part, not just of human value but of the true character of the world itself. Deleuze's reduction of truth to a symptomology of value (activity/nobility and reactivity/baseness) falls short of my stronger metaphysical claims. See Gilles Deleuze, *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, trans. Hugh Tomlinson (London: Athlone Press, 1992), pp. 89–94.

of corresponding to value properties instantiated in a mind-independent and non-empirical world, and the subsequent revelation that this presupposition is an error, which, in turn, subjects to challenge our capacity to act in accordance with values that are now revealed to be metaphysically groundless. The appeal to and the ultimate unjustifiability of the traditional realist presupposition of a metaphysical support to our values is thus the root cause of nihilism.[2] Nietzsche writes that 'the faith in the categories of reason is the cause of nihilism. We have measured the value of the world according to categories that *refer to a purely fictitious world*' (WP, 12 KSA 13: 11 [99]). The willing of nothingness and the belief in and ultimate demise of the appeal to a realist metaphysical basis to our values are intimately intertwined. Accordingly, nihilism culminates in 'disbelief in any metaphysical world and forbids itself any belief in a *true* world' (WP, 12 KSA 13: 11 [99]). However, the problem of nihilism and the metaphysical homelessness of our values following the demise of the non-empirical metaphysical support offered by the 'true' world is compounded by the fact that our values cannot find a metaphysical home in the empirical world, the only world that is left, and seem destined to float free of that world into oblivion.

I will argue that despite the metaphysical challenges posed by nihilism, Nietzsche's response must not be the reactionary one of throwing the baby

[2] Ken Gemes has argued, contrary to my claim here, that nihilism for Nietzsche is primarily an affective disorder rather than a cognitive issue. Affective nihilism, according to Gemes, is evident in the Christian and ascetic practice of denying the drives. However, Gemes concedes that there is a tension in Nietzsche's philosophy between its affective roots in Christianity and its more cognitive expression in the secular world that ensues from the death of God. The tension resides in the fact that the Christian, by virtue of their belief that value is housed in another metaphysical world, does not consider themselves to be nihilistic and that secular nihilism arises from the demise of the metaphysical basis of the Christian belief. Christian nihilism is affective whereas secular nihilism is cognitive. Gemes suggests that Nietzsche moves from the affective to the secular view as two stages in the coming to consciousness of nihilism. However, whereas Gemes thinks that affective nihilism is the most profound form of nihilism, for Nietzsche, viewing secular nihilism as just a cognitive expression of the Christian practice of suppressing the drives, it seems to me that emphasis should be placed on the cognitive expression of nihilism as the root cause rather than just symptom of nihilism. That is, the cognitive issue is evident in the Christian's affective nihilism. This is because it is the belief that our values are grounded in another metaphysical world that leads the Christian to deny the drives. Equally, it is the disbelief in such a metaphysical world that leads to secular nihilism. Moreover, the seeds of secular nihilism are grounded in Christian nihilism because, for Nietzsche, the demise of the traditional metaphysical basis of our values results from the Christian will to truth turning on itself and revealing that the idea of a metaphysical other world is an elaborate fiction (WP, 1 KSA 12: 2 [127]), in addition to the influence of growing scientific caution and knowledge of naturalistic facts (AC, 48, 49). See Ken Gemes, 'Nietzsche and the Affirmation of Life: A Review and Dialogue with Bernard Reginster', *European Journal of Philosophy*, 16.3, December 2008, pp. 459–466, pp. 461–462. For a recent study of the varied meanings of nihilism in Nietzsche, see Jeffrey Metzger (ed.), *Nietzsche, Nihilism and the Philosophy of the Future* (London: Bloomsbury, 2013).

out with the bathwater. That is, if we are to be motivated to act according to values that do not correspond to value properties mind-independently instantiated in either a non-existent 'true' world or the actual empirical world then they must be deemed to be objective in some other way that connects and subjects them to constraint by the empirical world. This alternative account of the objectivity of our values must, therefore, be a metaphysically laden one and must reflect the fundamental relationship between mind and the empirical world. Else, Nietzsche is guilty of perpetuating the will to nothingness that informs nihilism rather than adequately responding to it. However, although the argument of the book is framed against the backdrop of the problem concerning the metaphysical status of our values bequeathed to us by nihilism, the book is about the metaphysical issue rather than about nihilism *per se*.[3] As a result, the issue of nihilism will be used to frame the metaphysical problem of value rather than the other way around and Nietzsche's response to the root metaphysical cause of nihilism will be prioritized over its broader existential, psychological and cultural dimensions.

I argue that Nietzsche's views with regard to the status of values stems from his reflection on the character of the relation between mind and world, which ultimately, in his view, must be understood to be metaphysically continuous and naturalistic by virtue of appealing to explanations that are confined within the spatio-temporal boundaries of nature and that

[3] It has been argued that Nietzsche is a theoretical rather than a practical nihilist (Nadeem J. Z. Hussain, 'Honest Illusion: Valuing for Nietzsche's Free Spirits' in Brian Leiter and Neil Sinhababu (eds.), *Nietzsche and Morality* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), pp. 157–191, p. 161). Hussain takes the distinction between two forms of nihilism from Nietzsche (WP, 4 KSA 12: 5 [71]) where theoretical nihilism entails the demise of the traditional Platonic-Christian metaphysical basis of our values and the consequent valuelessness that follows from the denial that our values can be mind-independently and non-naturalistically instantiated in reality. Practical nihilism entails the psychological responses of disorientation and despair to theoretical nihilism (see Bernard Reginster, *The Affirmation of Life: Nietzsche on Overcoming Nihilism* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006), pp. 26–28). In this study, however, I will refrain from addressing the question of whether Nietzsche is a nihilist despite the fact that he sometimes describes himself as one (WP, 25 KSA 12: 9 [123]). This is because it seems to me that Nietzsche's response to nihilism is to alter rather than accept the terms and conditions of the theoretical nihilist's world view by allowing, for example, that our values can be considered objective without being mind-independently and non-naturalistically instantiated in the 'true' world. Nietzsche's response to nihilism, as I interpret it, entails reworking from within some of its oppositional presuppositions. Moreover, theoretical nihilism, for Nietzsche, does not just entail the demise of Platonic and Judeo-Christian metaphysics, it also entails the belief in such metaphysics, which amounts to willing nothingness. I argue that Nietzsche responds to nihilism in this broader sense also by showing that our values can be objective in an alternative sense to the Platonic and Judeo-Christian nihilist. See Simon May, 'Nietzsche and the Free Self' in Ken Gemes and Simon May (eds.), *Nietzsche on Freedom and Autonomy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), pp. 89–106, pp. 100–103 for how Christianity is nihilistic on account of willing nothingness.

eschew explanations of the supernatural variety. By metaphysical continuity, then, I mean that the mind, for Nietzsche, is immersed in nature by virtue of sharing certain metaphysical features in common with nature but that it is also irreducible to it. Metaphysical continuity entails not mere correlations of events observed from the outside but rather a shared metaphysical character, which emanates from within, that is, from the essential nature of a thing. The irreducibility of the mind to nature is evident in the manner in which Nietzsche, throughout his writings, understands the mind to be immersed in but differentiated from nature by virtue of its capacity to engage in certain evaluative practices, aesthetic practices involving invention and imagination, epistemic practices involving the giving of justifications and reasons, in addition to conscious reflective practices more generally. Since to be differentiated from nature does not entail that the human mind is divorced from it, the issue of a value's objective standing, for Nietzsche, is intrinsically connected to its metaphysical continuity with the character of mind-independent, empirical, reality.

The preceding interpretation of Nietzsche is not intended to provide an exhaustive overview of his philosophy as a whole. Rather, the aim is to identify a problem, that of the metaphysical status of our values in the wake of nihilism, and to trace one thread in his writings to its logical conclusion. Accordingly, I do not claim in the manner of Heidegger, for example, that the will to power is Nietzsche's central thought, but rather, more in the manner of Karl Jaspers, my interpretation of Nietzsche is a constructive one that assembles his many perspectives in relation to value under one guiding interpretive thread.[4] But, it will surely be argued, there are problems with my attempt to follow only one thread in his writings. That is, it will be argued that even if I can make a case for the feasibility of a metaphysically laden account of the objectivity of our values as a response to nihilism, we cannot simply ignore the fact that Nietzsche himself sometimes denies that our values are objective. That is, it may be argued that despite the fact that Nietzsche often articulates value judgements about, for example, the inferiority of some value systems over others, he nonetheless, at times, holds that all our values are, metaphysically speaking, fictions. My aim is not to deny that a fictionalist interpretation of Nietzsche poses problems for my particular account of the objectivity of our values. Rather, my strategy is to address the issue head-on by conceding that Nietzsche sometimes presents himself as a fictionalist but that to the extent that he does so he must fail to

[4] Karl Jaspers, *Nietzsche: An Introduction to the Understanding of His Philosophical Activity*, trans. F. J. Schmitz (London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1977), pp. 3–4.

offer an adequate response to the problem of nihilism. Moreover, I will contend that although there is evidence of alternative views in Nietzsche, the metaphysically laden one that I highlight and follow to its logical conclusion is potentially feasible even if it is not necessarily Nietzsche's only possible response and, moreover, that the terms and conditions of what would constitute a feasible response emerges from reflection on why other possible responses such as fictionalism ultimately fail. For example, I will argue that if our values are fictions, then they are cut off from the metaphysical character of the natural world contrary to Nietzsche's aim to return the human being back to nature by way of rejecting the old metaphysical view that the human being is other than nature (BGE, 230), a view that is at the root of the problem of nihilism. Yet, if he is to avoid reducing the human being to the natural world in the manner of those he describes as bungling naturalists (BGE, 12), he needs to allow that values fundamentally pertain to and reflect the concerns of human beings and do not merely mirror value properties independently instantiated in the world. Nietzsche, therefore, needs to provide an account of value that is neither metaphysically realist, on the one hand, nor subjectively idealist, on the other. That is, values do not correspond to value properties residing in the natural world independently of human beings, but neither are they simply reducible to the wishes and interests of human beings without further constraint.

Now, one might argue that this constraint can be of the purely intersubjective and metaphysically neutral kind. This intersubjective constraint might be thought to stem from the rule-governed character of language[5] or from the character of shared human consciousness itself,[6] or indeed it might stem from mere pragmatic agreement.[7] But appealing to such intersubjective constraints situates Nietzsche's account of value in various and different ways in the idealist camp and fails to account for the manner in which our values are, for him, metaphysically continuous with nature by virtue of the human being's immersion in it. A possible rejoinder might claim such an explanation is not forthcoming on the basis that Nietzsche holds that whilst there are aspects of the human being that can be explained naturalistically we also have higher – 'unnatural' – cognitive capacities that

[5] See Simon Blackburn's arguments for 'quasi-realism' in Simon Blackburn, *Essays in Quasi-Realism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993).

[6] See J. N. Findlay, *Values and Intentions* (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd. and New York: The Macmillan Company, 1961).

[7] See Richard Rorty, *Truth and Progress: Philosophical Papers, Volume 3* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp. 43–63, and Rorty's 'Response to Putnam' in Robert Brandom (ed.), *Rorty and His Critics* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2000), pp. 87–91.

are incapable of the same naturalistic explanation. However, such a response is simply a refusal to answer the question. Whilst it is true that Nietzsche appeals to such higher capacities, such as our capacity for self-awareness, for providing justifications for our beliefs and for forming value judgements, it is not correct to say that they must be *sui generis*.[8] Rather, what Nietzsche needs to argue is that our values reflect the interests and concerns of human beings but that they can be understood to be metaphysically continuous with the character of the mind-independent world such that our values reflect the manner in which the mind and world fundamentally interact. Such a focus also allows Nietzsche to distinguish between objective and non-objective values according to the extent to which those values reflect and are constrained by the character of the mind-independent empirical world. However, by virtue of being metaphysically continuous, the relation between our evaluative practices and the mind-independent world should not, for Nietzsche, be understood dualistically. Rather, the relationship is one of reciprocal metaphysical engagement that is made possible by the degree of the evaluating agent's activity in the world and the normative receptivity of the world to this activity.

Nietzsche's argument here is prescient and is of philosophical significance beyond the confines of historical scholarship. In particular, it is of interest to those concerned with the issue of how to reconcile naturalism and normativity. Specifically, Nietzsche can be seen to remedy a deficiency in some contemporary attempts to forge such a reconciliation. As Joseph Rouse notes, there is a general tendency, even amongst those who aim to treat normativity naturalistically in contemporary debates, to describe the natural and the normative as parallel rather than intra-acting domains. Despite his praise for the arguments of Robert Brandom and John Haugeland, for example, regarding questions of naturalism and normativity, Rouse argues that a broader conception of naturalism is needed to overcome the residual dualism and voluntarism that he detects in the arguments of his contemporaries. Rouse contends that this residual dualism and voluntarism is evident in their respective tendencies to view the constraint exerted by the world on our normative practices in terms of a constraint by a normatively inert and scientistically characterized world. According to Rouse, Brandom and Haugeland are correct to want to avoid reducing our normative commitments to mere desires on the part of

[8] See John McDowell, *Mind and World* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996), pp. xxii, 67, 74, 89, 110.

human valuers by viewing those commitments as constrained by the world. However, Rouse contends that this claim can be properly secured only if we appreciate that the world does not exert a constraint by virtue of being dualistically separate and apart from our evaluative practices. Rouse writes that '[t]hey are right to see meaning and action as intelligible only as accountable to something not under the agent's own control'.[9] However, he contends that, as a result of the tendency to view the world as normatively inert, 'what Brandom and Haugeland have both shown is that commitments and desires could only be contentful and binding if they were accountably beholden to something outside of themselves. In the end, their own projects once again show how distinctions between meanings and things, norms and causes, subjects and objects can become dichotomies whose components cannot be intelligibly related to one another'.[10] Rouse also targets McDowell with the charge of dualism despite the latter's denial that the natural and the normative are mutually exclusive.[11] The sceptre of dualism raises its head, according to Rouse, in McDowell's presentation of what he calls the reason-giving sphere of second nature as operating parallel to the sphere of first nature whilst eschewing any account of how the two spheres are ultimately connected.[12] As we shall see, Nietzsche, in some respects, pre-empts Rouse's response to these contemporary accounts that what we mean by naturalism needs to be broadened to include the human evaluative point of view.

Whilst I will argue that Nietzsche ultimately has the conceptual resources to avoid the dualism of some contemporary approaches, it results from some wrong turns taken on his part but which he ultimately corrects. I argue that both these wrong turns and corrections come through a very particular historical route, specifically Nietzsche's engagement with Kant's epistemology and metaphysics and ultimately, and through Kant, with Hume's philosophy of value. It will be seen that Nietzsche's account of how values reflect the manner in which the human being is immersed in but irreducible to nature does not come metaphysically cheap but rather entails a commitment on his

[9] Joseph Rouse, *How Scientific Practices Matter: Reclaiming Philosophical Naturalism* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2002), p. 257.
[10] Ibid., pp. 257–258. [11] McDowell, *Mind and World*, p. xix.
[12] McDowell writes that '[h]uman life, our natural way of being, is already shaped by meaning. We need not connect this natural history to the realm of law any more tightly than by simply affirming our right to the notion of second nature' (ibid., p. 95). Contrary to McDowell, Rouse contends that second nature permeates first nature (Rouse, *How Scientific Practices Matter*, p. 103). And, rather than view Wilfrid Sellars's realm of natural causes captured by science as an 'appendage to the meaningful human world', Rouse contends that what Sellars describes as the manifest image of human normativity and meaning permeates the scientific image (ibid., p. 98).

part to the metaphysics of the will to power. Since the status of this thesis is a controversial one in the Nietzsche literature, effort will be made to demonstrate the rationale informing the thesis and to put to bed concerns about it being a 'silly' and 'crackpot metaphysics'.[13]

The argument developed in the book will employ a combination of historical and rational reconstruction where the former ultimately serves the ends of the latter. Nietzsche himself alerts us to the fact that he employs various historical figures as representatives of views or philosophical positions that he endorses or rejects (EH, 'Why I Am So Wise', 7). The philosophical history gives us a sense of the historical roots to the philosophical problem that perplexes Nietzsche and frames his response to the problem. However, historical explanations alone cannot provide an assessment of the overall philosophical merits or demerits of Nietzsche's arguments. Rational reconstruction of his arguments will therefore be deployed to assess their general philosophical cogency. The principal historical lens employed in the book will be Nietzsche's engagement with Kant's epistemology and metaphysics, which, it will be argued, ultimately gives us insight into the reasons why Nietzsche sometimes sounds like a Humean fictionalist but ultimately isn't and shouldn't be. Nietzsche's account of the metaphysical status of human values reflects his engagement with Kant's idealism as a way of understanding the relation between mind and world. This engagement is ultimately a critical one that sees Nietzsche adopt a specifically non-Humean metaphysical account of the world and, in the end, a non-Humean account of value. However, these conclusions are drawn from implications that follow from Nietzsche's engagement with Kant's idealism rather than from Nietzsche's adoption of an explicitly non-Humean stance.

There is a generally held view amongst Nietzsche commentators that Nietzsche's epistemology and metaphysics of value are shaped by Hume rather than Kant. The rationale informing this view is that Nietzsche's naturalism aligns him with empiricism rather than with philosophical idealism. Consequently, it is generally thought that when Nietzsche engages with Kant, that engagement focuses on a rejection of the moral implications of Kant's appeal to the thing-in-itself and particular formalistic conceptions of agency.[14] The implications of Nietzsche's rejection of

[13] Brian Leiter, 'Nietzsche's Naturalism Reconsidered' in *The Oxford Handbook of Nietzsche*, Ken Gemes and John Richardson (eds.) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), pp. 576–598, p. 594.

[14] See, for example, Paul Katsafanas, *Agency and the Foundations of Ethics: Nietzschean Constitutivism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013); Garrath Williams, 'Nietzsche's Response to Kant's Morality', *The Philosophical Forum*, 30.3, 1999, pp. 201–216.

Kant on these issues, the dominant view goes, is his adoption of a Humean-inspired naturalism.[15] As a result, it is generally thought that when Nietzsche proposes views that suggest that values are metaphysical fictions, he does so because of the influence of Hume rather than Kant. I will contend that whilst there are certain philosophical overlaps between Nietzsche and Hume, Nietzsche's engagement with Hume is mediated by his critical reflections on Kant's epistemology and metaphysics. Thus, for example, when Nietzsche writes like a fictionalist about value, his fictionalism is not a straight-forward appropriation of Hume's argument but rather is complicated by his engagement with what he views as Kant's account of the aesthetic relation between mind and world. My aim is to focus on how Nietzsche's critical reflections on Kant's idealism draw our attention to a non-Humean account of metaphysics and value. This methodology is justified by the fact that there is no evidence that Nietzsche read Hume directly[16] and whilst the extent to which he read Kant directly is disputed,[17] it remains the case, as R. Kevin Hill notes, that

[15] See Maudemarie Clark, 'On Knowledge, Truth and Value: Nietzsche's Debt to Schopenhauer and the Development of His Empiricism' in Christopher Janaway (ed.), *Willing and Nothingness: Schopenhauer as Nietzsche's Educator* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998), pp. 37–78. She writes that Nietzsche adopts Hume's fact-value distinction, which he interprets in terms of an error theory of value in HAH although in GS he interprets it as the claim that the world of value is a human creation but not necessarily an error (ibid., p. 68). Although Clark later revises her account of Nietzsche on value to adopt the Spirean distinction between causes and reasons, it is nonetheless clear that the general 'Humean' flavour to her account of Nietzsche persists despite her acknowledgement that 'we presently have little evidence that Nietzsche actually read Hume . . . ' (ibid., p. 68). The Humean flavour of her interpretation persists because she contends that Spir acts as a valuable resource for Nietzsche's knowledge of the British empiricist tradition and that to the extent that Spir provides Nietzsche with a critical insight into that tradition, the insight comes in the form of an awareness of the need to distinguish between physical causes, which simply are, and the normative reason-giving role of judgement (Maudemarie Clark and David Dudrick, 'The Naturalisms of *Beyond Good and Evil*' in Keith Ansell Pearson (ed.), *A Companion to Nietzsche* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2006), pp. 148–168, p. 161).

[16] Clark, 'On Knowledge, Truth and Value', p. 68.

[17] There is a divergence of opinion on this issue. For example, R. Kevin Hill argues that Nietzsche read Kant's texts directly. His evidence for this is the fact that Nietzsche cites all three of Kant's *Critiques* in addition to a pre-critical text, *Universal Natural History and Theory of the Heavens*, at various points throughout his writings (*Nietzsche's Critiques: The Kantian Foundations of His Thought* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2003), p. 20). Thomas Brobjer makes a similar claim in relation to Nietzsche's acquaintance with Kant's third *Critique* (*Nietzsche's Philosophical Context: An Intellectual Biography*, Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 2008, pp. 36–39, 48, 195, 202, 226–227). Tom Bailey, however, pointing to the fact that Nietzsche seems never to have owned or borrowed a copy of any of Kant's texts, suggests that Nietzsche's acquaintance with Kant was mediated through secondary sources, such as Kuno Fischer's commentary on Kant, *Immanuel Kant und seine Lehre* (Tom Bailey, 'Nietzsche the Kantian' in Ken Gemes and John Richardson (eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Nietzsche* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), pp. 134–159). Thus, the fact that Nietzsche quotes from Kant's texts does not support the view that Nietzsche actually read those texts directly. However, since my aim is to examine how Nietzsche's understanding of Kant influences his